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Chapter I 
GENERAL PROBLEMS. Words, Words, Words 
1.1. Introduction 
Surprisingly enough, the term l e x i c o l o g y is not to be found in most medium-
sized dictionaries and in various handbooks (e.g. LYONS 1977) and English 
grammars (with the exception of the L o n g m a n D i c t i o n a r y of C o n t e m p o r a r y 
E n g l i s h (LDCE) 21987 and Quirk et al. 1985). Only l e x i c o g r a p h y , explained 
as 'dictionary-making* or 'the writing and making of dictionaries', is usually 
mentioned. Apparently this situation is now changing.1 L e x i c o l o g y might be 
defined as the study of the l e x i c o n or l e x i s (specified as the vocabulary or total 
stock of words of a language). L D C E 21987 has the following entry: 
lexicology ... n [U] tech the study of the meaning and uses of words. 
What is most important, however, is that in lexicology the stock of words or 
lexical items is not simply regarded as a list of isolated elements. Lexicologists 
try to find out generalizations and regularities and especially consider relations 
between elements (see chapters n and IV). Lexicology is therefore concerned 
with structures, not with a mere agglomeration of words (cf. Jackson 1988: 
222). 
In order to illustrate this approach I wi l l draw on some entries from 
dictionaries and use as a starting point a remark made by Fillmore (1978:167f.) 
in his article "On the Organization of Semantic Information in the Lexicon". 
Discussing the characteristics of the language of law, he points out: 
The difference between j a i l and prison in many states is determined by the duration 
of the incarceration ... less than one year, it's a jail; a year or more, it's a prison. 
So in the legal language of some parts of the United States the two lexical 
items j a i l and p r i s o n could be said to be differentiated by a distinctive feature 
[over/under one year]. In other areas and in ordinary language, the two words 
seem to be largely synonymous. 
A relation of synonymy also seems to hold in the following quotations from 
two dictionaries, where one item (namely j a i l ) is defined in terms of the other 
Cf. the title of the new Oxford Studies in Lexicography and Lexicology, and 
Jackson (1988:239 ff.) with the chapter 16 "Lexicology, Lexicography and 
Semantics" containing an extensive discussion of Ullmann's view of lexicology 
as a branch or "basic division of linguistic science". See also diagram (1) p. 
6. It is perhaps significant that lexicology is not contained in the Lancaster-
Oslo-Bergen (LOB) Corpus of contemporary British English. 
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(namely p r i s o n ) . Let us first look at a partial quotation (slightly modified) from 
the revised L D C E 21987: 
Jail1 II also Gaol B r E ... n ... a place where criminals are kept as part of their 
punishment; prison 
Jail 2 II also Gaol B r E - v [T] to put in jail ... 
Jailbird ... n infinl a person who has spent a lot of time in prison 
Jailbreak ... n an escape from prison ... 
Jailer ... n esp. old use a person who is in charge of a prison or prisoners 
A number of interesting relations can be found in these entries between lexical 
items and also some of their constituents. Obviously, there are variants of items, 
too, and it is interesting to see, how these are treated in another dictionary. I 
will only give a short excerpt from the C o n c i s e Oxford D i c t i o n a r y of C u r r e n t 
E n g l i s h (COD 1982): 
Gaol ... Jail, n . y & v. t. (G- in official use, G- and J- in literary use, J- inU.S). 1. 
n . public prison for detention of persons committed by process of law; confinement 
in this, ... 2. v. t. put in gaol ... 
For the L D C E j a i l is the normal variant, and the British English (BrE) g a o l is 
the marked option. For the COD the American variant is the marked one, and 
further distinctions are drawn concerning official and literary use. 
Another interesting difference is the treatment of the distinction between the 
noun and the formally identical verb in the two dictionaries. In the L D C E j a i l , 
noun, and j a i l , verb, are considered as homonyms and distinguished by raised 
numbers.2 In the COD, however, g a o l is treated as one lexical entry with two 
meanings, and we therefore have a relationship of polysemy. 
Synonymy and homonymy are counted among paradigmatic lexical relations 
(see 4.2.), since the lexical items so related stand in a relationship of opposition 
or contrast to each other. Polysemy is a relationship internal to a lexical entry 
or word (see 3.1., 4.2.1.). But we may also say that j a i l v and j a i l 2 are 
derivationally connected and that j a i l 2 is a denominal verb derived from the 
noun j a i l y We are then concerned with word-formation processes (see 3.2.). 
This could be justified by pointing out that the meaning of the verb necessarily 
contains the meaning of the noun, and that the latter is included in the 
paraphrase 'to put in j a i l \ Since the derivation is not formally expressed by a 
suffix, it is customary to speak in such cases of zero-derivation (see 3.2.2.). 
That this specific pattern is a productive word-formative process can be seen 
from examples such as t o b a g , t o b o t t l e , t o box, t o dock, and t o k e n n e l 
There are also the synonymous verbs t o i m p r i s o n and t o i n c a r c e r a t e 'to 
imprison' (LDCE). The latter is marked as "formal" (fml) in the L D C E and 
"literal or figurative" in the COD. Only the COD gives a further zero-derived 
verb t o p r i s o n 'imprison', labelled "poetical or dialect". Here, a so-called 'zero-
In the following replaced by subscripts, in order to avoid confusion with the 
raised numbers for footnotes. 
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morpheme'3 (usually symbolized as 0) may be postulated (see 3.2.2.), since an 
overt derivational suffix (parallel to - a t e ) is missing which expresses the mea-
ning elements 'put into'. To i m p r i s o n may be analysed as a prefixal deriva-
tive, a zero-derivative with a prefix, or a zero-derivative with a discontinuous 
morpheme representable as: i m l p r i s o n l o ^ 'to put (= 0) into (= im) prison'. 
It should be obvious from these examples that the use of such 'labels' (e.g. 
f m l ) , for indicating limitations of usage, is far from identical in the two 
dictionaries (see 2.2.5.). For example the L D C E makes many more and finer 
distinctions with regard to regional varieties of English. It is also clear that 
the use of an item in legal language may be very different from the use of 
the same item when labelled i n / m l . We will have a closer look at the varieties 
of English later (see 1.3.). However, it should be stressed here that lexical 
variation and the restriction of items to specific varieties must not be neglected 
in lexicology, as has so often been the case in the past. 
The relevance of syntagmatic lexical relations can also be seen from the 
above examples (see 4.3.). Here elements are not contrasted or substituted for 
each other, but combined. This is the case with j a i l and b i r d which yield the 
so-called compound j a i l b i r d . The second constituent has to be understood 
metaphorically (see 3.4.2.). This is not at all unusual, since animal names are 
often transferred to human beings (cf. assf goose, f o x , r a t ) . Furthermore, b i r d 
in slang can denote a girl or woman, and in informal language also a male 
person (e.g. He's a dear o l d b i r d ) . Only the COD also gives the synonymous 
p r i s o n b i r d (cf. Ger G a l g e n v o g e l ) . 
The next syntagma j a i l b r e a k can either be interpreted as a regular 
compound, since the second constituent may stand for the whole combination 
in the sense 'escape from prison'. It could also be regarded as a so-called 
pseudo-compound, with a 'zero-morpheme', analysable as j a i l / b r e a k / 0 - parallel 
to the overt derivation p r i s o n l b r e a k l i n g which also means 'escape from prison'. 
There is also a syntagmatic relationship between j a i l and the suffix -er in 
j a i l e r . The same systematic relationship is to be found in the combination of 
the synonym p r i s o n and the identical suffix -er, resulting in p r i s o n e r . However, 
p r i s o n e r is 'a person kept in a prison' (LDCE), not one 'in charge of a prison'. 
From the point of view of the system of the language, it could equally well 
be the other way round, namely that the j a i l e r was inside and the p r i s o n e r 
outside the prison. Basically, the suffix only denotes someone who has 
something to do with what is denoted by the derivative base. In my opinion, 
the fact that specific irregular meanings have become customary in a language 
can best be captured with the concept of 'norm' in the sense of Coseriu (see 
3.2.5.). With regard to the results of word-formation processes the concept of 
'lexicalization' can also be profitably used in this respect (see 3.2.5.). 
3 This is a lexicalized technical term which should actually be replaced by zero-
allomorph (cf. BuBmann 21990). 
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Before starting a thorough discussion of paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
lexical relations4 - which presupposes a detailed investigation of the nature of 
the linguistic sign and of the internal structure of words - we must have a 
look at some general problems. These concern the general notion of the 
structure of the English 'lexicon', the problem of varieties of English, and a 
survey of the most important dictionaries of English. 
1.2. The Structure of the English Lexicon 
In what sense can we say that the 'lexicon' of English is structured, or has 
s t r u c t u r e ! What does l e x i c o n mean in the technical sense in which it is used 
here? Why do we not simply speak of the v o c a b u l a r y of English? What does 
one understand by l e x i c a l s t r u c t u r e ! 
In her book M o d e r n E n g l i s h S t r u c t u r e Barbara Strang (*1968:215) makes 
the following remark: 
While grammar is the domain of systems, lexis is the domain of vast lists of formal 
items about which rather little generalization can be made. 
Although it is true that, historically speaking, the vocabulary of a language is 
an accumulation of words, I would claim - against Strang - that it is not merely 
a list of items. It is certainly possible to make a number of important generalizations. 
The 'lexicon' is not simply an inventory of unconnected, isolated elements, but 
it definitely has a structure. There are various types of relations and connections 
between the elements (see 4.2. and 4.3.) and we may establish (at least partial) 
regularities and recognize clear, i f partly incomplete, patterns (cf. Jackson 
1988:243f.). 
If we consider language as a system of signs, or, following Saussure, as a 
structure of interdependent elements, then we may distinguish at least two types 
of structure in the 'lexicon': external (to the word) and internal structure. Full 
words may substitute for each other, i.e. be in opposition, or they may combine 
with each other. Such paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations constitute external 
structure (see ch. 4). We may also look at the internal structure of lexical items, 
which are either morphologically complex (such as compounds, or prefixal and 
suffixal derivatives) or simple (see ch. HI). In the last case, although there is 
no superficial, morphological regularity visible, we may nevertheless find and 
postulate underlying semantic structure. 
Such a structuralist approach, in the sense of Saussure, however, has serious 
limitations. It is restricted to purely language-immanent relationships. Thus, it 
Loosely defined here as the substitution or association and the combination of 
words; see 4.2. and 4.3. and cf. Jackson (1988:96, 244), Carter (1987:158). In 
Lyons (1981:91) the terms substitutional and combinatorial (relations) are 
introduced as equivalents for the Saussurean paradigmatic and syntagmatic. 
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abstracts from and cannot capture certain so-called pragmatic factors, which 
have been rediscovered in recent linguistics (cf. Lipka 1975a). For example a 
language-immanent approach cannot account for certain metaphorical and 
metonymic relationships in the lexicon (see 3.4.2.). We will return to these 
aspects in connection with the various models of the linguistic sign and also 
elsewhere. 
L e x i c o n is defined in the L D C E (4978) as 
a dictionary, esp. of an ancient language 
and in the COD (61976) as 
dictionary, esp. of Greek, Hebrew, Syriac, or Arabic; (fig.) vocabulary of a person, 
of a language, of a branch of knowledge, etc. 
Obviously, the first definition is rather narrow and does not cover the way I 
have used l e x i c o n so far. The second part of the definition in the COD comes 
close to it (but cf. L D C E 21987); the first part, containing the synonym 
d i c t i o n a r y , is not of much use. 
Two things should be pointed out here: both terms, l e x i c o n and d i c t i o n a r y , 
have been used as technical terms in the literature, and there is no single 
"correct" use of l e x i c o n or d i c t i o n a r y . To take up the last point first, I claim 
that such words are "notational terms". I here follow Enkvist (1973:17), who 
points out that s t y l e "is a notational term rather than a linguistic prime" and 
can be defined differently in different frameworks. Within the theory of 
transformational-generative grammar (or TG), Chomsky, Katz, and Weinreich 
have used d i c t i o n a r y in different ways (cf. Lipka 1972:37, 84 f.). Weinreich 
even postulates a distinction between a "simplex dictionary" and a "complex 
dictionary". 
In the following, I will use l e x i c o n in two senses that are not always sharply 
distinguished: a) for a metalinguistic level, or a subcomponent in a linguistic 
model (basically compatible with a variety of theories of language); and b) in 
the sense of vocabulary as seen from a systematic, synchronic point of view. 
I will deal with the two aspects in turn. Let me first illustrate sense a) with 
the analogy of the following position of l e x i c o l o g y in the classical structuralist 
model in Ullmann's P r i n c i p l e s of Semantics (21957:39) here reproduced as 
diagram (1). The justified criticism of the model voiced in Jackson (1988: 
241 ff.) may be disregarded for our purposes. It is certainly true that lexicology 
must include both the study of individual words and their structure (see ch. 
Ill) and of the overall structure of the vocabulary as a whole (see ch. IV), 
and that it cannot describe either from a purely formal point of view, without 
considering semantic aspects and relations. 
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(i) 
Phonology 
Lexicology 
Syntax 
Morpho- Scman-
logy tics 
In this three-dimensional linguistic model, 5 l e x i c o l o g y , as the discipline 
concerned with lexis or the lexicon, is represented as a level in between 
phonology and syntax. A l l three levels, phonology, lexicology, and syntax are 
subsystems of the entire language system. They may be described at a particular 
point in time, i.e. synchronically, or in their historical evolution, i.e. dia-
chronically. Phonology, which is concerned with the sound system of the 
language, has a formal, but no semantic aspect.6 Lexicology has both a 
morphological and a semantic dimension, and both may be regarded from a 
diachronic or a synchronic point of view. The same holds for syntax, which is 
concerned with larger linguistic units. Ullmann (21957 :31) explicitly relates the 
distinction between "morphology" and "semantics" to the duality of form and 
meaning and to Saussure's "signifiant" and "signifi6" (see 2.1.1.). 
He clearly states that his diagram is only a possible representation of the 
various disciplines of linguistics and their interrelation. Here the lexicon is an 
organic and essential part of a structuralist model. In generative grammar both 
the status of the lexicon as a component as well as its scope are rather 
controversial. In particular, there is a controversy between the so-called "lexi-
calists" and the "transformationalists" (cf. Lipka 1975:207-209, Kastovsky 
1982a: 220 ff). The former argue for a very comprehensive lexicon that contains 
as a list not only simple words and idiomatic expressions but also compounds 
and derivatives. According to the transformationalists (whose position Chomsky 
Cf. also the three-dimensional "language block" (Sprachklotz) for the represen-
tation of the levels, historical stages, and varieties of the English language 
used in Bald (1988: 129). 
This view obviously disregards onomatopoeia and attitudinal meaning related to 
prosody. 
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himself had shared in early TG), complex words are derived by a productive 
mechanism of so-called "transformations". Such complex lexical items therefore 
need not be separately listed in the lexicon. 
The second sense b) of l e x i c o n , with stress on the systematic and synchronic 
point of view, distinguishes my approach from other descriptions of the 
vocabulary of English. Naturally, to adopt such different perspectives is perfectly 
legitimate. As an example of such a different view of the English word-stock 
I will briefly mention Manfred Scheler's (1977) D e r E n g l i s c h e W o r t s c h a t z . The 
author is mainly concerned with the following points: the etymological 
heterogeneity of the English vocabulary (as his most important focus), the 
problem of the mixing of languages with its causes and consequences, and 
finally specific forms of the English vocabulary and its stratification. His 
approach is therefore primarily historical, and it is partly based on the results 
of the C h r o n o l o g i c a l E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y (CED) by Finkenstaedt, Leisi and 
Wolff (1970).7 There is no comparable full-scale treatment of the word-stock 
of English by a British or American author (but cf. Baugh/Cable 1978, esp. 
ch. 4.7.8. and 10). 
I will draw in the following on the approach to the vocabulary of English 
in Ernst Leisi's C1985) book D a s h e u t i g e E n g l i s c h . There are two relevant 
chapters namely n , "Der gemischte Wortschatz", on the mixed vocabulary, and 
V , "Die Schichtung des Englischen", on the stratification of English. Leisi's 
treatment can be characterized as a synchronic description on a historical basis. 
He distinguishes various historical strata and deals with the consequences of 
language-contact. In chapter V he discusses a purely synchronic star-shaped 
model of the stratification of the English vocabulary (see diagram (2) p. 10), 
based on a diagram in the S h o r t e r Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y (SOED). Common 
etymological origin and period of adopting loanwords, as well as stylistic strati-
fication (in a wide sense of s t y l e ) result in groups or categories of words and 
thus permit generalizations and impose a sort of structure on the vocabulary. 
According to Leisi, contemporary English is a unique mixture of Germanic 
and Romance elements and this mixing has resulted in the international 
character of the vocabulary. Its great richness allows far finer differentiation 
in comparison with other languages. For example German T i e r corresponds to 
either a n i m a l or beast in English. Wagen can be rendered by a series of English 
translations, such as c a r , c a r t , c a r r i a g e , and c h a r i o t . As equivalents of 
nachdenken or i i b e r l e g e n , English has t h i n k , r e f l e c t , m e d i t a t e , p o n d e r , and 
c o g i t a t e . Clearly, the structure of the vocabulary is different in both languages.8 
7 Cf. Jackson (1988: 242 f.) where this dictionary is mentioned as an example of 
a practical answer to lexicology's legitimate question about the overall structu-
re of the vocabulary. Its early use of computational methods is also stressed. 
8 But cf. Farrell (31977:vii): "The fact that German lacks terms of such wide 
application as 'take', 'way', 'leave', 'keep', 'power' (to mention only a few of 
the more notorious), and must therefore use specific terms, perhaps to a 
greater extent than even French G. Pascoe is of the opinion that German 
7 
This is also true for the negative consequences of the mixing of languages. 
Leisi treats these under the headings "Dissoziation" and "hard words". 
"Dissoziation" (dissociation) describes the phenomenon that words are unrelated 
or not associated with each other, which is typical of English as opposed to 
German. Thus for example in German mündlich and Dreifuß are related 
("vergesellschaftet" or "konsoziiert") to M u n d , d r e i , and Fuß. The English 
equivalents o r a l and t r i p o d , however, are completely unrelated to m o u t h , t h r e e , 
and f o o t . Other examples of the dissociation of the English vocabulary are 
a p p e n d i x , as opposed to B l i n d d a r m , h i p p o p o t a m u s as opposed to Nilpferd or 
Flußpferd, and s y r i n g e as opposed to S p r i t z e . 
Leisi (71985:68 f.) uses the term h a r d w o r d s (following a tradition in English 
lexicography) for words of Latin or Greek origin that pose problems for those 
ignorant of classical languages. This may lead to more or less funny mistakes 
and erroneous use, so-called malapropisms. Thus, for example e p i t a p h and 
e p i t h e t may be easily confused as well as i l l i t e r a t e and i l l e g i t i m a t e . A l l e g o r y , 
a l l i g a t o r , and a t h e i s t are further examples. Besides social consequences of such 
difficulties Leisi also sees change of meaning as a result of the problem of 
hard words.9 
It is certainly true that all languages are mixtures to a greater or lesser 
extent. Comparing English to German and French, however, Leisi 0985 :58 ) 
comes to the conclusion that the present-day English vocabulary is unique in 
this respect.10 
A brief look at the various historical strata may perhaps not be out of place. 
Through cultural contact with the Romans, partly already on the Continent, and 
also through the influence of Christianity, a very early stratum of Latin-Greek 
words entered the language. This origin is no longer felt by the normal speaker 
today in words such as d i s h , cheese, m i n t , p o u n d , d e v i l . The same holds for 
some Scandinavian words from about the loth century that today belong to 
the central core of the vocabulary. This means that their frequency is very high. 
The stratum contains: they, t h e m , t h e i r , sky, s k i n , s k i l l , i l l , d i e , cast, and t a k e . 
They partly supersede a number of Old English words such as heofon 'sky, 
heaven', steorfan 'die', and n i m a n 'take'. 
A more radical change and profound influence on the English vocabulary 
occurred in the wake of the Norman conquest of 1066. Until the 15th century 
a great number of French words were adopted that belonged especially to the 
areas of court, state, law, and church (another possible generalization) such as: 
s o v e r e i g n , c o u n t r y , m i n i s t e r , p a r l i a m e n t , n o b l e , h o n o u r , j u s t i c e , r e l i g i o n , s e r v i c e , 
has more "generalisation gaps" than English, which cause German learners 
usage-problems, since they lack what he calls "the small wide words of 
English", e.g. box, p u l l , move, get, stop. 
9 Some of the examples he gives are: sensible, pathetic, emergency, premises, 
realize, and for recent shifts of meaning: a l i b i , a l l e r g i c , facility. 
1 0 G. Pascoe justly points out that Persian and Japanese are certainly similar, 
with a native "base" plus a huge admixture of words from another source 
even less closely related than in English. 
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v i r t u e , v i c e , p i t y , beauty and also p r e a c h , a r c h , and chaste. The influx was 
strongest before 1400 but continued up to the 17th century. 
These early words are distinguished from later French loans, such as 
c h a m p a g n e and m a c h i n e , by phonological peculiarities of the latter, namely the 
pronunciation [j] instead of [tj]. In Leisi 's 0985:60) opinion the adoption of 
French words at various times prepared the ground for the invasion of learned 
words of Latin and Greek origin during the humanistic period. 
We mentioned before that as a positive result of the mixing of languages, 
the possibility of distinguishing fine nuances of meaning arises. Leisi 0 9 8 5 : 
68) points out that the distinction between m a n l y , m a s c u l i n e , m a l e , v i r i l e is 
not parallel to that between w o m a n l y , w o m a n i s h , f e m a l e , f e m i n i n e . It must be 
added that it is impossible to capture the exact differences of meaning, unless 
we consider the combining potential of these words, the so-called collocations 
(see 4.3.5.). Thus, for example, m a s c u l i n e can be combined with s t y l e , w o m a n , 
and p r o n o u n , but m a l e cannot. 
We have so far considered various historical strata in the English vocabulary. 
In contrast to this analysis on the basis of etymological criteria, we will now 
look at the synchronic stratification of English. Although Leisi speaks of 
'stratum' ("Schichtung") in this context, this is perhaps not a very fortunate 
term. It would be better to speak of areas or zones, since s t r a t u m implies the 
existence of various horizontal levels on top of each other. For the structure 
of the vocabulary discussed in the following, the metaphors of circles or zones, 
however, seem more appropriate. We can establish a relatively clear-cut centre 
or core. The peripheries, however, are rather vague and fuzzy. The zones also 
overlap and penetrate mutually in various ways. This is related to the problem 
of varieties of English, which we will discuss in greater detail later. 
The simple image of stratum may have some justification in the explanation 
of sociolectal differences in the vocabulary. Sociologists often do not only speak 
of classes, but also of strata and social stratification. How difficult it is to reach 
general and permanent agreement in this field can be seen from a concrete 
example mentioned in Leisi's book 0985 :182) . In 1954, Alan S.C. Ross 
introduced a distinction between two kinds of words in British English: U (for 
upper class) vs. n o n - U (for non-upper class), which were said to be linguistic 
"class-indicators". For example he labelled i l l , c y c l e , m i r r o r , dentures as "non-
U " , while sick, b i k e , l o o k i n g - g l a s s , f a l s e teeth were claimed to be " U " . The 
distinction between U and n o n - U soon became part of the public consciousness 
in Britain and the whole business quickly developed into a sort of party game. 
The linguistic situation was already changed by the heated discussion itself and 
by the eagerness of many people to be considered as (/-speakers. There was a 
revival of the U vs. n o n - U debate around 1979. What is more important, how-
ever, than discussing further individual examples, is to realize that the simple 
image of two distinct layers or strata in society and language is far too 
simplistic. Reality is far more complex, as we will see when discussing varieties 
of English in 1.3. Furthermore, there is often an interrelationship between 
various regional, social, and situational parameters which results in the choice 
of a specific lexical item (cf. Lipka 1988a). A glance at the pair i l l l s i c k alone 
wil l show that there are crucial differences between British and American 
English, but also within each geographical variety, depending on specific 
collocations - cf. i l l n e s s , sickness, be s i c k (on the boat), s i c k l e a v e , s i c k p a r a d e 
= AmE s i c k c a l l (see 4.3.5). 
In the following I would like to give a traditional, synchronic survey of 
the structure of the English vocabulary based on a diagram given in the 
introduction to the S h o r t e r Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y (SOED 31973:x). This 
is also discussed in Leisi's book C1985 :187 f.) and should be related to the 
treatment of varieties of English in 1.3. Here is a slightly modified version of 
the original diagram: 
medium 
The representation starts out from the assumption that the vocabulary of English 
contains a large central area, which is common to all media, styles, and social 
classes. This concept of common English, symbolized by C O M M O N , is 
equivalent, with respect to the lexicon, to the "common core" treated in the 
U n i v e r s i t y G r a m m a r of E n g l i s h (Quirk/Greenbaum 1973 :1 ff.; cf. Quirk et al. 
1985:16 ff.), which is present in all varieties of English. This central area, which 
contains words like e.g. come, f a t h e r , c h a i r , g o o d , bad, v e r y , is labelled 
"Common English" by the editors of the SOED. 
Above and below we have the neighbouring areas of "Literary" and 
"Colloquial". Connected with these in a radial manner are further areas of the 
vocabulary, which are also related to each other in content, according to the 
opinion of the editors of the Oxford Dictionary. 
The literary vocabulary contains scientific, foreign and archaic words such 
as W e l t a n s c h a u u n g or b l a s i . The transition from other "literary" words such 
as f i r m a m e n t , s i m i l i t u d e , whence, w h i t h e r to the outer areas is gradual and fluid. 
On the other side "Colloquial" English contains dialectal and vulgar elements, 
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as well as words from slang and technical language. We should add that the 
term s l a n g is often used for special languages of specific groups, e.g. in a r m y 
s l a n g , p u b l i c s c h o o l s l a n g , navy s l a n g , R A F s l a n g . There are thus no clear 
boundaries between s l a n g in this sense and t e c h n i c a l l a n g u a g e . 
It is true, in general, that all categories used in this diagram have no sharp 
boundaries. Thus "Colloquial", "Slang", and "Vulgar" cannot be precisely and 
unambiguously defined. In the diagram they are consequently close neighbours. 
The areas of vocabulary denoted by them merge and interpenetrate. The radial 
lines connect the peripheral and the central areas of the vocabulary. The further 
we get to the periphery, the more we are removed from the common vocabulary 
of "Common English". 
Leisi (71985:187f.) draws attention to the fact that if we start out with 
Archaic and turn right in a circle, until we get to Foreign, we always find an 
inherent connection between the labels. Archaic words are often alive in 
dialects, dialectal and vulgar expressions both belong to popular language, etc. 
He further points out that if we draw a line through C O M M O N , this would 
divide written English above from spoken English below. Vocabulary is thus 
assigned in equal parts to the two media. 
In the following I would like to give an example of the general treatment 
of lexical structure, not restricted to the vocabulary of English. As a model 
approach, I will discuss the following schema (3), adapted from Coseriu (1970: 
166) (cf. also Coseriu/Geckeler 1981:56). He basically proposes the following 
model for describing and analysing lexical structure (with my modifications): 
(3) 
a) paradigmatic b) 
(oppositional) 
primary secondary solidarities 
[collocations) 
word-field word-formation 
"word class" (compounding & derivation) 
For the moment, the following explanation of diagram (3) should suffice. 
Paradigmatic structures 6bmpnse words which can be substituted for each other 
in a specific slot in a sentence. They necessarily belong to the same syntactic 
class (see 4.2.). Syntagmatic structures, which Coseriu labels 'solidarities' 
("Solidaritäten"), comprise the relationships between words which are 
systematically and conventionally combined in a sentence (see 4.3.). Examples 
for the latter are b l o n d and h a i r or b a r k and d o g . Coseriu distinguishes three 
types of solidarities but does not mention collocations. Word-fields (his 
"Wortfeld") are primary paradigmatic structures consisting of lexical items that 
syntagmatic 
(combinatorial) 
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share a common zone of meaning and are in direct opposition to each other 
(see 4.2.4.). "Word class" in Coseriu's sense (marked by inverted commas, here 
and in the English version of 1981 labelled 'lexical class') are classes of lexical 
items that contain the same very general semantic feature, called a 'classeme' 
("Klassem") by Coseriu (see 4.3.). Examples of such classes are animate beings, 
objects, humans, and animals. Secondary paradigmatic structures comprise the 
traditional field of word-formation (see 3.2.). 
Let us now have a closer look at the fundamental distinction between 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships in the lexicon (cf. Lipka 1972:32 f.). 
This distinction basically derives from the linear nature of linguistic substance, 
what Saussure (1916:103) called the "caractère linéaire du signifiant". This 
linearity goes back to the fact that speech sounds follow each other in time. 
Successive linguistic elements that are combined were called "syntagme" by 
Saussure. In English, both s y n t a g m a and sometimes syntagm are used as 
equivalent terms. Elements that are in opposition or contrast in the same 
position in a syntagma are said to be in a paradigmatic relationship. One can 
also say that they can be substituted for each other and form a paradigm. The 
different relationships and the resulting two dimensions may be illustrated with 
the following simple example adopted from Crystal (21985 :163): 
(4) He can -
she may 
I will 
you could 
o o 
o o 
o o 
This example only demonstrates syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations between 
words, i.e. between full linguistic signs. As we will see presently, the relations 
also obtain between larger linguistic units, such as morphemes and phonemes, 
and between higher units, such as clauses and sentences. 
As already mentioned, the distinction goes back to Ferdinand de Saussure, 
whose fundamental C o u r s de l i n g u i s t i q u e générale must now be quoted expli-
citly, Saussure, however, does not use the term "paradigmatic" but "associatif 
and speaks of "rapports associatifs". 
A paradigmatic relationship exists between linguistic units that can be 
substituted for each other in the same syntagma. These units are often said to 
be in o p p o s i t i o n . Sometimes a finer terminological d i s t i n c t i o n is made between 
o p p o s i t i o n and c o n t r a s t . In this case o p p o s i t i o n is reserved for paradigmatic 
relationships, while c o n t r a s t is only used for preceding and following elements 
in syntagmatic relation (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 22). It will be immediately obvious 
that again these are notational terms, if we consider that Lyons (1977:279) uses 
both for paradigmatic meaning relations, with c o n t r a s t being "the most general 
term" and o p p o s i t i o n denoting "dichotomous, or binary contrasts" (see 4.2.3.). 
Syntagmatic relations exist between elements of the language system that are 
go -
come 
ask 
sleep 
o 
o 
o 
tomorrow <r-
soon 
next 
now 
o 
O 
o 
-> syntagmatic 
relationships 
£ 3 
o & 
s: g 
•o a. 
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combined, i.e. that co-occur. On the lexical and syntactic level the result of 
such a combination is therefore often called s y n t a g m a , which is equivalent to 
c o n s t r u c t i o n used in American structuralism. 
Some further illustration may perhaps be useful. On the phonological level, 
the English phonemes N , I t l , and /#/ in the words p i t , pet, and p a t stand in 
paradigmatic relation, since they may be substituted for each other as in (5a). 
Each of these phonemes, however, is in syntagmatic relation with the English 
phonemes /p/ and A/ in all three words. On the lexical level the distinction 
can be illustrated as in (5b): 
(5a) pit N (5b) the old man 
pet /e/ the t a l l m a n 
pat fx/ the old w o m a n . 
The adjectives o l d and t a l l as well as the nouns man and w o m a n are in 
paradigmatic relationship. The article, the adjective, and the noun, however, are 
syntagmatically related in all three cases. The following example has been taken 
over in modified form from Leech (21981:15), who uses it for a different 
purpose:11 
(6a) They cast stones at the police 
I X 
(6b) They chucked stones at the cops 
The relation between the italicized verbs and nouns marked by vertical arrows 
is paradigmatic; the relation between the verbs and the nouns in both sentences 
(6a) and (6b), however, is a syntagmatic one. 
As a sort of summary of my general remarks on the structure of the lexicon 
let me give the following diagram representing lexical structure and relations: 
G. Pascoe rightly argues that Leech's example has certain drawbacks and in-
stead proposes: (a) The comestibles were unsatisfactory (over-formal or mock-
formal), (b) The food was poor (neutral), (c) The grub was chronic (school-
children's slang). 
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1.3. Varieties of English 
We now come to varieties of English and their relevance for the lexicon (cf. 
Quirk et al. 1985:15 ff.). We have already seen in diagram (2 that the 
vocabulary of English is far from being homogeneous. This also holes for other 
linguistic levels. It will immediately become clear that no language ipproaches 
the completely homogeneous system postulated by many linguistic tleories and 
models. 
We have noted that the vocabulary of English has a temporal dimension 
visible in its stratification through various influences at different timts. English 
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has changed so much that it is even relevant to ask whether English before 
the Norman Conquest in 1066 can be said to be the same language as modem 
English. Obviously the language of Shakespeare compared to present-day 
English shows many more correspondences and equivalents than Old English. 
Nevertheless, there are very important differences that are often overlooked, 
due to the frequent formal similarity of words. A precise analysis in many cases 
shows considerable discrepancy of meaning between words used by Shakespeare 
and formally identical contemporary words. As part of our literary heritage, 
such words and their use in famous quotations simultaneously belong to Early 
Modem English and the contemporary language. 
Besides the temporal dimension, the geographic dimension of a language 
naturally also plays a very important role. The differences between British 
English and American English immediately come to mind. I will restrict myself 
to the level of the lexicon. In many descriptions of the English language and 
in some school grammars we find pairs of lists such as the following (cf. Leisi 
71985:226, but also the illustrations in L D C E 2 s.v. house, k i t c h e n ) . 
AmE: r a i l r o a d , conductor, baggage, package, gas(oline), truck, sidewalk, as opposed 
to BrE: r a i l w a y , guard, luggage, parcel, petrol, lorry, pavement. 
It is rarely mentioned that a number of British words are perfectly acceptable 
in many areas in America. On the other hand numerous Americanisms have 
become quite familiar in Britain, due to an increase in transatlantic travel and 
the influence of broadcast media. At Heathrow Airport, for example, the signs 
read b a g g a g e not l u g g a g e . In many cases the original American flavour has 
been lost completely, especially for younger British speakers. 
Before the Second World War some Americans insisted on referring to "the 
American language" instead of "the English language in America". Today, 
nobody seriously claims that these are two different languages. Nevertheless, 
there is a grain of salt in the well-known saying by George Bernard Shaw that 
Britain and America are two nations divided by a common language. We can 
conclude that the differences between British and American English are on the 
same level as those between other varieties of English, although the two might 
be regarded as the most important "national standards". 
Basically, the assumption that language is a homogeneous system, which 
goes back to Saussure's l a n g u e , echoed in Chomsky's competence, is always 
an abstraction. The idealization is particularly evident in Chomsky's (1965:3) 
claim that linguistic theory is concerned 
with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who 
knows its language perfectly. 
As a rule, every speaker has at his or her disposal several variants of a lan-
guage, which becomes particularly apparent in phonology and the choice of 
words. Especially in times of great mobility many members of a speech com-
munity are subject to varying linguistic influences, which are most clearly 
noticeable in the vocabulary. 
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Consequently, as a rule, every single speaker has his or her very personal 
language. This language form of the single speaker is nowadays generally called 
i d i o l e c t . As opposed to this, d i a l e c t is the language form of a particular group 
of speakers. The term d i a l e c t is currently often used in a broad sense, i.e. both 
for a regional, geographical variety, as well as for a social subclass of a speech 
community (cf. Wachtler 1977:37-45). The neutral term v a r i e t y is frequently 
preferred today since it lacks the negative connotations, or shades of meaning, 
of d i a l e c t . Sometimes a tenriinological distinction is made between d i a l e c t , used 
for the regional varieties (cf. Quirk et al. 1985 :16), and s o c i a l d i a l e c t , or s o c i a l -
class d i a l e c t , for the language of a socially determined group of speakers. 
In Strang (21968:19) d i a l e c t is used for both a geographical and social sub-
section of speakers of a language, and a scale of i d i o l e c t - d i a l e c t - l a n g u a g e 
is set up. This is said to intersect with three other parameters necessary for 
the description of language variation: 1. m e d i u m , 2. social role, labelled ' s t y l e ' 
(with inverted commas to mark the technical sense), and 3. r e g i s t e r . A l l these 
5 are obviously notational terms, and it is not justified to speak of the "correct" 
defmition of r e g i s t e r . The mistaken belief that such terms only have a single 
correct definition, in my opinion, is a result of the process of 'hypostatization' 
(cf. Lipka 1975 :200, 212; 1977).12 By this term I mean, following Leisi, that 
the existence of a word implies the existence of a single entity denoted by it. 
For Strang both m e d i u m (denoting the distinction between writing and speech) 
and ' s t y l e ' depend on the user of the language (cf. 21968: 21). The third type 
of variety, r e g i s t e r , according to Strang, does not depend on the user but on 
the use of language (cf. Quirk et al. 1985:16). An example of this would be 
the lexical item d r o p g o a l in talking about rugby. According to Strang, r e g i s t e r 
is not merely a matter of lexical forms, but may also be realized by 
phonological and grammatical features. 
The distinction between "user" vs. "use of language" has a long tradition 
in British linguistics in the analysis of language variation (cf. Wachtler 1977: 
27-30). It is sometimes equated with the opposition between "dialectal 
varieties", which are relatively permanent, and "diatypic varieties", which 
depend on situations. The former can be further subdivided into diachronic, 
diatopic and diastratic varieties, according to variation in time, place, and social 
class. The diatypic varieties are often referred to as r e g i s t e r s . Halliday (1978: 
31, 35, 142 f.) and others consider r e g i s t e r as a complex notion determined by 
the three variables: 1. field, 2. t e n o r , and 3. mode of d i s c o u r s e . It is said that 
the configuration of all three variables taken together determines situation-types 
and the "context of situation". The three situational features correspond to: 1. 
subject matter plus type of social action, i.e. what is actually taking place (field), 
2. role relationships, i.e. who is taking part ( t e n o r ) , and 3. symbolic organi-
Other alternatives for mis admittedly clumsy term, such as hypostasis or 
reification, do not seem to have caught on. I believe that the reverse of the 
medal of this phenomenon is the "concept-forming power of the word" 
mentioned in Leech (M981:32). 
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zation, i.e. what part the language is playing ( m o d e ) (cf. Lipka 1988a). For 
Halliday (1978:132f., 143 f.) subject matter is only one element of field. As 
he points out, while one is engaged in gardening or playing football, one hardly 
uses words from this area. However, when talking about these subjects, the 
relevant terminology is very important. 
We shall now look at the explicit classification of varieties of English as 
given by Quirk/Greenbaum (1973:Iff.) in the UGE. The variety classes distin-
guished there are not restricted to the vocabulary. I will tentatively illustrate 
the respective limitations of words to certain areas by using the "labels" 
employed for this purpose in the LDCE. There are evident connections with 
the distinction between * denotation' and 'connotation' that wil l be discussed 
later (cf. 2.2.). 
In the following diagram (8), I have added to the variety classes 
distinguished by the U G E some more or less equivalent terms from other 
approaches (cf. Lipka 1988a). Partial equivalences are symbolized by « . So-
called "labels" used in the two editions of the L D C E have also been included.13 
(8) 1. Region (geographical variation) A m E , NEngE 
2. Education and social standing = ///, si 
3. Subject matter register/field law, med 
4. Medium ~ mode = l i t , poet 
5. Attitude = 'style'/tenor fml, humour 
6. Interference Fr, Ger 
Before considering the relevance of this schema for the structure of the lexicon 
in greater detail, I should like to explain the distinctions as made by the UGE. 
The grammar points out that there are numerous varieties of the English 
language and that what is normally meant by E n g l i s h is the "common core" 
realized in the different spoken or written froms of the language.14 There is, 
thus, a set of grammatical and other characteristics common to all "variety 
classes". Within each class, further subdivision is possible and so there are 
1 3 According to the LDCE 2 (21987:F45) the purpose of the labels is to indicate 
that "the use of a word is limited in some way", e.g. to informal situations 
(in/ml), to technical legal language ( l a w ) , or to specific regions such as the 
North of England (NEngE), etc. (see the list of abbreviations p. 189 f). The 
LDCE has labels for: region, special fields or subjects, situations, time (old-
fash, old use, r a r e , becoming r a r e ) , attitude (e.g. apprec, pomp), and "other 
limitations on use" namely d i a l (local speech of a particular area), nonstandard 
("regarded as incorrect"), taboo (very offensive), and tdmk (trademark). Two 
additional devices for helping to choose the right word in the LDCE 2 are the 
so-called "Usage Notes" and "Language Notes", both containing (besides other 
things) pragmatic information. 
1 4 In the L D C E 2, E n g l i s h , defined as 'the language of Britain, the US, 
Australia, etc' is still marked as an uncountable noun. In recent usage, 
especially by linguists, the word can be pluralized, and Englishes appears in 
the title of articles and books, a form likewise not yet recorded in Howard 
(1985). 
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varieties within varieties. Naturally, these are closely interrelated. Also, each 
of the six kinds of variety is related to the other variety classes. Clearly, there 
are many parallels to the distinctions made in the vocabulary by the SOED, 
as represented in diagram (2). Here is a closer look at the distinction of the 
six classes. 
1. "Region" 
For geographical or regional variation the term d i a l e c t is traditionally used. As 
we have seen, this is a notational term that is not at all unambiguous. It is 
often used for socially determined variants of a language (but not in Quirk et 
al. 1985, for example). Sometimes there is close interdependence between the 
two variety classes 1 and 2. Thus, Cockney is really the dialect of a particular 
social class living in a particular part of London. Regional variation in language 
seems to be predominantly realized on the phonological level. This is often 
referred to as accent, although the term may also refer to variety class 6 
"Interference". We may speak of a Welsh or S c o t t i s h accent, but also of a 
noticeable G e r m a n or F r e n c h accent. A dialect, or rather a regional variety, 
may also be distinguished by different lexical or grammatical features. 
It has to be noted that there is regionally different familiarity with specific 
variants of English. Thus, an Englishman will hear an American Southerner first 
as an American and may perhaps then classify him as a Southerner in addition. 
On the other hand, he may be able to distinguish within Great Britain between 
Irish, Scots, Northern, Midland, Welsh, South-Western, and may perhaps 
recognize several London varieties. In North America, however, many people 
are able to distinguish between Canadian, New England, Midland and Southern. 
With regard to lexical variants, we have already seen a number of examples 
of differences between British and American English. Another regional variety, 
namely Scottish English, is perhaps less well known, although words such as 
l o c h , k i r k , b o n n i e , l a s s i e , wee are certainly not only familiar to British speakers. 
It may be difficult (cf. Lyons 1977:619) to decide whether these are purely 
dialectal variants, or whether they have a more specific descriptive meaning 
than their corresponding stylistically neutral equivalents ( l a k e , c h u r c h etc.). Less 
well known is e.g. o u t w i t h meaning 'outside', which may be found in formal 
written Scottish texts. 
Besides British and American English, the U G E distinguishes several other 
"national standards of English". Scots, Irish English, and Canadian English are 
comparable to these two overwhelmingly predominant standards. South African 
English, New Zealand English and Australian English are in a different position 
in several respects. Although they are similar in orthography and grammar to 
British English, there are considerable differences in the lexicon and the 
phonology. 
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2. "Education and Social Standing" 
Within geographically different forms of English there is considerable variation 
depending on education and social standing. This is sometimes referred to as 
s o c i o l e c t or s o c i a l d i a l e c t . Although there is some correlation between une-
ducated speech and regional dialect, the two are certainly not coterminous. As 
an example of uneducated English the UGE mentions the double negative. 
Educated English is often referred to as S t a n d a r d E n g l i s h which, however, is 
clearly a notational term. There is a partial correspondence between educated 
and literary English as well as between uneducated and so-called substandard 
and slang (see diagram (2) p. 10). 
With regard to the lexicon, the stratum of words of Greek and Latin origin 
must be mentioned here. "Hard words" are a problem mainly for the un-
educated. The distinction betwenn £/-words (such as l a v a t o r y and r i c h ) and n o n -
{/-words (such as t o i l e t and w e a l t h y ) is a matter of social standing.15 
3. "Subject Matter" 
The U G E points out that varieties according to subject matter are often referred 
to as "registers". We have already seen that this is a notational term, and that 
it may be considered, for example by Halliday, as a complex notion involving 
further variables. Both Strang and Halliday define r e g i s t e r as a "variety 
according to use". More precisely, for Halliday "subject matter" is only one 
element in the contexual variable field. In Quirk et al. (1985:16) class 3 is 
consistently replaced by "field of discourse" (see diagram (9) p. 23). 
The use of particular lexical items is one of the most typical characteristics 
of language variation according to subject matter or field of discourse. The UGE 
mentions law, cookery, engineering, and football in this connection. It also 
points out that there are certain interrelations and dependencies between specific 
varieties. Thus, for example, a well-formed legal sentence presupposes an 
educated variety of English. Such connections, however, are not limited to 
relations between the classes 2 and 3. There are also correlations with other 
classes, as, for example, the following one. 
4. "Medium" 
This term is usually employed to distinguish the spoken from the written variety 
of a language. Further subdivision is possible (cf. Lipka (1988b) for the 
distinctions made by Crystal and Davy, such as between "simple medium" vs. 
"complex medium"). Thus, a dictation is "spoken to be written", while a radio 
news bulletin is "written to be spoken". Many legal expressions and specific 
1 5 See p. 9 for the distinction between U and non-U. Words of Greek or Latin 
origin are not necessarily "hard words" (e.g. angel, church, devil, mint, parson) 
and it is sociolinguistically revealing that {/-words tend to have an Anglo-
Saxon etymology (such as looking-glass, false teeth). 
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grammatical peculiarities are only found in written texts, such as documents 
and contracts. 
Obviously, the choice of medium depends on the situation in which language 
is used. The written medium normally presupposes the physical absence of the 
addressee. There are also differences in the devices used for the transmission 
of spoken and written language. In print we have various typographical means, 
as well as headings and paragraphs, for structuring the message. The spoken 
language, on the other hand, makes use of devices such as intonation and 
speech tempo, as well as extralinguistic communication signals, like gestures 
and eye contact. 
In Halliday's theory, mode is the equivalent of m e d i u m , although it 
comprises further elements of the "symbolic organization". Here, textual 
functions such as expository, didactic, persuasive are included as well as the 
concept of "genre" (Halliday 1978:144f.). 
With regard to the lexicon, literary and poetical words are relevant here, 
which occur practically only in the written language. Also, archaic and extinct 
words are normally only found in writing and hardly in the spoken medium. 
Clearly there is a close relationship here with variety class 2. In French, the 
differences between the spoken and the written medium are even more 
important. Here we have practically two different languages co-existing side 
by side, the so-called code parlé and the code écrit. 
5. "Attitude" 
In this variety class, according to the UGE, linguistic form may be determined 
by the speaker's or writer's attitude to the hearer or reader (the addressee), to 
the subject matter, or to the purpose of the message. The UGE points out that 
this variety is often marked by the ambiguous label s t y l e . We must add that 
Halliday's t e n o r is a more precise equivalent, although it does not include 
attitude to the subject matter. The U G E distinguishes five variants of attitude 
along the following scale: rigid / FORMAL / neutral / INFORMAL / familiar (of 
which only the two in capitals are explicitly marked). 
With regard to the lexicon, finer distinctions are usually drawn in many 
dictionaries. There are different kinds and different degrees of formality and 
informality. From the point of view of etymology it is noteworthy that formal 
words are normally of classical or Romance origin, while informal words 
usually derive from Anglo-Saxon (cf. four-letter words). 
There is a problem here sometimes, parallel to the one mentioned in 
connection with variety class 1, namely whether we have to do with two 
formally distinct variants of the same word, or with two denotationally different 
lexical items. For example Leech (21981:14) mentions as "synonyms with ... 
stylistic overtones": steed (poetic), h o r s e (general), n a g (slang). According to 
this, h o r s e would be stylistically neutral or unmarked, while both steed and 
n a g are stylistic variants of h o r s e . However, n a g is defined in the COD as 
"small riding-horse or pony; (colloq.) horse". The O A L D compresses this 
twofold definition of n a g into: "(colloq.) (usu old) horse". The L D C E 1 (1978), 
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gives two distinct definitions: "1 n o t f m l a horse that is old or in bad condition 
2 infml, esp. d e r o g a horse, esp. one which races". If we take the second 
definition in the L D C E and C O D , 1 6 and the one in the O A L D without the 
qualification "usu old", then n a g is simply a stylistically marked variant of 
horse (see 2.2.5.). If, on the other hand, we consider a n a g to be a horse that 
is either small, old, in bad condition, or one which races, then n a g has a 
meaning or denotation different from h o r s e . The example demonstrates the 
problem of the delimitation of meaning, the so-called "fuzziness" of meaning 
that will be further discussed in 2.1. and 2.2. The dictionaries try to capture 
this by using labels such as "usu" or "esp". A label such as d e r o g clearly refers 
to attitude towards the thing talked about (here: dislike), while h u m o r denotes 
attitude more towards the addressee than towards subject matter. 
6. "Interference" 
This class (set off from the others by a broken line in the UGE) is in fact 
rather different and, as the authors state, "on a very different basis" (UGE 1973: 
7). It refers to contact with a foreign language and includes varieties caused 
by the traces left by a speaker's native language when speaking English. An 
example of grammatical interference given by the U G E is the utterance / am 
h e r e s i n c e Thursday made by a Frenchman. The grammar points out that certain 
varieties of English spoken in India, Pakistan, and some African countries, 
might be considered as almost reaching the status of a national standard. This 
shows that there is considerable overlap with the other variety classes. Also, 
pidgins and Creoles are relevant here. 
On the level of the lexicon, interference is probably more important than 
on the phonological level. In this connection loan-words and loan-translations 
must be mentioned as the result of interference. The so-called "false friends" 
also belong here, for example when Ger sensibel, b r a v , p a t h e t i s c h are identified 
with E s e n s i b l e , b r a v e , and p a t h e t i c (cf. Pascoe and Pascoe 1985). Interference 
can further cause change of meaning, as for example in Ger r e a l i s i e r e n and 
k o n t r o l l i e r e n , which have acquired the additional meanings 'notice' and 
'command, influence' under the influence of E r e a l i z e and c o n t r o l . 
As already mentioned, there exists a great deal of overlap and interrelation 
between the variety classes. The UGE points out that certain subjects can hardly 
be handled in writing, while others (e.g. legal statutes) must be handled in this 
medium. It is further observed that for certain topics (e.g. funerals) informal 
language would be inappropriate and distasteful. Nevertheless, attitudinal 
varieties possess a great deal of independence, compared to other varieties. The 
parameters used for defining the six variety classes are not absolute either. They 
are graded and variable and there are varieties within each variety. 
1 6 This is missing in the LDCE 2 (1987), where the noun nag (denoting a horse) 
only has the entry: "infml a horse, esp. one that is old or in bad condition". 
See 2.2.5 (p. 64) and the remarks on foal and FohlenlFallen p. 155, 157. 
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A few farther points must be made with regard to the subject of this book. 
Not all variety classes are equally relevant for the lexicon. Idiolectal variation 
wi l l be disregarded here, although it is perfectly legitimate to establish 
concordances of the usage of words by authors such as Chaucer, Shakespeare, 
or Byron. The choice of specific lexical items by an individual may be crucial 
in textual studies, for example for establishing authorship. Temporal variation 
is completely neglected by the classification in the UGE; but cf. L D C E (21987: 
F46). However, most speakers of a language are definitely able to distinguish 
archaic, obsolete, or obsolescent words from recent coinings, new words, and 
neologisms generally. Lyons (1977: 621) has coined the expression "diachrony-
in-synchrony" for this phenomenon. Language change is probably most rapid 
on the lexical level (cf. Strang 21968: 227 ff.). This is one of the reasons for 
the frequent characterization of the lexicon as an open set or list, as opposed 
to the closed systems of grammar. It also forces lexicographers to revise their 
dictionaries at certain intervals, and even induces some of them to write 
dictionaries of "New English" (see 1.4.). 
There are also dictionaries of Americanisms and other regional varieties of 
English. Geographical variation is tied up with another vexing problem: some 
words are identical in form, but have a different meaning in various parts of 
the English-speaking world. This is well known in the case of the names of 
certain bakery products, such as b i s c u i t s , c o o k i e s , and scones (cf. Lehrer 1974: 
65) which do not mean the same in America, England, and Scotland. In 
German, equally, e.g. Wecken may denote a roll in some parts of the country, 
while it refers to a loaf of bread in others. A c r u m p e t , in the sense of 'cake', 
is sweet in Scotland (equivalent to an English p a n c a k e ) , while it is unsweetened 
in England. The word has a further meaning, not geographically restricted, 
denoting 'a (sexually desirable) woman' that must be considered a metaphorical 
extension of meaning (see 3.4.2.). In this sense it is labelled " B r E infml & 
often h u m o r " in the L D C E (1978), but "s i ." in the COD, which shows how 
variation according to "attitude" may be classified differently. Further examples 
of regional variation from other semantic fields are: bucket, which to some 
people in Scotland is 'a dustbin', and c h a p e l , which denotes a place of worship 
'for non-conformists' in England and Wales, and 'for Roman Catholics' in 
Scotland. 
In the second type of varieties (social class or standing), usually two differ-
ent items are used as a shibboleth (U or n o n - U ) . But within this type, there 
are also lexical items with identical form and different referent. Thus d i n n e r 
is the chief meal eaten 'at midday' by some people and ' in the evening' in 
other social classes in Britain. 
In Quirk et al. (1985:15 ff.), the underlying model for the treatment of 
varieties of English has been considerably simplified, with a noticeable influence 
of Hallidayan ideas. Thus, there are only five types left and "field of discourse" 
(defined as "type of activity engaged in through language") replaces "subject 
matter". If the distinction between "variety according to user" and "variety 
according to use" (which is stressed throughout the text) is furthermore 
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incorporated into the schema, the following diagram with five parameters 
results: 
(9) (a) region > 
(b) social group J U S E R 
(c) field of discourse >j 
(d) medium I language use 
(e) attitude J ( 
These distinctions are certainly justified from the point of view of a grammar. 
However, as already mentioned, the discarded category "Interference" is 
particularly relevant for the lexicon, especially from a diachronic point of view. 
Most entries in any dictionary wi l l be neutral with regard to the six variety 
classes. In other words, the items can be used anywhere in the world where 
English is spoken or written. This also holds for the entries in the L D C E . If, 
however, the usage of a word is limited or restricted to a particular geographical 
area, subject matter, or type of discourse, this is marked by the label. 
Sometimes several labels can be combined, which is not surprising if we think 
of Strang's remarks about the overlap of different scales and the reference to 
the interdependence of variety classes in the UGE. Here are two examples. 
G r a m o p h o n e is defined in the L D C E (1978) as 'record player' and marked: 
B r E b e c o m i n g r a r e (cf. Strang 21968:220). In the second edition of the dic-
tionary, the label changes to o l d - f a s h . The marking of a regional variety is in 
1978 combined with one of restricted frequency of use, which refers to diachrony-
in-synchrony. G r a n is explained as 'grandmother' and labelled B r E infml, a 
combined reference to the variety classes 1 and 5. 
In the following, some further correlations between the labels of the L D C E 
(both editions) and the variety classes in the U G E will be mentioned for 
illustration. 
1. Pommy is defined as 'an Englishman' (in 1978) and (in non-sexist 
language in 1987) as 'an English person'. In both editions of the L D C E 
it is marked (for "region") as Australian and New Zealand English. It 
furthermore belongs to slang and is therefore assigned to both variety 
classes 1 and 5. It has the additional label often d e r o g , defined as words 
which show that "the speaker dislikes or disapproves of something". This 
is clearly a matter of "attitude". Beck, meaning 'stream', is characterized 
as a word used in the North of England (NEngE) and is obviously related 
to Ger B a c h , although definitely a Scandinavian loanword. 
2. It is much more difficult to fmd examples for illustrating the second 
variety class ("education and social standing") in the LDCE. F a g , defined 
as 'a young pupil who has to do jobs for an older student' and cha-
racterized as "in certain English public schools" by the L D C E , certainly 
applies to both aspects of the variety class 2. However, there is no 
specific label to indicate this. There are certain interdependences which 
allow us, probably, to relate both the labels l i t (for literary) and si (for 
slang) to variety class 2. But the association is not a necessary one. 
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Although it cannot be seen from the label, w i r e l e s s , which belongs 
to a conservative speech variant, must probably be included in this group. 
Also, literary l a m b e n t 'softly shining' is certainly restricted to educated 
English. On the other hand, the slang noun/ag 'cigarette'17 a homonym 
of the above-mentioned f a g and the verb t o f a g 'work hard', can 
probably be associated with the other end of the social class scale, 
although its use is certainly also situationally conditioned. The verb t o 
c l o c k 'to strike', homonymous with the zero-derived denominal verb (in 
/ c l o c k e d h i m w h i l e he r a n a m i l e ) in the expression I ' l l c l o c k y o u one, 
will certainly not be considered as belonging to the educated English 
of the upper classes. 
The examples just mentioned clearly reveal the problems of discussing 
words in isolation, without linguistic or extralinguistic context (see 5.1.). Today, 
a terminological distinction is often made between c o - t e x t (linguistic context) 
and c o n t e x t (extralinguistic context, including context of situation). The choice 
of a lexical item or lexical unit is not only determined by the language user's 
more or less permanent property of belonging to a specific social group, but 
also by the situation of language use (see diagram (9), and cf. Lipka 1988a: 
320 f.). Not only educated speakers have more than one level or "style" at their 
disposal, a phenomenon which is well known in sociolinguistics under the term 
c o d e - s w i t c h i n g (cf. Halliday 1978:65). According to situation, all speakers may 
rapidly move from one 'code' to another - here code denotes different language 
varieties or even, in multilingual societies, entirely different languages (e.g. 
Spanish and Guarani). 
3. Decisions on the next class ("subject matter") are easier to make. For 
this, there is quite a range of labels in any dictionary. Words from legal 
or medical language are clearly marked. Words used by specialists in 
various other subjects are labelled t e c h . We are obviously concerned here 
with 'register' or 'field'. Lexical items used predominantly in the Bible 
(labelled b i b t ) clearly also belong to variety class 3. Here, temporal 
variation is involved at the same time. 
4. In contrast to the preceding group, assignment to the next class 
("medium") is not entirely unproblematic. In my opinion, we can assume 
that literary and poetical expressions, as well as obsolete words, can 
1 7 To be precise, according to the LDCE 2 mere are four lexical items fag, 
namely three nouns marked as 1. B r E si ('cigarette'), 2. A m E derog si 
('homosexual man'), 3. infinl, esp. B r E , and a verb 4. marked as infinl, esp. 
B r E . The dictionary gives two meanings each for noun 3. and the verb 4., so 
that in my terminology they both consist of two lexical units: 3a) 'chore* (as 
in C l e a n i n g the oven is a r e a l fag), 3b) 'young pupil who has to do jobs for 
an older pupil'; 4a) 'to do jobs for an older pupil', 4b) *to work hard'. The 
verb 4a) can be interpreted as a zero-derivative from the noun 3b) which is 
equivalent to Ger F u c h s (in student fraternities). Transatlantic misunderstandings 
may arise, e.g. when L o r d Smith was my f a g at E t o n is said by a British 
speaker to an American (cf. Moss 1973). 
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normally be assigned to the written medium. Again, we can see the 
overlapping of categories. V e l o c i p e d e in the meaning 'bicycle' has the 
label obs, defined in the L D C E as "often found in old books". It is 
therefore correlated with the written medium. Incidentally, the COD gives 
two different meanings of the noun: 1. "(Hist.) Light vehicle propelled 
by rider, esp. early form of bicycle", and, with a symbol marking it as 
"Chiefly U.S.", 2. "Child's tricycle". Obsolete words may be used inten-
tionally in spoken language, which results normally in a humorous effect. 
This is why v e l o c i p e d e is labelled "old use or humorous" in L D C E . 
5. Lexical items marked by the label h u m o r may definitely also be assigned 
to variety class 5 ("attitude"), since they pertain to 'attitude', 'style', or 
'tenor'. As with the group indicating regional variation, the L D C E here 
has a wide range of finely differentiated labels. This can be seen from 
the following examples. A negative or positive attitude is characterized 
by the pair of labels d e r o g l a p p r e c (derogatory/appreciative) as implied 
by words like b r a t 'child', and cosy. Polite words for things that for 
some reason or another are regarded as unpleasant, are marked euph 
(euphemistic). Examples are: s e n i o r c i t i z e n 'old person', c h a r l a d y 
'cleaner', and c l o a k r o o m 'toilet'. Today the expression i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n 
is often used instead of s t r i k e . Besides neutral words that are unmarked, 
the L D C E in 1978 distinguished three degrees of formality: f m l / n o t f m l l 
infml, which are replaced in the second edition by infml/fml/sl. N a g , 
when meaning an old or bad horse, is labelled n o t f m l in 1978, but is 
marked infml in the second edition of the L D C E . Words that should be 
avoided in formal society or in conversation with foreigners and children 
are marked t a b o o . Items that "show a foolishly self-important attitude" 
are labelled p o m p (pompous), such as t o pen 'write with a pen'. 
There are two particular areas, within the variety class 5 of attitude, 
which are not marked by the system of labels used in the L D C E : racist 
terms and sexist language. These have become extremely important for 
good English in the 1980s (cf. Howard 1985 and the differences between 
the two editions of the LDCE). Certain words are considered offensive 
by certain groups of people, but this is only pointed out in the "usage 
notes" of the dictionary. For example, b l a c k is the word preferred by 
many black people today, but c o l o u r e d , and especially n e g r o are con-
sidered to be offensive. Many women resent the words c h a i r m a n and 
spokesman, when used referring to both sexes, and prefer to say She/he 
i s o u r new c h a i r p e r s o n or She/he a g r e e d t o a c t as spokesperson. These 
two examples are only given in the latest L D C E (1987) and exemplify 
clear cases of language change (s.v. b l a c k and p e r s o n , but cf. also Howard 
(1985) esp. sexist l a n g u a g e ) . The problems of the new, non-discrim-
inatory title Ms are discussed in great detail by Howard and mentioned 
in the L D C E also in the "language notes" on "addressing people". 
6. The last group of items, related to variety class 6, "interference", consists 
of words that have been borrowed from other languages and that are 
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still felt to be foreign. They are frequently pronounced in an un-English 
way. Here, we may have labels which refer to the language of origin 
(Fr, G e r , I t , Sp), but the origin may also be named in the definition 
itself. This is illustrated by the treatment of d i t e n t e , Z e i t g e i s t , H e r r , 
S a u e r k r a u t , and p a e l l a in the two editions of the L D C E . 
Obviously, words contained in the class interference frequently also belong to 
other variety classes. Thus, loans from certain languages often belong to certain 
topics, i.e. there is a relationship with class 3. For example English, like many 
other European languages, has borrowed a number of expressions from the 
register of music from Italian. In this field, terms like a n d a n t e , d a c a p o , and 
p i a n o have become so familiar that they are not marked by the label I t in the 
L D C E at all. In general, the dictionary does not contain a specific technical 
label m u s i c (but cf. l a w , med, n a m ) , but in a number of cases "in music" is 
added in brackets. 
A mistake due to interference which is unfortunately often made by German 
linguists is the use of Ger l i n g u i s t i s c h in the sense of 'sprachlich', due to the 
convergence of both l i n g u i s t i s c h and s p r a c h l i c h in the English lexical item 
l i n g u i s t i c . One could even argue that this is an instance of language change 
(extension of meaning) in the technical register of linguistics. 
This brings to a close our discussion of the marking of varieties of English 
in a modem dictionary. We have seen that all variety classes distinguished in 
the UGE can be correlated with specific labels in the L D C E . We have noted 
some quite fine distinctions, particularly in the first and fifth class. It is 
important, however, to repeat that the majority of entries in dictionaries are 
neutral with respect to variety classes. Furthermore, even those words that are 
marked by specific labels often belong to the "common core" of English, at 
least with regard to the passive vocabulary of many speakers. 
1.4. Dictionaries of English 
An outline of English lexicology would not be complete without a sketch of 
the most important and most relevant English dictionaries (cf. Strang 21968: 215 
ff.; Marchand 21969:457f.; Scheler 1977:170; Standop 1985, Hohlein et al. 
1987:9 ff.). We will have a look at the great tradition in English lexicography, 
consider some medium or concise dictionaries (beyond the pocket dictionary) 
in greater detail, and look at various dictionaries for specific purposes. 
Completeness is clearly impossible in this field, and there is rapid change 
and development in the publication of dictionaries, as in the lexicon itself, 
reflected in the dictionaries. We will only be concerned with unilingual 
dictionaries. 
Leech (21981:204) sees the dictionary as "a store of all the p a r t i c u l a r facts 
about a language" [his emphasis], stresses its "open-ended" nature, and 
distinguishes between "practical" and "theoretical" dictionaries. He uses the term 
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l e x i c o n in the sense of the "inbuilt dictionary", as part of the competence of 
the native speaker, and identifies it with the "theoretical dictionary" (21981: 
207). He further raises the question of how much "encyclopedic information 
about the referents" (21981: 205 f.) dictionary definitions should contain. 
It is an old and knotty problem how to distinguish between linguistic and 
encyclopedic knowledge (cf. Lipka 1972 : 49, 56; Hullen/Schulze 1988), to 
which we will return in connection with the discussion of language, meaning, 
and reality in 2.1. and 2.2. In principle, knowledge of language and knowledge 
of the world have to be separated, but it is not always easy to draw a neat 
line in specific cases. This is tied up with the problem of the "fuzzy" nature 
of language to which we will return. 
In dealing with practical dictionaries, we have to keep in mind that they 
are not "the true repositories of lexical knowledge" as the man-in-the-street 
believes, and that a "reverent attitude to dictionary authority is mere 
superstition" (Strang 21968:217). As Strang points out, in the layman's view a 
dictionary is not a work written by somebody. This false impression is further 
enhanced by the fact that most titles of dictionaries do not mention an author. 
The absence of an author definitely contributes to the awe-inspiring authority 
of the dictionary, especially if the lack of originator is coupled with the 
illustrious name of Oxford. 
It is contained in the title of a series of reference books that derive from 
the most comprehensive and impressive work of English lexicography, the 
Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y (OED). It has rightly been referred to as the greatest 
dictionary ever written for any language. Although it certainly cannot be up-
to-date (due to its history and its genesis) it is without any doubt a most 
astonishing achievement and an inexhaustible storehouse of knowledge about 
the English language.18 
A glance at its history will reveal why the OED is unique (cf. McArthur 
1986:124ff.). Around the middle of the last century it was felt in England that 
existing dictionaries of the language were inadequate. So the Philological 
Society in London, around 1850, started the project of a new dictionary. For 
this purpose, in 1879 a contract was signed with the old and famous Oxford 
University Press for the financing and publication of the dictionary. During the 
long and eventful years of writing and publishing, several editors were in charge 
of the process. The most important of these was probably James A . H . Murray. 
To be sure, "the OED can only be understood as a product of 19th century 
philology" and the use of the first edition as "a safe standard of vocabulary in 
the second half of the twentieth century" is doubtful (Finkenstaedt/Wolff 
1973:21, 23). Its editors always tended to be conservative (cf. Marsden 
1985:28), which is most obvious from the fact mat Americanisms only began 
to be admitted in the 1933 Supplement, other Englishes were only recognized 
in the second Supplement (1972ff.), sexual terms ("dirty words") were 
excluded up to its first volume (1972), and the inclusion of racial terminology 
made the second volume (1976) notorious. For the reliability of the OED's 
first citations and voluntary readers cf. Schäfer (1980; esp. 3-5). 
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But neither a single editor nor the entire Philological Society could have managed 
to complete this immense project single-handed. The plan (which was in fact 
carried out) was to give for every word of the English language and for each 
of its meanings, quotations from actual written texts. To find such examples 
by the systematic reading of texts could only be done by the help of many 
volunteer readers, over the course of years and years. The material contributed 
by hundreds of readers formed the basis of the editing of the dictionary. At 
one point there were over 800 of them (cf. The C o m p a c t E d i t i o n of t h e O E D : 
vii) and all in all 2,000 readers sent in 5 million quotations over a period of 
70 years (cf. McArthur 1986:131). In 1884 the first instalment of the dictionary, 
originally entitled A New E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y o n H i s t o r i c a l P r i n c i p l e s , was 
issued.19 This title is responsible for the abbreviation N E D , still occasionally 
used today. The final part with the letter Z appeared in 1928. Thus the whole 
project had taken exactly 70 years since the resolution of the Philological 
Society calling for a new dictionary was passed in 1858. However, the 
undertaking was not completed with the issuing of the last instalment.20 In 1933 
an important supplement volume appeared containing new and omitted words, 
as well as corrections necessitated during the long publication process. The 
completed work treats more than 400,000 words and phrases. Together with 
the 1933 supplement it is bound in 13 large volumes, occupying 16,570 pages. 
Since the original format of the huge work takes up an enormous space, a 
micrographic reproduction in two volumes was produced in 1971. It bears the 
title The C o m p a c t E d i t i o n of t h e Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y . Most of it can 
only be read with a magnifying glass, but it is sold at a reasonable price which 
individuals can afford. 
But this was by no means the end of what Mc Arthur (1986:124) calls "the 
unendable dictionary". In 1957 the New Zealand scholar Robert W. Burchfield 
became editor of the new supplements to the dictionary (OEDS) which led to 
a shift of viewpoint away from the original "Britocentric" approach (cf. Weiner 
1987). In 1984 Edmund Weiner (responsible for the computerization of the OED) 
was appointed co-editor of the New Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , which aims at 
integrating the OED and its supplements into an electronic database, publicly 
available both online and on compact disc. 2 1 This new "electronic O E D " can 
1 9 A "Historical Thesaurus of English", based on the OED and its supplements, 
has been in preparation at the university of Glasgow, under the direction of 
M.L.Samuels, for a number of years. Modem electronic equipment (machine-
readable data, a mainframe computer) is being used for storage, processing, 
and classification and it is hoped that the project will be completed in the 
early 1990s. Section I, "The External World", including "Land, Water, The 
Extraterrestrial Universe, Mankind, etc.", is largely completed. Other sections 
are: II "The Mind" and III "Society". 
2 0 The original ten-volume work (NED) was later (1933) reprinted and bound in 
twelve volumes (as the OED) plus Supplement (vol. 13). 
2 1 This first computerized edition of the OED on CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read 
Only Memory) has been available since late 1988 and contains the original 
twelve-volume OED (thus not including the new Supplements) on a single 
28 
be revised and up-dated continuously and rapidly. It favours an "inclusive 
approach" (Weiner 1987) and attempts to become the historical dictionary of 
every variety of World English. 
As we have seen already, the rate of language change is greatest in the 
area of the lexicon (cf. the example g r a m o p h o n e discussed in Strang (21968: 
220)). This development has caused a need for constant revision and publication 
of further supplementary volumes in the past. Under the title A Supplement t o 
t h e Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y (OEDS) four volumes were published in 1972, 
1976, 1981, and 1986. They incorporate and replace the 1933 Supplement and 
contain new words adopted into the language since the publication of the OED. 
They are based on a collection of quotations from literary, scientific, and 
technical works, as well as from newspapers and magazines. 
In 1987, sixteen years after the publication of The C o m p a c t E d i t i o n (vols. 
I and II), the four new supplement volumes edited by R. W. Burchfield (OEDS) 
were also published in a reduced compacted version (as vol. I l l ) , thus 
completing the printed output of what an Oxford University Press release praises 
as "the culmination of about 130 years' work on the complete Dictionary". In 
1989, a second edition of the OED was produced in twenty volumes (the OED 
2), conflated by computer, integrating the supplements, thus making available 
all the wealth of material (over half a million words and 2,4 million quotations, 
including some 5,000 new entries) in a single alphabetical sequence, on 21, 
728 pages. The OED 2 has further been improved by many corrections and a 
modernized, standardized phonetic transcription (IPA). 
The OED claims to record every word in the English language and to give 
quotations for each of its "senses", "about one for each century" in which the 
word was not extinct. Beginning with its earliest appearance in Old English 
or at a later period, all recorded spellings, uses, and meanings are registered, 
in order to account for the history of the word as completely as possible. An 
attempt is also made to register the latest occurrence of words that have died 
out. However, words that were already extinct by 1150 are not included. 
This short sketch can certainly not do justice to the OED. But it is necessary 
to draw attention to some further dictionaries derived from the OED. Besides 
the C o m p a c t E d i t i o n there is a shortened version in two volumes, containing 
about one sixth of the material of the OED, entitled The S h o r t e r Oxford E n g l i s h 
D i c t i o n a r y o n H i s t o r i c a l P r i n c i p l e s (SOED). This in turn is the basis for a 
dictionary published in 1970, which lists the English vocabulary not in 
alphabetical but in chronological order, and bears the title A C h r o n o l o g i c a l 
E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y (CED). It was prepared by Th. Finkenstaedt, E. Leisi, and 
D. Wolff and contains the 81,000 main entries of the SOED listed according 
compact disc. In addition there are indexes for etymology, definition, labels 
(parts of speech, topics, registers etc.), and quotations (date, author, work) -
which may also be combined - for electronic searches. Considerable space is 
devoted to several aspects of the second edition of the OED (1989) in twenty 
columes (OED 2) in E T 19 and 20 (1989). 
29 
to first occurrence and etymological origin. It further includes material from 
the 1963 edition of The A d v a n c e d L e a r n e r ' s D i c t i o n a r y of C u r r e n t E n g l i s h 
(ALD) and the G e n e r a l S e r v i c e L i s t of E n g l i s h W o r d s (GSL) (see below). 
The smallest and therefore most up-to-date dictionary based on the OED 
and its Supplements is The C o n c i s e Oxford D i c t i o n a r y of C u r r e n t E n g l i s h 
(COD). In spite of this origin, former editions of the COD contained relatively few 
quotations, illustrative sentences, or collocations, i.e. co-occurrences of lexical 
items. The latest editions, however, have adapted more to the pressure of 
competing dictionaries of comparable size and price. Furthermore, the long 
tradition in which it stands is a burden in some respects. Thus the COD 7 
(1982) could still be characterized as conservative, in spite of the inclusion of 
recent usage. This was particularly evident in the strange, unorthodox 
scheme for the notation of pronunciation (also used in OED up to the 
Compact Edition (1987)), for which the intended non-specialized native 
speaker readership was responsible. The symbols of the International Phonetic 
Alphabet (IPA) were not used, but the transcription followed the orthographic 
conventions of English, which was believed to be easier for the layman. 
After eighty years of C O D (first published 1911), the eighth edition of 
1990 is a departure from the tradition in several respects. Like OED 2, it has 
now newly adopted the use of the IPA. Up to the 7th edition, an attempt 
had been made to separate linguistic and encyclopedic information by 
emphasizing the distinction between "a dictionary" and "an encyclopaedia 
[sic!]". The editor R. E . Al len now states ( 81990: 23) that this distinction "is 
rather less strictly maintained". Finally, as specified on the same page: 
With this eighth edition the COD has entered the computer age. The text was 
initially assembled as a computer database... 
This database contains material from a broad variety of printed and electronic 
sources and the dictionary articles have a completely new structure. The COD 
is thus no longer directly derived from the OED, as shown in diagram (10). 
Other medium dictionaries of comparable size will be considered later (cf. 
Standop 1985, Hartmann 1987, and Summers 1988). Although the Oxford 
A d v a n c e d L e a r n e r ' s D i c t i o n a r y of C u r r e n t E n g l i s h (OALD), originally compiled 
in 1942 by A . S. Hornby (with the help of others), is also published by Oxford 
University Press, it is indirectly related to the preceding work. The character-
ization "Advanced Learner's" in the title is somewhat misleading (but cf. Cowie 
1987). It is definitely profitable for other users as well. In contrast to earlier 
editions, the fully revised one of 1989 (Cowie 1989) has returned to the transcrip-
tion system used by Gimson and now conforms to the notation found in the 
E n g l i s h P r o n o u n c i n g D i c t i o n a r y (EPD). Compared to the COD, the O A L D is 
rather restricted to more basic vocabulary and contains fewer learned and 
technical words, and of course no etymology. On the other hand it is modem 
and up-to-date and is distinguished by its clarity. It further contains many 
typical examples and collocations and very useful illustrations (cf. Ilson 1987). 
Another helpful feature found in most modem dictionaries (automatically 
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incorporated in computer programms for word processing today) is the marking 
of word-divisions at the end of a line. Three advantages of the O A L D may 
be particularly emphasized: 1. It contains simple but nevertheless exact definit-
ions and paraphrases of the concepts, 2. each definition and different use is 
illustrated with an example, i.e. the word is shown in a typical context, 3. 
valuable grammatical information is provided. In the latest edition, a new 
simpler verb classification scheme is introduced. Nouns are marked with special 
symbols according to whether they are countable or uncountable. As in most 
recent dictionaries, a number of useful appendices are added at the end. 
Another important medium-sized dictionary that is not derived from the 
OED is the L o n g m a n D i c t i o n a r y of C o n t e m p o r a r y E n g l i s h (LDCE). It was first 
published in 1978 as a completely new, original work, which uses the findings 
of modem linguistics to give a more precise description of language. The editors 
have frequently had recourse to the material of the Survey of English Usage 
at University College London. This is a representative corpus set up for the 
analysis and description of the contemporary language, containing examples of 
many varieties of English. There are very important and symptomatic changes 
and improvements in the second edition of 1987. 
The L D C E is comparable in scope to the O A L D and has many original 
features. It also contains grammatical information on word classes, countability, 
and the construction potential of verbs. As in the O A L D , illustrations are used, 
besides definitions, for the explanation of the words treated. Syllable structure 
is also indicated, which is relevant for end-of-line divisions. The use of words 
is demonstrated in extensive typical contexts, and collocations are shown in 
three different ways: in example sentences, by explanation in the so-called 
Usage Notes, and by typographic emphasis if the collocation is idiomatic or 
found very often. The revised edition is furthermore improved by additional 
"Language Notes", i.e. tables which incorporate pragmatic aspects into the 
dictionary and provide useful information on addressing people, apologies, 
criticism and praise, invitations and offers, politeness, thanks, the use of articles, 
collocations, modals, phrasal verbs, prepositions etc. It also consistently attempts 
to avoid racist and sexist language (see 1.3.). Neologisms and natural and 
typical usage in the 1980s are captured by constant updating of the Longman 
Citation Corpus. 
There are two features of this dictionary which were unique in 1978. First 
"Usage Notes" are appended to many entries in both editions. Thus, e.g. under 
fastness we learn that there is no noun formed from f a s t when it means q u i c k , 
and that instead speed or quickness is used. The note following h i r e not only 
provides information on the differences between British and American English, 
but also on the nouns that may be combined with h i r e in contrast to the usual 
collocations of r e n t , lease, c h a r t e r , a p p o i n t , engage, and employ. 
The second peculiarity (revolutionary in 1978) is the controlled basic 
vocabulary used for the definition of the main entries. Every single word in 
the definitions was checked by computer to ensure that it belongs to the list 
of approximately 2,000 words selected on the basis of frequency studies (also 
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with reference to the GSL) . The list of this defining vocabulary is printed at 
the end of the book. When a word had to be used that is less common and 
does not belong to the special list of 2,000 words, it is marked by small capital 
letters. The careful labelling of different varieties of contemporary English, 
especially the detailed coverage of different national varieties, have already been 
discussed. 
A third example of medium British dictionaries free from the burden of 
tradition is the C o l l i n s D i c t i o n a r y of t h e E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e (COLLINS), first 
published in 1979. A slightly revised edition appeared in 1986. It pays 
considerable attention to geographical variation and has special consultants for 
Scottish English, Caribbean English, Australian English etc. The COLLINS is 
larger than the COD, which is due in part to the fact that it contains a great 
deal of encyclopedic information. This may be illustrated by the following 
entries: B r e n n e r Pass 'a pass over the E Alps, between Austria and Italy. 
Highest point: 1,372 m'; B r e t a g n e 'the French name for Britanny'; B r i d g e ... 
F r a n k '1879-1941, English composer B r i d g e of Sighs 'a covered 16th-
century bridge in Venice . . . \ 
With its special focus on varieties of English, it is not surprising that the 
COLLINS (like the LDCE) should have developed a neat system of "restrictive 
labels", subclassified into "temporal" ( A r c h a i c , O b s o l e t e ) , "usage" ( S l a n g , 
I n f o r m a l , T a b o o , F a c e t i o u s , E u p h e m i s t i c , N o t s t a n d a r d ) , "connotative" 
( D e r o g a t o r y , Offensive), "subject-field" ( A s t r o n o m y , B a n k i n g etc.), and "national 
and regional labels" ( A u s t r a l . , B r i t . , C a n a d i a n , C a r i b b e a n , I r i s h , N . Z . , S. 
A f r i c a n , Scot., U.S.). In this context it is worth mentioning that a proposal for 
a consistent abbreviated labelling system for the world's Englishes has been 
proposed in GfJrlach (1987). 
In the foreword to the COLLINS, the publishers claim in 1979 that: 
For the first time in a major dictionary of mis kind, computer technology has been 
used from the inception of the work. 
This feature, they continue: 
made it possible to survey every field of human activity subject by subject, defining 
technical as well as everyday vocabulary in an exceptionally short time. 
Closely related to the new possibilities of the computer age, and particularly 
interesting in comparison with the quotation from the COD given above, is the 
following statement in the foreword to the second edition (1986 :vii): 
Parallel to this concern with the contemporary language went a comprehensive 
treatment of modem science and technology, the most thorough and encyclopedic 
of any general single-volume dictionary to date. This encyclopedic approach was 
extended by a generous provision of biographical and geographical entries mat 
provided information on people and places of cultural importance on an international 
scale. 
I wi l l return to this conflict between purely linguistic and encyclopedic 
knowledge, and the possibility of their separation, repeatedly in this book. In 
the development of linguistics, it is paralleled with a shift of attitude from a 
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strictly structuralist to a more comprehensive cognitive and interdisciplinary 
point of view. 
Let us now turn to a fourth medium-sized dictionary of contemporary 
English, produced by the same publisher, the C O B U I L D E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e 
D i c t i o n a r y , which was unique in many ways when it appeared in 1987 
(incidentally, our counting could be renumbered on good grounds, if we 
considered the second edition of the L D C E as a different, fifth book. It is really 
a new edition, with a woman Delia Summers as a new Editorial Director, with 
a more progressive attitude, where women feature as protagonists in many of 
the examples given). A number of features of the C O B U I L D are quite 
exceptional, which make it a kind of "odd man out".22 
The C O B U I L D (an acronym which stands for Coll ins Birmingham 
University International Language Database) is derived from computerized 
evidence from spoken and written actual texts. Both the L D C E and the 
C O B U I L D are thus based on citations corpora. 2 3 Since in the latter, the 
examples are only slightly adapted, we find a high percentage of proper names 
(e.g. 12 m i l l i o n pounds spent by C o u r t a u l d ' s i n m o d e r n i z i n g i t s o l d G r e e n f i e l d 
f a c t o r y under m o d e r n i z e ) , which are often not very helpful for the user's 
understanding of the definitions. As discussed in the introduction by the Editor-
in-Chief, John Sinclair, "The dictionary is designed to read like ordinary 
English", collocations are stressed (see 4.3.5.), social and geographical variety 
is considered, and warnings are given to avoid offensive racist and "sexist talk". 
The first-mentioned characteristic, which results in a sort of "folk definition", 
is considerably, and perhaps unnecessarily, space-consuming. Finally, a unique 
positive feature of the dictionary must also be mentioned, which is especially 
relevant with respect to sense-relations (see 4.2.3.): a system of semantic cross-
referencing with the help of special symbols for synonyms (=), antonyms (*), 
and superordinate terms (ft). 
The highly competitive market for dictionaries aimed at students of English 
as a foreign language (cf. Summers 1988) has also produced a number of other 
Most reviews have been rather critical of the striking departures from 
lexicographical standards, e.g. the fact mat grammatical information is put into 
a so-called "extra column", to the right of the definitions, while the claimed 
"user-friendliness" of the definitions has been criticized as a waste of space 
and a mixture of condescension and chumminess. Thus the entry for to nudge 
reads: "When you nudge someone, you push or poke them, usally with your 
elbow, in order to draw their attention to something or to make mem move". 
Homographs are not distinguised (s.v. lead) and mere is also a single lemma 
only for different word classes (s.v. open, twist). The indication of pronunciation, 
a mixture of broad and narrow transcription, is also problematic. For a 
comparison of OALD, LDCE, and COBUILD cf. Jackson (1988:181ff.) and 
Summers (1988). 
As appears from the "Corpus Acknowledgements" in the COBUILD (1987:xxii), 
the bulk of quotations derives from texts produced in the 1970s and 1980s, 
with a very few earlier sources going back as far as 1945. Cf. Carter 
(1987:140-142). 
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books, of which only The P e n g u i n Wordmaster D i c t i o n a r y (1987), compiled 
by M . H . Manser and N . D. Turton, can be mentioned here in closing. It is 
described by the publishers as a combination of thesaurus, usage guide, lexicon, 
and historical survey, with boxed notes about usage and etymology. 
Diagram (10) gives a survey of British and American dictionaries (the latter 
to be discussed on the following pages) most relevant for our purposes.24 It 
includes as an example of a particularly useful medium-sized American 
dictionary the college edition of Webster's New W o r l d D i c t i o n a r y of the 
A m e r i c a n L a n g u a g e , with the new editor-in-chief V . E. Neufeldt in charge of 
the latest edition 1988. This has nothing to do with WEBSTER'S THIRD (W 3), 
since the name Webster is not protected by American law. Originally published 
in 1953, the college edition was based on an earlier two-volume encyclopedic 
edition which first appeared in 1951. 
The schema does not contain dictionaries of synonyms, or other specialized 
works of reference. Since, however, synonyms are especially important in our 
context (see 4.2.3.1.), a few remarks on the topic may not be out of place here. 
A useful book, which also draws on the favourable connotations of the name 
Webster, is Webster's New D i c t i o n a r y of Synonyms, latest edition 1973. As the 
subtitle indicates (see bibliography Gove 41973), it further deals with other 
sense-relations, in particular antonyms. For the German user, the E n g l i s c h e 
Synonymikfur Studierende u n d L e h r e r (31968) may be very helpful, originally 
written in 1951 by H.-W. Klein alone. The newest relevant (British) publication 
is the L o n g m a n Synonym D i c t i o n a r y (1986), with editor-in-chief Laurence 
Urdang, a renowned lexicographer. An extremely useful contrastive dictionary 
of synonyms, particularly helpful for the English learner of German, is Farrell 
(21977). 
2 4 The L o n g m a n D i c t i o n a r y of the E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e (= Gay et al. 1984) is not 
counted among the medium-sized dictionaries here and is also often too 
technical. E.g. the noun f o a l is defined as two lexical units: 1. "the young of 
an animal of the horse family; esp one under one year'*, and 2. "a horse up 
to the first January after its birth". Is this perhaps explainable from the fact 
that there are even two consultants for the field of horse-riding? It is 
extremely instructive to compare entries for this item in various dictionaries. 
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(10) 
B r i t i s h D i c t i o n a r i e s : 
CED (1970) 
(1884-1933) 
SOED C1973) 
i 
COD C1982) 
COD 8 (1990) 
OALD 
(1942/1989) 
Compact Edition (1971) 
(1987) 
New Supplements (1972-86) = 
OED 2 (1989) 
New OED (electronic) 
LDCE 1 
(1978) 
LDCE 2 
(1987) 
OEDS 
COLLINS 
(1979,21986) 
COBÜILD 
(1987) 
A m e r i c a n D i c t i o n a r i e s : 
DAE 
(1936-44) 
DARE 
(1985 ff.) 
W3 
(1961) 
P1976) 
(1969) paperback 
P1971) (1970) 
RHD 
(1966,21987) 
Webster's 
New World 
(1953) 
(31988) 
As we have seen, most British dictionaries, especially the recent medium-
sized ones, give due consideration to regional variation of English. There are, 
of course, special dictionaries for English and American dialects, for Scottish 
English, for Americanisms, Canadianisms, etc. and the D i c t i o n a r y of A m e r i c a n 
R e g i o n a l E n g l i s h (DARE), currently published under the direction of F .G. 
Cassidy. 
Since, however, the American national standard plays such an extraordinary 
role, I will briefly consider some important American dictionaries mentioned 
in (10). The nearest equivalent to the OED (although a far cry from the 
monumental original) is A D i c t i o n a r y of A m e r i c a n E n g l i s h o n H i s t o r i c a l 
P r i n c i p l e s (DAE) published in four volumes by the University of Chicago Press 
between 1936 and 1944. It has the same lay-out, and one of its editors, W. 
Craigie, was co-editor of the OED. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive modem authoritative work is WEBSTER'S 
THIRD New I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y of t h e E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e (W 3) that 
provoked heated discussions when it first appeared in 1961. It was originally 
published in 2 volumes, but a later edition of 1976 is in 3 volumes. The same 
year, a supplement appeared under the title Six T h o u s a n d W o r d s . This is 
contained in the most recent compilation: 12 0 0 0 W o r d s : A Supplement t o 
Webster's T h i r d , edited by Frederick C. Mish et al. (1986). 
An original venture with etymological information and usage notes, based 
on the deliberations of a panel, is The A m e r i c a n H e r i t a g e D i c t i o n a r y of t h e 
E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e (AHD), which first appeared in 1969. An abridged paperback 
edition was published in 1970. 
Another "entirely new dictionary", also with usage notes, is The Random 
H o u s e D i c t i o n a r y of t h e E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e (RHD). Symptomatically, the 
foreword of the first edition (five years after W 3!) stresses the need for a 
dictionary to be a "fully descriptive" record. The enlarged and updated second 
edition, with the subtitle U n a b r i d g e d is based on the "Random House citation 
files". In addition to various charts, tables, and the Declaration of Independence, 
it further contains four (or eight, counting both directions, e.g. E/F and F/E) 
concise bilingual dictionaries of French, Spanish, Italian, and German. 
Variation in time is responsible for dictionaries specialized on "New 
English" like A D i c t i o n a r y of New E n g l i s h (DNE, 1973) by C. L . Barnhart, 
S. Steinmetz, and R. K. Barnhart and its sequel The Second B a r n h a r t D i c t i o n a r y 
of New E n g l i s h (1980) by the same authors. Since the period covered by the 
D N E is restricted from 1963-1972 the dictionary can provide much more 
detailed information and extensive quotations are often given. The appearance 
of e.g. H o v e r c r a f t , s k a t e b o a r d , and s e x p l o i t a t i o n is recorded. 
This already demonstrates that such dictionaries become old very rapidly 
(like the NED!). The enormous rate of change of the lexicon and its record in 
medium-sized dictionaries may be further illustrated by applying the checklist 
of recent coinages, used for comparing the O A L D , COBUILD, and L D C E in 
Summers (1988: 12), also to the DNE and the two editions of COLLINS. This 
list of new words consists of: a c i d r a i n , a r b i t r a g e , baby buggy, b a g l a d y , e x p e r t 
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system, h a c k e r , i n s i d e r t r a d i n g , y u p p i e . Of these the DNE only contains a c i d 
r a i n and b a g lady and the COLLINS (1979) only a r b i t r a g e and baby buggy. 
The second edition of the latter (1986) records all the items of the list except 
i n s i d e r t r a d i n g , but gives i n s i d e r information instead. Incidentally, of the parallel 
checklist of formal, historical, and literary words, all are contained in the COD. 
Summers (1988:13 f.) concludes: 
The future for dictionaries must surely be electronic ... The dictionary could be 
partnered with a corpus of authentic written text ... paper dictionaries specially for 
ELT needs will no doubt exist for as long as there is a demand for them ... 
As a third group, besides the major British and American dictionaries, those 
for specific purposes should be briefly discussed here. For the history of 
individual words, besides the OED, the Oxford D i c t i o n a r y of E n g l i s h E t y m o l o g y 
(ODEE, 1966) and its shortened version, the C o n c i s e O D E E , edited in 1986 
by T. F. Hoad, must be mentioned. 
There are countless dictionaries of English idioms, which cannot be dealt 
with individually here. More or less idiomatic fixed collocations (cf. Lipka 
1972: 76 ff. and see also 3.2.5. and 4.3.5.) are listed in all good dictionaries. 
Two books specializing in contemporary English collocations are Friedrich/ 
Canavan (1979), D i c t i o n a r y of E n g l i s h W o r d s i n C o n t e x t , and Benson/Benson/ 
Ilson (1986), The B B l C o m b i n a t o r y D i c t i o n a r y of E n g l i s h . A special type of 
British and American collocations and proverbial sayings (from the sixteenth 
century onwards) are to be found in Partridge/Beale (1985), A D i c t i o n a r y of 
C a t c h Phrases, first edited in 1977 by E. Partridge alone. It is intended as a 
companion volume to his monumental work of reference A D i c t i o n a r y of S l a n g 
a n d U n c o n v e n t i o n a l E n g l i s h CI970), in two volumes. The corresponding work 
across the Atlantic is the D i c t i o n a r y of A m e r i c a n S l a n g C1967) by Wentworth/ 
Flexner. 
There is a related dictionary, of rather restricted scope, that deals with a 
unique phenomenon only found in one specific variety of English, namely 
Cockney, A D i c t i o n a r y of R h y m i n g S l a n g (21971) by J. Franklyn. Rhyming 
slang has some characteristics of a secret language, and consists of the 
replacement of a complex expression for a single word. Both are linked by 
rhyme, such as apples a n d pears for s t a i r s , t r o u b l e a n d strife for wife. Often 
the expressions are abbreviated, which destroys the connection by rhyme. Thus, 
daisy r o o t s for boots is shortened to d a i s i e s and c h i n a p l a t e , for m a t e , according 
to Franklyn (21961:50) is "invariably reduced to C h i n a " . Some terms have 
gained wider currency, beyond Cockney, as e.g. loaf (of b r e a d ) for head, as 
in the expression use y o u r loaf 'think!*. 
As with idioms, there are many books on good current usage, especially 
for teaching purposes. I shall single out two here, which I believe to be most 
valuable for foreign users, particularly German ones. A balanced and objective 
look at contemporary vocabulary is given in Howard (1985), A G u i d e t o G o o d 
E n g l i s h i n t h e 1980s, with helpful advice about sexist, racist, and four-letter 
words. The same year, Pascoe/Pascoe (1985), Sprachfalien i m E n g l i s c h e n , was 
37 
published, an extremely useful small dictionary, functioning as an eye- and ear-
opener, warning of false friends. 
For the purposes of hearing and pronouncing correctly, the standard 
pronouncing dictionaries for the two most important national standard varieties 
of English are still Jones/Gimson (141977), E v e r y m a n ' s E n g l i s h P r o n o u n c i n g 
D i c t i o n a r y (the EPD) and Kenyon/Knott (41953), A P r o n o u n c i n g D i c t i o n a r y of 
A m e r i c a n E n g l i s h . A most useful addition is the B B C P r o n o u n c i n g D i c t i o n a r y 
of B r i t i s h Names (21983), with no American equivalent. In case of need the 
larger dictionaries must be consulted. For determining the frequency of words 
and their particular meanings, we have West (31967) A G e n e r a l S e r v i c e L i s t 
of E n g l i s h W o r d s (GSL) and HoflanaYJohansson (1982), W o r d F r e q u e n c i e s i n 
B r i t i s h a n d A m e r i c a n E n g l i s h . The latter contains only word lists based on the 
L O B and Brown corpora, without differentiating senses and not even 
homonyms.25 
In the fourth category, there are dictionaries of a very different kind, not 
organized according to the normal alphabetical principle and without any 
explanations or definitions. The Reverse D i c t i o n a r y of P r e s e n t - D a y E n g l i s h by 
M . Lehnert (1971) is a list of words arranged according to the letters they end 
with. Such "dictionaries", which merely list words in reverse order, may be 
useful to the philologist for the emendation of mutilated texts, the intelligence 
expert for the deciphering of codes, as a rhyming dictionary, and for research 
in word-formation, in particular connected with suffixation. 
The last type of non-alphabetical, thematical reference book is the thesaurus. 
In such a work, lexical items are arranged on a more or less intuitively 
determined basis of similarity of meaning and association. This principle of 
arrangement is more linguistic than a mere alphabetical listing. However, in 
practice, explicit semantic criteria are not used and normally modem linguistic 
research in the area is not drawn upon (but cf. McArthur 1986 :esp. 119ff., 
148 ff). 
For the English-speaking world, ever since 1852 when the first edition 
appeared, ROGET's Thesaurus of E n g l i s h W o r d s a n d Phrases has been a 
household name. It was devised by Peter Mark Roget, as his own personal 
instrument for improving his powers of expression. In 1805, as a young doctor, 
he started setting up a "classed catalogue of words". Since then the work has 
gone through many editions, and has been published by various editors and 
publishing houses. The latest edition was prepared by Betty Kirkpatrick, and 
published in 1987 by Longman. 
According to the preface (1987: vii): 
The GSL does consider "semantic frequencies", as mentioned in its subtide. 
However, since it was originally produced in 1936 and revised in 1953 (with 
a number of subsequent impressions), it is questionable how far it represents 
good contemporary usage. Thus there seems to be a need for up-to-date 
frequency counts, which are of considerable importance for language learning 
(cf. Carter 1987:43, 183ff). 
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This new edition has been made necessary by the unprecedented rapid expansion 
of the English vocabulary in the 1980s, reflecting major scientific, cultural and social 
changes. 
Examples given of such neologisms include a c i d r a i n , A I D S , c e l l u l a r r a d i o , 
g e n e t i c f i n g e r p r i n t etc. This strongly reminds us of the never-ending story of 
the OED. 
The grouping of items in ROGET's Thesaurus is according to logical 
connection and semantic likeness (cf. McArthur 1986:120 f.). Sets are established 
by deduction and association and may be compared to our "lexical sets" (as 
opposed to "lexical fields", see 4.2.5.). The classification starts from 6 very 
general classes, which are then split up into larger categories, or "sections", 
and ultimately into roughly 990 "heads" oder "topics". These are intended to 
subsume practically the whole range of ideas expressed in the vocabulary. The 
six general classes are: 1. "Abstract Relations", 2. "Space", 3. "Matter", 4. 
"Intellect", 5. "Volition", and 6. "Affections". These are further split up into 
subclasses called "sections". Thus, e.g. Class 1: A b s t r a c t R e l a t i o n s consists of 
the 8 "Sections": "Existence, Relation, Quantity, Order, Number, Time, Change, 
Causation". These distinctions are not based on linguistic principles, such as 
paradigmatic or syntagmatic relations between words or their contents. It is 
therefore no strict semantic classification. However, since R O G E T ' s Thesaurus 
groups together words related logically and by subject matter, it is an 
inexhaustible treasure house for finding the appropriate and "correct" word in 
the writing of texts. The most recent - and at the same time original - thesaurus 
of the English language was produced by Tom McArthur, at the end of nine 
years' work, published in 1981 as the L o n g m a n L e x i c o n of C o n t e m p o r a r y 
E n g l i s h (LLCE), based on the material of the L D C E . Following ROGET's 
example, the L e x i c o n attempts a combination of: a) thematization, as in the 
work of compilers of human knowledge over the centuries, and b) semantic 
structuring, as proposed by linguists like John Lyons and certain anthropologists 
(cf. McArthur 1986:148 f.). 
As stated in the preface, the L L C E (1981: vi) "has only fourteen 'semantic 
fields' of a pragmatic, everyday nature", e.g. A : "Life and Living Things", B : 
"The Body: its Functions and Welfare", C: "People and the Family", etc. As 
only explained in McArthur (1986: 149 f.), these "themes" represent the 
"macrostructure" of the L e x i c o n . They each contain a range of "sub-themes", 
or "supersets", like e.g. life and death, living creatures, animals/mammals, birds, 
etc. (of A "Life and Living Things"), or the universe, light and colour, weather 
and temperature, etc. (of L "Space and Time"). These, in turn, are further sub-
divided into "lexical sets" or "word sets", which form the "microstructure" of 
the L e x i c o n . The author openly admits the subjectivity of the method and labels 
its result "Tom McArthur's taxonomy of semantic fields". Thus, the L L C E is 
based on the view that language and the world cannot be interpreted inde-
pendently of each other, and that our linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge is 
stored as a network of associations in a conceptual framework. This approach is 
clearly compatible with our discussion of association and "lexical sets" in 4.2.5. 
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Chapter II 
THE LINGUISTIC SIGN. What's in a Word? 
After discussing some problems of a general nature, we now turn to various 
aspects of the linguistic sign. First and foremost we have to look at some 
important models of the linguistic sign (2.1.) which derive from Saussure's ideas 
about it, although these views will be modified later (see 4.1.1.). Closely 
connected is the further question about the definition of the meaning of the 
linguistic sign (2.2.). In this context we may distinguish purely language-
immanent approaches from those that take into account the extra-linguistic 
reality. If, following Saussure, we separate the language system (his l a n g u e ) 
from its realization and application (his p a r o l e ) we then must distinguish 
between 'denotation' and 'reference' (2.2.3.). 
But the linguistic sign not only has a meaning, it also has a form. If we 
start from this aspect, we must distinguish between words, word-forms,, 
morphemes (defined here as the smallest signs of a language), and lexemes 
(2.3.). The distinction between 'type' and 'token', is also relevant here. 
2.1. Models of the Sign 
In modem linguistics, Saussure was the first scholar to consider language as 
a structured system of signs. From this basic assumption he derived several 
further axioms, which we cannot discuss in detail here. His binary model of 
the sign, however, must be considered more closely. A second important 
concept is Ogden/Richards's s e m i o t i c t r i a n g l e . It is crucial to realize that both 
models - Saussure's and Ogden/Richards's - abstract from certain facts that 
have been rediscovered in linguistics during the last twenty years or so (cf. 
Lipka 1975a). These are the users of signs, the context of use, and the function 
of the linguistic sign. A l l three have since been integrated into linguistics under 
the label "linguistic pragmatics". A model of the linguistic sign that does not 
only encompass extra-linguistic reality, but also speaker, hearer, and the 
functions of language, is the so-called "Organon Model" postulated in 1934 
by Karl Bühler (cf. Buhler 21965 and Hormann 1986 :esp. 79ff.). A closer 
inspection of this model, too, is indispensable in my opinion. 
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2.1.1. Saussure's Approach 
In Saussure's view of language as a system of signs, sign and system are 
mutually conditioning, since a sign only derives its value from within the 
system on the basis of its relation to other signs. This structural insight is 
particularly relevant for the theory of lexical fields (Wortfeld, cf. LYONS 1977: 
250-261, Lipka 1980). Although Saussure in his posthumously published work 
of 1916 explicitly deals with the concrete process of communication, as an 
exchange between a speaker and a hearer (Saussure 31965: 27-29), he later 
abstracts from this process and concentrates on the non-individual, social, 
abstract language system which he called l a n g u e . 
For him the linguistic sign itself has two sides: a given notion ("concept") 
that is associated in the brain with a certain phonic image ("image acoustique"). 
Both are mutually conditioning and evoke, or call each other up, mutually. This 
is symbolized by the arrows in the following diagram (1) taken over in slightly 
modified form from Saussure 01965: 99): 
(1) Saussure's model: 
Saussure stresses repeatedly that the linguistic sign is a mental unit ("une entité 
psychique à deux faces"), and does not link a thing and a name, but a concept 
and a phonic image. This image is for him nothing material, physical, but a 
mental impression of a sound. The connection of c o n c e p t and i m a g e a c o u s t i q u e , 
of concept and sound picture, for Saussure constitutes the s i g n e l i n g u i s t i q u e , 
the linguistic sign. The notions "concept" and "image acoustique" are latej 
replaced by him by the terms signifié and s i g n i f i a n t , which have since become 
internationally accepted technical terms, due to their precision and un-
ambiguousness. It must be pointed out here, that s i g n e , signifié and s i g n i f i a n t 
are all considered as discrete entities by Saussure. The model is therefore 
incapable of handling the fuzziness inherent in all languages (see 2.2.3.). 
Saussure's psychological approach is essentially different from another 
linguistic school, which is also usually included under the comprehensive label 
"structuralism", namely American linguistics during the forties and fifties. The 
North American structuralists, who considered as their authority Bloomfield and 
his book L a n g u a g e (1933), tried to ban subjectivism and intuition from the 
description of language. A psychological view of language was therefore 
frowned upon in so-called "taxonomic structuralism" as the "deadly sin" of 
"mentalism". For this reason, most linguists regarded statements about the 
meaning of linguistic elements that were based on introspection as highly 
suspect. Semantic description, i.e. conclusions concerning the meaning side of 
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language, was either postponed to a later period, when semantics could be 
captured with more objective means, or was identified with the results of the 
natural sciences. Thus, Bloomfield himself (1933:139) claimed that the meaning 
of the English word s a l t was 'sodium chloride (NapT. 
Saussure (M965 :100ff.) postulates two prmciplesM^Jlhe arbitrariness of the 
sign, and/zTVhe linear character of the s i g n i f i a n t . For him the relation between 
the two siti€s of the linguistic sign is fundamentally arbitrary ("arbitraire"), non-
motivated, or conventional. There is no necessary connection between the 
s i g n i f i i and the s i g n i f i a n t . Even onomatopoeic words (sound symbolism), like 
c u c k o o , and interjections, like o u c h , are for him basically not motivated and 
are acquired conventions of a specific language system. We may, however, 
object to this view. With some onomatopoeic formations, e.g. c r a s h , b a n g , d i n g -
d o n g etc., there exists nevertheless a non-arbitrary relation between s i g n i f i a n t 
and s i g n i f y . Furthermore, as Saussure (31965: 180 ff.) himself points out, there 
are degrees of arbitrariness and transitions between arbitrary and motivated 
formations and vice versa. Thus, the principle of arbitrariness only holds for 
simple linguistic signs. Combinations of signs, such as complex lexemes, may 
be morphologically motivated by their constituents, as e.g. t w e n t y - f o u r , s i x t y -
e i g h t , or houseboat, l e t t e r w r i t e r . Saussure (31965: 181) speaks of "elements 
formatifs transparents", but it would be better to consider the whole combination 
to be transparent. In modem semiotics, i.e. the general theory of signs, the 
motivated, non-arbitrary sign is called 'icon', and is distinguished from the 
arbitrary sign labelled 'symbol'. One may further distinguish between primary 
and secondary iconicity (cf. Lyons 1977:193 f.). 
According to Saussure's second principle, of the linearity of t h z s i j > n i f i a n t v 
this is made up of a chain of temporally successive elements. The principle 
is based in the last resort on the fact that one cannot produce several sounds 
simultaneously. The linearity corresponds to the syntagmatic dimension of lan-
guage already treated, but on the phonetic and phonological level. 
• > T o sum up, for Saussure the linguistic sign is binary or bilateral, since it 
insists of two pans. Its meaning, its content, is defined as a concept and there-
fore as a psychological or mental entity. Saussure consequently uses a binary, 
mentalistic model of the sign abstracted from the users and the functions of 
the sign. In this binary model the extralinguistic object denoted by the linguistic 
sign is not included. This, however, plays a role in the triadic model developed 
by Ogden and Richards to which we will now turn. 
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2.1.2. Ogden/Richards's "Semiotic Triangle" 
The model of the linguistic sign developed by Ogden and Richards is represented 
in (2) in modified form: 
(2) THOUGHT or REFERENCE 
SYMBOL ("word") ("thing") REFERENT 
Besides the term 'semiotic triangle*, the labels 'triangle of signification', and 
'referential triangle' are also used in the literature. The last term is justified 
by the fact that the model includes the "referent". It has to be interpreted in 
the following way. There is no direct relationship between the word or 'symbol' 
and the extralinguistic thing or 'referent' denoted by it. This is symbolized by 
the broken line connecting the two, which Ogden/Richards characterize as "an 
imputed relation", saying that the 'symbol' "stands for" the 'referent'. The 
relationship between the two is indirect and mediated by a concept or "thought", 
which Ogden/Richards also label reference. Since in this schema a psychological 
or mental entity, namely t h o u g h t , plays a role, we have a mentalistic model 
here too. 
The term r e f e r e n c e , identified with t h o u g h t , is used in a different way by 
Ogden/Richards than in many recent linguistic theories. In the latter, reference 
is usually understood as a relational concept (see 2.2.3.). 
The term is either used for the relation between the full linguistic sign and 
an extralinguistic referent, or the action of a speaker referring to an extra-
linguistic object by means of a linguistic sign. According to Ogden/Richards's 
semiotic triangle, there is then, for example, no direct relation between the 
s i g n i f i a n t (or symbol) d o g and a certain class of living beings, or a specific 
element of this class. They stress the point that the meaning of a linguistic 
symbol (as a concept or thought) has to be clearly distinguished from the 
extralinguistic object (or referent) denoted by it. Words, as linguistic signs, are 
therefore indirectly related to extralinguistic referents. 
For this relationship (besides r e f e r e n c e ) some linguists, such as Coseriu 
(1970:159) have used the term d e s i g n a t i o n ("Bezeichnung"). Coseriu postulates 
that designation, as a relation between linguistic signs and extralinguistic 
referents, has to be clearly distinguished from s i g n i f i c a t i o n ("Bedeutung"), i.e. 
the content of words or the relation between the contents of words. We will 
return to this problem. 
Saussure's binary model of the sign is thus expanded in the semiotic triangle 
into a triadic model with the comers s y m b o l , t h o u g h t , and referent (cf. Lyons 
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1977: 96, where "sign", "concept", and "significatum" are used). However, this 
model still excludes the speaker and the hearer. Thus, both models, the 
"Saussurean egg" and the triangle, are non-pragmatic, in that they abstract from 
the users of the sign. It was as late as 1934, when Karl Biihler, in his organon 
theory of language ("Organonmodell der Sprache"), also included the speaker 
and the hearer in his theory as well as the extralinguistic referent. 
2.1.3. Buhler 's "Organon M o d e l " 
Biihler proposed his model of the sign in the book S p r a c h t h e o r i e (Linguistic 
Theory), published in 1934. It bears the subtitle D i e D a r s t e l l u n g s f u n k t i o n der 
S p r a c h e (The Representational Function of Language). His theory, following Plato, 
which views language and its signs as a tool (= o r g a n o n ) , is represented in 
somewhat simplified form in the following diagram (cf. Hbrmann 1986:79ff.). 
(3) Buhler's organon model: 
Diagram (3) has to be understood in the following way. The sign in the centre 
links a sender (normally the speaker) with an addressee (normally the hearer) 
and the represented objects and relations. The connecting lines between the sign 
and the three elements just mentioned symbolize the three most important 
functions of the complex sign, i.e. language, namely: EXPRESSION (also called 
' e m o t i v e function'), REPRESENTATION (also called ' r e f e r e n t i a l function'), and 
APPEAL (also called ' c o n a t i v e or v o c a t i v e function'). Language, as weU asjhe 
individual lmguisjtic sign, is an "organon", i.e. an instrument or tool for its 
users, hence the name of Buhler's linguistic model. The linguistic sign, as an 
instrument, is an expression of the sender who uses it, i.e. the speaker in the 
spoken and the writer in the written medium. At the same time it serves for 
the representation of objects, states of affairs, and relations, i.e. the 
extralinguistic referents. Thirdly the linguistic sign and language in general have 
the function of appeal to the addressee, i.e. the hearer or reader. 
Objects and relations 
REPRESENTATION 
EXPRESSION 
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As an expression of the speaker or writer, i.e. due to its dependence on the 
sender, the linguistic sign is a Symptom. Because of its correlation with an extra-
linguistic referent, it is at the same time a Symbol. In view of its relation to 
an addressee, whose behaviour it is meant to direct and control, the sign, finally, 
is a S i g n a l . These three types of sign, as well as functions of the complex lin-
guistic sign (and therefore language in general) may be summarized as follows: 
(4) 1. EXPRESSION (speaker, writer) Symptom 
2. REPRESENTATION (referent) Symbol 
3. APPEAL (hearer, reader) S i g n a l 
i''' -
Bühler's model has been expanded by others, e.g. by Jakobson (1960), who 
added three additional functions, namely the ' m e t a l i n g u i s t i c ' , the 'phatic* and jhe 
' p o e t i c f u n c t i o n ' (see 2.2.4. for the connection with types of meaning). Jakobson 
does not dispute the domination of the representational function of language, 
but argues for a mixing of functions in the concrete realisation of a sign. Bühler 
is interested in the concrete speech situation and therefore in the problem of 
deixis. By this term one usually understands some kind of pointing, anchored 
in the speech situation, by means of gestures and words, to the people involved, 
in particular the speaker, as well as to the place and time of speaking. Deictic 
expressions, sometimes called "indexical" signs, relate utterances to the spatio-
temporal co-ordinates of the act of speaking, namely to speaker, hearer, and 
their location. Traditionally, a distinction is made between person deixis, place 
deixis, and time deixis (cf. Lyons 1977:281f., 636ff.). 
In Bühler's S p r a c h t h e o r i e (21965:79ff.) the important second chapter deals 
with the field of pointing and the pointer words ("Zeigfeld der Sprache" and 
"Zeigwörter"). The origin of the field of pointing and of the orientational system 
is the speaker at a particular place and a particular time. This centre point can 
be represented by the pointer words h i e r , j e t z t , i c h I h e r e , n o w , 1 (21965:102). 
Other linguists, e.g. Fillmore, have referred to this phenomen as deictic 
anchoring. For Bühler ^1965:81, 90) pointer words ("Zeigwörter"), such as 
h e r e , t h e r e , function primarily as Signals ("Signale"), whereas naming words 
("Nennwörter, Gegenstandszeichen"), such as t a b l e , t r e e , h a t , are Symbols 
("Symbole") for extralinguistic objects. Pointer words are at the same time 
Symbols, since e.g. h e r e denotes a location, t o d a y may denote any day, and 
/, y o u denote the sender and addressee. 
In the following discussion of the structure of the English lexicon, we will 
largely neglect pointer words (although they are not exclusively signals) and 
pragmatic phenomena, such as deixis. We will rather concentrate on the other 
type of signs which Bühler calls symbols. These are often referred to also as 
"content words" or "contentives". The latter usually stand in opposition to the 
so-called "function words" or "grammatical words" (cf. Jackson 1988:15 ff.), 
which are said to have grammatical function rather than lexical content. We 
will return to this distinction in 2.3. It has a long tradition and was made earlier, e.g. 
by Sweet, in terms of "full words" vs. "form words" (sometimes "empty words" 
is used). The term f u n c t i o n w o r d is mainly used in American structuralist 
45 
linguistics and in language teaching. Both pointer words and function words 
have in common that they belong to relatively restricted grammatical systems, 
i.e. so-called closed classes (cf. Quirk et al. 1985:67ff., see also 2.3.1., 4.1.2.). 
These are more or less stable and do not change in a language except over 
a long period. Instead of looking at such closed sets, we will mostly concentrate 
on elements of open classes, such as nouns, adjectives, and verbs. 
2.2. The Meaning of Signs and Kinds of 'Meaning' 
That m e a n i n g is a notational term (like several others we have already 
discussed) becomes particularly apparent if we look at Ogden/Richards's book 
(21949:186f.) entided The M e a n i n g of M e a n i n g where a list of 22 definitions 
of m e a n i n g is given. There is certainly no single, correct explanation of mean-
i n g . Lyons (see 2.2.4.) distinguishes three kinds of meaning, or semantic in-
formation, namely 'descriptive meaning', 'social meaning', and 'expressive 
meaning'. For him, these are correlated with the descriptive, social, and 
expressive functions of language. In most chapters of his book, however, he 
is solely concerned with 'descriptive meaning'. 
Leech 01981:23) identifies m e a n i n g in the widest sense with c o m m u n i c a t i v e 
v a l u e . This comprehensive notion may be split up into three groups: 1. sense, 
2. a s s o c i a t i v e m e a n i n g and 3. t h e m a t i c m e a n i n g (see 2.2.4.). The second category 
may itself be further divided into a number of subgroups (a-e), as shown in 
the following diagram: 
(5) 
MEANING = 
COMMUNICATIVE < 
VALUE 
r 1. conceptual m. (sense) 
2. associative m. 
^ 3. thematic m. 
a. connotanve m. 
b. stylistic m. 
c. affective m. 
d. reflected m. 
e. collocative m. 
According to Leech sense, or c o n c e p t u a l m e a n i n g , is the most important 
element in linguistic communication. This is probably the reason why he 
restricts himself, like Lyons, almost exclusively to this type of meaning. We 
will return to the other kinds later, as well as to the three levels of word 
meaning Leech introduced in the second edition of his book 01981:121). A 
crucial point in any discussion of meaning is the relationship between language 
and the extralinguistic world (2.2.1.). This is closely connected with the question 
of the fuzzy nature of meaning. Both cannot be regarded independently of the 
general problem of which approach to semantics is chosen (2.2.2.). In this 
context Lyons (1977) convincingly introduces a useful distinction between reference 
and d e n o t a t i o n (2.2.3.). Following a discussion of this distinction, we must have 
a look at the various kinds of nondescriptive meaning (2.2.4.). Finally, the 
opposition between denotation and connotation leads to a consideration of the 
notion of markedness (2.2.5.). 
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2.2.1. Language and Reality 
We have already seen that Coseriu stresses the importance of the distinction 
between s i g n i f i c a t i o n ("Bedeutung") and d e s i g n a t i o n ("Bezeichnung"). D e s i g -
n a t i o n , for him, denotes the relationship between the full linguistic sign 
(combining s i g n i f i a n t and signifif) and the extralinguistic object or referent. 
Only s i g n i f i c a t i o n , however, is purely linguistic and linguistically structured, 
and it alone is therefore relevant for structural semantics. Nevertheless, he does 
not deny the importance of d e s i g n a t i o n for communication and actual speech. 
He distinguishes three types of designation (cf. Kastovsky 1982a:26f.): 1. Desig-
nation in speech, as when p i g is used instead of m a n ; 2. multiple designation, 
as when the same referent is classified as either house, b u i l d i n g , c o t t a g e , etc. 
and 3. the coalescence or syncretism of classes of referents, as when in Greek 
the human species is classified as either d n t h r d p o s ('man as non-animal') or 
as b r o t d s ('man as non-god'). 
According to Coseriu the distinction between 'signification' and 'designation' 
is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it is possible to denote the same 
extralinguistic object with different linguistic means. Secondly, linguistic and 
extralinguistic relations must not be confused, since knowledge of the language 
is not to be identified with the knowledge of the world and of objects. 
Coseriu, Lyons (1977:197ff.) and other linguists often quote famous 
examples from philosophers such as Frege and Husserl which demonstrate the 
need to distinguish between the meaning of a linguistic expression and its 
relationship to an extralinguistic object in reality. These are often treated in 
the context of a discussion of what to understand by reference. Thus, according 
to the logician Frege's classic example, the complex words m o r n i n g s t a r (Mor-
g e n s t e r n ) and ev£mng_siar ( A b e n d s t e r n ) both refer to the same extralinguistic 
referent, namely the planet They obviously have a different meaning. 
Similarly, as Husserl noted, the expressions t h e v i c t o r a t Jena and t h e l o s e r 
a t W a t e r l o o clearly differ in meaning (or 'sense' in Lyons's terminology), buT 
have the same reference, or, as Coseriu would call it, d e s i g n a t i o n . Although 
v i c t o r and l o s e r are not only different in meaning, but opposites, they may be 
used for referring to an identical referent, to whom, for instance, the proper 
name N a p o l e o n could also have been applied. 
However, in this case - and strictly speaking also in the case of t h e m o r n i n g 
s t a r and t h e e v e n i n g s t a r - we do not have a single word for referring to an 
object, but a whole expression, a so-called 'definite d e s c r i p t i o n * . Only in this 
case does Lyons (1977) use the term reference and speak of an extralinguistic 
r e f e r e n t . The relationship between a single word, or lexeme, and a class of 
objects (or a single element from this class) is called d e n o t a t i o n by Lyons, 
while he calls the class, or set, or category of objects denoted by a lexeme 
d e n o t a t u m (1977: 207). We will return to these distinctions presently. What 
is important at the moment is that both reference and d e n o t a t i o n , as used by 
Lyons, fall together in Coseriu's d e s i g n a t i o n , but are strictly separated by him 
from s i g n i f i c a t i o n . 
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Coseriu's concept of m e a n i n g ( s i g n i f i c a t i o n , B e d e u t u n g ) excludes extra-
linguistic objects and relations, and is therefore restricted to language itself. 
His position can thus be characterized as a language^ntrir^ 
immanent approach to structural semantics. In his theory, lexical items are 
opposedtoeadTotrier, and this opposition or contrast yields specific 'distinctive 
features' or semantic components. The methods or techniques of phonology, 
as a functional and language-immanent discipline, are carried over to lexical 
and semantic structures and applied in semantic analysis. 
It must be pointed out that words are not simply names for pre-existing 
extralinguistic categories. Different languages do not capture reality in the same 
way. This becomes particularly evident in language comparison, as carried out 
by contrastive linguistics. Thus, e.g. Ger Student and L e h r e r do not denote the 
same class of extralinguistic objects as student and teacher, since in German 
we also have S t u d e n t i n and L e h r e r i n , which must be used if the referent is 
female.1 The classes, or categories, denoted by the first two pairs of words, 
are therefore not identical. Student and S t u d e n t i n taken together are equivalent 
to the category student in English. 
The distinction that must be made in German, but is neutralized in English, 
is also relevant in English when a different word class is at stake, namely 
pronouns. In the singular, the linguistic distinction of gender between he and 
she largely coincides with the respective biological categories of sex.2 On the 
other hand, they may refer to persons of any sex and also to things. The mean-
ing of they therefore contains "less" than that of he or she. In more precise 
terms, adopted from the logic of classes, the 'intension' (in German B e griffs-
i n h a l t ) , i.e. the set of properties which determines the applicability of the term, 
is smaller. Conversely, the 'extension' (German Begriffsumfang) of they is larger, 
since the class of things to which it may be applied is larger, i.e. it may be 
used for denoting more referents (see diagram (8) p. 51).3 
This is a simplification. The lexeme student consists of various lexical units 
(e.g. in a student of h u m a n n a t u r e , cf. the different entries in LDCE and 
LDCE 2 and the respective "usage notes"). In AmE the word is also used for 
children in schools (pupils in BrE). For the exact delimitation of the class of 
referents, the lexical set (see 4.2.5.) for the persons concerned must be consi-
dered, including at least student, pupil, and scholar (cf. I 136 in the LLCE). 
A semantic change in the word gender seems to be under way, as witnessed 
by recent publications and the use of the word in TIME magazine, replacing 
sex, in the sense 'condition of being either male or female* (still the first 
definition in LDCE 2). This new use of gender is labelled infml in LDCE 1 
and euph in LDCE 2. Cf. also OEDS s.v. sex. 
The static, logical sense of extension ('class of objects' vs. intension 'set of 
essential properties') (cf. Lyons 1977:158f., 1981 ff.) must not be confused with 
the traditional, dynamic, historical sense of extension (e.g. in metaphorical 
extension) characterizing a kind of semantic change or transfer. Thus, Ger 
Abendstern and Morgenstern have the same 'extension', since they bom denote 
die planet Venus, but Ger B a l l and E b a l l do not, a fact which is relevant for 
contrastive and applied linguistics. The extensions of AmE and BrE student 
also differ. 
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In general terms, the different categorization of the same extralinguistic 
reality by different languages may be represented as in the following diagram, 
adapted from Leisi (21985: 5) (cf. also Lipka 1989a). 
(6) 
Language A word 1 word 2 word 3 
extralinguistic 
I reality I OAAAAAAP 
Language B word r word 2' word 3* 
This may be interpreted as follows. In the extralinguistic world, there are no 
clear-cut borderlines or distinctions. The lines between certain categories are 
only drawn in a specific language. It is not the case, as is often believed, in 
a naive view of language, that pre-existing categories in nature simply have 
to be correlated with their respective names (cf. Lipka 1988b). There are no 
clearly distinct categories of things, processes and properties in reality. This 
is most obvious if we compare colour terms in different languages (cf. Bennet 
1988). Although the physical spectrum of light, split up according to wave-
lenght, is the same everywhere, different languages take a different choice. 
Thus, the extralinguistic continuum is articulated and categorized in a language-
specific way. To apply (6) to our example: word 1 in the diagram (e.g. Student) 
and word 2 (e.g. S t u d e n t i n ) taken together are almost equivalent to word 1' 
in the schematic representation (student), but in the concrete example they cover 
exactly the same ground. We may say that two lexical items in one language 
(e.g. German) converge in a single lexical item in another (e.g. English), and 
thus, that there is 'convergence*. Looking at the same situation from the point 
of view of the other language, e.g. English, or, more concretely from the 
perspective of a native speaker of that language, we have 'divergence', i.e. the 
speaker has to make a choice between two (or more) items in the target 
language when he wants to render a single item of his own language (cf. Farrell 
31977). 
This non-coincidence of categories, even with very concrete everyday words, 
can be illustrated with the following examples (from Lipka 1981a: 376 f.). The 
German category Schnecke is split up in English into s n a i l and s l u g . The 
category Affe corresponds to the two categories ape and monkey in English. 
This situation can be represented in the following way, where the extension 
of the English terms taken together is equivalent to the range or class of 
referents of the German lexeme: 
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(7a) 
S e h n e c k e 
Ob) 
A f f e 
snail slug ape monkey 
If a German speaker wants to translate Straße into English, he has to make 
a choice between s t r e e t and r o a d . In this case we have divergence of the lexical 
items in the target language English. But beware of false friends such as 
A p a r t m e n t / a p a r t m e n t , B l i t z / b l i t z , B u t t e r b o h n e n l b u t t e r beans etc. (cf. Pascoe & 
Pascoe, 1985). 
In the case of s n a i l and s l u g there are no equivalent items in German, at 
least in the simple vocabulary, the so called primary vocabulary. However, as 
soon as we turn to complex lexemes, the so-called secondary vocabulary, the 
differences can be rendered in German as well, by using the compounds 
W e i n b e r g s c h n e c k e and Nacktschnecke. Syntactic paraphrases could also be used, 
such as e.g. Schnecke m i t / o h n e H a u s . This possibility is due to the interrelation 
of syntagmatic modification and paradigmatic lexical structuring in languages 
(cf. Lipka 1981a). The same holds for Menschenaffe/ape and Äffchenlmonkey. 
Cases of divergence in German, for native speakers of English, are eat vs. 
essenlfressen and d r i n k vs. t r i n k e n ! s a u f e n . The English learner of German must 
discover under which conditions each word is used.4 For the German learner 
of English, however, no problem arises, since there is convergence in eat and 
d r i n k . On the other hand, he has a problem when he wants to translate the 
German category H a n d s c h u h , which is split up in English into g l o v e and m i t t e n . 
There are specific complex words for this in German, namely F i n g e r h a n d s c h u h 
and F a u s t h a n d s c h u h , or Fäustling. However, in English there is no superordinate 
term for g l o v e and m i t t e n , and so we have an obligatory distinction that must 
be drawn in the classification of extralinguistic reality. 
To show that the situation may be even more complicated, let us look at 
the German equivalents for p a p e r w e i g h t and p a p e r knife. Here, the German 
lexical items B r i e f b e s c h w e r e r and Brieföffner may be considered as denoting 
practically the same class of extralinguistic objects.5 Although the denotation 
4 Farrell CI977) is no help here since he does not treat either verb, but only 
gives Ger Getränk, Trank, Trunk, the paraphrase etwas zu t r i n k e n , A l k o h o l , and 
the nominalized verb Trinken as equivalents of the E noun d r i n k . The informal 
verb gobble comes fairly close to Ger fressen when applied to humans, though 
it has the extra element 'quickly', not contained in fressen. By contrast, eat is 
not restricted to humans (see 4.3. for syntagmatic relations). 
5 AmE letter opener (equivalent to BrE paper knife) does not subsume the instru-
ment under the category of knives (cf. LLCErH 140). From the illustrations in 
LLCE and LDCE 2 (s.v. knife) the best English equivalent of Ger Taschen-
messer is penknife, but pocketknife is also possible. Another most interesting 
contrastive example of language-specific categorization (E/Ger and BrE/AmE) is 
Ger N a d e l vs. E pin/needle (cf. the illustrations in LDCE 2, s.v. needle, p i n ) . 
It is also instructive for the usefulness of the notions of 'prototype' and 'visual 
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(Coseriu's d e s i g n a t i o n ) of the English and German linguistic signs is almost 
identical, the meaning of the complex words (e.g. 'knife for paper(s)\ 'Offner 
fur Briefe') is clearly different. 
If we confine ourselves to a single language, and return to the example 
student discussed above, we can see that the same referent may be designated, 
or referred to, by means of a variety of different words. The choice of words 
with a different meaning depends on the speaker and his intentions. Thus, instead 
of student, the following linguistic signs could be used: b e g i n n e r , c a n d i d a t e , 
but also son, u n c l e , husband, or d a u g h t e r , a u n t , wife. This is another case of 
what has been called multiple designation above (p. 47). Consequendy, the meaning 
of linguistic signs and their use for referring to extralinguistic objects or re-
lations, in specific situations, must be distinguished in principle (see also 2.2.3.).6 
In the previous discussion we have not been concerned with individual 
extralinguistic objects in the real world, but mainly with whole categories or 
classes of referents in reality. A class can be considered as a collection of 
individuals. In order to describe the relationship between classes, the logic of 
classes, or set theory, may be used (cf. Lyons 1977:154ff.). In the graphic 
representation of such relations so-called Venn diagrams are often used (Lyons 
1977:158). Class-membership may be given either by means of an extensional 
definition, i.e. by listing its members, or by an intensional definition, i.e. by 
giving its identifiable, essential properties. 
For our purposes the most important concept is that of the inclusion of 
classes, or class-inclusion (cf. Lyons 1977:156f). Since linguistic signs have 
both meaning and denotation, two different types of inclusion are possible that 
must not be confused. Either the meaning (or 'sense' in Leech's use) of one 
item may be included in that of another, or the class of extralinguistic referents 
denoted by a sign may be included in the class of referents denoted by another 
sign. Thus, we may distinguish between m e a n i n g (or sense) i n c l u s i o n and 
r e f e r e n t i a l (or denotationaf) i n c l u s i o n (derived from the noun referent). This 
is represented in the following diagram: 
meaning (sense) inclusion vs. referential (denotational) inclusion 
intension extension 
image' (cf. Lipka 1989b, Ilson 1987), metaphor, metonomy, and collocation 
(e.g. to needle, pins and needles) (see 3.3.3., 3.4., 4.3.5.). 
6 To be precise, referring is a matter of pragmatics (cf. Cruse 1977). Context-
dependent 'reference' (in the sense of Lyons 1977:177) is not made by means 
of 'lexemes' (nouns, or verbs) but means of 'referring expressions' (e.g. the 
noun phrases: that embittered old bachelor, the professor of linguistics, the 
postman) containing them. 
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As pointed out by Leech (21981:93) there is an inverse relationship between 
"meaning inclusion" and "referential inclusion". This is equivalent to the traditional 
logical relationship between the intension and the extension of a term. Thus, 
the meaning of a n i m a l is included in the meaning of h o r s e , but the class of 
referents of h o r s e is included in the class of referents of a n i m a l . Similarly, 
the meaning of a n i m a l is included in the meaning of p o o d l e , but the class of 
referents of p o o d l e is included in the category, class, or set of dogs, and is 
therefore a subclass or subset. 
This brings us back to the vexing problem of the fuzzy nature of word 
meaning. The question of referential boundaries and the recognition of the fact 
that word meanings are not always precise, but rather essentially vague, have 
received growing interest in recent linguistics. As far back as 1960, the phi-
losopher Quine (1960:125-156) discussed referential vagueness and opacity in 
chapter 4 of his book Word a n d O b j e c t , entitled "Vagaries of Reference". Quine 
talks about "fuzzy edges" and mentions that terms denoting physical objects 
may be vague in two ways. This is illustrated by his example m o u n t a i n (1960: 
126), which is: 
vague on the score of how much terrain to reckon into each of the indisputable 
mountains, and it is vague on die score of what lesser eminences to count as 
mountains at all. 
Thus, the physical extent of the extralinguistic object denoted by m o u n t a i n is 
not precisely delimited and it is also unclear where to draw the line between 
a m o u n t a i n and a h i l l , as distinct categories. 
Leech (21981:120f), in his discussion of "fuzzy meaning", points out that 
it is not at all easy to state what persons should be counted among the classes 
denoted by g i r l and c h i l d . He proposes to solve the problem by drawing on 
the notion of 'prototype*, or "prototypic category", which is frequently used 
in recent psychological and linguistic research. We will return to this concept 
in our discussion of reference and denotation in 2.2.3., in connection with some 
experiments conducted by Labov on referential boundaries. 
Obviously, the fuzzy nature of language also has a bearing on the method 
of componential analysis and the use of semantic features which we will discuss 
in 3.3. 
2.2.2. Approaches to Semantics 
Before we go on with our discussion of the meaning of linguistic signs, it will 
probably be helpful to have a look at some general differences between various 
approaches to semantics. 
A broad distinction can be drawn between structural semantics and 
generative semantic theories (in the wider sense). Although such simplifying 
labels may be misleading, they are useful and necessary in giving a general 
survey. Structural semantics is mainly concerned with word semantics, while 
semantics in generative grammars often deals with sentence semantics. The 
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former, however, is not confined to isolated items, but has focussed on lexical 
fields and paradigmatic semantic relations between words generally. Within 
generative grammar, two schools of thought can be distinguished, namely the 
so-called Interpret(at)ive Semantics and Generative Semantics. Scholars of the 
former group (Katz, Fodor, Chomsky, Jackendoff) focus on the syntagmatic 
semantic relations, while those of the latter (McCawley, Postal, Lakoff) argue 
for lexical decomposition and are thus largely limited to word semantics (cf. 
Lipka 1972:30-83, 1976).7 
In our context it is most appropriate to concentrate on word semantics, or 
lexical semantics. We may distinguish between a language-intrinsic or language-
immanent approach to semantics on the one hand and a referential or deno-
tational approach on the other. Coseriu's position can be characterized as a 
language-immanent one (see 2.2.1.). In his theory lexical items are opposed 
to each other and this opposition or contrast yields specific distinctive features 
or semantic components. The methods and techniques of phonology, as a 
functional and language-intrinsic discipline, are carried over to lexical and 
semantic structures and are applied in semantic analysis. Componential analysis 
in the tradition of Hjelmslev is a further example of a language-immanent 
approach to semantics (see 3.3. and cf. Lipka 1976). 
Both the schools of Interpretive Semantics and Generative Semantics must 
be generally counted among the language-immanent approaches to semantics, 
since in their concepts of meaning they do not normally look beyond language. 
Finally, with some reservations, the work of Lyons and Leech also belongs 
here, although both differ fundamentally in their attitude towards componential 
analysis.8 
Yet, many other linguists have concentrated on the properties of the referents 
denoted by linguistic signs, and can therefore be said to be doing referential, 
or denotational, semantics. Among those that have to be mentioned here are 
Nida, Lehrer, and Leisi. In Leisi's influential book D e r W o r t i n h a l t , published 
for the first time in 1952, the second chapter (51974:25ff.) bears the title: "Die 
Darstellung des Bezeichneten" (the representation of the referent, my italics, 
LL) . In contrast to e.g. Coseriu, Leisi in his analysis of the content of words 
makes explicit reference to specific properties of extralinguistic referents. Thus, 
7 See 3.3.4. p. 101 ff. and the reference to Cognitive Linguistics in the index of 
this book. George Lakoff has since become one of the leading figures of this 
discipline (besides Ronald Langacker and Gilles Fauconnier). He argues mat 
the "new view of experiental realism'*, which uses 'cognitive models*, proto-
types, holistic gestalt properties, and imaginative mechanisms (like metaphor 
and metonymy) for the construction of categories should replace the traditional, 
atomistic, logical view of language which Lakoff labels objectivism and which 
"involves the manipulation of abstract symbols" (cf. Lakoff 1987: ix ff.). With 
reference to semantics, the latter, analytical approach has also been labelled 
"Aristotelian semantics" or the "checklist theory of semantics". See 3.3.3. and 
cf. also Rudzka-Ostyn (1988). 
8 Cruse (1986) - but not (1977) - in which Lyons's theory is further elaborated, 
is another important example. 
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for him, the form, substance, thickness, or number of referents may for instance 
play a role in the determination of the content, or meaning, of words. 
The following example (9) from Leisi's book P r a x i s der e n g l i s c h e n Seman-
t i k (21985: 37) may illustrate his referential approach to semantics. He points 
out that the two words t o w e r and T u r m in English and German are not at all 
equivalent, in spite of their etymological kinship. According to Leisi the con-
ditions for the use of these words ("Gebrauchsbedingungen") are crucially 
different. He also argues that especially for the conditions of use of the English 
word t o w e r , the form of the extralinguistic referent-type plays an essential role. 
The objects depicted in (9) can all, according to Leisi, be called T u r m , but 
not all can be called t o w e r . This he represents in the following way: 
(9) T u r m * tower 
I 2 3 4 S 6 
The German word T u r m and the English word t o w e r both denote a category 
or class of objects. These classes, however, are not identical. In English t o w e r 
does not include objects of the type 3 and 4. Leisi generally defines the 
meaning of a word as the conditions under which its form may be used in 
connection with an ostensive definition, i.e. when pointing at an object while 
saying: "This is a . . ." 
For the appropriate use of t o w e r , in contrast to German T u r m , according 
to Leisi (21985:45) two conditions must be fulfilled: a condition of form, and 
a condition of position. The referent must not be pointed and it must start out 
from the ground. For this reason, objects of the type 3 and 4 cannot in English 
be denoted by t o w e r according to Leisi. The word is in opposition to steeple, 
s p i r e , t u r r e t , p i n n a c l e , which all taken together are equivalent to the extension 
of the German word T u r m . 9 
A second definition of meaning ("Bedeutung") given by Leisi (21985:38) 
identifies it with the relation ("Bezug") between the phonological form 
("Lautgestalt") and all objects of a certain category. For the conditions of use 
for verbs, the states of matter of an extralinguistic object may be relevant. Leisi 
(51975:66f.) points out that German s p r i t z e n requires a liquid extralinguistic 
9 Leisi does not give any evidence for specific 'conditions of use', and docs not 
draw on tests with informants. It is true that some pointed tall structures may 
be called tower, e.g. the Eiffel Tower. 
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object, while streuen can only be used with a powdery, or granular referent. 
In contrast, the English verb s p r i n k l e can be used with either type of referent.10 
The states of matter also play a role with verbs of cooking and with e.g. eat 
vs. d r i n k . In Ger setzen, s t e l l e n , l e g e n the form of the object is a relevant con-
dition, which is neutralized in E p u t . Finally, the weight of the referent is 
essential for the use of both Ger s c h l e u d e r n and E h u r l . 
In many of his contrastive analyses of words in English and German Leisi 
is concerned with concrete extralinguistic referents. Here, a referential approach 
is certainly sensible and useful. It is further evident that insights for the 
explanation of child language acquisition and foreign language learning can be 
gained from such an approach. Leisi, however, does not claim that his theory 
can capture the meaning of all words in all languages. On the contrary, in his 
P r a x i s der e n g l i s c h e n Semantik (21985 :42) he explicitly points out that from 
a certain degree of abstractness onwards words can only be defined by means 
of other words (namely paraphrases). 
As a last remark, his views must be related to the notions of prototype and 
gestalt in psychology and linguistics. His concept of meaning is basically 
holistic and nonanalytic. Thus, Leisi ( 21985:41, 45) repeatedly stresses that 
"Bedeutungen gestalthaft und nicht analytisch erfaßt werden", i.e. that meanings 
of words are perceived as wholes, and that the speaker-hearer possesses them 
as wholes. 
2.2.3. Denotation and Reference 
As we have seen, the categories of objects denoted by t o w e r and T u r m are 
not identical, and thus the denotation of the words is not the same. This can 
be explained by means of different conditions of use ("Gebrauchsbedingungen"), 
in this case the shape of the extralinguistic referents. 
In an article entitled "Denotational Structure" Labov (1978) describes 
experiments he conducted to discover "the conditions for the denotative use 
of c u p , b o w l , glass and other container terms" (1978:221). This formulation 
reminds one strongly of Leisi's G e b r a u c h s b e d i n g u n g e n . Labov starts out by 
saying that linguistic analysis is the study of linguistic categories, and claims 
that the character of category boundaries has remained largely unexamined 
1 0 Leisi does not mention die verbs spray and scatter, which as G. Pascoe 
rightly points out, cover broadly the same field as spritzen and streuen and 
seem to have the same syntagmatic restrictions. Schmieren requires its object 
to be viscous, which is not the case with spread. There is partial convergence 
of both spray and inject in Ger spritzen, while, on the other hand, German 
lacks a superordinate term equivalent to E sprinkle (but cf. the more general 
words Schnecke, Affe, Uhr, Straße, Stadt, H a n d s c h u h , Kissen, N a d e l and their 
(partial) English equivalents). Cf. Durrell (1988: esp. 233), for the non-con-
gruence of lexical structures between me two languages and the problematic 
status of both cutlery and Besteck as superordinate terms. 
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within linguistics. The studies of container terms he reports on deal with 
denotata that form continuous series of increasing width or height. Informants 
were first asked to name the objects without any particular context. In a second 
experiment they had to imagine them filled with coffee, food, soup, or flowers. 
Besides diameter, height, and shape, Labov also introduced material (e.g. china 
or glass) as a variable. In the following diagram (10) (cf. Labov 1978:222) 
b) and c) show extreme cases of the varying ratio of height to width. (10a) 
shows the typical proportion for the use of c u p , i.e. it can be considered the 
'prototype' (in more recent terminology). Shape d) is the most favoured form 
for mug.11 
(10) 
a) b) c) d) 
cup m ug 
Labov shows that the boundaries between c u p and b o w l are vague (or "fuzzy" 
in modem terms), and that context plays an important role, so that in spite 
of increasing width, an object like (10b) may still be called c u p if it is filled 
with coffee. Presence and absence of a handle also has a decisive influence. 
Labov (1978:223) finds "two general properties of denotational boundaries: (1) 
vagueness and (2) interdependence". By the second term he means that variables 
(such as height, width, or function) are not independent of each other. 
Labov (1978:226) distinguishes two kinds of semantic judgements, which 
he calls "categorical" and "weighted" judgements. Both are necessary in denota-
tional structure. The former concern yes/no-decisions, or necessary conditions, 
such as the presence of a stem for using g o b l e t , or the condition "female" for 
m o t h e r . The latter concern gradable properties, such that if a variable X is 
present, the use of a particular word is more or less likely. According to Labov 
(1978:226) "achieved statuses like 'adult' would require weighted judgements". 
This category does not exist in High German, but it does in other varieties 
(e.g. Bavarian Haferl). A Becker does not have a handle. 
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Labov also reports on experimental studies with drawings of bottle-shaped 
containers, where several dimensions such as neck opening, width, and over-
all height were varied. The results were that the object most likely to be called 
b o t t l e , the "prototypical bottle", appeared to be "a glass object with a narrow 
opening and a neck one-third the width of the bottle" (Labov 1978: 231). Labov 
(1978: 232) also discusses properties of a "prototypical m a m a " and a 
prototypical c a t in child language acquisition. 
Both the experimental studies on container terms reported by Labov (1978) 
and the (originally purely psychological) research in Prototype Theory or Proto-
type Semantics (cf. Lipka 1986, 1987a) are concerned with the culture-
dependent categorization of reality, of the extralinguistic world, in natural 
languages (cf. Lipka 1988b). While Labov is primarily interested in the fuzziness 
of category boundaries, Prototype Theory is concerned with their prototypical 
kernel. Language, or more specifically the lexicon of each natural language, 
is a means for interpreting our environment, for classifying or categorizing our 
experience. By such language-specific categorization we impose a certain 
structure on extralinguistic reality. In the view of the recent discipline of 
Cognitive Linguistics,1 2 each language is equivalent to a particular conceptual 
system by means of which we perceive, structure, organize, and understand the 
infinite flow of impressions from the world we live in. Rosch (1977:36) has 
pointed out that 'prototypes', as unitary gestalt-perceptions, relieve the human 
brain of laborious cognitive processes by providing an "efficient processing 
mechanism of matching to a prototype". 
The notion of 'prototypic category' or 'prototype' derives from research in 
psychology, from which it has been argued that we recognize members of a 
category by matching them with a 'prototype'. It has recently been adopted 
into linguistics, e.g. in the work of Fillmore and Leech ( 21981:84-86, 120). 
Fillmore (1978:153) even opposes a "prototype semantics" to what he calls 
the "checklist theory of semantics", and argues that the former 
makes it possible to talk about a central or nuclear sense of a word, and ... about 
the various weightings of the individual criteria that go into specifying the prototype. 
For him (1978:167) the "prototype definition" of m u r d e r 
involves killing somebody, intending to kill the person mat got killed, and having 
a malignant heart about the whole thing. 
A great deal of work in linguistics on the subject has been done in the 
meantime (cf. Lipka 1987, Aitchison 1987:51 ff., Hullen/Schulze 1988). The 
concept of 'prototype' makes it possible to distinguish between the central or 
typical example of a category (e.g. house, d o g , fish) and the periphery of the 
category, where a decision on membership is not so easy, and only a few 
conditions, properties, or criteria are present. 
For various approaches within mis general framework cf. Rudzka-Ostyn (1988). 
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In my opinion, both the notions of prototype' and of 'semantic feature' 
(or 'semantic component', see 3.3.) are necessary and useful. It is unreasonable 
to impose a choice between them and set up a false alternative (cf. Lipka 
1987a). The two approaches to lexical meaning are complementary anp! there 
is a division of labour (cf. Cuyckens 1984). 
When talking about categories and categorization, we are concerned with 
classes of extralinguistic objects, not with single, individual referents. This 
important difference is most clearly brought out in the distinction made in 
Lyons (1977:174ff.) between 'denotation' and 'reference'. In order to clarify 
this distinction, we must make use of the concept of lexeme. By this concept, 
coined in analogy to phoneme and m o r p h e m e , Lyons understands an abstract 
linguistic unit (spelt in capitals) with different variants (e.g. WRITE as against 
w r o t e , w r i t t e n ) . We will return to this concept of lexeme in 2.3. 
For Lyons the relation of d e n o t a t i o n holds between a lexeme and a whole 
class of extralinguistic objects, as represented in the following schema: 
(11a) Denotation - Denotatum 
RELATION: lexeme —> class of objects 
D O G , C O W , ANIMAL, MAMMAL; 
TURM, TOWER, SNAIL, CITY. 
Lyons (1977: 207) defines the d e n o t a t i o n of a lexeme as: 
the relationship that holds between that lexeme and persons, things, places, properties, 
processes and activities external to the language-system. We will use the term 
denotatum* for the class of objects, properties, etc., to which the expression correctly 
applies. 
He characterizes the d e n o t a t u m of e.g. cow as a particular class of animal, and 
adds that the individual animals also are its d e n o t a t a . Lyons further points out 
that the denotation of a lexeme is independent of the concrete circumstances 
of an utterance. On the other hand, expressions such as t h e cow, John's cow, 
or those t h r e e cows o v e r t h e r e may be used to establish a relationship of 
r e f e r e n c e with specific individuals as referents. In this case the reference of 
these expressions containing cow is partly determined by the denotation of 
the lexeme C o w in the system of the English language. 
This brings us to the notion of reference as defined by Lyons (1977) in 
Semantics. He discusses a fair number of uses of this term in philosophy and 
linguistics (1977:177ff.) and gives a prehminary definition of r e f e r e n c e (1977: 
174) as: 
the relationship which holds between an expression and what that expression stands 
for on particular occasions of its utterance. 
This clearly is a relational conception, as is his view of sense. For Lyons 
reference depends on concrete utterances, not on abstract sentences. It cannot 
relate single lexemes to extralinguistic objects. He expresses this (1977:176) 
in the following way: 
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reference ... is an utterance-dependent notion. Furthermore, unlike sense and 
denotation, it is not generally applicable in English to single word-forms; and it is 
never applicable to lexemes. 
His use of the term r e f e r e n c e can be summarized and illustrated in the 
following way (but see below for his basic conception): 
(lib) Reference - Referent 
expression 
RELATION: .^ —> specific object 
'definite 
description' 
the m a n over there, the cow, N a p o l e o n , 
the queen, the king of F r a n c e . 
For Lyons (1977:206) both lexemes (i.e. single vocabulary words) and larger 
expressions have sense and denotation. Reference, however, is a property only 
of expressions, more specifically the subset of 'referring expressions'. The sense 
of an expression is a function of the senses of the lexemes it contains and 
of their occurrence in a particular grammatical construction. This compositional 
notion of the meaning of larger linguistic expressions is sometimes referred to 
as the Fregean principle of meaning. The first attempt in linguistics to apply 
the compositional idea to sentence semantics was made in Katz/Fodor (1963). 
Although we will not often be concerned with r e f e r e n c e here, in a book 
primarily discussing lexemes, it should be noted that Lyons distinguishes various 
kinds of reference, including "successful reference" (1977:180f.). This, 
obviously, is a pragmatic concept, no longer purely relational and language-
immanent, but based on the concept of 'speech act* (cf. Searle 1969:72 ff., 
Verschueren 1981). Lyons does not make use of it, but he abstracts from the 
speaker who refers by means of a referring expression to a referent, thus 
establishing the relationship of reference. 
Closer inspection of Lyons's concept of reference reveals, however, that he 
is not really in disagreement with Searle. It is only on a single page in his 
monumental work (1977:177) that Lyons states explicitly that he too considers 
reference as an act performed by a speaker for a hearer by means of a linguistic 
expression (successfully or not). Although he believes that "it is the speaker 
who refers", namely in "the act of referring", he continues (1977: 177): 
It is terminologically convenient, however, to be able to say mat an expression refers 
to its referent ... and we will follow mis practice. 
So for purely external reasons of economy a shorthand way of speaking is 
introduced which creates the impression that Lyons had a relational notion of 
r e f e r e n c e . 
The clearest example of such a pragmatic use of the term r e f e r e n c e is to 
be found in Searle's Speech Acts (1969). Chapter 4 of this book bears the title 
"Reference as a Speech Act". Here, the conditions and rules for this 
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i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t 1 3 are discussed in detail. For Searle (1969:95) - as for Lyons 
-reference is a linguistic act, by means of which a speaker may successfully 
"pick out or identify" an extralinguistic "object X " , or r e f e r e n t , for a hearer. 
According to Searle (1969:81) "definite reference" may be performed by 
means of the following linguistic categories: 
1. Proper names, e.g. Socrates, Russia; 
2. Complex noun phrases in me singular - often with a definite article - a category 
that is normally termed definite descriptions in philosophy, e.g. the m a n who 
called, John's brother; 
¡3. Pronouns, e.g. this, that, I, he, she, it; 
4. Tides, e.g. the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , the Pope. 
The concept of reference as used by Searle demonstrates again how important 
it is to distinguish between r e f e r e n c e - or more clearly r e f e r r i n g - as 
(establishing) a relation to a single extralinguistic object, and d e n o t a t i o n , as 
the relationship between a class of objects and a lexeme. We will be specifically 
concerned with denotation in the following. 
As we have seen, Lyons (1977:210f.) distinguishes between d e n o t a t i o n and 
sense. For him, both are equally basic relations, and they are dependent on 
each other. According to him (1977:210) there are some words, such as 
u n i c o r n , which have no denotation, but nevertheless have sense. This conclusion 
is based on the observation that a sentence such as T h e r e i s no such a n i m a l 
as a u n i c o r n is perfectly normal, while a sentence such as T h e r e i s no such 
b o o k as a u n i c o r n is semantically odd. It further proves that both lexemes 
u n i c o r n and a n i m a l are "related in sense". 
2.2.4. Other Kinds of Meaning 
In the following we will use the terms d e n o t a t i o n and r e f e r e n c e as illustrated 
in the diagrams (11a) and ( l ib ) in spite of what has been said about the act 
of referring. There are, however, other types of meaning. They might be 
referred to as non-descriptive, non-conceptual, or non-denotative. As mentioned 
at the beginning of 2.2. (p. 46), Lyons distinguishes descriptive meaning from 
social and expressive meaning, while Leech separates conceptual meaning (or 
sense) from various types of associative meaning and from thematic meaning, 
as shown in diagram (5) (p. 46). 
At this point it should also be mentioned that within 'descriptive meaning' 
Lyons (1977:247) makes a further distinction between the "central or focal, 
denotation of a lexeme" and its "total denotation". Languages may differ with 
respect to the denotational boundaries of words, but still be in agreement 
1 3 Cf. Searle (1969:23f.) where "complete speech acts" such as stating, 
questioning, commanding, promising etc. are labelled illocutionary acts, a term 
originally introduced by the founder of speech act theory J.L. Austin. 
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concerning the "focal denotation" of equivalent words. Thus, certain "focal types 
of colour, shape, texture, biological and social function" have to be recognized. 
For this, the notions of b i o l o g i c a l and c u l t u r a l s a l i e n c e are introduced by Lyons 
(1977:247f.). 
The different kinds of meaning are clearly related to different language 
functions (see 2.1.3.). Language does not only serve to transmit information 
(Biihler's 'representation'), although this function has been the main concern 
of traditional grammar and of structural as well as generative linguistics. Leech 
(21981:40 ff., 42, 57) distinguishes five functions of language: the informational, 
expressive, directive, aesthetic, and phatic function. They correspond to those 
distinguished by Jakobson (1960:353 ff.), but his 'metalinguistic function' is 
missing (see p. 45). The position adopted in Lyons (1977:50 ff.) can be sum-
marized as follows: 
(12) language functions: 
1. descriptive 
2. social 
r - interpersonal (emotive, "expressive" ...) 
3. expressive J 
According to Lyons (1977:51), whose main concern in the book is with 
descriptive meaning, the distinction between the expressive and social functions 
of language, and the respective expressive and social meanings is far from clear-
cut. Both may be included under a single term, such as "interpersonal", 
"emotive", "expressive" etc., all of which have been used in publications. Lyons 
himself prefers "interpersonal" for the common aspects of the social and 
expressive functions of language. He further discusses in some detail the 
instrumental, metalinguistic, phatic and poetic functions of language (cf. also 
Jakobson 1960). 
It should be obvious, if we compare this with Leech's approach, that ex-
p r e s s i v e f u n c t i o n is also a notational term. We can already see from (12) that 
there is a wider use of "expressive" (by other authors) than in Lyons's dis-
tinction of three functions of language. Leech's use is still narrower, since for 
him "expressive" is further distinguished from "directive", "aesthetic", and 
"phatic", which all concern social or interpersonal aspects of language. 
Besides distinguishing between d e n o t a t i o n and r e f e r e n c e , Lyons - within 
d e s c r i p t i v e m e a n i n g - further recognizes the existence of sense. Already in his 
I n t r o d u c t i o n t o T h e o r e t i c a l L i n g u i s t i c s (1968:427) he had defined the sense of 
a word as: 
its place in a system of relationships which it contracts with other words in the 
vocabulary. 
This, obviously, is another relational definition of meaning (cf. the discussion 
of "sense-relations" in 4.2.). Generally speaking, Lyons's approach as a whole 
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can be characterized as relational semantics. In his later two-volume work on 
semantics, a clear, explicit definition of sense is not given. He remarks at one 
point (1977:202) that sameness or difference of sense depend on descriptive 
meaning and that expressions with the same sense must be regarded as 
synonymous. Clearly, his concept of sense is here again primarily seen from 
a relational point of view. This is also apparent in the following quotation 
(1977:206): 
Sense is here defined to hold between the words or expressions of a single language 
independently of the relationship, if any, which holds between those words or 
expressions and their referents* or denotata*. 
It follows that sense is a purely language-immanent relationship. On the other 
hand, both reference and d e n o t a t i o n are relations between linguistic units and 
the extralinguistic world. However, single lexemes, as well as larger expressions, 
have sense and d e n o t a t i o n . But only expressions have r e f e r e n c e (cf. 2.2.3.). 
That sense also is not an absolute concept, but a notational term becomes 
quite clear if we compare its use by Leech. Both Lyons and Leech use the 
term quite differently. Incidentally, Lyons himself draws attention explicitly at 
various points (e.g. 1977:206) to the fact that other authors use d e n o t a t i o n and 
r e f e r e n c e differently, sometimes even the other way round. 
As we have seen in diagram (5) (p. 46), Leech uses sense synonymously 
with c o n c e p t u a l m e a n i n g . For him, it is the most central aspect of m e a n i n g 
(in the wide sense), or "communicative value". As is clearly shown in (5), for 
him c o n n o t a t i v e m e a n i n g is only a subclass of a s s o c i a t i v e m e a n i n g . 
With regard to lexemes it has been customary in linguistics to distinguish 
between d e n o t a t i o n and c o n n o t a t i o n . Lyons's s o c i a l and expressive m e a n i n g , 
as well as Leech's a s s o c i a t i v e m e a n i n g can all be regarded as various aspects 
of the same phenomenon that may be summarized under the term c o n n o t a t i o n 
(see below 2.2.5.). T h e m a t i c m e a n i n g is different in that it concerns the ordering 
of elements larger than lexemes, and is thus mainly relevant for sentence 
semantics. However, since lexical converses, such as o w n and b e l o n g are also 
involved, it may have some bearing on word semantics. This is illustrated by 
the following example (13), where the (a) and (b) sentences are identical in 
denotative or conceptual meaning, but differ in thematic meaning: 
(13) (a) My father owns the Rolls Royce. 
(b) The Rolls Royce belongs to my father. 
Before we come to our wider notion of c o n n o t a t i o n let us look at one last 
recent proposal concerning word meaning. Leech (*1981: 121), in the revised 
version of his book on semantics, sets up a three-level approach to "word-
meaning" which partly integrates some of the aspects of 'lexical meaning* 
discussed above. This approach - which is not entirely unproblematic - can 
be represented and summarized as follows: 
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(14) levels of ' l e x i c a l meaning': 
1. 'word-sense' = conceptual unit 
2. features: f, f2 f3 
3. attributes (fuzzy sets of): a, 
The "word-sense" as a whole may be regarded as a "conceptual unit", also 
referred to as "prepackaged experience" by Leech (21981):32). According to 
him, this unit or category (in the sense of linguistic categorization discussed 
in 2.2.3.) may then be split up into features or components by componential 
analysis (cf. Lyons 1981:84). Finally both 'word-senses' and features, which 
represent prototypic categories, may be broken down into "fuzzy sets" of 
"attributes". It is probably more convincing to regard the 'attributes' of Proto-
type Semantics as equivalents of the 'components' or 'features' of componential 
analysis or Feature Semantics (cf. Lipka 1986a). 
This new focus on concepts is quite in keeping with the theory of Cognitive 
Linguistics. Already in the first edition of his book, Leech had stressed 
"language as a conceptual system" and emphasized that it is not only an 
instrument of communication, but the means by which we "classify or 
'conceptualize' our experience" (1974: 28). He also discussed lexical innovation 
as a technique for introducing new concepts, and the abbreviatory function of 
the word, as well as its "concept-defining role" and its "concept-forming power" 
(1974:36f.). 
'Lexical meaning', i.e. the meaning of a lexeme or lexical unit, is a matter 
of l a n g u e , or the language-system. This may be modified when words are used 
in context (see 4.4.), a fact recognized by the distinction sometimes made (cf. 
Schmidt 21967) between 'lexical meaning' and 'actual meaning'. 
2.2.5. Connotations and Markedness 
In some treatments of lexical semantics, a binary distinction is made between de-
n o t a t i o n and c o n n o t a t i o n , or d e n o t a t i v e vs. c o n n o t a t i v e m e a n i n g (cf. Kastovsky 
1982a:37ff.,Hansen et al. 21985:17ff., Ullmann 1962:74; but not in Cruse 1986). 
Other authors like Lyons (1977:28^ vl&(i' , 'Lc^h'^1981:12ff0 use c o n n o t a t i o n 
and c o n n o t a t i v e in a specific sense. The latter regards this type of meaning 
as a subclass of his a s s o c i a t i v e m e a n i n g see (5) (p. 46), which could be seen 
as a paraphrase of the more general sense of c o n n o t a t i o n . The concept is closely 
tied up with a widespread definition of synonymy. In this view, synonyms have 
the same d e n o t a t i o n , i.e. cognitive, or conceptual meaning, but differ in 
connotations. Connotations must be regarded as an inherent property of lexical 
items. Synonyms may be specifically marked by connotations. 
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Such additional ("associative") aspects of meaning14 - as opposed to the 
central denotational core - can be illustrated with the following examples of 
"stylistic" or "social and affective meaning" from Leech (21981:14 f.): 
(15) (a) steed (poet.) (b) domicile (leg.) (c) cast (lit.) 
horse residence (fml.) throw 
nag (si.) abode (poet./old) 
gee-gee (baby 1.) home chuck (si.). 
The twofold distinction between d e n o t a t i o n and c o n n o t a t i o n can be justified, 
in that the d e n o t a t i v e m e a n i n g refers to the relation between a linguistic sign 
and its d e n o t a t u m . C o n n o t a t i o n s , however, are additional properties of a lexeme. 
Leech marks steed as "poetic", nag as "slang", and gee-gee as "baby language". 
Dictionaries give further characterizations, such as "literary, rhetorical, hu-
morous" for steed, "colloquial" for n a g , and "(child's word for a) horse" for 
gee-gee. D o m i c i l e is labelled "very formal, official" by Leech, while dictionaries 
give "formal" and "legal". A b o d e is marked "poetic" by Leech and "old, 
literary, legal" by various dictionaries. Finally, Leech marks cast as "literary, 
biblical" 1 5 and c h u c k as "casual, slang". 
The apparent discrepancies between the various dictionaries and Leech's 
characterization are explained by the fact that there are no clear-cut boundaries 
between the labels c o l l o q u i a l , c a s u a l , and s l a n g . Also, dated and archaic words 
are often found in poetical, literary and legal usage. In other contexts, these 
j connotations may be exploited for humorous effects. In figure (15) we have 
| the same d e n o t a t i o n in all three cases, i.e. the denotatum of the nouns in (a) 
and (b) and of the verbs in (c) is the same. But the synonymous words have 
different connotations - in other words, they are 'marked', or instances of 
'marking' or 'markedness' (cf. Lyons 1977:305ff.). This is why the italicized 
lexemes are characterized as "general" by Leech. 
The notion of m a r k i n g or markedness is derived from phonology, where 
the marked item of a pair of phonemes is distinguished by a specific feature. 
Thus, of the phonemes A/ and /d/, the /d/ is marked because it exhibits the 
additional feature of voice. In analogy to this we can say that h o r s e , home 
and t h r o w are unmarked, while the other lexemes are 'marked' in one way 
or another It is obvious - in particular from (15a) and (15b) - that markedness 
is not only a matter of binary opposition, as Leech (21981:113) claims and 
1 4 As already mentioned in 1.3., in connection with variety class 5 "attitude", it 
is sometimes difficult to draw a line between 'connotation' (or stylistic 
marking) and 'denotation'. Lyons (1977:618f.) argues that Scots English loch 
(vs. l a k e ) can be regarded either as a dialectally marked variant of the 
Standard English word or as a different lexeme, with a specific "descriptive 
meaning", or 'denotation'. 
1 5 Alternatively, as with the marking of nag as (si.) discussed in 1.3., one could 
hold that cast should be labelled fig., as in cast aspersions on, or also tech., as 
in cast a fishing l i n e . The LDCE 2 gives "lit or old use" (for fishermen cast 
their nets) and fig. (for The witch cast a spell). 
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derivation of the concept from phonology suggests. There may be a number 
of marked lexemes related to a single concept or neutral word. The unmarked 
lexemes are neutral and not restricted to specific contexts in their use. 
In his magnum opus, Lyons (1977:307 ff.) introduces the concept of se-
m a n t i c m a r k i n g . For him, a semantically marked lexeme is more specific than 
an unmarked one. For this reason he labels b i t c h - as opposed to d o g - as 
well as l i o n e s s (as opposed to l i o n ) "semantically marked". Furthermore, l i o n e s s 
is also "formally marked" by the suffix -ess and therefore a case of f o r m a l 
m a r k i n g . In this connection, Lyons (1977:308) discusses the problem of whether 
we can distinguish two distinct lexemes DOG . If d o g is used in opposition to 
b i t c h , we could speak of a different lexeme d o g 2 , which is distinct from d o g x 
in the wider sense.16 I would like to illustrate this hypothesis with the following 
diagram: 
(16) dog, 
According to Lyons it may make sense to ask a question like: I s t h a t dog a 
d o g o r a b i t e h i Such a question would then contain both lexemes (or 'lexical 
units') d o g l and d o g r ] 1 However, Lyons decides against such a solution, as 
could be expected. He argues that the phenomenon of semantic marking is 
widespread and that it is necessary only in exceptional cases to refer to sex 
by a marked lexeme like b i t c h . Since for him polysemy has to be distinguished 
from semantic marking, he is against treating d o g as an instance of polysemy. 
Lyons's notion of (formal, distributional, semantic) 'marking' is not identical 
with my use of markedness in connection with connotation. There is a certain 
amount of overlap, however, since semantically marked lexemes as well as 
words with additional connotations have a more specific meaning than the 
unmarked, neutral lexeme. 
We can further subcategorize, if required, the class of connotatively marked 
lexemes of a language. This will depend on the specific purpose of a description 
and the relative delicacy of the semantic analysis. Such a finer classification 
could also result in a particular structuring of the vocabulary (cf. Hansen et 
al. 21985:19 ff.). Certain aspects of linguistic variation (cf. figure (8) in ch. I) 
may serve to distinguish between regional, temporal, and social connotations. 
1 6 Cf. Rohdenburg (1985). Obviously, there is also a connection between die 
notions of 'marking' and 'extension'. The marked item has a narrower 
extension, but its 'intension' is greater. If we draw on the notion of 'lexical 
unit' (see 4.1.1.), we could claim mat the lexeme DOG contains two lexical 
units d o g , and d o g v with different (although largely overlapping) 'senses'. 
1 7 Sec 4.1.1. for the notion of lexical unit which I adopted from Cruse (1986). 
The term is used in a similar way in Chafe (1970:44, 105 ff.). 
dog2 
[+MALE] 
bitch 
[+FEMALFJ 
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Besides stylistically, affectively, or emotionally marked lexemes, we could 
furthermore group lexical items according to regional or dialectal, archaic or 
; neologistic, and sociolinguistic variation (cf. Lipka~ll)88a). We could draw on 
parameters like 'mem'um', or 'field, mode, tenor', or like Leech (who follows 
Crystal and Davy) on 'province, status, modality'. Furthermore, we could set 
^ up a comparison between Leech's subclassification of a s s o c i a t i v e m e a n i n g and 
the labels used in dictionaries, for example the L D C E (cf. diagrams (8), (9) 
I in ch. I). However, all this would lead too far here. 
Let us therefore look at another possible system of connotations, namely 
the one proposed in Hansen et al. ( 21985:19 ff.). I shall try to represent its 
most important points in diagrammatic form below, illustrating only with a 
fraction of their wealth of examples. The three main classes of connotations 
are the following: 
(17) A. stylistic: eg. edifice, swain, apothecary, baksheesh, buddy, bloke, bugger; 
B. expressive: niggard, bastard, bathroom, bugrake 'comb', dolly bird; 
C. regional: elevator, streetcar, truck (all AmE), wee (Scottish E). 
These three classes of connotations could be used for setting up three distinct 
groups of lexemes. The unmarked lexical items will then form a fourth large 
category. According to Hansen et al. (who speak of zero-connotation in this 
case) neutral lexemes make up the vast mass of common vocabulary. The 
authors further state that connotations can affect either the complete meaning 
of a lexeme or only specific senses of it, i.e. in their terminology only single 
'sememes' of a polysemous lexeme. 
The major categories of connotations are further subclassified in the book 
as represented in my following diagrams: 
(17a) 
stylistic 
("gehobene 
Konnotationen") 
low 
("gesenkte 
Konnotationen") 
1. formal 
2. literary or poetic 
3. archaic 
4. foreign 
1. colloquial 
- 2. slang 
-3. vulgar 
(17b) 
expressive 
1. derogatory 
2. taboo 
3. euphemistic 
4. jocular 
5. appreciative 
e.g. bluestocking 
prick, pussy 
cloakroom 
powwow 
elegant 
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Regional variation is not further subclassified in Hansen et al. (21985). The 
authors mention varieties such as British, American, Scottish, Irish, Canadian, 
Australian, New Zealand, South African, Indian English and also point to further 
interior differentiation (e.g. Northern English). They only give examples of 
Americanisms, correctly stating that there is considerable American influence 
on British English as well as fluctuation. 
It has to be stressed here that this is one possible taxonomy of connotations 
and connotatively marked lexemes in English. It is certainly one of the most 
detailed descriptions available but other systems are also possible. The classification 
sketched here deserves a few comments. Social variation is clearly neglected, 
e.g. the much talked-about distinction between U and n o n - U in Britain (cf. also 
Trudgill 1983, Lipka 1988a). Within temporal variation neologisms are also 
relevant (cf. the dictionaries discussed in 1.4.). Within expressive connotations, 
the distinction derogatory/appreciative belongs together, since approval/ 
disapproval is a binary distinction of attitude. It is quite systematic in at least 
part of the lexicon, and may be expressed by specific word-formation processes. 
Thus, for example, appreciative m a n l y , w o m a n l y is opposed to derogatory 
m a n n i s h , w o m a n i s h , effeminate. In this connection it may be of interest that 
according to Quirk (1986: 129) and the introduction of the COBUILD dictionary 
(1987 :xx) terms of racist abuse and sexist language are today considered very 
offensive and are far more dangerous than sexual or religious taboo and swear-
words. 1 8 Furthermore, approval and disapproval seem to be distinct from 
affectionate connotations of lexemes, as e.g. when t o w n is used for a large city, 
as in C h i c a g o my home t o w n \ (cf. Lipka 1986:137). 
Technical language and register are mentioned by Hansen et al. C1985: 22) 
as "funktional-stihstische Merkmale" and they stress the possible combination 
of connotations and the corresponding combination of labels in dictionaries. 
Situationally determined variation is of course closely connected with the 
problem of the definition of the terms s t y l i s t i c and s t y l e (cf. Lipka 1988a). 
In sum I would like to stress again that the binary distinction between 
d e n o t a t i o n and c o n n o t a t i o n is a useful and necessary one but that a further 
subcategorization of connotations to a greater or lesser degree may be necessary, 
depending on the purpose of the description. Dictionaries may legitimately use 
different labelling systems, depending on whether they have the foreign learner 
in mind or an educated native speaker. 
G. Pascoe suggests the following taxonomy of taboo words, with three classes: 
1. "becoming weaker": a) swearwords (damn, bloody), b) sexual words (prick, 
pussy); 2. "slowly becoming stronger": sexist words (man 'species', broad 
girl'); 3. "rapidly becoming much stronger": a) human pejorative (mongol, 
cretin, l u n a t i c ) , b) racist (nigger, Jewess, yid). 
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2.3. Morpheme, Word, Lexeme 
The notion of w o r d is not as simple as it seems at first sight. We will return 
to the ambiguity of the term presently. Even a superficial look at the simple 
example (18) will show immediately that the word and the linguistic sign can 
not be equated. Words are certainly linguistic signs, but the reverse is not the 
case, since not every linguist sign is necessarily a word. The smallest linguistic 
sign is the m o r p h e m e . 
2.3.1. The classification of morphemes 
In classical American structuralism, the most important procedures for 
discovering morphemes were segmentation and classification. Linguistic 
utterances produced by so-called informants were first segmented, i.e. broken 
down into possible constituents. The elements resulting from this, the phones 
on the level of sound and the m o r p h s on the level of form, were then grouped 
into classes. This grouping was made on the basis of the function and 
distribution of the elements. Thus, the phoneme comprises a class of variants 
called a l l o p h o n e s . Likewise, the m o r p h e m e can be defined as a class of variants, 
namely its a l l o m o r p h s . 
If we now apply the method of segmentation and classification to the 
English word f a r m e r s , we get the following smaller units (cf. Matthews 1970: 
98): 
(18) farmers: FARM -ER PLURAL 
Such a morphological analysis reveals several linguistic signs in one word. It 
describes several elements ( i t e m s ) in a particular sequence ( a r r a n g e m e n t ) . Such 
a morphological model has therefore been labelled I t e m a n d A r r a n g e m e n t 
(abbreviated as IA). This simple example, however, does not show the following 
two kinds of difficulties which may arise for classical morpheme analysis: 
1. For words like t o o k and r a n such a simple segmentation is not possible 
even in a morphologically simple language like English (cf. Matthews 
1970:107ff. for It c a n t e r e b b e r o ) . To solve this difficulty, the notion of 
r e p l a c i v e a l l o m o r p h was introduced by some linguists (cf. Gleason 
2. In certain inflecting languages, like Latin or Russian, another method 
of morphological description will be more appropriate. Charles Hockett, 
one of the most important representatives of American structuralism, has 
called this the Word a n d P a r a d i g m m o d e l (abbreviated WP). Here, words 
f a r m 
free 
lexical 
morpheme 
-er 
bound 
lexical 
morpheme 
s 
bound 
grammatical 
morpheme 
21961). 
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like a m o , amas, a m a t etc., or g a l l u s , g a l l i , g u i l d etc., are described and 
learnt in an inflectional paradigm. For such languages the IA model is 
less adequate. The difficulties of segmenting some words in English were 
solved elegantly in early generative grammar by a third model: I t e m a n d 
Process (IP). I cannot discuss this here.19 
In the history of linguistic thinking the development of the notion of morpheme 
in descriptive structuralism can be understood as a counter-reaction in two ways: 
1. In opposition to traditional grammar, which was word-based and mistakenly 
projected the situation in the classical languages onto modem English; 2. As 
a counter-reaction against the vagueness of the notion of w o r d and the manifold 
difficulties in defining it. 
However, the new basic unit of m o r p h e m e was not completely immune 
against such difficulties. In my opinion, the structuralist notion of 'morpheme' 
can only be captured adequately by conjoining three different definitions: 
1. The morpheme is the smallest meaningful linguistic unit and therefore 
the smallest linguistic sign. 
2. The morpheme consists of a class of variants, the allomorphs, which are 
either phonologically or morphologically conditioned. 
3. The morpheme is an abstract unit of the system of a language, for 
example the plural morpheme or the past tense morpheme in English, 
symbolized by {Z^} and { D J . 2 0 
Thus, for example, the English past tense morpheme in h i t is realized as a z e r o -
m o r p h e m e , symbolized by 0. In the case of t o o k it is realized by a special type 
of element called a r e p l a c i v e m o r p h , namely /u/«- /(ei)/. Only the three defini-
tions taken together completely capture the classical concept of 'morpheme'. 
I now propose a classification of morphemes which is language-independent, 
but will be illustrated with English examples. This classification is not strictly 
hierarchically ordered, but the classes partly overlap. In linguistics, such a phe-
nomenon is termed a c r o s s - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
As a first step, the elements found by segmentation and classified as allo-
morphs on the basis of their distribution may be divided into two great classes: 
1. L e x i c a l morphemes, (also called 'semantic morphemes') and 2. g r a m m a t i c a l 
(functional) morphemes.2* In spite of the fact that there are difficulties with 
1 9 Cf. Matthews (1970:103-107). E.g. sank or men are described as the result of 
morphological and morphophonemic processes triggered by abstract morphemes 
('Past Tense', 'Plural') which are combined with basic representations (sink, 
m a n ) . 
2 0 Cf. Lipka (1969) where the plural morpheme {Z,} and the past tense mor-
pheme (Dj) are discussed in detail (as well as {Z2} = genitive, (Z3) = 3rd 
person singular present, {D2} = past participle). The notation is adopted from 
Gleason (M961: cf. 75), who prefers, however, the term "zero-allomorph" to the 
(lexicalized) zero-morpheme (see fn. 3 ch. I). 
2 1 Cf. Jackson (1988: 15-17) for the parallel distinction between 'lexical' and 
'grammatical words', regarded as a gradation between the two extremes: "com-
pletely lexical" (nouns) and "completely grammatical" (articles, auxiliary verbs). 
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definition and overlap in some areas, the two large classes can be characterized 
on the basis of certain features or attributes in the following way: 
It is customary to refer to the combination of lexical and grammatical mor-
phemes with the terms i n f l e c t i o n , or m o r p h o l o g y (in the narrow sense, cf. Lipka 
1969). On the other hand the combination of lexical morphemes with each other 
is usually labelled w o r d - f o r m a t i o n . Since it results in new (complex) words, 
or more precisely units of the lexicon, i.e. lexemes, it ought to be called 
"lexeme-formation" (cf. Bauer 1983:13). However, we will stick to the lexical-
ized, or institutionalized, term w o r d - f o r m a t i o n . 
It is sometimes difficult to draw the distinction between lexical and gram-
matical morphemes, because there are borderline cases and the limits of an 
individual morpheme may be vague or fuzzy (e.g. - i d o l , - e r ) . Furthermore, it 
may be hard to assign a single specific meaning to a particular constant form 
(see below for the concept of f o r m a t i v e ) . But basically, the distinction is sound 
and useful and can be easily made in most cases. 
The two large groups of morphemes can be further subclassified on the basis 
of other criteria. First and foremost, morphemes may occur either alone and 
independently, or only in conjunction with others. This leads to the distinction 
between f r e e and b o u n d morphemes. A further aspect of their distribution is 
position. With bound lexical morphemes it is relevant whether they are added 
in front or behind, i.e. as a prefix or suffix. Finally, it is important to know whether 
a morpheme only occurs once, as a so-called u n i q u e or b l o c k e d m o r p h e m e , 
or repeatedly. 
Examples, such as F r i in F r i d a y or c r a n in c r a n b e r r y are called b l o c k e d 
morphemes by Marchand and those who follow him. They could be subsumed 
under the class of f o r m a t i v e s , as done in Kastovsky (1982 a :70). I will here 
use the term in the same way, for minimal formal units without identifiable 
meaning, which are only relevant on the phonological or syntactic level. It is 
not a comprehensive term (as in Bauer 1983: 16, 124) which includes both 
such formal units as well as morphemes. Thus for me the term denotes the 
formal segments of words like u n d e r s t a n d (with past tense u n d e r s t o o d ) and 
(19) l e x i c a l morphemes 
denote (particular) 
extralinguistic objects & states of affairs: 
g r a m m a t i c a l morphemes 
denote (general) 
grammatical functions: 
e.g. plural, tense, 
syntactic relations: e.g. concord 
of gender, number, 
closed class (inventory), 
follow lexical morphemes 
(in Germanic languages), 
combination (with lex. m.) 
relatively unrestricted, 
result of combination: 
word-forms. 
e.g. actions, events, 
situations, relations. 
open class (set). 
precede grammatical morphemes 
(in Germanic languages), 
combination (with other lex. m.) 
often restricted, 
result of combination: 
new lexemes. 
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idiomatic verb-particle constructions like make up (one's face), set off (the 
alarm). It includes blocked morphemes, but not full linguistic signs. Formatives 
could also be called pseudo-morphemes (cf. Toumier 1985:85 f.). 
The criteria just discussed for defining and distinguishing morphemes lead 
to the following classification (or rather cross-classification, cf. Kastovsky 
1982a: 73) of morphemes: 
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A few comments must be added to figure (20). Word-formation is not restricted 
to the addition of affixes (sometimes called d e r i v a t i o n ) , but includes the 
combination of free lexical morphemes, i.e. c o m p o u n d i n g , ( t a b l e c l o t h , g r e e n -
house, w r i t i n g - t a b l e ) . Examples of affixation include: r e w r i t e , u n c l e a n , g r e e n i s h , 
w r i t e r , Wednesday, r a s p b e r r y . 2 2 The combination of free grammatical and 
lexical morphemes belongs in syntax. Inflection (or m o r p h o l o g y in the narrow 
sense) (cf. Bauer 1988: esp. 73 ff.) can be subdivided according to the word 
class of the free lexical morpheme (noun or verb) into declension or conjugation. 
Bound grammatical morphemes are not normally combined but added to simple 
or complex lexemes. Formatives are not included in diagram (20). 
2.3.2. The Ambiguity of ' W o r d ' 
The term w o r d can be used in at least three different senses, as has been 
demonstrated by Matthews (1991:24-31), originally in 1974, (cf. Jackson 
1988:1 ff.). His views can be summarized as follows: 
(21) word, = phonological/orthographic ~ (dies/died, man/men) = WORD-FORM 
word2 = abstract unit (DIE, MAN) = LEXEME 
word3 = grammatical ~ (come 1. present, 2. past participle) = WORD. 
W o r d l consists of a sequence of sounds, syllables or letters. D i e s and d i e d are 
obviously different words in this sense. On a deeper level, such different forms 
obviously belong to the same abstract unit (Dm or MAN), the dictionary w o r d 2 , 
or in technical terms, the same lexeme. Finally, the same sequence of sounds 
or letters (such as come) may represent a different grammatical w o r d y Matthews 
proposes to retain the term w o r d for this third sense.23 
In connection with the ambiguity of the term w o r d Matthews also draws 
attention to the important distinction between type and t o k e n , originally 
introduced by the American philosopher C. S. Peirce (cf. Lyons 1977:13 ff., 
Kastovsky 1982a: 74). Although there are some more likely correlations, basic-
ally words in all the senses distinguished in (21), as well as letters or sounds, 
can be regarded as either types or tokens. Thus, the total number of occurrences 
of words in a novel (the word 'tokens') is far greater than the number of differ-
ent words (the word 'types') in it. The relationship between tokens and types 
can be characterized as one of realization or instantiation. Concrete tokens can 
be said to realize or instantiate abstract underlying types. Thus, the same letter 
'Blocked morphemes' like Wednes- and rasp- (and 'formatives' generally) are 
by definition not pattern-forming and productive like r e - , -er, -ize. 'Combining 
forms' (cf. Adams 1973:128f., Bauer 1983:213ff.), like astro-, disco-, hydro-
and -cide, -crat, -graph(y), -meter, - p h i l e , in neo-classical compounds, have not 
been included in diagram (20). 
In addition to die kinds of words distinguished in (21), Jackson (1988: 8, 11, 
15) also deals with 'multi-word lexemes' and the two classes (open and 
closed) of 'lexical' and 'grammatical words'. 
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type e may occur several times in one word (e.g. reference) or in different 
shape (different tokens of the same letter type) in the hand-writing of different 
people. 
The 'types' of words (lexemes), sounds, and letters belong to the lexical, 
phonological, and orthographic system of a language (Saussure's l a n g u e ) , while 
the 'tokens' belong to its concrete realization (parole). 
As we have seen in 2.3.1., words are not the smallest linguistic signs. The 
word, in the traditional sense, consists of at least one free lexical morpheme. 
But it can also be made up of a whole series of lexical morphemes, like beer-
d r i n k e r , t h e a t r e g o e r , s e g r e g a t i o n i s t , or d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . Leech (21981: 222) 
gives the examples d r u m - m a j o r e t t i s h l y and r a i l w a y - s t a t i o n r e f r e s h m e n t r o o m . 
The fact that lexical morphemes can be combined again and again in principle 
is an instance of the phenomenon called recursiveness in linguistics. That the 
resulting new word is one lexeme is apparent from the possibility of assigning 
it to a specific word class. Even very complex words can be inflected, i.e. 
grammatical morphemes can be added to such a combination of lexical mor-
phemes. These inflected words are then cases of word-forms, not instances of 
new words, i.e. new lexemes. 
2.3.3. Lexemes, lexical items, and word-forms 
Before we continue with our discussion, some terminological clarification will 
not be out of place. As in (11a) (p. 58) we will henceforth use the terms lexeme 
for the abstract unit of the lexicon and word-form for the (inflectional or other) 
variants of the lexeme on the morphological, phonological, or graphemic level. 
In contrast to Matthews's usage represented in (21), I will use w o r d in a general 
sense when there is no need for the specific technical terms and no ambiguity 
arises. I will continue to use the established term w o r d - f o r m a t i o n , although it« 
should really be l e x e m e - f o r m a t i o n , because it has a long tradition in linguistics ] 
and is lexicalized and institutionalized. I 
Some books (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985) prefer the term l e x i c a l i t e m to lexeme.! 
I wil l occasionally use both terms as synonyms, for stylistic variation, but w i l | 
normally prefer lexeme for various reasons. It is shorter, seems to be more 
current in English and general linguistics (especially for Romance languages), 
and furthermore stresses the parallel with the concept of m o r p h e m e . Like the 
latter, the lexeme is: 
1. A complete sign on a particular linguistic level, namely the lexicon; 
2. A class of variants, namely word-forms; 
3. An abstract unit of the language system. 
Unlike the morpheme, the lexeme is not the smallest unit and may be a simple, 
a complex, or a p h r a s a l lexeme. Let us look again at some examples which 
illustrate the necessity of the distinctions introduced. The lexemes FIND and 
TAKE are realized (amongst others) by the word-forms f i n d , f o u n d and t a k e , 
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t o o k , t a k e n . On the other hand s i n g e r does not belong to the lexeme SING 
despite its close phonological and morphological connection with s i n g , s i n g i n g . 
The last two word-forms, however, are related to the phonologically more 
different forms sang and sung. The lexeme, as a unit, therefore comprises a 
group of word-forms, in analogy to the morpheme and its variants, the allo-
morphs. Thus, the complex lexeme SINGER also includes, besides the unmarked 
form s i n g e r , the genitive s i n g e r ' s and the plural s i n g e r s . It is itself composed 
of the morphemes {SING} and {-ER}. 
But there are also complex lexemes whose constituents are not morphemes. 
Examples are h o l d up (a bank), p u t up w i t h (something), do o u t of 'cheat' (in 
H e d i d me o u t of five p o u n d s ) which can be characterized as discontinuous 
lexical items or p h r a s a l lexemes (cf. Lipka 1971:215, Lyons 1977:23). These 
verbal lexemes cannot be decomposed into meaningful units, i.e. morphemes. 
The formal segments cannot be correlated with an invariant content which also 
occurs in other combinations. Consequently they are not morphemes but 
f o r m a t i v e s . 
Such formatives of a single lexeme can often be interrupted by other mor-
phemes or strings of morphemes. This is frequendy the case in idiomatic and 
rion-idiomatic verb-particle constructions (cf. Lipka 1972), where interruption 
by a pronominal object is the rule. But it is also possible with noun phrases, as 
for example in She beat t h e dust o u t , We w o k e t h e man u p . In these non-idi-
omatic verb-particle constructions, however, the constituents are morphemes, not 
formatives. In spite of the discontinuity, we must recognize here a single 
lexeme. 
Other formally complex lexemes which cannot be broken down into mor-
phemes are normally labelled i d i o m s (cf. 3.2.5.). With some idioms the formal 
constituents never occur independently or in other combinations, e.g. eke in eke 
o u t , peter in peter o u t . With other idioms, the constituents are homonymous 
with independently occurring free lexical morphemes, e.g. in u n d e r s t a n d , p u l l 
someone's l e g , AmE shoot t h e breeze 'talk idly', b l o w a r a s p b e r r y 'make a 
vulgar noise with lips to, express contempt, dislike, disapproval'. In the past 
tense the formatives shoot and s t a n d behave exactly like the homonymous 
morphemes. In order to capture such phonological regularities, a concept like 
the 'formative' is absolutely necessary. 
As a result of the preceding remarks, we can now give a further twofold 
definition of the lexeme, namely from a syntagmatic and a paradigmatic point 
of view. A lexeme can therefore consist of: 
1. One morpheme or two or more formatives or morphemes (syntagmatically); 
2. A set of mutually substitutable word-forms (paradigmatically). 
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Chapter III 
T H E INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF WORDS. Word-Formation, 
Features, and Componential Analysis 
Lexemes may have internal structure, but their relationship to other lexical items 
is also structured in various ways. Both kinds of structuring are neutralized in 
the ambiguous noun phrase l e x i c a l s t r u c t u r e , which refers: 1. to the structure 
of lexemes and 2. to the structure of the lexicon. We will discuss both in turn 
in chapters III and IV. 
If 'lexemes' are defined as consisting of 'lexical units' (related to the various 
'senses' of a polysemous word, see 4.1.1. p. 130ff.), they clearly have internal 
semantic structure. 'Word-formation' (or, more precisely 'lexeme-formation') 
then produces new 'lexemes', while the productive semantic processes of 
metaphor and metonymy (or 'semantic transfer', see 3.4.) produce new 'lexical 
units'. Both, lexemes and lexical units, may then be affected by 'lexicalization', 
and 'institutionalization' (cf. Bauer 1988 and see 3.2.5.). 
The internal formal structure of words can furthermore be analysed on the 
graphemic and phonological level (possible sequences of letters, consonants and 
vowels, phoneme clusters, syllable structure), but this is clearly not the business 
of an outline of English lexicology. In the following, we will first look at 
polysemy and the morphological structure and then investigate the semantic 
structure of lexemes, also from a dynamic point of view. Consequendy, word-
formation processes and semantic processes will play a role here. 
3.1. Polysemy, Lexical Entries, and Sememes 
Before looking more closely at the internal morphological structure of words, 
we must raise the question of the unity of the word. This has always been 
a knotty problem for both linguistic theory and lexicographic practice. It is often 
not easy to decide whether in a specific instance we have a single lexical item 
with several meanings, i.e. a case of polysemy, or several lexemes which are 
formally identical, i.e. h o m o n y m y (cf. Lipka 1986b). We will return to this 
problem in greater detail in 4.2.1. after adopting the new notion of l e x i c a l u n i t 
in 4.1.1. 
Let me mention here, however, that the problem of polysemy has received 
a great deal of attention recently, and also that I have modified my position 
on this since 1986. The rediscovery of polysemy (cf. Lipka 1975a) must be seen 
in connection with two central issues of Cognitive Linguistics: the fuzziness 
of word meaning and the ubiquity of metaphor (cf. Paprotte/Dirven 1985). 
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Like so many other words in the language of linguists, polysemy is a 
'notational term\ Lehrer (1989:1) explicitly states that she is "not using it in 
the standard way". She adopts a very wide notion of polysemy (including 
metonymic pairs of material and product, e.g. n y l o n , n i c k e l , p a p e r , glass and 
even "nominalizations" of movement verbs, e.g. a w a l k , a s w i m , a f l y , cf. 1989: 
11, 24f.). Rohdenburg (1985) discusses it in the context of the markedness or 
hyponymy of items such as d o g (see 2.2.5. p. 65). The most comprehensive 
theoretical treatment of the subject, combined with an extensive computer-aided 
corpus study, is Schneider (1988). 
Spatial metaphor and "localist approaches to semantics" are not new, as 
King (1988:555) points out (cf. also Leech/Svartvik 1975:82-90). However, 
a cognitive point of view may open up new perspectives to a fuller 
understanding of originally locative relations, which include visual images and 
representations which are banned from purely language-immanent structural 
semantics (cf. Rudzka-Ostyn 1985). 
At the moment we will introduce the following convention. We start out 
from the assumption that a word of a specific spoken or written form and 
particular syntactic properties (especially belonging to a specific word class) 
is a single lexeme. The possible different senses of this lexeme, like those of 
w o r d discussed in 2.3.2., will be labelled sememes following Hansen et al. 
(21985:14, 179 ff.). Sememe is here defined as a specific meaning, or 'sense' 
of a lexeme made up of a complex of semantic components. The term sememe 
is not used by many linguists, in particular it will not be found in Kastovsky 
(1982a), Leech (21981), Lyons (1977) and in the work of Coseriu (but cf. Lipka 
1972:33 f., 43 f.). Kastovsky (1982a: 84 f., 90, 92) only introduces the term 
archisememe to denote the features common to all lexemes of a word-field, 
which may be realized materially as an a r c h i l e x e m e . 
The following examples may illustrate the need for introducing such a 
concept and my use of the term sememe: 
(1) sememe 1 'round root of plant' 
The second illustration draws on an example introduced into linguistic research 
in 1963 by Katz & Fodor (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 247 ff.) which has been 
extremely influential. Originally, it served to introduce so-called l e x i c a l e n t r i e s 
with different types of semantic components (cf. Lipka 1972:37 ff.). We will 
return to this question in 4.1. 
(a) BULB 
sememe 2 'sth. like bulb, in shape' 
(b) HOUSE 
sememe 2 'people in house* 
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(2) 
BACHELOR < animal human 1 'young fur seal without mate' 2 'so. with first academic degree' 3 'young knight serving a great noble' 
4 'so. who has never married' 
Note that b a c h e l o r consists of a rather specific sequence of sounds or letters, 
especially if compared for example with c u p . Surprisingly, this property has 
never played a role in the long discussion of the distinction between polysemy 
and homonymy. 
The following example is a modified and simplified version of the represen-
tation of various senses of the noun c u p given in Dirven (1985:102). As in 
many other cases discussed here, definitions from various dictionaries are 
integrated in my diagram. Diagram (3) can/be regarded as illustrating either 
a possible lexical entry for an English noun, or eight different sememes of the 
polysemous lexeme c u p . i 
(3) see page 78 
Obviously, metaphor and metonymy play an important role in (1) and (3). It 
can be clearly seen that the word definitely has internal structure (cf. Hansen 
et al. 21985: 208 f.), which can be brought out more or less clearly by an 
appropriate analysis and representation. I will not give any further detailed 
comments on my proposal in (3), since alternative representations are certainly 
possible. We will now discuss the morphological structure of lexemes. 
3.2. Morphological Structure: Simple vs. Complex Lexemes 
We now turn to the distinction between simple and complex lexemes, like c u p 
or t a b l e vs. d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . Clearly, the latter has a complex morphological 
structure, in that it consists of a number of lexical morphemes (see 2.3.1.). We 
are thus concerned with analytic, synchronic word-formation in the sense of 
Bauer (1983), Adams (1973), and Marchand (21969). Basically, the combination 
of lexical morphemes may be regarded either from 1. a synchronic or a 
diachronic and 2. an analytic or synthetic point of view. In this outline we 
have to restrict ourselves, for practical reasons, normally to a synchronic 
perspective. Furthermore, the main focus here will be on the analytic aspect 
of word-formation, i.e. the perspective of the hearer or reader who encounters 
already existing complex lexemes. In other passages (see 3.4.) we will stress 
the complementary synthetic aspect, namely the perspective of the speaker/writer 
who creatively produces a new lexeme. The productive nature of word-
formation, in particular of certain patterns and processes, has been emphasized 
by many linguists, notably by Hans Marchand 
The clear distinction between analytic and synthetic word-formation is 
relatively recent (Lipka 1971:222f., Kastovsky 1982a: 16f., 151 ff., Hansen et 
al. 21985:28, 32 f.). Analysis in word-formation can be linked to a structuralist 
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It is well known in the discussion of 'prototypes' that there are cups (for 
example Chinese ones) without a handle. However, they do not invalidate the 
statement that the prototypical cups have a handle (cf. Lipka 1987a: 287 f.). In 
German the attribute is criteria! for the distinction between Tasse and Senate. 
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approach while the synthetic perspective is inherent in the various models of 
generative grammar, whose starting point is the sentence (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 
216ff.). 
A complex lexeme may be synchronically analysable but no longer moti-
vated, like b l a c k b o a r d or w a t c h m a k e r . If its complete meaning is not derivable 
from its morphological structure and the pattern exhibited in parallel formations, 
as in callgirl, highwayman, streetwalker, pushchair, wheelchair, we say that 
such lexical items are idiomatic. We will return to such questions of lexi-
c a l i z a t i o n and i d i o m s in 3.2.5. For the moment we will concentrate on the 
question whether lexemes are analysable, i.e. decomposable into linguistic signs, 
namely morphemes. Word-forms, i.e. the inflected variants of a lexeme (see 
2.3.2.), are irrelevant for the description of lexical structure. Although they can 
be segmented into signs, such combinations of grammatical and lexical mor-
phemes do not belong in lexicology. They are the object of morphology in the 
narrow sense. 
Formatives (in our sense), i.e. pseudo-morphemes (see 2.3.1., 2.3.3.) are also 
of marginal interest for word-formation. They do, however, play a considerable 
role in the discipline of p h r a s e o l o g y which is concerned with idiomatic p h r a s a l 
l e x e m e s (cf. Gläser 1986:15). There are also other properties, besides 
idiomaticity, which distinguish phrasal lexemes from the results of word-for-
mation and speak for not regarding phraseology as a sub-discipline of lexicology 
(cf. Gläser 1986:15-25). Thus there are relatively close connections with syntax, 
and phrasal lexemes shade off into complex idiomatic phrases, proverbs, 
quotations, and routine formulas. Practical reasons, of course, also favour a 
separation of lexicology proper from phraseology. 
The result of the combination of lexical morphemes can be labelled a 
s y n t a g m a , more precisely a word-formation syntagma. Such a morphological 
syntagma can be regarded as the reduced form of an explicit syntagma, the 
sentence (cf. Lipka 1971:218 f.). This idea, as well as the concept of syntagma 
itself, taken over from Charles Bally, belongs to the foundations of Marchand's 
theory of word-formation (cf. Lipka 1976:119, Marchand 21969 : 2f.). For 
Marchand as well as those who follow him (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 22, 152 f.) 
including myself, a s y n t a g m a is a combination of full linguistic signs, which 
are in a determinant/determinatum relationship to each other. Thus, the sentence 
is a full grammatical syntagma, with the subject considered as deterrninatum 
and the predicate as deteirninant. In a word-formation syntagma, in English and 
other Germanic languages, the determinant (dt) normally precedes the 
deterrninatum (dm, in the following in capitals): space/SHIP, r e / W R r r E , w r i t / E R 
The deterrninatum furthermore denotes the identified element, which is already 
known, while the determinant represents the differentiating element, the new 
information. 
The combination of formatives (pseudo-morphemes) and lexical morphemes 
can be represented in schematic form as in (4), a diagram, which also shows 
certain general c a t e g o r i e s of word-formation. I here make a terminological 
distinction between such c a t e g o r i e s , as general procedures (like compounding, 
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affixation etc.) and specific types (in Marchand's sense), as subclasses, for 
example within compounding (e.g. steamboat, b l a c k b i r d , w a t c h m a k e r , c o l o u r -
b l i n d , w a t e r p r o o f , e a s y g o i n g , h i g h b o r n ) . These types are not to be identified 
with Marchand's types of r e f e r e n c e (e.g. the Subject-type, Adverbial 
Complement-type etc.). As general, neutral terms for the combination of lexical 
morphemes I will use c o m b i n a t i o n or c o m p o s i t e in the following: 
(4) 
(of formatives) 
P H R A S E O L O G Y 
- phrasal lexemes -
(of morphemes) 
W O R D - F O R M A T I O N 
complex lexemes (syntagmas) -
(of lexemes) 
compounding 
(of BASE with affixes) 
affixation 
prenxation suffixation 
(with zero-derivation) 
As can be seen from the diagram (4), I prefer the term affixation to the 
ambiguous term d e r i v a t i o n , except in the special case of z e r o - d e r i v a t i o n (cf. 
Toumier 1985: 48, Quirk et al. 1985:1539 ff.). Prefixes and suffixes are said 
to be attached to a base, which may be simple or complex, and in this case 
has its own internal structure (cf. Quirk et al. 1985:1519). This can be illus-
trated in the following way: 
(5) polarize 
depolarize 
disgracefulness 
POLAR + ize 
de + POLARIZE 
DISGRACEFUL + ness 
The segmentation into base and affix reveals the I m m e d i a t e C o n s t i t u e n t s (or 
ICs) of the complex lexeme. This notion was introduced into linguistics in 
classical structuralist syntax, where the analysis into ICs, starting from the 
sentence, was often performed down to the level of morphemes. An illustration 
of the IC-structure of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is found in Kastovsky (1982a: 170).2 
His analysis is decentralization but del centralize, which shows that 'base' and 
'determinatum' are not identical. For reversative verbs in English and German 
generally (e.g. also unload, entladen, desensibilisieren) cf. Funk (1988). IC-
analysis presupposes a semantic analysis and thus we have Ger Straflen/wetter-
vorhersage, E unlgentlemanly but old m a i d l i s h . Spelling and hyphens may 
indicate the closeness of ICs, as e.g. in lighthouse-keeper vs. die noun phrase 
(NP) light housekeeper. Cf. also the improbability of guaranteed used/cars and 
the possibility of both selfconsciouslness and self!consciousness (cf. Ger Selbst-
bewufitisein which is lexicalized in a different way). 
80 
The ICs of a word-formation syntagma are the determinant and determi-
natum, with the latter usually in second position in English, as e.g. in houseboat 
vs. b o a t - h o u s e . Each can internally be complex and analysed into constituents 
on a deeper level. Thus, e.g. self consciousness has a complex determinant, while 
l e t t e r - w r i t e r has a complex determinatum. 
I will not normally use the term stem, which Quirk et al. (1985:1518 f.) 
illustrate with j e a l - , p i e - in j e a l o u s , p i o u s . L i k e Marchand (21969:5f.) I consider 
these cases, as well as c o n c e i v e , deceive, r e c e i v e , and horrify as not analysable 
into full linguistic signs, and therefore consisting of formatives. These are 
relevant for phonological regularities, but not for word-formation. 
Tournier (1985:72) gives the following general formula for affixation in 
English, which is not a theoretical postulate but based on the observation of 
a large corpus (cf. also Stein 1971 for recursive affixation in English and French 
adjectives). 
(6) P 2 P , ( B ) S, S 2 S 3 
As can be seen from (6) the base in English complex lexemes, which forms 
a sort of nucleus or kernel, can be combined with up to two prefixes and three 
suffixes. 
In the following, I shall discuss compounds, derivatives, and nominalizations 
in some detail. Although I prefer the action noun affixation to d e r i v a t i o n , I 
shall employ, for the result of this process, the useful cover term (prefixal, 
sujfixal, z e r o - ) d e r i v a t i v e s . The three groups will serve to show in an exemplary 
way the problems which arise in the analysis and description of complex 
lexemes. For an extensive description of the productive patterns of English 
word-formation I refer the reader to Tournier (1985), who calls these m a t r i c e s 
l e x i c o g 4 n i q u e s (including also productive semantic processes), to chapter 2 in 
Hansen et al. (21985), and to the A p p e n d i x I in Quirk et al. (1985). Before 
we come to the survey of the three groups, three general remarks are necessary. 
The first one concerns so-called n o m i n a l i z a t i o n s (see 3.2.3.). The criterion 
for setting up this category of lexemes is the result of the word-formation 
process of nominalization. This class provides the most obvious justification 
for a syntactic level in word-formation. Thus, both Marchand (21969) - but 
not the first edition of his book - and generative grammarians start from an 
underlying sentence, which is converted into a nominalization by trans-
formations. In our short survey it is impossible to take up the controversy which 
has arisen within generative grammar over the treatment of nominalizations. 
Two competing hypotheses have been proposed, the so-called transformationalist 
hypothesis (or TH) and the lexicalist hypothesis (or LH) (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 
220 ff.). 
Secondly, I would like to emphasize again that complex lexemes constitute 
a separate area within the lexicon, as opposed to simple lexemes. As already 
illustrated in diagram (3) in 1.2. (p. 11), Coseriu distinguishes word-formation, 
as secondary lexical structures, from primary structures like "word fields". This 
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distinction within paradigmatic lexical structures has led him to distinguish the 
p r i m a r y v o c a b u l a r y from the secondary v o c a b u l a r y in a number of publications. 
It corresponds to the opposition between arbitrary and motivated linguistic signs 
and is particularly relevant for foreign language learning and teaching. Simple 
lexemes have to be learnt in isolation, while complex lexemes are internally 
structured and can thus be related to other lexemes in the mental lexicon (cf. 
Aitchison 1987).3 
As to my third remark, it must be stressed, however, that the same kind 
of distinctions which can be made by specific simple lexemes like d r i v e , can 
in principle also be expressed through syntagmatic modification of a general 
lexeme, as in go by c a r (cf. Lyons 1968:452). This general principle also holds 
for complex lexemes, in which the determinatum is syntagmatically modified 
by the determinant. I have discussed this interrelation between syntagmatic 
modification and paradigmatic lexical structuring in English in great detail in 
Lipka (1981a). Thus, for example the simple lexeme s e t t l e (noun) necessarily 
contains the semantic components 'without legs' and 'made of wood', which 
are not specified in e.g. a r m c h a i r . On the other hand, this complex lexeme 
necessarily contains 'with arms', which is explicitly expressed morphologically, 
as well as the facultative inferential f e a t u r e s (see 3.3.2.) 'upholstered' and 'com-
fortable' (cf. Lipka 1985). These, in turn, are obligatory, inherent components 
of easy c h a i r . 
From a contrastive point of view the principle of interrelation also holds, 
as demonstrated in Lipka (1981a) by comparing ape and Menschenaffe, monkey 
and the suffixal derivative Affchen. For simple lexemes Cruse (1977) discusses 
the question of the degree of lexical specificity chosen by a speaker in a 
specific situation, when he has at his disposal e.g. d o g , a n i m a l , and a l s a t i a n . 
Cruse argues that d o g here represents the neutral level of "lexical specificity". 
He claims that "under-specification" a n i m a l (in this case) is chosen when the 
speaker is either unwilling or unable to give further information. According to 
Cruse this suggests either compassion (e.g. The p o o r c r e a t u r e l The way they 
t r e a t t h a t w r e t c h e d a n i m a l i s d i s g r a c e f u l ) or that he is an expert in a particular 
field (e.g. using stone and i n s t r u m e n t for a diamond or a violin). 4 
Although the problem of lexical specificity is related to the choice between 
simple and complex lexemes, it must be maintained that this concerns reference 
in a particular situation and is therefore a matter of pragmatics. 
3 However, sometimes it may be easier to learn simple, unrelated lexemes man 
a series of compounds, especially if irregularity and iexicalization are involved. 
G. Pascoe argues that German beginners learn dead/kill faster than English 
ones learn totltoten. 
4 But cf. Lehrer (1989:7), for another aspect of technical language and experti-
se, where it is argued that "the polysemous use of dog is used mostiy by dog 
breeders, for whom a word denoting 'male dog* would be desirable" (see 
p. 65). The equivalent 'specification gap' in the German 'word-field' Pferd (see 
4.2.4.) is filled with the compounds Hengstfohlen and Stutfohlen in the lan-
guage of horse breeders. 
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3.2.1. Compounds 
We have mentioned already that traditionally the essential criterion for a 
combination to be a c o m p o u n d is that it is made up of at least two free lexical 
morphemes. According to our terminological conventions (see diagram (4) p. 
80) we must now specify that a compound consists of at least two lexemes. 
This means that on the highest level of analysis, it is made up of at least two 
constituents which occur (or can in principle occur) in isolation. These ICs may 
themselves be complex, as e.g. w r i t e r in the compound l e t t e r - w r i t e r . This is 
true for the morphological level, which may be in conflict with the IC-analysis 
on the syntactic level. If we keep the two levels apart, there is no conflict but 
two complementary analyses. Thus, e.g. b l o o d s u c k e r is a compound on the mor-
phological level (with the detennirratum but a suffixal derivative on 
the syntactic level ( b l o o d s u c k l E R ) as illustrated in Kastovsky (1982a: 170). 
For Marchand (21969:21) there is an additional necessary criterion for the 
definition of a compound: "The compound must be morphologically isolated 
from a parallel syntactic group". This criterion is not based on the internal struc-
ture of the complex lexeme, but serves to distinguish the lexeme from syntactic 
syntagmas. It has to be understood as the result of Marchand's originally 
structuralist approach, which is more obvious in the first edition of his book. 
The morphological isolation of the compound from parallel syntactic groups 
or phrases, according to him, can result from different causes, which may be 
strictly speaking not morphological. Thus, for Marchand, the compound 
blackboard is distinguished from the parallel syntactic group black b o a r d by 
a different stress pattern. Most compounds in English have a single main stress 
on the first element. However, there are also compounds which have two heavy 
stresses in isolation (so-called 'level stress') e.g. b d t t l e - g r i e n . In such cases, 
for Marchand, "morphological isolation" results from the different word order 
of parallel syntactic groups, as in g r i e n bottle.5 
In inflecting languages such as German, the presence or absence of an in-
flectional morpheme may, in addition to the stress pattern, serve as a criterion 
for morphological isolation. Here, the compound Hochschule is clearly mor-
phologically distinct from the syntactic group höhe Schule. The same holds for 
Großstadt, as opposed to the syntactic group of adjective plus noun große Stadt. 
For Marchand, because of the missing morphological differentiation in 
English, black m a r k e t is not a compound, as opposed to b l a c k b i r d . For him, 
spelling and hyphenation are no criterion, because of their irregularity and 
inconsistency. The same holds for semantic specificity or the unity of a concept. 
It must be mentioned, however, that many linguists do not accept Marchand's 
criterion of stress, inter alia because it is difficult to apply (cf. Levi 1978:41 f.). 
3 The compound greenbdttle, just like the more common bluebdttle (both deno-
ting a kind of fly), is again isolated from the syntactic group by the stress 
pattern ('forestress'). 
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Compounds may be further subcategorized according to word class and other 
criteria on various levels (cf. Lipka 1983, Hansen et al. 21985: 43-64, Quirk v/ 
et al. 1985:1567-1578). Thus, according to the word class of the resulting 
word-formation syntagma (in this case identical with that of the determinatum) 
we can distinguish between: 1. nominal or noun compounds like steamboat, 
b l a c k b o a r d , w r i t i n g desk, and w a t c h m a k e r on the one hand and 2. adjectival 
or adjective compounds, like c o l o u r b l i n d , i c e - c o l d , e a s y - g o i n g on the other. In 
Marchand (21969: 60ff.) a very fine subclassification of further "types" of 
compounds is made, like e.g. 1. b l a c k b i r d , c r a f t s m a n , w h e t s t o n e , a l l - s o u l , he-
g o a t , s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and 2. c o l o u r - b l i n d , g r a s s - g r e e n , h e a r t - b r e a k i n g , m a n -
made, h i g h - b o r n . The latest and most comprehensive semantic analysis of 
English noun-noun compounds is Warren (1978). 
Another important type of subclassification introduced by Marchand is made 
according to the presence or absence of a verb in the compound. This leads 
him to distinguish between "verbal nexus combinations" and "non-verbal nexus 
compounds". Within the subclass of noun-compounds we can therefore 
distinguish between c r y b a b y , d r a w b r i d g e , l e t t e r w r i t e r on the one hand and 
steamboat, o i l w e l l , and o a k t r e e on the other. This distinction is particularly 
relevant if one tries to correlate complex lexemes (as reduced syntagmas) with 
complete sentences (as full syntagmas), or rather tries to derive the former from 
the latter synchronically. 
3.2.2. Suffixal and Zero-Derivatives 
The hypothesis that complex lexemes can be derived from sentences is 
particularly plausible with those derivatives and nominalizations which contain 
a verbal element. Thus, e.g. b u l l f i g h t e r , t h e a t r e g o e r , and g r a v e - d i g g e r are 
obviously closely related to sentences like Someone f i g h t s b u l l s , Someone goes 
t o some t h e a t r e , and Someone d i g s g r a v e s . 
In an article published in 1966 Marchand (1966:133) first explicitly 
postulates: 
A morphologic syntagma is nothing but die reduced form of an explicit syntagma, 
die sentence. 
As already mentioned, Marchand took over this idea, which is closely related 
to the transformationalist hypothesis first postulated in print in 1960 by the 
generative grammarian Robert B. Lees, from Charles Bally. The first edition 
of Bally's book L i n g u i s t i q u e générale et l i n g u i s t i q u e française appeared in 
1932. The notion and the term syntagma ultimately derives from Saussure 
(1916:133), who calls complex lexemes, groups of words, and sentences 
syntagmas. 
In the second edition of Marchandas book (21969: 31) this hypothesis is 
reformulated in the following way: 
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Morphologie composites (= compounds, suffixal derivatives, préfixai combinations) 
are 'reduced' sentences in substantival, adjectival, or verbal form and as such 
explainable from 'fuir sentences. 
As already mentioned (p. 83), bullFiGHTER, t h e a t r e - G O E R , g r a v e - D I G G E R can be 
analyzed in a twofold manner: 1. As compounds with a complex determinatum 
(fighter, g o e r , d i g g e r ) and 2. As nominalizations with the determinatum -er, 
which corresponds to the subject in an underlying sentence (on the syntactic 
level). These competing analyses are not mutually exclusive alternatives, 
although they are based on different ICs. It is essential, however, for the group 
of suffixal derivatives which we are now discussing that the determinatum, 
i.e. the derivative suffix, determines the word class of the whole complex 
lexeme. 
Whether we have déverbal derivatives like a r r i v a l , g u i d a n c e , p a y m e n t , w r i t -
i n g , or deadjectival ones like i l l n e s s , w a r m t h , the suffix is always responsible 
for the affixation resulting in a noun. Also, the so-called n o m i n a a g e n t i s can 
be derived from various word classes as bases with the help of different suffixes 
(e.g. n o v e l l i s t , b a k l e r , c o o k / 0 ) . Similarly verbs can be derived with a variety 
of suffixes, as in modern/ize, hyphen/ate, dark/en, and clean/0. 
I mentioned the verb c l e a n and the noun c o o k in the same breath with 
suffixal derivatives. This needs an explanation and justification, since this 
assumption is by no means uncontroversial. If we assume the presence of a 
so-called z e r o - m o r p h e m e , symbolized by 0, this is in contrast with many 
traditional opinions. To my mind, z e r o - d e r i v a t i o n is an extremely productive 
process in contemporary English by which many new lexemes are formed. An 
alternative, pragmatic approach to the same phenomena is used in Clark/Clark 
(1979) (see 3.2.5., but cf. also Lipka 1982). 
The term and concept z e r o - d e r i v a t i o n is used in Adams (1973) and many 
publications by Marchand, Kastovsky, and myself, while c o n v e r s i o n is preferred 
in Bauer (1983) and Quirk et al. (1985:1558 ff.). It is sometimes claimed that 
the term c o n v e r s i o n should be avoided in synchronic treatments, since word 
class in many English words is neutralized or latent and derivable from context. 
In Lipka (1971) I have argued against this notion, which has been revived 
recently in a number of generative proposals. Quirk et al. (1985: 1558) openly 
admit that: 
Conversion is the derivational process whereby an item is adapted or converted to 
a new word class without die addition of an affix. In this way, conversion is closely 
analogous to suffixation (as distinct from prefixation). 
The authors treat it 
not as a historical process, but radier as a process now available for extending the 
lexical resources of die language. 
Admittedly, it is sometimes difficult to determine the direction of the synchronic 
derivation, which may be contrary to the actual diachronic development. 
Marchand (1964) has proposed a set of criteria for doing this. Generally, we 
can assume that that lexeme is derived in whose paraphrase the other lexeme 
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is used. This means for example that the verb t o nailO 'make fast with a nail, 
fasten with a nail' is derived from the noun. In contrast to this the noun a 
cheato 'someone who cheats' must be considered as derived from the verb. 
Leech (21981:224f.) proposed to give up the distinction and replace it by "bi-
directionality", i.e. to regard such cases of derivation "as a two-directional 
process". According to him, this disposes of "the chicken-and-egg problem". 
The theoretical concept of z e r o - m o r p h e m e (see p. 69), however, is not 
exclusively based on semantic relationships expressed in paraphrases. It is 
furthermore supported by the parallel to derivational patterns in which the same 
derivative relationship is expressed morphologically by a suffix. Thus we can 
set up the following proportional equations: 
(7) legal : legallize :: clean : clean0 'make Adj* 
atom : atom!ize :: cash cashO 'convert into N \ 
Besides such deadjectival and denominal verbs, there are also obvious parallels 
with déverbal nouns. Examples are the following n o m i n a a g e n t i s : c h e a t 0 , 
corresponding to s w i n d l l e r , c o o k o to b a k l e r , spy0 to o b s e r v i e r . Other déverbal 
nouns are e.g. d r i n k , cover, d u m p 'place where something is dumped', a t t a c k . 
Conversely, the following zero-derivatives are denominal verbs: t o hammer, t o 
b o m b , t o p i l o t , and t o s l i c e . 
The notion of zero-morpheme was not introduced arbitrarily in order to 
complicate matters. It accounts for the fact that two homonymous lexemes, 
which are superficially identical, are in a synchronically directed relationship. 
One lexeme is the base, while the other one is derived from it by means of 
a zero-suffix. Nevertheless, the two distinct lexemes are very closely related 
semantically and morphologically (cf. Lipka 1986b). 
To sum up: the zero-morpheme as a theoretical construct can be justified 
in two ways, namely 1. by a semantic inclusion relation, and 2. by parallel 
derivational patterns as in (7), where the suffix is overtly expressed. Zero-
derivatives are therefore only superficially simple. On a deeper level of analysis, 
they are syntagmas, consisting of a determinant and a determinatum, like overt 
suffixal derivatives. As with all word-formation syntagmas, the determinatum 
is in principle semantically and grammatically dominant. This means in 
particular that it determines the word class of the entire syntagma and that it 
precedes grammatical morphemes, as in e.g. t h e c l e a n l e r l s , he m o d e r n J i z l e d , 
he c l e a n l 0 l s . In languages like German, the determinatum also determines 
grammatical gender, as in d i e F r a u , but das FrauchenlFräulein. 
3.2.3. Nominalizations 
This third group of complex lexemes has been characterized above as 
determined by the result of the word-formation process. In this case it is a 
n o m i n a l , i.e. a nominal expression (cf. Levi 1978). The second criterion for 
the definition of nominalizations is their transformational derivation from a 
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sentence. In linguistic research the term n o m i n a l i z a t i o n is used both for the 
transformational process as well as for the concrete result of this process, as 
in the title of R. B. Lees's most influential book The G r a m m a r of E n g l i s h 
N o m i n a l i z a t i o n s , originally published in 1960. Thus the term is used for a 
linguistic expression. However, terminological usage is far from being uniform. 
For example the term may also be used for complex noun phrases which 
function as subject or object, as e.g. H i s c o n t i n u a l d r u m m i n g o n t h e t a b l e w i t h 
h i s knife a n d f o r k (irritated me). 
Alternatively, the term can be used in the narrow sense only for those noun 
phrases which have the structure of a noun itself. Exemples are: w a t c h m a k e r , 
b i r d - w a t c h e r , b e e r - d r i n k e r , c a v e - d w e l l e r , w r i t i n g - d e s k , w a s h i n g m a c h i n e , 
housekeeping, and c l o s i n g - t i m e . In the following, I will only deal with such 
nominalizations. 
From the point of view of morphology, nominalizations may be either com-
pounds or suffixal derivatives. The latter include zero-derivatives, like chimney 
sweepO, which parallel overt derivatives, like deer huntER Obviously, many of 
the complex lexemes just mentioned are clearly related to full sentences and 
can therefore be considered nominalized sentences, like b u l l f i g h t e r , t h e a t r e g o e r , 
g r a v e - d i g g e r . The synchronic derivation of such nominalizations from sentences 
has considerable explanatory power. 
Marchand (21969:32ff.) therefore postulates that the determinatum in such 
nominalizations corresponds to a particular constituent of an underlying sen-
tence. He distinguishes the following types of reference (in his terminology): 
(8) S(ubject)-type: apple-eatlER, cry I BABY 
0(bject)-type: eating/APPLE, drawl BRIDGE 
Pr(edication)-type: apple-eatlim, a r r i v l A L 
Ad(verbial Complement)-type: o i l refinlERY, carvinglKNiFE 
Marchand labels these types according to the syntactic function of the element 
which corresponds to the determinatum in the complex lexeme. This 
classification is thus based on syntactic criteria. The principle can be illustrated 
with the examples bullfighter and o i l refinery, with the help of the following 
diagrams (9) and (10) from Kastovsky (cf. Lipka/Gunther 1981:378). B u i fighter 
(like t h e a t r e g o e r , g r a v e - d i g g e r ) is obviously a Subject-type: 
(9) O P S 
bull <—_ fight ^____> -ER 
'someone fights ~" - bulls' 
S P O 
The determinatum in Subject-types is not necessarily the suffix -er, as can be 
seen from chimney sweepO. 
The Subject-type can also be represented by a compound, like c r y b a b y 
'person, esp. a child, who cries too often'. This can be derived from an under-
lying sentence like 'the baby cries' or 'some baby cries' with additional 
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lexicalization (see 3.2.5.; but cf. also the derivation of "complex nominals 
(CNs)" in Levi (1978) by means of 'Predicate Deletion' and 'Predicate Nomi-
nalization'). 
Complex lexemes without a verbal element are more difficult to correlate 
with an underlying sentence. In this case one can either introduce a specific, 
concrete verb in the underlying sentence, or postulate an abstract semantic 
element. The second proposal was first made in Lees (1970). His notion of 
"generalized verb" only contains a minimal set of semantic features which 
characterize variants like e n e r g i z e , d r i v e , p o w e r , p r o p e l in compounds like 
m o t o r c a r , steamboat, w i n d m i l l This suggestion corresponds to the later 
theoretical construct of "Recoverably Deletable Predicates (RDPs)" such as 
CAUSE, HAVE, MAKE, USE etc. used in Levi (1978). The most recent approaches 
to nominal compounds and adjective-noun combinations (Warren 1978, 1984) 
also start out from abstract semantic relations (cf. Leitzke 1989b). 
Another illustration of the derivation of types of reference can be given for 
the suffixal derivative n o v e l i s t . We can either start from an underlying sentence 
such as 'someone writes novels' or introduce a generalized verb like make, 
p r o d u c e (or an RDP MAKE), which gives the sentence 'someone produces 
novels'. In either case, however, the suffix - i s t corresponds to the subject in 
an underlying sentence and we consequently get a Subject-type here too. 
The adverbial complement of a sentence can also become the determinatum 
in a nominalization. O i l refinery will be used in our last example to illustrate 
Marchand's types of reference. Its derivation can be represented in the following 
way: 
(10) 
'(someone) 
CS) 
refines oil 
P O 
AdP 
-ERY 
t 
at some place' 
AdP 
The subject of the underlying sentence is not contained in the complex 
lexeme. The predicate, direct object, and adverbial complement, however, are 
clearly recognizable constituents of the nominalization. Since the locative 
adverbial has become the determinatum, we must classify o i l refinery as an 
Adverbial Complement-type of Place (AdP). 
For action nouns and other types of nominalization denoting a fact, process, 
event, or state, a more recent theoretical proposal is the so-called "head-noun 
analysis" (cf. Kastovsky 1982a:189f., 200, 228f.). Without going into detail, 
we can state that there is a close parallel to Levis's (1978) approach to 
'complex nominals' (e.g. v i r a l i n f e c t i o n , f e m i n i n e i n t u i t i o n , u r b a n r i o t , cf. 
Leitzke 1989a:106ff.), in that abstract antecedent "head nouns", like ACTION, 
FACT, PROCESS, EVENT, STATE etc., are postulated in the underlying structure 
from which such nominalizations are derived. Thus, on a deeper level, e.g. 
c o c k f i g h t i n g , bloodsheds, b o a t r i d e O , d a n c i n g , a r r i v a l etc. contain ACTION, while 
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the head noun for d e p a r t u r e may be either ACTION or FACT. The interpretation 
depends on the context (e.g. John's d e p a r t u r e was odd) and on the nature of 
the verb serving as base for the nominalization. Clearly, this proposal amounts 
to a more refined analysis of Marchand's Predication-type (cf. Kastovsky 
1982a:189f.). 
This fourfold classification of nominalizations in (8) (namely the 'types of 
reference') has considerable explanatory power for disambiguating identical or 
similar surface structures. Thus, dishwashER can either be a S-type or an Ad-
type of Instrument. In German both are clearly kept apart as Tellerwäscher, 
on the one hand and Geschirrspüler or Geschirrspülmaschine on the other. 
D r a f t e e 'someone who has been drafted' is obviously an O-type. The same 
suffix in escapee 'prisoner who has escaped', however, corresponds to the 
subject of the underlying sentence and is therefore a S-type. The complex 
lexeme payment, like its German equivalent Z a h l u n g , can either be used for 
the process or the sum paid. This ambiguity can be resolved by distinguishing 
the P-type from the O-type (cf. Lipka 1976:134). 
Marchand's 'types of reference', however, cannot only be used for the 
disambiguation and classification of nominalizations. In addition to this, they 
have a more far-reaching explanatory function. They can be used to explain 
the information selection and condensation which takes place in complex 
lexemes. Thus, if we look at diagram (8), we can see that different nomina-
lizations can be derived from the same underlying sentence. A p p l e - e a t e r , e a t i n g 
a p p l e , a p p l e - e a t i n g all go back to the sentence 'someone eats some apple'. 
The question now arises why such different reduced syntagmas are derived 
from the same complete syntagma, the sentence. Marchand's explanation is 
based on the observation that the distinction between old and new information 
plays an important role here. According to his theory, the determinatum of the 
complex lexeme always corresponds to that constituent of the sentence which 
is presupposed as known information. Marchand ^1969:32) characterizes this 
process in the following way: 
One grammatical part of the sentence is taken to be known: the Subject, the Object, 
the Predicate, the Predicate Complement, or the Adverbial Complement, and it is 
this part of me sentence mat becomes the determinatum of the composite. 
This process is often referred to as t o p i c a l i z a t i o n in linguistics. Marchand 
consequently also denotes his 'types of reference' as "selectional patterns of 
information". He points out that the distinction between old and new 
information was captured in the Prague school of linguistics by the terms theme 
(Thema) and r h e m e (Rhema). A number of American linguists have preferred 
the terms t o p i c and comment for this distinction, hence the term topicalization. 
In Prague linguistic theory, the phenomena involved are usually discussed under 
the term f u n c t i o n a l sentence p e r s p e c t i v e (FSP). Today the terms t h e m e l r h e m e -
s t r u c t u r e , t h e m a t i c s t r u c t u r e and t h e m a t i z a t i o n are often used for the phenomena 
involved. Obviously, the context of situation may be relevant here and 
topicalization is also determined by the textual functions of word-formation (cf. 
Lipka 1987b, Wotjak 1987 and see also 5.1.). 
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In this connection, I would like to take up again the distinction between 
denotation and reference as introduced in 2.2.3. If we apply this to Marchand's 
'types of reference', we have to modify some of his statements. It is not a 
grammatical part of the sentence which is known or given, but the relationship 
between this constituent and an extralinguistic referent or denotatum. This 
relationship corresponds to the one between the determinatum of the complex 
lexeme and the identical referent or denotatum. For example the subject in the 
underlying sentence Someone e a t s s o m e apple denotes the same extralinguistic 
referent as the suffix -er in the agent nominalization. This referent, the agent, 
as well as its existence are presumed to be known or given. 
The given information does not only contain the relation of reference and 
the existence of the referent; it also includes the denotation of the linguistic 
sign used for referring. It is known that a c r y b a b y is a kind of baby, a 
d r a w b r i d g e is a bridge, and a carving-knife a knife. The syntagma belongs to 
a subclass and is therefore a hyponym (see 4.2.3.) of its determinatum (cf. 
Kastovsky 1982a: 185 f., Bauer 1983:30). 
This fact is also expressed by the stress pattern of complex lexemes. As 
a rule, the determinatum only bears secondary stress or no stress at all. The 
determinant, which is more important from the point of view of given versus 
new information, normally bears the main stress. This pattern is found e.g. in 
crybdby, drdwbrldge, cdrving-knife, stiambodt, bldckblrd, ndvellst. The 
determinant syntagmatically modifies the given determinatum and makes the 
category denoted by the syntagma more specific. Complex lexemes therefore 
have a higher degree of semantic specificity compared to the simple words that 
constitute their determinatum. 
Up to now we have left aside an important point relevant for the classi-
fication of 'types of reference'. Marchand's basis for the classification is 
obviously a purely syntactic one. However, the distinction for example between 
the S-type and the Ad-type in the nominalization dishwashER also touches 
semantic questions. In one case we have an agent, in the other an instrument 
expressed by an adverbial complement. Yet the relation between the verb w a s h 
and an agent or an instrument is clearly of a different nature. This difference 
is therefore not only a matter of syntax, but also of semantics. 
There is a linguistic theory which understands the relationship between the 
verb and other elements of the sentence as syntactic-semantic relations, namely 
Charles Fillmore's Case Grammar. In the framework of this linguistic theory, 
the relations just mentioned are labelled d e e p cases or c a s e r o l e s . These cases 
must not be confused with the surface cases of traditional grammar. In the latest 
model relevant here (an article published in 1971), Fillmore gives the following 
list of deep cases: Agent, Experiencer, Instrument, Object, Source, Goal, 
Location, Time. The grammatical subject and object, as syntactic functions, are 
understood as purely surface relations in the classical version of Fillmore's Case 
Grammar (see 3.3.1. p. 105). 
If we now replace the syntactic categories in Marchand's 'types of reference' 
by deep cases, we can achieve a finer and semantically more appropriate 
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differentiation of types. At the same time, this is more consistent and less 
heterogeneous. For details of such a proposal I refer the reader to Lipka (1976). 
Some further remarks on the analysis of nominalizations, as a subgroup of 
complex lexemes, based on Case Grammar, may be appropriate. Thus, 
b u l l f i g h t e r is no longer a S-type, but an Agent-Type. The referent of the 
American word draftee is the goal of the action denoted by the verb. In Case 
Grammar this category is labelled G o a l . Consequently draftee is, like most 
suffixal derivatives in -ee, a Goal-Type. The superficially similar escapee, 
however, is an Agent-Type. D r a w e r may be either an Agent-Type or an Object-
Type depending on whether we refer to a person or a box-like container in 
a chest. 
The traditional classification of adverbial complements on the basis of 
content is also captured by Case Grammar and leads to a more appropriate 
description of the Ad-types. Therefore h u n t i n g season is described as a Time-
Type, o i l r e f i n e r y as a Location-Type, and p r i n t i n g - i n k as an Instrument-Type. 
We can now maintain that the application of Fillmore's deep cases to 
Marchand's 'types of reference* throws a new light upon the structure of 
complex lexemes and leads to a better understanding of the functioning of 
word-formation. With this theory we can capture fundamental differences 
between superficially and morphologically parallel words and explain them 
better. Thus, the lexemes listed in (11a) are all derivatives in -er, but represent 
different 'types of reference'. Conversely, morphologically distinct complex 
lexemes as for example those in ( l ib) can be explained and described as 
realizations of the same underlying type. 
(11a) -ER (lib) A G E N T - T Y P E : 
To sum up, word-formation, in particular the device of nominalization, can be 
understood - on the basis of a revised theory of 'types of reference' - as a 
productive process for the economical expression of the communicative needs 
of the speaker of a language. Complete sentences can be transformed in a rule-
governed way into nominalizations, i.e. complex lexemes. By this process, 
information-condensation is achieved, one of the most important functions of 
word-formation (cf. Lipka 1983, 1987b, Kastovsky 1982b). The complex 
lexemes thus formed can then fill the position of a simple lexeme in a sentence. 
The determinatum of a complex lexeme denotes given information; the simple 
or complex determinant contains the new information added to it. The various 
kinds of nominalization processes (Agent-, Action-, Fact-, Result- etc. 
Of course, diner may also be an Agent-Type. 
payer (Agent-) 
cooker (Instrument-) 
d i n e r (Location-)6 
m o u r n e r (Experiences) 
c o n t a i n e r (Objcct-Typi:) 
grave-digglcr 
c u t - t h r o a t / 0 
novel/ist 
cook/0. 
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nominalizations) in English and German belong to the most productive devices 
of word-formation and are relatively unrestricted. 
3.2.4. Word-Formation Processes and Productivity 
For Marchand (21969:2) word-formation is fundamentally a matter of productive 
processes, since he defines it as: 
that branch of the science of language which studies the patterns on which a 
language forms new lexical units, i.e. words. 
For him, productivity is a matter of more or less productive types. In Bauer 
(1983 : 62-199) a whole chapter is devoted to problems of productivity (cf. 
Tournier 1988). He adopts a distinction originally drawn by Lyons (1977:549) 
between p r o d u c t i v i t y and c r e a t i v i t y . The former is a rule-governed feature of 
the language system, the latter concerns the unpredictable (non-rule-govemed) 
innovations, i.e. the language-users' ability to extend the language system. Bauer 
illustrates the former with the literal meaning of the complex lexeme h e a d h u n t e r 
and the latter with the metaphorical extension of this lexeme to mean 'one who 
recruits executives for a large corporation'. For Lyons, metaphorical creativity 
is a matter of strategies, not of rules. Although Bauer recognizes that both 
productivity and creativity give rise to many neologisms, he restricts himself 
to the rule-governed innovations, i.e. productivity of word-formation. 
Finally, Tournier (1985:21) criticizes Marchand and Adams for doing 
precisely this and claims that both semantic neologism and the external process 
of adopting loanwords have to be included in a comprehensive description in 
order to capture "la totalité des processus lexicogéniques de l'anglais" (his 
emphasis). He repeatedly stresses that the dynamic nature of lexical processes 
("la dynamique lexicale") must be captured in an adequate description, and to 
do this proposes various lexeme-producing matrices, or moulds (1985:47 ff., 
50; cf. Tournier 1988:18-24). He distinguishes three large categories, or macro-
mechanisms, of such productive patterns, namely according to which elements 
of Saussure's linguistic sign are concerned: 1. Both s i g n i f i a n t and signifié 
(morpho-semantic neologism), 2. only the signifié (semantic neologism), and 
3. only the s i g n i f i a n t (morphological neologism). The external process of 
adopting loanwords remains outside these three categories. Word-formation 
proper, for Tournier, falls within category 1 (compounding and affixation) and 
3 (clipping and the production of acronyms). 
His schema (1985:51) can be summarized in simplified form in the 
following way (see also diagram (4) p. 80): 
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(12) 
1. Morpho-
Semantic 
Neologism 
Prefixation 
Affixation Suffixation 
/ Backdcrivation 
Construction ( 
\ ^ Juxtaposition 
\ (e.g. statesman) 
Composition < C ^ ^ ^ 
Amalgamation 
(e.g. sexploitation) 
Phonetic Motivation 
2. Semantic 
Neologism 
Class Transfer Conversion 
Metasemantic ^ Metaphor 
Processes 
("Métascmic") — — - Metonymy 
3. Morphological 
Neologism 
Aphaeresis 
Reduction ^ — (Fore-Clipping) 
of 'signifiant' -<CT^^ Apocope 
(Back-Clipping) 
— Acronymy 
("Siglaison") 
4. EXTERNAL Loan-Processes 
J 
In Tournier (1988:18-24) twelfe types of mould (or "matrices lexicogeniques") 
are distinguished which correspond to the subclassification on the right in (12), 
together with onomatopoeia and loan-words, with 'clipping* forming a single 
type. 
We will return to productive semantic processes for extending the lexicon 
after discussing the internal semantic structure of lexemes (see 3.3.). At this 
point, however, we must already have a look at the concept of motivation,, in 
lexicology. Ultimately, this concept goes back to Saussure, for whom the 
linguistic sign is basically arbitrary or non-motivated. He admits that sound-
imitation, or onomatopoeia exists, but claims that onomatopoeic words are rare 
and of secondary importance. Further on Saussure (1916:181) argues that signs 
like dix-neuf, H a n d w e r k may be relatively motivated. Taking up this argument, 
Bally (1944:129) claims that the sign may be motivated by: 1. the s i g n i f y 
(e.g. dix-neuf, p o i r - i e r ) , 2. by its s i g n i f i a n t (e.g. the verb c r o q u e r ) , and 3. by 
both of them together (e.g. c r o q u e - m o r t 'gravedigger'). He thus claims that 
sound-imitating words and interjections are motivated "par le signifiant". 
Ullmann (1962: 81 ff.) introduces another threefold distinction, namely between 
1. phonetic (onomatopoeia), 2. morphological (word-formation) and 3. semantic 
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motivation (through metaphor and metonymy). He claims (1962:92) that "in 
many cases, a word is motivated both morphologically and semantically". As 
examples of such "mixed motivation'* he gives b l u e b e l l and r e d b r e a s t . 
Returning to word-formation proper, we must state with Marchand 
( 21969:2f.) that the combination of full linguistic signs (i.e. morphological 
motivation) is not the only kind of motivation that occurs in the coining of 
new words. He distinguishes two groups and consequently two kinds of process: 
1. the combination of full signs (resulting in "grammatical syntagmas") namely 
Compounding, Prefixation, Suffixation, Derivation by a Zero-Morpheme, Back-
derivation, and 2. the combination of other elements (not resulting in syntagmas), 
namely Expressive Symbolism, Blending, Cl ipping, Rime and Ablaut 
Gemination, Word-Manufacturing. The second group of processes, which may 
also be very productive, he sometimes labels non-grammatical word-formation. 
In a book on English lexicology it does not seem out of place to have a 
short look at these devices for forming new words. It must be emphasized again 
that new lexical items belonging to the second group are not complex lexemes, 
because they are not syntagmas made up of morphemes. Nevertheless, they are 
not arbitrary words either, since they are partially motivated by their linguistic 
form. Marchand (21969:397ff.) discusses them in the last four chapters of his 
book: VII. Phonetic Symbolism, VIII. Motivation by Linguistic Form: Ablaut 
and Rime Combinations, IX. Clipping, and X . Blending and Word-Manu-
facturing. I will just give a few examples of the phenomena described. H i s s , 
c l i c k , b a n g , c r a s h , s p i t , spew, c h i t c h a t , p i n g p o n g are instances of expressive 
symbolism. In m o t e l , smog, b r u n c h two words are blended together. In word-
manufacturing more or less arbitrary parts of words are combined to denote 
new scientific discoveries, organizations, etc. resulting in various subtypes of 
letter-words or acronyms, like r a d a r , Salt, N a t o . Recent S D I and AIDS testify 
to the enormous productivity of this process. In all these cases, the productivity 
is not rule-governed and pattern-based as with "grammatical word-formation", 
the result of the process is not a syntagma, and the partially motivated 
constituents are not morphemes. 
3.2.5. Lexicalization and Idioms 
Traditional studies of word-formation, including Marchand's, were almost 
exclusively concerned with established complex lexemes recorded in 
dictionaries. Although productive patterns and regularities of word-formation 
were studied, so-called a d h o c - f o r m a t i o n s , or n o n c e - f o r m a t i o n s , were excluded. 
In recent research, beginning perhaps with an article on English compound 
nouns by Pamela Downing published in 1977, non-established complex lexemes, 
their function, and the actual process of coining came into focus. Such 
'innovations' may depend heavily on context, and were therefore termed 
c o n t e x t u a l by Eve and Herbert Clark in 1979 in a study on innovative verbs 
such as t o p o r c h a newspaper, t o H o u d i n i o u t of a closet. Although the Claries 
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argue against this, they may be interpreted as zero-derived denominal verbs. \ 
In my opinion both studies show that noun-noun compounding and zero- J 
derivation of denominal verbs in English are almost unrestricted productive 
processes (cf. Lipka 1982). In spite of this enormous productivity and the 
regularity of certain word-formation processes, an adequate theory of word-
formation must not disregard a certain phenomenon which affects complex 
lexemes, once they have been coined, to greater or lesser degree. I am referring 
to the process of l e x i c a l i z a t i o n , which in my opinion particularly influences and 
changes frequently used complex lexemes (cf. Lipka 1981b). This phenomenon 
interferes with regu^jword-formation processes and overlaps their result. If 
the resulting irregularity is only slight, we can speak of systematic l e x i c a l i z a t i o n , 
as Kastovsky (1982a: 166f., 196ff.) does. If the semantic changes are so extreme 
that the meaning of the whole lexeme can no longer be derived from its parts, [ 
we speak of an i d i o m (cf. Lipka 1972:75 ff., 1974). 
I would like to define l e x i c a l i z a t i o n as the phenomenon that a complex f 
lexeme once coined tends to become a single complete lexical unit, a simple 
lexeme. Through this process it loses the character of a syntagma to a greater \ 
or lesser degree (cf. Lipka 1981b: 120). In my definition an essential condition ^ 
and a prerequisite for this gradual diachronic process is the fact that a particular 
complex lexeme is used frequently. For Kastovsky (1982a: 164f.), whose 
defmition of lexicalization is similar to mine, frequency of usage is not an 
essential criterion. He stresses the fact that lexicalization causes the integration 
of a syntactic or word-formation syntagma into the lexicon, with semantic and/ 
or formal properties which are not completely derivable from either the 
constituents or the word-formation pattern. Both definitions are legitimate and 
to a large extent compatible, since l e x i c a l i z a t i o n , in my view, is a n o t a t i o n a l 
t e r m . This means that there is no single, correct definition of the term. This 
fact becomes particularly obvious if we look at the use of the term in 
Generative Semantics. Within this theoretical framework, l e x i c a l i z a t i o n denotes 
a process in which a configuration of semantic elements in an abstract 
representation is replaced by a lexeme. In earlier generative models l e x i c a l 
i n s e r t i o n was used for this transformational process. The word l e x i c a l i z a t i o n 
itself may thus exemplify the process it traditionally denotes within the 
discipline of word-formation. This sense, as well as the one current in 
Generative Semantics, can both be explained (according to Marchand's theory) 
if we derive the nominalization from the same underlying sentence 'Something 
becomes (a) lexical (item)' (cf. Lipka 1975a: 205). 
Other definitions of l e x i c a l i z a t i o n are possible, thus demonstrating its nature 4~ 
as a notational term, as a look at chapter 3 in Bauer (1983:42-61) will reveal. 
His subtype of syntactic lexicalization is problematic, to my mind. More 
convincing is Kastovsky's (1982a: 166f., 196 ff.) systematic l e x i c a l i z a t i o n , which 
affects whole types of word-formation and adds very general semantic features. 
Quirk etal. (1985:1522 ff.) distinguish lexicalization from i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , 
by which they understand the integration of a lexical item, with a particular 
form and meaning, into the existing stock of words as a generally acceptable 
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and current lexeme. This use of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n is identical with the one 
found in Bauer (1983:48) and I will adopt it whenever I want to stress the 
sociolinguistic aspects of a word. A complex lexeme is institutionalized when 
the original nonce-formation is accepted by other speakers as a known lexical 
item. In this connection it is important to draw a distinction introduced into 
linguistics by W. J. Meys in 1975 between i t e m - f a m i l i a r i t y and type-familiarity 
(cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 151, 164 ff.). For example f a m i l y man and f a m i l y t r e e are 
both item-familiar and type-familiar, as instances of the productive compound 
type 'Noun+Noun'. Although cow t r e e is formed according to the same familiar 
type, it is not i t e m - f a m i l i a r because it has never been institutionalized. Finally 
h i g h w a y m a n meaning 'robber' is not only item-familiar but semantically 
lexicalized and therefore idiomatized. 
Institutionalized and lexicalized complex lexemes clearly do neither belong 
to the level of the l a n g u e (with its systematic word-formation types) nor to 
the level of p a r o l e (with specific, concrete realizations of the underlying 
language system). Obviously, a level in between the two is needed. As early 
as 1951, Eugenio Coseriu (1967:11) proposed such an intermediate level and 
called it the n o r m of a language. It is not restricted to the lexicon, but also 
responsible for the conventional, unsystematic realization of certain sounds and 
for irregular inflections like o x e n , b r e t h r e n , sang, and t o o k . It is particularly 
useful, however, to apply the concept of 'norm', as the traditional, collective 
realization of the language system to lexicology and word-formation. This has 
been done repeatedly in the past (cf. Lipka 1971b, 1972:85, 129f., Kastovsky 
1982a: 33, 205). The norm accounts for the choice between alternative word-
formation types (to n a t i o n a l i z e , t o c l e a n , but not * t o n a t i o n a l i f y , * t o n a t i o n a l ) , 
for lexical gaps, and for the habitual disambiguation, e.g. of s l e e p i n g t a b l e t 
and headache t a b l e t , or Ger S c h w e i n e b r a t e n and J a g e r b r a t e n . 
Trie results of the process of i d i o m a t i z a t i o n , i.e. i d i o m s of various kinds, 
also belong to the norm of a particular language (cf. Lipka 1972:75 ff.). A 
survey of research in this field including a discussion of the work of Mel'fcuk, 
Amosova, Hockett, Bugarski, Fraser, Chafe, and Weinreich can be found in 
Lipka (1974). Idioms are defined there as formally complex linguistic 
expressions whose meaning is not derivable from that of their constituents. They 
may be relatively simple compounds, like c a l l g i r l , and h o l i d a y , fixed 
collocations like r e d h e r r i n g or b l a c k m a r k e t , or complex expressions like make 
up once's f a c e , k i c k t h e bucket, b l o w a r a s p b e r r y a t . 
Idioms are not a simple, homogeneous category and syntagmas of various 
kinds are more or less affected by idiomaticity in the process of lexicalization. 
Idiomaticity is a matter of degress, and the phenomenon is of the more-or-less 
kind rather than the all-or-none kind. There is a continuous scale ranging from 
a simple conjunction of morphemes to the creation of completely new formal 
and semantic units, both from a historical and synchronic point of view. With 
regard to the use of competing terms like i d i o m a t i z a t i o n , l e x i c a l i z a t i o n , and 
d e m o t i v a t i o n there is a great deal of terminological variation in linguistics (cf. 
Kastovsky 1982a:164, Bauer 1983:48f., Bauer 1988:246f.). 
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In my opinion (cf. Lipka 1983:927) l e x i c a l i z a t i o n is a gradual, historical 
process, involving phonological and semantic changes and the loss of 
motivation. These changes may be combined in a single word. Semantic 
changes, i.e. idiomatization, may be formalized as the addition or loss of 
semantic features. Synchronically, the result of this process, various degrees of 
idiomaticity, form a continuous scale. The process of lexicalization in general, 
as well as its result, namely the irregularity of the lexicon, can only be 
explained historically. In sum, I define lexicalization as the phenomenon that 
complex lexical items, through frequent usage, may lose their syntagmatic nature 
and tend to become formal units with specific content. Here, the border between 
complex and simple lexemes becomes fuzzy. 
Let us look briefly at some examples of the various changes possible within 
the general, comprehensive notion of lexicalization. First, formal changes may 
involve either the spoken or the written medium or both. They are obvious 
symptoms for the lexicalization of a syntagma. Examples on the phonological 
level are the reduced final vowel in p o s t m a n , Sunday and the more open first 
vowel in Ger H o c h z e i t . F o r e c a s t l e 'part under the bows where the seamen have 
their living and sleeping accommodation' can serve as an illustration of both 
phonological and graphemic changes. The syntagmatic character is completely 
lost in the usual pronunciation ['fo\)ksl]. In the alternative graphemic variant 
f o ' c ' s l e the word has also become an unanalysable simple lexeme in the written 
medium (cf. also b o a t s w a i n ! b o ' s u n , b o s u n ) . 
The second kind of change, the loss of morphological motivation, can be 
seen in b l a c k b o a r d (often green today), w a t c h m a k e r , and "lipstick in a pot" 
(cf. Downing 1977:819). Demotivation may also be signalled by the addition 
of a second determinant, if a first one is no longer motivated. Some German 
examples are H a n d t u c h 'towel' which is clearly analysable but has lost its 
motivation for many speakers, since it can also be used for the feet. Thus, a 
specific kind of small towel, which is exclusively used for the hands, may be 
referred to today by H d n d e h a n d t u c h or G a s t e h a n d t u c h . Another case in point 
is O s t w e s t f a l e n , the area around Paderbom in Northern Germany. There is no 
contradiction, since Westfalen has become a single lexeme, where the first 
constituent is no longer motivated. Demotivation may result from either 
linguistic or extralinguistic developments. B l a c k b o a r d and w a t c h m a k e r (who 
today normally only repairs watches), and the zero-derived verbs t o s a i l 0 , and 
t o s h i p 0 show the results of such extralinguistic developments. And clearly, 
we can sail by steamboat or hovercraft and ship goods by train. 
The third type of development, semantic changes, may be either slight or 
considerable. A very small degree of idiomatization is caused by very general 
additional features like [+HABITUAL] in c r y b a b y , s l e e p w a l k e r , r a t t l e s n a k e , or 
[+PROFESSIONAL] in baker, w r i t e r (in J o h n i s a w r i t e r ) and chimneysweep. These 
are instances of Kastovsky's "systematic lexicalization". 
Rather specific, unpredictable semantic features are added in the following 
examples for what Leech (21981:225-227) called "petrification": w h e e l c h a i r , 
p u s h c h a i r , t r o u s e r s u i t . According to him they contain the additional meaning 
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elements: 'for invalids, for infants, for women'. H i g h w a y m a n , s t r e e t w a l k e r , and 
c a l l g i r l are unpredictable idioms. In contrast to the latter, c a l l b o y is defined 
in dictionaries as 'a boy who tells actors when it is time for them to go onto 
the stage' but is now also used parallel to c a l l g i r l . 
Examples of a combination of various changes in one lexeme are h o l i d a y 
and Ger H o c h z e i t . They combine phonological deviation and semantic changes, 
both the addition and loss of meaning elements. I have discussed the case of 
h o l i d a y in great detail in Lipka (1985:342-344). The sememe of its second 
constituent day has lost all its components except for [PERIOD OF TIME]. An 
inferential feature (see 3.3.2.) of the first constituent, namely [NO WORK] has 
become an obligatory feature of the whole lexeme. These examples shall suffice 
to illustrate the complexity of lexicalization in word-formation. 
3.3. The Semantic Structure of Words: Componential Analysis 
and Semantic Features 
Before we try to structure the content, s i g n i f y , or sememes of a lexeme, we 
must return to some problems already touched on in 2.2.2. and 2.2.5., namely 
different approaches to semantics and the distinction between denotation and 
connotation. To start with the latter distinction first, let me emphasize here that 
- like Lyons (1977) and Leech ^1981) - I will concentrate in this book on 
denotation, in spite of the extensive discussion of other kinds of meaning in 
2.2. Reference will be made in passing to other aspects, but my main focus 
will be on denotative or conceptual meaning, both for practical reasons and 
because most research so far has been done in this area. 
As regards the different approaches to semantics in linguistic research we 
can distinguish, in my opinion, two large groups or categories, namely language-
immanent and referential ones. For the moment we can illustrate the two 
directions - within the field of word semantics - with the names Coseriu and 
Leisi. I derive the term r e f e r e n t i a l semantics from the extralinguistic r e f e r e n t , 
As a synonymous expression we may also use d e n o t a t i v e semantics. 
Of course there are other possibilities of classifying directions of research 
in linguistic semantics. Another pair of alternatives would be F e a t u r e Semantics 
vs. P r o t o t y p e Semantics. Semantic f e a t u r e s , often used synonymously with 
semantic components, are understood as a specific kind of meaning elements. 
Not all linguists who subscribe to language-immanent semantics consider the 
postulation of semantic components useful and justified. This statement holds 
e.g. for John Lyons, whose language-immanent semantic theory is non-
componential. 
Within primarily logically oriented semantics, there are a variety of other 
subclasses, with which we will not be concerned in this book. More about them 
can be found in Lyons (1977) and Lutzeier (1985). I will just mention the 
names of such approaches, especially t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, and a variety 
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of more recent and specific models like s i t u a t i o n semantics, i n t e r v a l semantics, 
p o s s i b l e - w o r l d semantics, and g a m e - t h e o r e t i c a l semantics. 
Before discussing various methods of semantic decomposition in language-
immanent theories, let me make an observation concerning Leisi and the 
concept of m e t a l a n g u a g e . His denotational approach is closely related to 
Prototype Semantics (cf. Lipka 1987a). When Leisi ^1985:37) compares t o w e r 
with Ger T u r m , he discusses the different categorization in the two languages. 
Both languages create similar, but not identical categories of extralinguistic 
objects. Although Leisi does not use the term, he is really concerned with the 
different prototypes for t o w e r and T u r m . The two languages divide up the same 
extralinguistic reality differently, by drawing boundaries between the respective 
classes of objects in a different way. Leisi tries to capture this distinct 
categorization of reality with the concept of G e b r a u c h s b e d i n g u n g e n , i.e. 
different 'conditions of use' for the respective lexemes. In doing this, Leisi 
obviously does not use a metalanguage for the analysis and description of 
lexical meaning; in other words, he does not resort to semantic features or 
components, or other formal meaning elements. 
Let us briefly look at the distinction between m e t a l a n g u a g e and o b j e c t -
l a n g u a g e (cf. Lyons 1977:10 ff.). This distinction has a long tradition in logic 
and philosophy. Metalanguage means "language used to describe language", the 
object language. Thus we might use English to describe French, as in Lyons's 
example: The F r e n c h w o r d 'homme' i s a n o u n . Here, one natural language 
serves as a metalanguage for another. It is more common though, to restrict 
m e t a l a n g u a g e (in a rather narrow sense) to specially constructed and formalized 
systems of representation. In a less technical sense, the terminology of grammar 
is a metalanguage. So are certain theoretical constructs and terms of specific 
linguistic theories, usually signalled as such by a specific notational convention 
or formalization. 
Thus for example phonemes are metalinguistic constructs, written between 
slants (J /), as opposed to square brackets for a phonetic notation. M o r p h e m e s 
are often marked as such by braces ({ }). In contrast to both, syntactic and 
semantic features were often signalled in generative grammar by square brackets 
([ ]) as metalinguistic elements. An alternative notation for meaning components 
was introduced in the later framework of Generative Semantics, by linguists 
like McCawley and Lakoff. They conventionally symbolized what they called 
a t o m i c p r e d i c a t e s by using capital letters. For example the verb k i l l was 
decomposed into and paraphrased by CAUSE, BECOME, and NOT ALIVE - we will 
return to this so-called theory of l e x i c a l d e c o m p o s i t i o n later. By this notation 
the metalinguistic construct CAUSE is clearly distinguished from the English 
word cause of the object-language. In spite of this clever device, a confusion 
between object-language and metalanguage occurred more than once in the 
publications of Generative Semanticists. 
Metalinguistic elements like distinctive s e m a n t i c f e a t u r e s or s e m a n t i c 
components can basically be derived in two ways: 1. by purely language-
immanent procedures from the opposition of lexical items (cf. Coseriu/Geckeler 
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1981:34 f.), or 2. from properties of the extralinguistic referent or denotatum 
in a referential approach to semantics (cf. Coseriu/Geckeler 1981:41 ff.). In the 
latter case - as opposed to Leisi's G e b r a u c h s b e d i n g u n g e n - such features have 
to be standardized and formalized to some extent in order to be of general 
use. This can be done in many cases but not all, with the help of a binary 
feature notation using + and -. The advantage of such a notation is that it 
achieves a clearer and more economical description. Also, the results of a 
specific analysis can be verified and checked more easily. Such a simple 
formalization further reveals mistakes and inadequacies, which may be hidden 
by a merely verbal characterization of the conditions of use of a lexeme. 
Examples of a purely language-immanent semantic approach can be found 
in Coseriu's position and the so-called c o m p o n e n t i a l a n a l y s i s , which goes back 
to Hjelmslev. We will discuss this presently. The method of implicit or explicit 
paraphrase evaluation, practised e.g. by Generative Semanticists like Lakoff and 
McCawley, must also be discussed in this context. 
3.3.1. Semantic Decomposition and its Justification 
The decomposition of lexemes into semantic elements or components has a long 
tradition both in European structuralism and American anthropology. In the 
1950s anthropologists like W. H. Goodenough applied the componential analysis 
of meaning to kinship terminology. As far back as 1943, the Danish linguist 
Louis Hjelmslev argued that words can be analysed into what he called c o n t e n t 
figurae. Some of the examples he gave for such a componential analysis are: 
r a m = 'he-sheep', ewe = 'she-sheep', man - 'he-human being' etc. (cf. Lyons 
1968:470-480; 1977:317-335; Coseriu/Geckeler 1981:34). It has often been 
noticed that such series of words have certain meaning components in common. 
These can be made visible by setting up proportional equations and applying 
the mathematical process of factorizing a number. The following English words 
are particularly suitable for such a procedure: 
(13) man 
bull 
stallion 
... etc. 
woman 
cow 
mare 
child 
calf 
foal 
To illustrate the process of factorizing a number and its parallel with lexical 
items, I will use an example given in Leech (21981:91) in slightly modified 
and simplified form. Just as we can pick out a common factor from a set of 
numbers, we can extract certain semantic components from words. 
(14)r 
(a) 
4 is to 10 m a n is to woman 
as 6 is to 15 (b) as boy is to g i r l 
as 8 is to 20 as gander is to goose 
(2x) (5x) (male x) (female x) 
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We can easily see the analogy of linguistic and arithmetical proportions. In 
(14a) the common factors 2 and 5 are picked out, just as in (14b) the 
components (male) and (female) are extracted. Returning to (13) it is evident 
that there are common components in both the horizontal and the vertical 
directions. Represented as a proportional equation (with :: symbolizing the 
equation) we can say that m a n is to woman is to c h i l d as b u l l is to cow is 
to calf. But m a n and w o m a n as well as bull and c o w also have something in 
common, as opposed to c h i l d and calf. From these equations we can extract 
the following factors, components, or features (spelt in capital letters) 
represented in diagrammatic form: 
(15) H U M A N 
r 
Man woman 
M A L I : FF.MALF. 
J 
child 
N O N - A D U L T 
bull 
MAI.K 
V 
B O V I N E 
" V — 
ADULT 
Fl : M A L I : 
J 
calf 
N O N - A D U L T 
A considerable number of terms have been used in semantic research for 
various kinds of semantic elements, such as: c o n t e n t f i g u r a e , s e m e s , s e m e m e s , 
components, semantic markersldistinguishers/features, and atomic predicates (cf. 
Sprengel 1980:150). We will have a closer look at the concepts of a t o m i c p r e -
d i c a t e s vs. s e m a n t i c f e a t u r e s in order to show that these distinctions are not 
merely matters of terminology. We will see that not only the labels for the 
different theoretical constructs differ, but also the range of empirical facts 
covered by the respective theories. Consequently it can be claimed that tra-
ditional componential analysis and Generative Semantics are complementary (cf. 
Lyons 1981:75 ff.). The former has almost exclusively been applied to nouns 
(but cf. Lipka 1972 for verb-particle constructions), while lexical decomposition 
into atomic predicates is practically restricted to verbs, in particular causative 
verbs (cf. Kastovsky 1973, Lipka 1982). In the following I shall try to charac-
terize the main assumptions of Generative Semantics, especially its theory of 
l e x i c a l d e c o m p o s i t i o n (cf. Lipka 1976; 1982:7 ff.). 
The main proponents of this theory, namely McCawley, Lakoff, and 
Postal started out in the late 60s, at first only implicitly, from a paraphrase 
relationship between simple words and their definition. Some particularly 
suitable lexemes were decomposed into semantic elements as follows (cf. 
McCawley 1968:73): 
(16) die = (Become) (Not) (Alive) 
These meaning elements were considered predicates in the sense of predicate 
logic (cf. Lyons 1981; 80 f.) and labelled a t o m i c p r e d i c a t e s , because it was held 
that they could not be analysed any further. The so-called Recoverably Deletable 
Predicates (RDPs) lateFlised by Levi were claimed to be possibly universal 
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primitives, but not necessarily atomic (1978:50 f.). Predicates were regarded 
as abstract units, not to be identified with the concrete words of the object 
language (Lipka 1972: 61 ff.). It is particularly important in our context that 
these meaning elements were supposed to represent the internal structure of 
lexemes not in a linear sequence, but as a hierarchic configuration. The analyses 
of specific English lexemes carried out in the various publications were not 
identical. There was also a development within the theory with some 
modifications, such as the introduction of an additional predicate DO (cf. Lipka 
1976). Disregarding for the moment the hierarchic tree-structure postulated, the 
following examples of the decomposition of lexemes in Generative Semantics 
can be given: 
(17) / kill = (DO) CAUSE BECOME NOT ALIVE 
break = (CAUSE) BECOME NOT WHOLE 
remind = STRIKE as SIMILAR, STRIKE LIKE/MAKE THINK 
apologize = REQUEST FORGIVE 
persuade = CAUSE BELIEVE, (DO) CAUSE BECOME INTEND. 
One of the most important results of work in this field is the insight that many 
lexemes contain very general, possibly universal, semantic elements. Although 
these allegedly atomic elements of the metalanguage are derived from para-
phrases in specific natural languages, they can be said to be transformed from, 
object-language elements and raised to the status of metalinguistic semantic 
components (cf. Lipka 1972:42). Thus, many causative verbs contain an element 
which can be symbolized either by BEWIRKEN or VERURSACHEN (derived from 
paraphrases in German for töten, säubern, wärmen etc.) or by CAUSE (contained 
in k i l l , c l e a n , p e r s u a d e , l e g a l i z e ) . The same predicate can be postulated to 
underlie the object-language verb make. 
The theory of Generative Semantics provides a mechanism and a principled 
way of relating explicit periphrastic causative constructions with make, cause, 
have (e.g. make l e g a l or 'The goverment caused the zone to become n o t 
m i l i t a r y ' ) to complex lexemes like l e g a l i z e and d e m i l i t a r i z e , and simple lexemes 
{ like k i l l , break, remind (e.g. CAUSE, BECOME, NOT ALIVE). It postulates so-called 
\ p r e l e x i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , which can be applied repeatedly, combining atomic 
j predicates in various ways, before substituting concrete lexemes for such 
. combinations. This process is called l e x i c a l i n s e r t i o n , or l e x i c a l i z a t i o n . The 
theory can thus explain, for example, that the following two sentences (18a) 
and (18b) have the same meaning and an identical underlying abstract structure: 
(18a) The court legalized bussing 1 
? CAUSE + BECOME 
(18b) The court made bussing legal ) 
In (18a) CAUSE is contained in l e g a l i z e together with the second predicate 
BECOME, which symbolizes a transition or change of state into a process or 
another state. In (18b), however, both abstract meaning elements have only to 
be combined with each other and realized in English make. In some publications 
by Lakoff the predicate BECOME is symbolized as Incho (from the traditional 
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term i n c h o a t i v e v e r b s , i.e. "change of state verbs"). It can be justified by 
paraphrasing e.g. h a r d e n as 'become hard' and liquefy as * become liquid'. In 
many English lexemes both inchoative and causative verbs are realized as a 
single surface form (cf. Lipka 1982). Kastovsky (1973 :esp. 290 ff.) discusses 
explicit and implicit causative constructions in English in great detail and with 
much ingenuity, as well as derived causative verbs like del m i l i t a r i ize (the zone), 
d e l f r o s t l 0 (the icebox), u n l s a d d l e l O (the horse). 
The much discussed stock example of Generative Semantics is k i l l . As 
opposed to Ger töten it is not a deadjectival derivative, but a simple lexeme. 
According to McCawley (1968:73) it can be decomposed into cause t o d i e . 
Although he does not say so, this claim is ultimately based on the observation 
that the paraphrase can replace k i l l in most contexts. D i e itself can in rum be 
decomposed into BECOME, NOT, ALIVE. Both decompositions, however, do not 
consist of a simple linear sequence of atomic predicates, but must be understood 
as hierarchic configurations. Since the adjective d e a d itself can be decomposed 
into NOT ALIVE, the sentence, or rather proposition, x k i l l e d y can be represented 
in the following form: 
= x killed y 
(Harry) 
The variables x and y are used here in place of concrete realizations of the 
subject and object, e.g. as the proper names J o h n and H a r r y . As is customary 
in predicate logic, the p r e d i c a t e CAUSE is written first, followed by its two 
a r g u m e n t s , in this case x and S. As a simplified explanation of the basic 
assumptions of predicate logic, let me say that the p r e d i c a t e is an abstract 
element which expresses a property of an object or a relation between two or 
more objects. Sometimes the less ambiguous term p r e d i c a t o r is used instead. 
The objects to which a predicate applies are called the a r g u m e n t s in logic. 
Thus e.g. in the sentences J o h n i s t a l l and J o h n i s s l e e p i n g , the adjective 
t a l l as well as the verb sleep can both be understood as predicates. Obviously, 
predicates are not necessarily verbs, but may be realized as adjectives, nouns, 
prepositions or conjunctions. 
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In 'JC killed / the two variables are the arguments of the two-place predicate 
k i l l on the surface level. On a deeper, more abstract, underlying level or 
structure, the second argument of the predicate CAUSE and the only argument 
of the one-place predicates BECOME is the symbol or node S. The only 
argument of the predicate ALIVE is y . 
This hierarchic structure is postulated as the abstract representation under-
lying a concrete linguistic utterance. Starting from this configuration of atomic 
predicates, we can now reverse the process of lexical decomposition in order 
to arrive at concrete linguistic material, i.e. lexemes. 
Thus, to arrive at alternative verbal realizations of the underlying structure 
(19), which are paraphrases of each other, we have to apply so-called 'prelexical 
transformations'. The most important one is called p r e d i c a t e r a i s i n g . It can be 
applied once or repeatedly and then combines two or more atomic predicates 
with each other. If for the result of the combination a lexeme exists in the 
language, it can replace the configuration and vice versa. Thus if predicate 
raising is applied twice to the structure (19), this may result in the following 
derived structure (20). The linear combination of the predicates BECOME NOT 
ALIVE can now be replaced by the lexical item d i e . Similarly, the English verb 
cause of the object language can be substituted for the atomic predicate CAUSE. 
With an additional reshuffling of the linear sequence of the elements, we get 
the paraphrase x caused y t o d i e . 
If all predicates - including CAUSE - are combined by predicate raising, we 
can insert the simple lexical item k i l l and thus derive the surface structure x 
k i l l e d y from the underlying abstract structure (19) (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 268). 
Perhaps some evaluation of Generative Semantics after 20 years will not 
be premature. The focus of mainstream linguistics has definitely changed and 
the interest, especially in semantics, has shifted from highly formalized theories 
to pragmatic, communicative, and cognitive approaches. Prototype Semantics 
is a case in point. Although a number of problems in connection with the theory 
of l e x i c a l d e c o m p o s i t i o n remain unsolved, Generative Semantics has clearly 
brought a number of valuable insights which are here to stay. The perspective 
has changed. The limitations of the theory are obvious and it must be seen, 
in my opinion, as a specific variant of componential analysis and at the same 
time as a complementary analytical counterpart to the holistic approach of 
Prototype Semantics. 
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The range of the theory is restricted - it concentrated almost exclusively 
on verbs. Consequently, it must be seen as complementary to those approaches 
in which nouns and noun phrases are more prominent. The method of lexical 
decomposition can reveal relationships between superficially very different 
structures like (18a) and (18b) and paraphrases such as x k i l l e d y and x caused 
y t o d i e . The distinction between the object-language and the metalanguage was 
often confused in the publications of the Generative Semanticists, and the 
explicit discussion of the justification of atomic predicates by paraphrasing is 
only found in relatively recent articles (cf. Lipka 1972, 1976). 
The claim of generality for predicates like CAUSE, BECOME, HAVE, NOT has 
proved most fruitful and stimulating in contrastive linguistics. Here, parallel 
semantic structures have been discovered in quite distinct surface structures. 
The abstract representations postulated for specific lexical decompositions 
usually contain the variables x and y . This explicitly demonstrates that predicates 
are in a syntagmatic relationship with certain arguments. 
It shows, too, that the analysis of lexemes into an unordered set of semantic 
features does not yield an adequate description, which becomes particularly 
evident in the case of lexemes functioning as predicates, but less so when they 
function as arguments. This observation is easily compatible with the distinction 
Uriel Weinreich (1972) first made in 1966 between an unordered set of 
semantic features, which he called a c l u s t e r , and an ordered, directed set of 
features, which he labelled c o n f i g u r a t i o n (see 3.3.4.). The configuration was 
supposed to account for the relationship between a transitive verb and its object. 
There are close connections with Case Grammar here.7 This linguistic model 
also uses the basic notions of predicate logic and applies them to syntactic and 
semantic relationships. The predicate-argument relation is to my mind more 
adequately captured by deep cases than in the framework of Generative 
Semantics. The model of Case Grammar therefore is of considerable relevance 
to sentence semantics. 
The lexical semantics studies published by Generative Semanticists and by 
Fillmore around 1970 almost invariably concentrated on a handful of lexical 
items, which were used as test cases or illustrative material to support or attack 
a certain theoretical point. An extreme case in point is Postal (1970) who 
7 See 3.2.3. p. 90 f. The theory of Case Grammar was first proposed in Fillmore 
(1968b) and later developed in various publications. By 'case' Fillmore did not 
mean the inflectional variations in nouns, as in the traditional sense of the 
term (today also labelled 'surface cases'). He rather postulated some underlying 
deeper relationships (today called 'deep cases' or 'case roles') between verbs 
and nouns (or more precisely NPs) which are independent of their surface 
realizations. Thus e.g. die 'deep cases' relating the verb open and die NPs 
John ('Agent'), the key ('Instrument'), the door ('Object') remain die same in 
John opened the door with the key, The key opened the door, The door 
opened, It was John who opened the door, in spite of different surface subjects. 
Cf. Lipka (1976:125-128) for a comparison of Case Grammar and Generative 
Semantics, and Lipka (1982:7-9) for a survey of the latter theory. 
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discussed, on almost a hundred pages, various aspects of the single "surface 
verb" r e m i n d . Weinreich's complaint in 1966 that "the most urgent need in 
semantics is for fresh empirical evidence obtained by painstaking study of 
concrete lexical data" (1972:120) had very little effect. More than 20 years 
later the situation is not radically different. Only now, with the advent of per-
sonal computers and the availability of a number of machine-readable corpora 
of the English language, have a number of large-scale projects got under way. 
At the risk of seeming immodest, I would like to sketch briefly my own 
contribution to the field in Lipka (1972). The basis of this study of verb-particle 
constructions was an open-ended corpus with a collection of material that 
attempted to incorporate as many currently used collocations with o u t and up 
as possible (cf. Lipka 1972 :14f., 154-162). In the semantic analysis of these 
verb-particle constructions the methods of the study of word-formation were 
combined with semantic feature analysis and complemented by a classification 
according to archilexemes representing certain word-fields. The constructions 
with o u t and u p , functioning as transitive and intransitive verbs, were regarded 
as one-place or many-place predicates in the sense of symbolic logic. They were 
broken up into semantic components with the help of specific formulas for their 
semantic structure, consisting of f o r m a t o r s and d e s i g n a t o r s , as represented in 
(21): 
(21) 
B E 
BECOME + 
CAUSE + BECOME + 
CAUSE 
Loc 1 r ± Apparent 
POSITION ? ± Awake 
STATE J ± Blocked 
± Confused 
Loc Ï + Covered 
POSITION ? ± Empty 
STATE J < ± Exist 
± Fastened 
Loc ^ ± Inflated 
POSITION > + Inside 
STATE J ± Process 
HAVE ± Proximate 
± Vertical > 
> 
Semantic components such as BE, BECOME, CAUSE, and HAVE were regarded 
in the study as 'connectives' or 'formators' which relate certain variables either 
to a certain place, position, or state, or to other variables. These variables, as 
well as PLACE, PosrriON, STATE were represented by 'designators' which consist 
of semantic features. Those features which were found relevant in the analysis 
of the comprehensive corpus are listed on the right hand side of (21), beginning 
with [± Apparent] and finishing with [±Vertical]. 
In addition, the more general features [Degree], [Dynamic], [Negative 
Evaluation] were also found relevant in the study of verb-particle constructions. 
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The application of the formulas is illustrated as follows in (22). In the examples 
in which the feature [tApparent] is seen functioning as a designator, the second 
argument of the two-place predicate is listed in brackets. The agent, as the first 
argument of the verb-particle construction is left unspecified. 
(22) CAUSE + B E + POSITION: 
hold out (arms, hand, baby) 
bend up (wire, piece of metal, edge of a book) 
CAUSE + BE + [+ Apparent]: 
b l u r t out (secret) 
b r i n g out (meaning of a passage, young lady, book) 
c a l l up (scenes from childhood) 
conjure up (spirits, visions of die past). 
The postulation of the binary semantic features functioning as designators was 
based on the use of semantic tests (cf. Lipka 1972:55 ff., Kastovsky 
1982a: 111 ff.). I cannot go into detail here. Suffice is to say that I first took 
up the subject in my book on Semantic S t r u c t u r e a n d W o r d - F o r m a t i o n , in 
which I further developed existing tests and applied them to verb-particle 
constructions. The most important discovery procedure suitable for the subject 
was the combination of the Bur-test and the So-test. In the first edition of 
Leech's book on semantics he introduced the E n t a i l m e n t a n d I n c o n s i s t e n c y Test 
and the T a u t o l o g y a n d C o n t r a d i c t i o n Test. Kastovsky (1982a: 11 Iff.) extensively 
discusses criteria and tests for the establishment of semantic features. Leech 
( 21981:73) uses so-called b a s i c statements for the control of intuition and is 
generally concerned with "means by which intuitive data can be more securely 
backed up". In an article on the justification of specific components for English 
nouns and verbs I have come to the conclusion that there are at least three 
types of evidence and three methods of justification for the postulation of 
underlying semantic elements, namely: 1. morphological evidence from complex 
lexemes, i.e. compounds and affixations, 2. the postulation of components on 
the basis of acceptable paraphrase relationships, and 3. the evaluation of 
semantic tests and logical relationships such as implication, tautology and 
contradiction. 
3.3.2. A Typology of Features 
Before we come to a specific proposal for a typology of semantic features, 
we must first have a look at the concept of feature itself, which has been 
transferred from the discipline of phonology to the syntactic and semantic levels 
of language. It originated in the functional approach to phonology of the Prague 
school of linguistics around 1940. In this approach phonemes were no longer 
regarded as the smallest, indivisible units of language, but were regarded as 
representing bundles of phonological features. Only one of these features may 
be responsible for the functional opposition of two phonemes. Thus, for 
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example, the distinction between the bilabial stops or plosives f b l and /p/ in 
English and German can be accounted for by the single distinctive phonological 
feature [+ VOICE]. Such features have been labelled d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s (or DFs). 
A number of other consonant pairs in both languages are also distinguished 
only by an opposition concerning this dimension of voice (Kastovsky 
1982a: 80 f.). 
Conversely, phonemes can also be represented as the sum of distinctive 
features, as in the following example: 
(23) /p/ = voiceless, bilabial, plosive 
Pol = voiced, bilabial, plosive 
/d/ = voiced, alveolar, plosive 
The binary feature [± VOICE], where the + symbolizes the presence and the -
symbolizes the absence of the feature, can be seen to conflate the two feature 
labels 'voiced' and 'voiceless'. This notation obviously provides a more 
economical way of representing phonological features. It is, however, only 
appropriate for characterizing so-called privative oppositions, in which one 
member of the pair lacks the feature in question. The Prague school also 
recognized other types of opposition in phonology, especially gradual and so-
called equipollent oppositions. In the former, the members have various degrees 
of the same property in question, with extremes at either end of the scale. In 
equipollent oppositions the members are equal, or equivalent, i.e. they have the 
same power or status. A l l three opposition-types can also be found in semantics 
(cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 93, 99 f.). 
It was already recognized by Hjelmslev, one of the founders of structural 
semantics, that generally speaking we can establish parallels between the 
phonological and semantic levels of languages. This parallelism therefore allows 
us to describe both levels with the same type of distinctive feature. Chomsky 
later transferred the concept of feature to the level of syntax as well. In my 
opinion semantic features must be empirically justified. In a purely language-
immanent framework as in structural semantics, this can be done on the basis 
of the opposition of lexemes. We can then state, as in example (15), that m a n , 
w o m a n , c h i l d have a feature [+ HUMAN] in common and that b u l l and cow differ 
in a feature [+ MALE] or equivalemly, [+FEMALE]. This, however, leaves out of 
consideration that such distinctions along the dimension SEX (or in more recent 
wording GENDER) are not privative oppositions. We can also derive meta-
linguistic elements, such as semantic features, in a referential approach to 
meaning, from properties or attributes of the referent or denotatum. Thus, we 
can say that the distinction between s n a i l and s l u g can be captured by the 
binary feature notation [+ SHELL]. In this case, the +sign symbolizes the presence 
and the - the absence or a shell on the extralinguistic referent. In this way 
properties of the extralinguistic object, if they have a distinctive function, can 
be raised to the status of metalinguistic elements. 
A survey of recent developments and an extensive discussion of the status 
of semantic features is to be found in Lipka (1972:30-71). Features, basically, 
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are theoretical units of the metalanguage and as such may be used for analysis 
and description on the phonetic, phonological, morphological, syntactic, and 
semantic level. Using the same theoretical construct on different levels 
undoubtedly makes linguistic theory more unified. 
There are, however, also a number of difficulties and problems related to 
the concept of semantic feature (cf. Lipka 1986a: 87 f., 91). In my opinion, 
Feature Semantics and Prototype Semantics are complementary and we have 
a division of labour between both theories (cf. Lipka 1987a). The most detailed 
and comprehensive analysis of the problems of semantic features I know of 
is given in Sprengel (1980). He discusses the questions of discovery procedures 
and circular definitions, metalinguistic status, linguistic vagueness, the distinction 
between linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge, hierarchies and concatenation 
of features, and their universality and psychological reality. Some of his 
arguments do not carry the same weight as others, but on the whole, his 
approach is quite balanced and by no means a condemnation of feature analysis. 
Such a verdict would indeed have been surprising in the face of the many 
successful applications of the theory to a variety of languages, including 
English. Many of the allegedly insurmountable difficulties for Feature Semantics 
can be solved to a large extent by using a specific type of semantic feature 
which I have proposed in Lipka (1985), namely the i n f e r e n t i a l f e a t u r e . 
Obviously, the concept of semantic feature itself is not completely uniform 
and inseparable, as is often alleged. Nothing prevents us from distinguishing 
various types for different phenomena and purposes. I now come to my own 
proposal for a possible typology or classification of semantic features. This has 
been developed over the years in a number of publications (cf. Lipka 1985: 87, 
1987a: 296). I do not claim that mis is the one and only correct way of dividing 
up the category of semantic feature. Alternative taxonomies are possible and 
legitimate and have been proposed recently (cf. Schneider 1988: 64 ff.). A 
comparison and evaluation of competing typologies must be based on their 
applicability, their descriptive adequacy, and the purpose of the classification. 
As with all classifications, the delicacy depends on the number and weighting 
of the criteria used for setting up subcategories. Ultimately, this runs up against 
the law of diminishing returns (see 4.2.3.4.). The criteria used in my classi-
fication are obviously heterogeneous. This is particularly evident for the seventh 
comprehensive "super-class" of d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s , which includes all others 
with the exception of inferential f e a t u r e s (IFs). IFs are exceptional in other 
respects also. I would like to summarize and illustrate my classification in 
schema (24). On the basis of various criteria we can distinguish the following 
types of semantic feature: 
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(24) 1. denotative e.g. [±HUMAN] 
[± ARCHAIC] 
[—>PARENT][<-PARENT] 
in girl vs. filly 
vs. horse 2. connotative 
3. relationaJ 
4. transfer <-SOUD> or 
<2PENETRABLE> 
[± PROXIMATE] 
steed 
father 
to drink 
vs. son 
5. deictic now vs. then 
come vs. go 
7. distinctive (DFs): 
6. inferential (IFs) (STICK) 
(TO GET ATTENTION} 
all except 6. 
to beat 
to nudge 
As already mentioned, except for IFs, all others function as distinctive features, 
a seventh, general, comprehensive type. IFs also have a special status in that 
they enable the linguist to capture synchronic and diachronic variation. A 
Feature Semantics which restricts itself to obligatory features cannot explain 
change of meaning, because in such a framework features cannot disappear or 
be added. This variable type of feature (IF) is furthermore exceptional in that 
it does not refer to a specific dimension, like sex, age, colour, heat, or physical 
state (SOLID, LIQUID, GASEOUS). It therefore does not have a particular value 
assigned to it (like +, - , 2, ->). 
In the following, I shall use the term (semantic) f e a t u r e for a subclass of 
(semantic) components. Many linguists (e.g. Leech) use the terms 
interchangeably as synonyms. In my terminology, however, f e a t u r e s are 
characterized by having a specific value (+, 2, -») assigned to them. Again, 
i n f e r e n t i a l f e a t u r e s (as a lexicalized term) have an exceptional status in this 
respect. I do not claim that semantic f e a t u r e s are indivisible or atomic and that 
they are absolutely universal units. However, as opposed to components (which 
can often be broken down into features) they have a tendency to be finer and 
more likely universal. 
I would now like to comment on the notation and symbols used, before 
explaining my classification in detail. Both the arrows e.g. in [^-PARENT] for 
son and the numbers, e.g. in <2PENETRABLE> for t o d r i n k , have been adopted 
from Leech (21981) as notational conventions. The former symbolizes the 
direction of the relation, which in Leech's terminology C2!981:102 f.) is a 
"relative opposition". Leech Q \ 9 % \ \ \ \ 2 ) treats 1, 2, 3 PENETRABLE, which cor-
responds to the physical states 'solid', 'liquid', 'gaseous' as a scalar opposition 
or "hierarchy". In this case a binary feature notation (with + and -) is obviously 
not appropriate. This is also the case for his "multiple taxonomies", like primary 
colour terms, species of animal, or types of metal like g o l d , c o p p e r , i r o n , 
m e r c u r y . The angled brackets < > are used for transfer f e a t u r e s , which I have 
adopted from Weinreich (1972). Finally, the braces or curly brackets { } for 
i n f e r e n t i a l f e a t u r e s are taken from Lehrer (1974:84f.). However, she does not 
use the term, which 1 have coined under the influence of Nida (1975). It 
denotes optional meaning components which may be inferred from the use of 
an expression. There are close relationships with the concept of i n f e r e n t i a l 
processes in text linguistics and the Gricean notion of i m p l i c a t u r e . 
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A final, general remark. The symbols used for the feature notation are 
basically arbitrary but can be of considerable use in relieving the memory. 
Leech (21981:95), who also stresses the arbitrariness of a semantic notation, 
labels his metalanguage as signese. Obviously this name, which evokes C h i n e s e , 
is coined in analogy to j o u r n a l e s e and officialese. Leech emphasizes that such 
an artificial, formal language has two properties: It is unambiguous and it is 
arbitrary. I will now rum to a detailed explanation of the individual types of 
semantic feature, following the order in diagram (24). 
1. D e n o t a t i v e f e a t u r e s are the most important and central features of a 
lexeme. They are inherent, i.e. always obligatorily present or absent. 
They capture and formalize what Lyons calls d e s c r i p t i v e m e a n i n g , which 
corresponds to Leech's c o n c e p t u a l or c o g n i t i v e m e a n i n g , as well as his 
sense. Denotative features are normally based on cognitive features, 
properties, or attributes of the extralinguistic denotatum. They may also 
be derived by purely language-immanent procedures, on the basis of 
acceptable paraphrases. Different languages may draw on different 
properties for the linguistic categorization of the extralinguistic world (for 
example the presence or absence of a shell). Consequently, the use of 
a specific property of the denotatum, as a metalinguistic feature, is not 
identical with the description of the extralinguistic objects themselves. 
Only features or attributes which are relevant for linguistic distinctions 
may be used for semantic analysis and description. 
2. C o n n o t a t i v e f e a t u r e s are needed to capture differences like those between 
steed and h o r s e , or t o s m i t e and t o s t r i k e . Thus, steed will have an 
additional feature [+ARCHAIC] which is missing in the unmarked lexeme 
h o r s e (2.2.5.). The opposite value [-ARCHAIC] can be used as a notation 
for neologisms.8 Connotative features are inherent components of a 
lexeme and do not concern properties of the denotatum. The latter is 
identical e.g. in the case of steed and h o r s e . What is at stake here, are 
stylistic nuances and attitudes of the speaker. For this reason Leech in 
1974, in the first edition of his book, speaks of s t y l i s t i c m e a n i n g 
(relabelled in 1981 s o c i a l ) and of affective m e a n i n g . 
English dictionaries use labels like "archaic, literary, humorous" for such 
features. In fact, "humorous" really characterizes the function or effect 
of a stylistically marked lexeme in an incongrent context. We have 
already discussed connotations at great length in 2.2.5. I would therefore 
simply like to maintain again that connotative features are properties of 
a lexeme, not properties of the referent or denotatum. Such features are 
relatively secondary, additional, or marginal compared to the central, 
denotative features. 
Obviously, since both archaisms and neologisms are marked forms, the binary 
feature [ ARCHAIC] does not symbolize a privative opposition and thus has a 
status different from that of [ VOICE]. 
I l l 
3. R e l a t i o n a l f e a t u r e s are essential and indispensable for the explanation 
of the opposition of f a t h e r and son and the semantic analysis of similar 
lexemes. They are furthermore required for describing converses (see 
4.2.3.3.) like t e a c h e r and p u p i l , or o w n and b e l o n g t o . Such words are 
fundamentally relational and cannot be properly understood and explained 
with the help of properties. They always involve relations. Ascending 
and descending generation in kinship terminology, i.e. relations in a 
different sense, also cannot be represented as a binary contrast. Leech 
(21981:103) introduces horizontal arrows, pointing in different directions, 
for symbolizing such "relative features", together with the common 
semantic component PARENT. Thus, e.g. the relational f a t h e r of is 
symbolized by [-^PARENT] and conversely son of (or c h i l d of) by the 
feature notation [<-PARENT]. Relational words always relate to entities, 
which are called arguments in predicate logic (in the following A p A 2 
etc.). Here, the direction of the relation marked by the linear order of 
the linguistic realization of the arguments is of vital importance. This 
can be represented in the following way: 
A, \ 
(25a) James is the father of John [—>PARENT] 
(25b) John is the son of James [<-PARENT] 
Lexical pairs such as f a t h e r and son are called converses. If these are 
substituted for each other and the syntactic position of the arguments 
is reversed, the denotative meaning of the whole sentence remains 
constant. Thus, James i s t h e f a t h e r of J o h n is equivalent to J o h n i s t h e 
son of James. Syntagmatic lexical relations, i.e. the linguistic 
environment, influences the direction of the arrow in such relational 
features. Obviously, this type of feature is closely related to Leech's 
t h e m a t i c m e a n i n g . 
4. Transfer f e a t u r e s are fundamentally syntagmatic in nature. As already 
mentioned, the concept and the term go back to 1966, when Weinreich 
first published his E x p l o r a t i o n s i n Semantic T h e o r y . We can make use 
of his own example H e was d r i n k i n g c a r r o t s and can represent it in 
the following way: 
(26) He was drinking carrots 
[+SOLID] 
> <-SOLID> 
The transfer feature <-SOLID>, which might also be formalized as 
<+LIQUID> or more adequately, as <2PENETRABLE>, is transferred from 
the verb d r i n k to its grammatical object c a r r o t s , according to Weinreich's 
theory. There it replaces the contradictory inherent feature [4SOLID]. The 
combination of d r i n k and c a r r o t s is not restricted or excluded. As a 
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result of the transfer process, the object c a r r o t s is reinterpreted as 'carrot 
juice'. 9 
The symbolization of transfer features by angular brackets goes back 
to the introduction of the notation for selectional restrictions in Katz/ 
Fodor (1963). Weinreich develops his own approach by starting out with 
a critical appraisal of Katz and Fodor's semantic theory. He adopts their 
notational device of angular brackets, at the same time reinterpreting 
them. In generative grammar, the notion of selection restrictions was the 
first attempt to capture semantic restrictions in the combination of 
lexemes on the basis of a syntactic theory. The mechanism was 
introduced to prevent the generation of deviant sentences. Weinreich's 
'transfer features' are more active and less restrictive. They can explain 
the semantic interpretation of unusual combinations of lexemes and are 
therefore more adequate for describing phenomena which actually occur 
in natural languages. 
Transfer features are also needed, in a language-immanent framework, 
for explaining metaphorical processes. Denotative features such as 
[+ANIMATE], [+HUMAN], and [+PERSON] may thus function as transfer 
features. In this way productive processes like animation and 
personification can be explained. From a referential and cognitive point 
of view metaphorical and metonymic processes are better explained as 
a secondary or dual categorization of the extralinguistic world (cf. Lipka 
1988). 
5. D e i c t i c f e a t u r e s are needed to explain certain locative and temporal 
relations, but also direction (with an additional dynamic component). 
They are not identical with the phenomenon of "directional opposition" 
discussed by Lyons, who clearly distinguishes this from deixis (cf. Lyons 
1977:28Iff., 636ff.). The feature [+PROXTMATE] contained for example 
in n o w , h e r e , and come, symbolizes proximity. The reference point of 
orientation, the centre, in relation to which closeness or distance are 
expressed, generally lies in the speaker of an utterance at a specific time 
and place. Consequently, since the language user is involved, this type 
of feature is pragmatic in nature. But since, at the same time, it is an 
G. Pascoe finds this: "a highly eccentric way of referring to 'carrot juice', of 
borderline acceptability". Other examples for transfer features Weinreich gives 
are: <+WATER VEHICLE> in to sail a craft, <+MOVABLE ON LAND> in to drive, 
<-MALE> in pretty children (all with a neutral head), and <+ANIMATE> in H i s 
fear ate him up (with a feature conflict with [-ANIMATE] or [+ABSTRACT]). 
Tournier (1985:229; 1988:119) postulates a type of semantic feature labelled 
"s6me de transfert", for the explanation of 'metaphor' (originally the Greek 
word for transfer). Cruse (1986:105) speaks of "traits" (his term for semantic 
features) which are "transferred to the head" in: my pregnant neighbour/cousin/ 
friend and Arthur drank the substance/it. Leech (21981 : 141) speaks of an 
"apparent clash of features" which we resolve "through transfer meaning ... 
often metaphorical transfer", e.g. in My gas meter eats up Wps. Cf. also 
Schneider (1988:67, 69 ff., 82). 
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inherent feature of a particular lexeme, it has to be treated and used in 
lexical semantics. This holds, for example, for the distinction between 
verbs such as come and g o , p u l l and p u s h , b r i n g and t a k e . Furthermore, 
the opposition between h e r e and t h e r e , t h i s and t h a t as well as temporal 
relations in now and then can be explained and described by the use 
of deictic features. 
Proximity and distance may also be of a psychological kind, and 
consequently t h i s may refer to something with which the speaker 
identifies himself. On the other hand, t h a t may point to something from 
which he distances himself. Fillmore has discussed such questions of 
deixis in great detail in a number of publications, in particular in his 
Santa C r u z L e c t u r e s o n D e i x i s , which first appeared in 1971. The 
criterion for the postulation of deictic features is evidently a pragmatic 
one, since they depend on the temporal and locative orientation of the 
user of linguistic signs. 
6. I n f e r e n t i a l f e a t u r e s (IFs) are unusual in several respects, as already 
mentioned. They do not occur in traditional Feature Semantics. From 
a synchronic point of view, only variable IFs can explain fuzziness of 
meaning, polysemy, and regional, stylistic, and other variation. In my 
opinion, the introduction of this type of semantic feature will neutralize 
the most important arguments levelled against the so-called "checklist 
theory of semantics". On the diachronic scale, it can capture semantic 
restriction, extension, shift and possibly other changes of meaning. 
IFs are not discrete, obligatory, and inherent but rather optional, supp-
lementary, and dependent on linguistic and extralinguistic context, from 
which they may be inferred. Thus, they can explain for example the 
lexicalization of h o l i d a y , and synchronic and diachronic variation of 
items like s t a r v e , b a r n and m i l l (cf. Lipka 1985). 
IFs may be used for formalizing properties which are normally as-
sociated with a referent or denotatum. This corresponds to Leech's 
"connotative meaning", illustrated by slyness associated with f o x , 
clumsiness with ox etc.10 The contextual dependence captured by IFs 
also concerns the phenomena discussed by Leech under the heading 
"reflected" and "collocative meaning". Dictionaries often mark IFs by 
using labels such as "usually, especially, often". Thus, for example beat 
contains {WITH STICK} and the verb n u d g e the feature {TO GET 
ATTENTION}. Container terms may have IFs for the dimension MATERIAL 
1 0 This is not to be confused with my 'connotauve features' (type 2), which are 
not optional but inherent in specific lexical units, although of secondary impor-
tance compared to the central 'denotative features'. Cf. also Ger dreckig, 
Scheiße, abkratzen 'die' vs. schmutzig, Kot, sterben and crap, piss, fuck, snuff 
it vs. excrement, urinate, copulate, die. Only IFs are a matter of fuzziness. Cf. 
also the distinction of criterial, expected, possible, unexpected, and canonical 
"semantic traits" in Cruse (1986:16 f., 52 f.), which may further be "promoted" 
or "demoted", "highlighted" or "backgrounded". 
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such as {GLASS} in b o t t l e or {EARTHENWARE} in p i t c h e r , but the features 
may also refer to content or other attributes, such as e.g. {DECORATED} 
and {FOR WINE} in decanter. In conclusion I would like to stress that 
IFs are also unusual in that the methods mentioned for the justification 
of features are not applicable. To be precise, this only holds for the first 
and third method of justification, because IFs may occur in paraphrases. 
So much for the discussion of the first six types of feature in schema 
(24). There is, however, a seventh class of feature which includes most 
of them. 
7. D i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s include all the other classes discussed so far, with 
the exception of inferential features, since these are not inherent and 
obligatory. As already mentioned, this comprehensive super-class is based 
on the criterion of distinctive function, as originally introduced in 
phonology. A l l semantic features which serve to distinguish a pair of 
lexemes that are otherwise identical in meaning are distinctive features. 
They must be empirically justified. If we cannot find pairs of lexemes 
which only differ in a single feature, we cannot postulate a distinctive 
feature. Thus, for example c a t and k i t t e n are only distinguished by the 
denotative feature [ ADULT]. Steed, if compared with h o r s e bears an 
additional connotative feature [+ ARCHAIC]. The transfer feature <+CAT> 
or <+FELINE> is contained in the verb m i a o w , and thereby distinguished 
e.g. from b a r k or n e i g h . The function of distinctive transfer features 
becomes especially clear, when the subject is not specified. This can be 
illustrated by comparing The a n i m a l m i a o w e d with The a n i m a l b a r k e d 
and The a n i m a l n e i g h e d (cf. Leech 21981:139). The seventh type of 
features thus forms an inclusive, global category which can be further 
subdivided if additional criteria are used. 
In concluding the presentation of my proposed typology of semantic features, 
I would like to give two examples for their justification, one for the para-
phrasing method and the other for possible semantic tests. Paraphrasing is 
discussed in detail, in connection with lexical fields, in Lipka (1980). Let us 
consider the paraphrases for the following verbs: 
(27) kick = 'hit (with foot)' 
punch = 'hit (hard) (with fist)' 
nudge - 'hit (not hard) (with elbow) 
esp. (in order to get attention)' 
If these definitional paraphrases are accepted, we can extract a series of 
modifiers of h i t and regard them as meaning-components. These modifiers of 
the object language can then be raised to the status of metalinguistic 
components (cf. Lipka 1972:42). We can therefore assign a denotative, 
obligatory feature [+HARD] to p u n c h . In addition, we can postulate an inferential 
feature {IN ORDER TO GET ATTENTION} contained in nudge. 
Various criteria and tests for establishing semantic features are discussed 
in great detail in Kastovsky (1982a:l 11 ff.). The possibility of semantic testing 
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can be based on logical relationships such as contradiction and tautology, used 
in Leech (21981), but also on various connectives like b u t , and, and so. In 
Lipka (1972:60f.) I have proposed a combination of the BUT- and so-tests, 
which can be illustrated with the following example (see also p. 107): 
In (28a) and (28b) the two sentences are conjoined by b u t . The second sentence 
is negated in (28b) but not in (28a). Both coordinated sentences conjoined by 
b u t must be unacceptable (symbolised by *) if a specific component explicitly 
appears in the second sentence which is implicitly contained in a lexeme in 
the first sentence. Consequently in (28a) we have a contradiction and in (28b) 
a tautology. The consequence or implication in the pair of sentences (28c), 
which is marked by the connective so, reveals which value of the binary feature 
[±MARRIRD] must be postulated as an inherent, denotative feature of s p i n s t e r . 
To sum up, I do not claim that all problems are solved in connection with 
the postulation and justification of semantic features in general, or of specific 
features of English in particular. The proposals made here are intended to show 
the direction which an applied practical word semantics of English might follow.. 
At the same time they demonstrate which theoretical considerations must not 
be neglected. Clearly, the proposed classification of features crucially depends 
on the criteria used for the definition of the types. In principle, other criteria 
and a different weighting might be applied (cf. Schneider 1988: 64 ff.). I still 
believe, however, that the proposed typology comprises all the important and 
necessary aspects. Nevertheless, even for a language which has been as 
thoroughly described and analysed as English, a great deal of work remains 
to be done. 
3.3.3. Feature Semantics vs. Prototype Semantics: A n Alternative? 
In 2.2.3. we already encountered the notions of p r o t o t y p e and Prototype 
Semantics, in connection with denotation and the question of categorizing 
extralinguistic reality in natural languages. The prototypical b o t t l e and c u p were 
mentioned and I have argued, in agreement with Cognitive Linguistics, that 
linguistic categorization is culture-dependent. Furthermore, I claimed that the 
distinction between Prototype Semantics and the "checklist theory of semantics" 
introduced by Fillmore sets up a false alternative, because they are 
complementary and there is a division of labour. 
After discussing semantic features at such great length, I would now like 
to take up Prototype Semantics again and consider it in comparison with Feature 
Semantics, evaluating the advantages and weaknesses of both approaches (cf. 
Lipka 1986a, 1987a). In a recent paper, Cuyckens (1984:175) also argued that 
Prototype Semantics alone is not an adequate model for word semantics, stating 
(28a) 
(28b) 
(28c) 
•Sheila is a spinster BUT she is married 
•Sheila is a spinster BUT she is not married 
Sheila is a spinster so she is not married 
= [-MARRIED] 
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furthermore that it "at least implicitly assumes a componential/semantic feature 
approach to word meaning". He points out that certain lexemes cannot be 
described with the notion of prototype and distinguishes between "category 
features" and "identification features (IF)". The latter are very similar to my 
inferential features. 
Aitchison (1987:51 ff.) has a chapter on "bad birds and better birds" with 
the subtitle "Prototype Theories", thus hinting at the fact that there is not a 
single, unified Prototype Theory. She discusses "birdy" and "unbirdy birds", 
as well as "vegetably vegetables" and emphasizes that there may be "new or 
damaged examples" such as new inventions and a one-winged robin or a three-
legged tiger which would still be categorized as a bird and a quadruped. 
Aitchison (1987:59, 62) argues for a distinction "between identification criteria 
and stored knowledge" and notes further problems with prototypes which to 
her mind, however, "do not invalidate Prototype Theory". 
In the following, I would like to summarize the most important general 
arguments against Feature Semantics, especially those advanced in recent 
publications. The attacks are often directed against the so-called "Aristotelian 
Semantics". Feature Semantics is usually characterized globally with a list like 
(29). It is said to involve the following points: 
(29) 1. clear category boundaries, 
2. features as discrete properties, 
3. yes/no-dccisions on die presence of features, and 
4. equal status of all features (no weighting). 
As opposed to this, a list of advantages of Prototype Semantics like (30) is 
often given. Thus, for example Geeraerts (1984) claims that only this approach 
can explain: 
(30) 1. vague, continuous category boundaries (fuzziness), 
2. gradual category membership, resemblance, 
3. categories with prototypical kernels, and 
4. the different importance of attributes (weighting). 
As mentioned before, the weaknesses exposed in such criticism can be 
overcome in a modified and elaborated Feature Semantics which distinguishes 
various types of features, especially IFs, as presented in 3.3.2. 
However, Feature Semantics can neither cope with the simultaneous presence 
of features from the same dimension, e.g. COLOUR, nor with the interdependence 
of criteria! properties. In classical Feature Semantics all features have the same 
importance or weight. Furthermore, semantic features do not capture the 
psychological reality of prototypes for concrete denotational structure, for 
example with containers, animals etc. In spite of all this, semantic features, 
if objectively justified, can be and have been applied most fruitfully to 
(contrastive) linguistic analysis and description, language teaching, and historical 
semantics. 
Prototype Theory, on the other hand, cannot adequately account for abstracts. 
Nor can it capture, unlike connotative features, differences between e.g. archaic 
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s m i t e vs. s t r i k e , or affective t o w n (as in L o n d o n t o w n , C h i c a g o t o w n ) vs. c i t y . 
Furthermore, Prototype Theory is incapable of dealing with deictics ( c o m e / g o ) , 
relational words (like p r e c e d e , l o v e , h a t e , f a t h e r ) , and syntagmatic relations 
(selection restrictions or transfer features) in general. Yet, like Rosch, I believe 
that in dealing with the concrete world and our everyday experiences, prototypes 
free human beings from time-consuming, laborious cognitive processes (see 
2.2.3. ) providing matching models and mechanisms for our mental lexicon, 
which enable us to perceive quickly and store and process words in the mind. 
If necessary, however, prototypes as holistic units or gestalts (here used as a 
technical loanword, cf. L D C E , COLLINS) may be broken down into the 
"elements" or "attributes" of Prototype Theory. These are doubtless equivalent 
to semantic features. 
Prototype Semantics is particularly suited for the description of concrete 
extralinguistic objects, especially those in which shape and proportion are 
relevant. There is considerable evidence for the belief that prototypical images, 
gestalts, and frames for situations (cf. Verschueren 1981) are stored in the brain 
and used for cognitive and linguistic processing. Metaphor and metonymy, as 
either individual or collective dual categorization, are also based on the 
psychological reality of prototypical models of shapes, objects, and situations 
(cf. Lipka 1988b). Neither Prototype Semantics nor Feature Semantics can claim 
that it alone is able to solve all problems and describe all phenomena 
adequately. 
The integration of both approaches is the most urgent task of semantic 
theory and practice. This has become particularly clear at a conference on the 
lexicon and lexical semantics, documented in Hullen/Schulze (1988) under the 
title U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e L e x i c o n . The second question hotly debated at this 
conference was the relationship between linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge, 
and consequently the alternative between a purely language-immanent or a 
referential approach to lexical semantics. Again, it was agreed that an all-or-
none approach is misguided and that any claim to an exclusive methodology 
must be abandoned. Thus the limits and boundaries of traditional structuralist 
semantics have been transcended and the necessity of an interdisciplinary point 
of view in lexicology was recognized. 
3.3.4. Relations between Components 
A particularly knotty set of problems seems to be here to stay: the internal 
structure of lexemes or sememes, i.e. the relationship between semantic 
components within the meaning of a word. This question was raised as early 
as 1966 by Weinreich, who introduced a distinction between unordered and 
ordered sets of semantic features, which he labelled c l u s t e r s and c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . 
I will illustrate the distinction in the following, using Weinreichs examples 
(1972:46 f., 54 ff.). 
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(31a) cluster: (a, b) = (b, a) as in d a u g h t e r (female, offspring) 
(31b) configuration: (a -» b) (b -» a) as in chair, dentist, spill, show 
If d a u g h t e r is analysed into the components (a) 'female' and (b) 'offspring', 
the internal order of the two features is irrelevant - either (a, b) oder (b, a) 
- and they therefore form a c l u s t e r . A c o n f i g u r a t i o n , on the other hand, is an 
ordered set of features (a -> b), symbolized by an arrow, which is said to 
represent transitivity or a causative relation. Thus, according to Weinreich, the 
two features (a) 'furniture' and (b) 'sitting' form a configuration (in c h a i r ) , 
because the latter ought to be rendered by 'to be sat on'. In my terminology, 
c h a i r contains a directed purposive relation. According to Weinreich (1972:56) 
transitive verbs contain a configuration. This is illustrated by the causative verbs 
s p i l l and show, which he paraphrases as 'cause to flow' and 'cause to see'. 
Thus, for him, simple lexemes (e.g. s p i l l , d e n t i s t ) may have an underlying 
structure similar to a verb-object construction (e.g. fix t e e t h ) , which he labels 
a "nesting construction". I would like to represent the parallel analysis of d e n t i s t 
and s p i l l in the following diagram (32) using Weinreich's symbolization. 
Nesting constructions yield c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . 
(32) fix teeth 
nesting construction: (a, b -> c, d) = d e n t i s t 
: (a, b, K -> , u, v) = spill 
MANNER cause -> flow 
Here, the "semantic feature of causation" is symbolized by K ; and (u,v) are 
the features of f l o w . (K -» u,v) represents 'cause (something) t o f l o w 9 and (a,b) 
specifies the manner in which this is accomplished (e.g. from a vessel). If the 
meaning of fix is represented by (a,b) and that of teeth by (c,d), the meaning 
of the "nesting construction" fix + teeth can be represented as the configuration 
(a, b -> c, d). According to Weinreich (1972:54) the same configuration may 
be (part of) the meaning of the simple lexeme d e n t i s t . 
Obviously, there is a close parallelism to the idea of lexical decomposition 
in the theory of Generative Semantics, discussed in 3.3.1., which is further 
enhanced by Weinreich's examples of causative verbs. This association is also 
strengthened by the following general statement in Weinreich (1972:84): 
Every relation that may hold between components of a sentence also occurs among 
die components of a meaning of a dictionary entry. This is as much as to say that 
the semantic part of a dictionary entry is a sentence - more specifically, a deep-
structure sentence. 
(cf. Lipka 1971:229, 1972:33). In fact, Kastovsky (1973:255) uses this very 
quotation as his starting point for a comprehensive and detailed discussion of 
causatives in the truly Generative Semantics spirit. Directly following this 
quotation, Kastovsky further states explicitly: 
In word-formation syntagmas, the components making up a word are directly ob-
servable, i.e. are explicit, and thus can easily be related to corresponding underlying 
structures, which will state the relations existing between the component parts of 
such a word-formation syntagma 
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and he illustrates this with the correspondence between Someone has w o n a 
p r i z e and the compound p r i z e w i n n e r . Putting this into a larger theoretical 
context, one could claim diat the theory of Generative Semantics is the 
continuation of the methods of word-formation below the unit of syntagma 
down to the level of simple lexemes. 
Looking back at diagram (19) in 3.3.1., we see that Generative Semantics 
is the only theory which represents the internal semantic structure of simple 
lexemes as an explicit, hierarchic configuration (also in Weinreich's sense) of 
semantic elements. Unfortunately, these ideas have not been further pursued, 
and the Generative Semanticists themselves restricted the application of the 
theory to a limited number of exemplary verbs. With the shift of the scholarly 
paradigm in mainstream linguistics to cognitive theories, it is not suprising that 
e.g. George Lakoff himself did not further develop such a language-immanent 
methodology. 
As far as I know, the only application of closely related ideas is to be found 
in Hansen et al. (21985). Furthermore when the authors attempt to combine 
componential analysis and predication analysis ("Pradikationsanalyse") they start 
out from a modified Case Grammar model (cf. 21985:165 ff.) and concentrate 
on complex lexemes and word-formation. It remains to be added, as already 
mentioned above, that atomic predicates and the deep cases of Case Grammar 
are to a large extent equivalent and that the two theories may also be regarded 
as complementary, as demonstrated in Lipka (1976). 
3.4. Lexical Rules and Semantic Processes 
In our discussion of the semantic structure of words, we have so far restricted 
ourselves mainly to an analytic perspective and to a discussion of existing 
lexemes, while in 3.2.4. morphological structure was also considered from the 
point of view of productivity. We will now adopt a more dynamic outlook, 
which at the same time breaks up or transcends to some extent the dichotomy 
of morphology and semantics. In order to do this, we must first discuss the 
comprehensive notion of r u l e , as advocated here, and will then look in some 
detail at a borderline case between derivation and purely semantic changes, 
namely metaphor and metonymy (cf. Iipka 1990). In my view both semantic 
transfer and word-formation provide productive patterns for creating new lexical 
units. There are a number of similarities and these justify capturing both in 
a single very general l e x i c a l r u l e . 
3.4.1. Rules and Tendencies 
In the following, the concept of rule will not be used in the strict sense of 
generative grammar, where rules were formulated and formalized as processes 
to be either applied or not, if certain conditions hold. My use of the term here 
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is nearer to the concept of "variable rule", as introduced into sociolinguistics 
by Labov. It is rather more like a tendency, which exists in a very wide sense, 
without precisely formulable conditions, and no absolute predictive power. A 
certain amount of individual variation is also possible for the application of 
a certain rule and there is furthermore a correlation with more or less permissive 
text types. 
Let us take a concrete example: B e r l i n i s a s p l e n d i d host t o t h e Congress 
of L i n g u i s t s . Clearly, here B e r l i n does not refer to a place, but to the people 
who live in it and is thus an instance of a highly productive metonymic rule. 
From the noun host, a verb t o host 'be, act as a host' can also be derived, 
just as the noun p a t r o n leads to a verb p a t r o n i z e 'be, act as a patron', with 
the addition of the derivative suffix - i z e . u 
(33) host n. 
patron n. 
to host0 v. 
patron/ize v. 
'be, act as a host' 
'be, act as a patron' 
In fact, both denominal verbs are institutionalized in the 'norm' of present-day 
English (in Coseriu's sense). 
I would now like to apply an approach developed by Leech (21981:216), 
who postulates a very general l e x i c a l r u l e for both semantic shift or transfer 
and word-formation (including 'conversion' or zero-derivation), which he 
represents as follows: 
(34) 
This formula is to be interpreted as follows: From the lexical entry A with 
the morphological, syntactic, and semantic specifications p , q, r we can derive 
an entry B with the specifications p \ q\ r\ In generative terminology such 
a very general formulation would be called a "rule schema". In fact, Leech 
derives several specific rules "of morphological derivation" and "of semantic 
transfer" from this, with further specific subclasses of rules. Leech (21981:220) 
states that all these lexical rules "are surprisingly powerful in their ability to 
generate new lexical entries" and that they are all "instances of the same general 
phenomenon" with a number of common characteristics. The first common 
property is "partial productivity", which wi l l be illustrated presently in 
1 1 The metonymic noun host is an instance of semantic transfer, while die zero-
derived verb to hosl0 is die result of word-formation. Bom are productive 
processes, but the former creates new lexical units and the latter new lexemes. 
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connection with metaphor. Lexical rules thus capture certain general, creative 
tendencies and represent productive morphological and semantic processes. 
3.4.2. Metaphor, Metonymy and Categorization 
With regard to semantic transfer, I shall now focus on metaphor, based on the 
notion of similarity, and metonymy, based on contiguity. For both, the 
boundaries of a language-immanent structuralist approach must be transcended 
and a semiotic model must include referents (in Ogden/Richards's sense) and 
the extralinguistic world. It is contiguity of the referents or denotata of linguistic 
signs in reality, or rather our cognitive models of it, as well as similarity in 
our view of the world, which are involved here, Leech (1969:148) sets up the 
following general formula for all kinds of semantic transfer: 
(35) "The figurative sense F may replace the literal sense L if F is related to L 
in such-and-such a way". 
According to Leech (1969:151) every metaphor has the following form, which 
I represent as diagram (36), in which the terms t e n o r , v e h i c l e and g r o u n d go 
back to I. A. Richards. 
- < is like 1 ( in respect of 2 r 
TENOR VEHICLE GROUND 
The terms t e n o r (X) and v e h i c l e (Y) may be illustrated as in the following: 
X Y 
(37a) Life is a w a l k i n g shadow 
(37b) A h u m a n elephant 
X Y 
In (37b) the g r o u n d (Z) of comparison may be clumsiness or long memory, 
if e l e p h a n t is Figurative. As opposed to metaphors, in similes like (38) all 
three terms are explicitly mentioned: 
(38) H i s f a c e was as w h i t e as a sheet 
X Z Y 
In my opinion, there are three kinds of similarity between semantic transfer 
and word-formation. Both devices for extending the lexicon are characterized 
by: 1. productivity, 2. degrees of acceptability, and 3. the possibility of 
institutionalization (or lexicalization). The last one is particularly relevant if 
transfer of meaning is involved on the level of the lexicon, i.e. if we look at 
w o r d m e t a p h o r s , not at metaphors as stylistic devices or figures of speech (cf. 
Lipka 1989a). This term was introduced by Dirven (1985), who distinguishes 
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it from three other types, namely s o u n d m e t a p h o r s , p h r a s e and sentence 
m e t a p h o r s , and d i s c o u r s e m e t a p h o r s , on the levels of phonology, syntax, and 
discourse. Leech (21981:204ff.) only mentions the first two parallels between 
semantic transfer and word-formation under the terms "partial productivity" and 
"graded acceptability". Later, however, he stresses the "semantic open-ended-
ness" of lexical rules in general. I agree, but furthermore claim that the rules 
are basically unrestricted, from a pragmatic point of view. In word-formation, 
this is particularly obvious in many languages where the compounding of two 
nouns and various types of zero-derivation are basically unrestricted processes 
(see 3.2.). They produce contextuáis, interpretable with the help of Grice's 
maxims and our knowledge of the world. 1 2 These may become institutionalized 
or lexicalized, and then often combine various types of word-formation and se-
mantic transfer, especially metaphor and metonymy. 
Dynamic processes of semantic transfer impose a dual (or even multiple) 
categorization on extralinguistic reality. This observation can only be accounted 
for by a dynamic, interdisciplinary theory of semantics which transcends struc-
turalism and includes referents and our perception and cognitive models of the 
world. For the naive speaker, there is a simple one-to-one correspondence 
between words and things, or classes of things. Words are simply names for 
preexisting categories of objects. Philosophers and linguists have long 
recognized that the relationship between language and extralinguistic reality is 
far more complex. In 1973, before the advent of Cognitive Linguistics, Ernst 
Leisi (21985:13), in the first edition of his P r a x i s der e n g l i s c h e n Semantik, first 
emphasized that languages divide up the same world in different ways, by 
drawing boundaries between classes of objects differently (see diagram (6) in 
2.2.1.). Of course there is a long tradition in the philosophical discussion of 
this problem, which could be labelled the "Sapir-Whorf-Humboldt-Weissgerber 
hypothesis" (cf. Lyons 1977:109 ff., 245 ff.; Leech 21981:26 ff.). Leisi (21985:13) 
stresses that: "Die Kategorien der Dinge, Vorgänge, Eigenschaften etc. ... 
[werden] erst durch die Sprache geschaffen", i.e. that categories only arise 
through language. Since then, this issue has become fashionable, and much 
work has been done on the concept of c a t e g o r i z a t i o n by psychologists 
like Rosen and linguists like Fillmore, Lakoff, and Labov (cf. Rosen 1977, 
1978,Lipka 1987a, 1988b, Craig 1986). While Labov, in his research on 
denotational structure (see 2.2.3.), concentrates on the question of the fuzzy 
boundaries of linguistic categories, Prototype Semantics focuses on their centre 
or kernel. 
S i m p l e c a t e g o r i z a t i o n may refer either to the naive view of language, or 
to the correlation of a single lexeme with one category. In the first sense it 
1 2 See 3.2.5. p. 94. This term was introduced into linguistics in Clark/Clark (1979) 
and illustrated with examples like The b o y p o r c h e d the n e w s p a p e r ('put it on 
the porch'), He H o u d i n i e d his w a y out of the c l o s e t ('escaped like Houdini'), 
W e were stoned and bottled by the spectators (a complaint of demonstrators at 
whom stones and botdes were thrown). 
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is opposed to philosophical nominalism, in the second one to figurative language 
or semantic transfer. There is, furthermore, a twofold indeterminateness with 
lexical categorization (but cf. Schneider 1988:142 f.). Referential boundaries may 
be vague as to where an object ends, e.g. a m o u n t a i n and also about where 
to draw the line between the categories m o u n t a i n and h i l l , cup and b o w l , g r e e n 
and b l u e , g i r l and w o m a n (see 2.2.1.). The first indeterminacy gives rise to 
metonymic semantic shift, for example with names of body parts, where no 
precise boundaries for the referents of a term exist. The second one is the main 
concern of Prototype Semantics and Cognitive Linguistics. 
Categorization is certainly not simple in either sense of the term mentioned 
above. Semantic transfer, i.e. figurative use of language, is a widespread 
phenomenon in natural languages, both synchronically and diachronically. For 
this, I have proposed the term d u a l c a t e g o r i z a t i o n in Lipka (1988b). As opposed 
to the literal meaning of a word (e.g. r o s e , d o g , h o u s e ) , a figurative use can 
be said to impose a second way of categorizing extralinguistic reality. 
Metaphor and metonymy^sjhe^entral types of semantic transfer, have 
been neglected to a very large extent in modem linguistics, in particular in 
works on lexicology and lexical semantics. This was certainly due to a 
structuralist bias, e.g. in the publications of Coseriu and Marchand, and the 
consequent ban on considering extralinguistic matters within linguistics. As so 
often in the history of thought, a neglected field is then rediscovered with great 
panache. Books and articles on metaphor and metonymy abound, so that I can 
only mention a few outstanding landmarks. The titel of PaprotteVDirven's (1985) 
collection The U b i q u i t y of M e t a p h o r is symptomatic and at least doubly 
ambiguous. Lakoff/Johnson (1980:41), perhaps the most influential book in the 
field, argue 
that metaphors and metonyms are not random but instead form coherent systems 
in terms of which we can conceptualize our experience. 
Obviously, by doing so, we categorize the extralinguistic world around and in 
us. To my mind, Dirven (1985) and Toumier (1985), are the most relevant 
publications in our context, and perhaps the only ones in the field of English 
lexicology. 
In Lipka (1988b) I have discussed a number of regularities in lexicalized 
cases of metaphor and metonymy, concentrating on SHAPE, as a semantic di-
mension responsible for similarity (metaphor), and PLACE , responsible for 
contiguity (metonymy). Culture-specific cognitive models of the world are 
shown to be relevant and the productive processes involved can only be ac-
counted for by a dynamic, interdisciplinary theory of semantics. Examples are 
taken from English, German, and various Romance languages. Body parts and 
animal metaphors are considered in some detail. Following Leisi's approach 
in his P r a x i s der e n g l i s c h e n Semantik, I have argued that metaphor does often, 
not involve a single semantic,feature or 'tertium comparationis', but rather a, 
complete situation, i.e. a 'prototypical scene' (in recent terminology, cf. Ver-
schueren 1981). I will come back to evidence for tiiis position presently, but 
would like to modify this statement now, in view of the large amount of 
124 
material analysed in Toumier (1985:199 ff.) to which I shall also return. I 
believe that this strengthens my argument against an alternative between Feature 
Semantics and Prototype Semantics (see 3.3.3.) and my plea for an integration 
of both approaches. 
I believe that a further detailed discussion of metaphor and metonymy is 
justified in view of the long neglect of these matters in English lexicology. 
Let me therefore return to the problem of 'tertium comparationis', and to some 
theoretical models for w o r d m e t a p h o r s , which stress the systematic nature of 
the process and its relationship to the concept of field. Here, semantic transfer 
is not regarded as unique instances of stylistic tropes on the level of p a r o l e . 
One of the first linguists to make this point quite explicit was Harald 
Weinrich, in a classic article on "Münze und Wort", originally published in 
1958, since reprinted in slightly abridged and edited form in Weinrich 
(1976:276 ff.). I shall refer to this more accessible source in the following. 
Weinrich (1976:282 f.) introduces the term Bildfeld (i.e. 'image-field', in ex-
plicit analogy to Wortfeld and B e d e u t u n g s f e l d ) and stresses the point that 
metaphors must not be seen as isolated phenomena. On the contrary, they relate 
a "BMspendendes" and a "bildempfangendes Feld", terms which are not equi-
valent to Richards's v e h i c l e and t e n o r . Rather, they emphasize the insight that 
metaphor is based on certain conceptual and lexical fields, paradigms, or 
domains. The point is made quite clear (1976:283): 
Wie das Einzelwort ... gehört auch die Einzelmetapher in den Zusammenhang ihres 
Bildfeldes. Sie ist eine Stelle im Bildfeld. 
Weinrich's examples of Bildfelder (1976:285) all combine semantic transfer 
and word-formation, e.g. Ger Wortmünze, L i e b e s k r i e g , W e l t t h e a t e r , Lebenssaft, 
L i e b e s j a g d , T i e r r e i c h , Verstandes l i c h t , Textgewebe. Furthermore, he Stresses the 
point that certain field-correlations exist in Western languages, since there is 
a common literary tradition, and he thus concludes (1976:287): "Das Abendland 
ist eine Bildfeldgemeinschaft". 
Basically the same point was made much later in Lehrer (1974:110 ff.), 
where field theory was applied to the "semantic extension" of English 
temperature words like h o t , w a r m , c o o l , c o l d . Recently, Lehrer (1985) has again 
returned to the influence of semantic fields on semantic change, analysing in 
detail the development of sets of animal metaphors, gambling terms, and the 
transfer of dimension adjectives to the domain of taste for wine. 
Leisi (21985:188f.), who summarizes Weinrich's approach, stresses the point 
that Weinrich has transferred the study of metaphor into the more or less 
constant domain of the linguistic system. The situational interpretation of 
metaphor in Leisi (21985:183 f.) has already been briefly mentioned. He ob-
serves that we usually do not have a single 'tertium comparationis', but a 
complex plurality, because "eine Metapher enthält oft eine ganze Situation". 
He illustrates this with the comparison of a warrior with a boar in a Middle 
English poem, and with c r a n e , in the sense of 'machine'. Not only is this 
metaphorical with regard to the shape of the bird's long neck and beak (and 
I would add, also with regard to their being joined at a particular point) but 
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it furthermore involves typical actions, such as busily going to and fro and 
picking up things from the ground. 
Rephrasing this in modem teiminology, we could say that the 'ground' (in 
the technical sense, see (36)) for the metaphor is a whole prototypical 'scene' 
involving the bird c r a n e . This explanation, in my opinion, would be further 
strengthened by a number of examples from English, German, and French (cf. 
Lipka 1988b). 
A different kind of to-and-fro movement can be compared to weaving with 
a loom. This leads to the lexical item s h u t t l e (a bus, railway, aeroplane, or 
spacecraft). In German, this movement is compared to that of a pendulum 
( P e n d e l ) , as in P e n d e l b u s , P e n d e l z u g 'commuter train', P e n d e l v e r k e h r 'shuttle 
service', P e n d l e r 'commuter', or a child's swing ( S c h a u k e l ) , as in Schaukel-
börse, literally 'swing-stockmarket'. Movement1 3 similar to that of a ship is 
certainly responsible, but not alone, for Ger Wüstenschiff (cf. E s h i p of t h e 
desert, for a camel, probably from Arabic). This lexicalized word metaphor 
evokes acomplex situation, in which the desert Ts further compared to the sea 
through which the camel ploughs (another metaphor!), like a ship through the 
waves. In addition, camels were for centuries the only possible form of long-
distance travel in the desert. In French the wide exit passages of a Roman 
theatre or amphitheatre are called v o m i t o i r e (E v o m i t o r y is not as common), 
which evokes the prototypical scene of spewing out people. 
Perhaps the best example of a complete scene being visualized is the 
b o m b a r d i e r b e e t l e . The COD explanation (not definition) "audibly releasing 
unpleasant vapour when alarmed" is not quite adequate. If you have once seen 
and heard in a documentary film how the little insect uses its body like a 
cannon when in danger, aiming with extraordinary precision, you will never 
forget the scene. With its use of a chemical weapon it is really like a 
bombardier. It can direct and aim and follow a shifting goal like a gun. It then 
mixes two liquids in its body, which explode with considerable noise and leave 
a noticeable mark very close to the goal. Obviously, we here have a very 
complex plurality and situation which cannot be adequately rendered by the 
metaphorical transfer of a single semantic feature. 
Nevertheless, exactly this is possible in many other cases, as demonstrated 
in Toumier (1985:239 ff.) on the basis of a large list of English lexemes, in-
cluding some contrastive observations on French. Thus, animal metaphors are 
highly culture-specific. While in English the c a m e l may be a symbol of 
submission and endurance, in French malice is attributed to it. While one of 
the characteristics of a p i g in English is egoism, this is not so in the French 
culture. Toumier also gives the example of v a c h e , 'cow', the sacred animal 
in India, but the symbol for the policeman (stupid and vicious) in France. One 
1 3 As G. Pascoe points out, Ger W e b e r k n e c h t e , in England called h a r v e s t m e n 
(because they mature in late summer), are not related to a specific movement, 
but probably to shape and habitat Shape is also responsible for die names of 
the rather leggy flies called crane-flies or d a d d y - l o n g - l e g s , equivalent tc Ger 
S c h n e i d e r (where weight also plays a role). 
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might add that the d r a g o n has very different characteristics attributed to it in 
Western and Chinese culture. 
Generally speaking, Toumier (1985:232) distinguishes four categories of 
metapJhox-aœorrJ^ 
which can be further subdivided, yielding 16 types of metaphor altogether. He 
also points out (1985:293 f.), in the tradition of Roman Jakobson, that the 
fundamental_oUstinction between metaphor arid metonymy is a psychological 
reality, because it can be related to two widespread types of aphasie disorders. 
These, in turn, are closely connected with the distinction between paradigmatic 
and syntagmatic relations in language. Thus, in the so-called "similarity dis-
order", where the ability for selection and substitution is impaired (correspond-
ing to the paradigmatic access), the patient has recourse to metonymy, saying 
e.g. f o r k for knife. Conversely, in the case of "contiguity disorder" (affecting 
syntagmatic relations), the patient has recourse to metaphoric substitution, saying 
e.g. spy glass for m i c r o s c o p e . This seems to prove that metaphor and 
metonymy, as fundamentally distinct lexical processes, are based on different 
mental or psychological processes.14 
Toumier admits that in some rare cases the distinction between metaphor 
and metonymy may be difficult to draw or to verify. What is more important, 
however, is his observation that the two processes are very often combined, 
which he illustrates with the example egghead. This is said to imply one 
metaphor (egg - dome of bald head), and two metonymies (baldness - intellec-
tual and egghead - egg-headed man). I would like to add that word-formation 
processes are obviously also involved and combined. 
This brings us back to the general question of various types of semantic 
shift and change, also from a diachronic point of view. Toumier (1985:200) 
distinguishes two kinds which he calls: 1. "mutation par rayonnement", and 
2. "mutation par enchaînement". The first type, which could be translated as 
r a d i a l shift or r a d i a t i o n shift, is illustrated by h e a d with the first or central 
meaning or sememe (S t) 'upper part of human body'. From this sense, or 
sememe, eight other senses (S2 - S 9) can be directly derived as represented 
in diagram (39): 
1 4 Cf. the discussion of the different "types of link" in our mental lexicon in 
Aitchison (1987:74 f., 194ff.). "Metaphorical extension" is also treated in detail 
in Lyons (1977:263 f., 548 ff.), who argues for accounting for it "in terms of 
strategies", since it is "a normal process in the everyday use of language" 
(1977:549), but prefers to use the term m e t a p h o r to include metonymy. For 
the position of Cognitive Linguistics cf. Lakoff (1987:271 ff., 276 ff.), who 
postulates "kinesthetic image schemas", especially the "CONTAINER schema", 
and deals with die "experiential bases of metaphors" and "cognitive models", 
including "metaphoric and mctonymic models". 
127 
(39) 'seat of intellect'. 
'life (cf. 4it cost him his head*)'. 
'image of head on one side of coin* 
'knobbed end of nail*. 
'foam on top of liquor*. 
'top of page*. 
•fully developed part of boil', 
'end of table occupied by host* ... 
In the second type, perhaps best labelled c h a i n i n g shift, one sense or sememe 
Sj leads to the formation of sense, or sememe, S 2, and in turn to S 3 , S 4 etc., 
thus each new sense deriving immediately from the preceding one. This can 
be represented as follows: 1 5 
(40) CESEESEESED 
Toumier gives the example v o l u m e , with Sj 'roll of parchment', from which 
is derived S 2 'book tome', and in turn S 3 'size, bulk of a book', and S 4 'size, 
bulk of other things'. Toumier points out that S p obviously, has disappeared, 
and that with this type of chaining the motivation for the semantic shift often 
gets lost, and that of course the two kinds of semantic shift represented in (39) 
and (40) may obviously be combined in various ways. 
As my final example from Toumier (1985:207) and as an illustration of 
the combination of semantic shift and figurative language (metaphor and 
metonymy), I would like to introduce his analysis of the development of the 
various senses, or sememes, of t e a . I have adopted his representation to English 
in (41), with the exception of the lexeme l e thé, and have added further 
examples. 
(41) TEA 
A. Sense involving "le thé" 
1. 
2. 
3. 
v 
6. 
plant, shrub 
(dried, shredded) leaves 
of shrub 
beverage made by 
infusion of leaves 
meal which consists of 
this beverage, cakes etc. 
(e.g. afternoon t e a , high tea) 
B. Sense not involving "le thé" 
-> 4. beverage made by infusion of 
leaves of other plants 
(e.g. camomile tea) 
beverage not made of plants 
(e.g. beef tea) 
From a synchronic point of view, diagram (40) could also be used as an 
excellent visual representation of Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances 
(cf. Aitchison 1987:47ff.). The category denoted by the word game (ranging 
from cards, chess, tennis, to ring-a-roses) has no single common semantic 
element (e.g. skill or luck) but is related through chaining like the members of 
a family (e.g. by build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament). This also 
holds for other categories, like furniture, vegetable etc. 
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According to Tournier senses 1., 2., and 3. are instances of semantic shift (or 
shift in application), 4. and 5. instances of metaphorical polysemy, and 6. of 
métonymie polysemy. I would rather say that 1. is the original sense, and the 
shifts to 2. and 3. are classic cases of metonymy. This also holds for the shift 
to 6., while the change from 3. to 4. and from 4. to 5. are instances of the 
second figurative semantic process, namely of metaphor. 
In my view, example (41) can furthermore serve as a good demonstration 
of language-dependent categorization. French thé is a narrower category then 
E t e a or Ger Tee. The two senses, or sememes of E t e a unter B can never 
be denoted by Fr thé. Other lexemes such as Fr infusion, t i s a n e , v e r v e i n e , come 
into play here. 
This brings our discussion of lexical rules, semantic processes, in particular 
metaphor and metonymy, and categorization to a close. We have seen that all 
these phenomena are extremely important for a better understanding of the 
lexicon, both from a synchronic and a diachronic point of view. And we have 
seen again that both Prototype Semantics and Feature Semantics are necessary 
for a full understanding of the observable facts. The dynamic, interdisciplinary 
perspective can account for productivity, lexicalization, and language- and 
culture-dependent categorization. Prototypes, as well as the distinction between 
metaphor and metonymy, as the central processes of semantic transfer, have 
psychological reality. There is clear evidence that these two fundamental 
productive semantic processes depend on the equally fundamental distinction 
between paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations in language, to which we will 
now turn. 
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Chapter IV 
T H E S T R U C T U R E O F T H E L E X I C O N . Relations between Words 
4.L Units, Classes, and Relations 
The lexicon, as the structured word-store of a language, consists of certain units 
which are related to each other in a twofold way. At the very beginning of this 
book, in diagram (4) (p. 12), I illustrated the fundamental distinction between 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships in the lexicon. It was pointed out 
that the distinction between the two axes - the linear, horizontal one and the 
vertical one (which Saussure called associative) - can be found on all levels 
of language, from the smallest phonological units down to the level of extended 
texts. 
In the following, we will first look at the nature of the units and introduce 
the new concept of l e x i c a l u n i t , as a technical term (4.1.1.). After reviewing 
various types of classes (4.1.2.), as possible generalizations, we will consider 
at length paradigmatic relations between words, lexemes, or lexical units (4.2.), 
and then discuss various approaches to the problem of syntagmatic relations 
(4.3.). 
4.1.1. Lexica l Entry and Lexical Unit 
Before we can tackle the question of paradigmatic lexical relations, we must 
revise the simple, binary model of the linguistic sign introduced by Saussure 
and see what more technical, formalized characterizations of lexemes have been 
given in various linguistic theories. For the moment, we leave aside die question 
of the unity of the word, the distinction between homonymy and polysemy (see 
4.2.1.), and the relationship between its different meanings or sememes. A 
formal specification of the various phonological, morphological, syntactic, and 
semantic properties of a word is commonly referred to by the term l e x i c a l e n t r y 
(cf. Bauer 1983:190ff., Kastovsky 1982a: 248 f., Lipka 1972:37 ff.). 
We have already encountered a very simple type of lexical entry in diagram 
(34) (p. 121) in connection with the general formulation of lexical rules given 
by Leech. Obviously, the three variables p , q, r used there do not specify the 
phonological properties of a lexeme, unless "morphological specification" is 
meant to include this. On the other hand, a schematic representation of a lexical 
entry like that given in Lyons (1977:517) makes an explicit distinction between 
"inflectional class" and "syntactic properties", which apparently fall together 
in the variable q used by Leech. Lyons thus distinguishes within a lexical entry: 
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1. stem(s), 2. inflectional class, 3. syntactic properties, and 4. semantic 
specification(s). 
If we conflated the two schemata and furthermore added the distinction 
between the spoken and the written medium, we would be forced to distinguish 
six variables: phonological, graphemic, morphological, inflectional, syntactic, and 
semantic properties. Many adjectives and especially verbs would need a seventh 
specification concerning the syntagmatic relations with other lexical items. In 
fact, Bauer (1983:196) gives a schema containing seven types of specification 
(with further subclassification) which does not, however, include syntagmatic 
restrictions, but explicitly mentions stylistic properties. What is more important, 
in our context, is his recognition of the relational nature of the term l e x i c a l 
e n t r y . This becomes apparent in his distinct treatment (1983:190 ff.) of lexical 
entries for "a simplex lexeme", "an affix", "a lexicalized complex form", and 
"institutionalized words". It wil l become clear presently that an even finer 
distinction is needed. 
As discussed in Lipka (1972:37ff.), simple and more refined lexical entries 
were given, in the various strands of generative grammar, for items like 
s i n c e r i t y , boy, f r i g h t e n , eat, chase, p e r s u a d e , and k i l l . In connction with Case 
Grammar, the question arose as to whether the adjective, the intransitive verb, 
and the transitive verb open were to be given a single lexical entry, a suggestion 
also made for b r e a k and cook, independently of their different environment or 
"case frame". The presence or absence of an Agent case clearly corresponds 
to the addition or subtraction of an atomic predicate C A U S E (cf. Lipka 
1976:126 f.), and the inchoative and causative open and b r e a k obviously differ 
in meaning like d i e and k i l l . This also holds for the ambiguity of derived verbs 
like b l a c k e n , h a r d e n , r e d d e n , s o f t e n , t h i c k e n , solidify, and liquefy (cf. Lipka 
1982:10 f) . Do we therefore assign them two lexical entries? What about the 
stock example b a c h e l o r and its "readings" or "paths" such as 'who has never 
married', 'fur seal when without a mate during the breeding time', etc. (cf. 
Kastovsky 1982a: 248 f., Fodor 1980:151 f.)? Katz/Fodor (1963) explicitly 
labelled this hierarchic structure a "dictionary entry". Is f o x with the meanings 
'small, dog-like, wild animal' and 'person who deceives others' to be given 
one or two lexical entries? 
In other words, the question really is whether we set up lexical entries for 
a lexeme or a unit smaller than the lexeme. This is closely related to the 
problems of the definition of lexeme (see 2.3.3.) and the tricky business of 
distinguishing between polysemy and homonymy (see 4.2.1.). At this point we 
must draw on a distinction first explicitly made in Cruse (1986:49), namely 
that between a lexeme and a l e x i c a l u n i t . Cruse (1986:76 f.) defines the l e x i c a l 
u n i t as "the union of a lexical form and a single sense" and the lexeme as 
"a family of lexical units". For him, the lexeme is the appropriate unit for the 
lexicographer, since dictionaries contain an alphabetical list of the lexemes of 
a language. He defines sense as "the meaning aspect of a lexical unit" 
(1986:49). Cruse (1986:84) rightly claims that "semantic relations" (i.e. the 
s e n s e - r e l a t i o n s in the terminology of Lyons), which Cruse describes in detail 
131 
in chapters 4-12 of his book, "hold between lexical units", not between 
lexemes. I will follow this terminological usage, namely the distinction between 
lexeme and l e x i c a l u n i t , in the remainder of my book. 
It has to be noted here that the introduction of the concept l e x i c a l u n i t 
(although within the restricted technical language of linguistics) is itself an 
illustration of the concept-forming power of the word (see 4.4.1.). Many 
linguists (e.g. Hansen et al. 21985, Glaser 1986, Schneider 1988) make a clear 
distinction between the seme (or semantic feature) and the sememe, defined as 
a complex or configuration of semes, which corresponds to a single sense of 
a lexeme. Sometimes the complete meaning of a lexeme is called a semanteme. 
However, up to Cruse (1986) a precise term was missing in lexicology and 
lexical semantics for the combination of a specific form with a single sense, 
i.e. a full linguistic sign in Saussure's sense. In the following we wil l 
distinguish two l e x i c a l u n i t s for example in the case of inchoative and causative 
verbs, or the literal and figurative meaning of a noun.1 Thus, there are clearly 
two distinct l e x i c a l u n i t s b r e a k { ' B E C O M E NOT W H O L E ' and b r e a k 2 'CAUSE 
BECOME NOT W H O L E ' and f o x x 'animal . . . ' and f o x 2 'person . . . ' . Obviously, 
the introduction of the notion l e x i c a l u n i t has serious consequences for the 
distinction between homonymy and polysemy (see 4.2.1.). It must be 
recognized, however, that paradigmatic as well as syntagmatic relations between 
words are a matter of l e x i c a l u n i t s , not of lexemes. 
4.1.2. Word Classes and Semantic Classes 
In the preceding section of chapter IV we have looked at the units of the 
lexicon at various levels: the lexeme and the lexical unit. Before considering 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations between lexical units, we must briefly 
return to the overall structure of the lexicon and the possibilities of its 
organization (see 1.2.). The traditional approach of dictionaries, which give 
alphabetical lists of lexemes, is clearly insufficient and unstructured, and the 
alternative solution of presenting linguistic knowledge in the form of a 
thesaurus, e.g. R O G E T ' s Thesaurus or the L o n g m a n L e x i c o n of C o n t e m p o r a r y 
See 3.3.1. for the discussion of the lexical decomposition of verbs in 
Generative Semantics. In Lipka (1982:9, 13) I have argued mat there are 
basically two possibilities of interpreting causatives and inchoatives like b r e a k , 
open, cook, dry, melt, burn etc.: 1. as two distinct (possibly zero-derived, in/ 
transitive) verbs, and 2. a single, contextually determined item, as in Case 
Grammar or in the sense of Clark/Clark's contextuáis. Cruse (1986: 77 ff.) 
postulates two criteria for assigning 'lexical units' to the same 'lexeme': 1. the 
existence of a rule, which predicts recurrent semantic contrasts between 
'senses', e.g. in b r i l l i a n t , s a d (person/book), d o g (unmarked/male), d r y up, 
flatten out (inchoative/transferred, as in After Kendal, the countryside begins to 
flatten out); and 2. "belonging to the same sense-spectrum", as with the va-
rious literal and metaphorical senses of m o u t h . 
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E n g l i s h , also has its drawbacks (cf. McArthur 1986:120f., 148 ff.). 2 
At the beginning of this book (p. 10 f.), diagrams (2) and (3) were given, 
which represent the structure of the vocabulary of English and a general schema 
(Coseriu's) for the structure of the lexicon. Two alternative ways of structuring 
the lexicon of any language (if it is recognized that alphabetical listing is merely 
a convenient means of retrieval) would be its division into word classes 
(traditionally called "parts of speech") and into semantic classes. We shall look 
at both in turn. 
In the various German versions of Coseriu's schematic representation of 
"lexematic structures" (cf. Coseriu/Geckeler 1981:56), primary structures are 
subdivided into "Wortfelder" on the one hand and "klassematische Strukturen" 
or "Wortklassen" on the other. The latter, termed "lexical classes" in the English 
version (Coseriu/Geckeler 1981), are not to be confused with w o r d classes (in 
the above sense). We will return to this presently. First, a brief discussion of 
"parts of speech". We will start with a simplified summary of the treatment 
in Quirk et al. (1985: 77 ff.). The following categories of words can be 
distinguished in English: 
(1) (a) CLOSED CLASSES: preposition, pronoun, determiner, conjunction, auxiliary verb 
(b) OPEN CLASSES: noun, adjective, verb, adverb 
(c) LESSER CATEGORIES: numeral, interjection 
Category (a) is often referred to as f u n c t i o n w o r d s , because of their grammatical 
function.3 Traditional lexicology, however, is almost exclusively concerned with 
category (b); but dictionaries normally include (a) and (c). Category (b) is often 
called "major word classes", content words (contentives), or lexical items. 
Nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs may be further subclassified, according 
to various criteria. The non-hierarchic nature of the so-called "strict 
subcategorization" was an important problem for generative grammar, which 
was tackled with the help of the notion c r o s s - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and formalized with 
"syntactic features", taken over from phonology. It has long been recognized 
in linguistics (cf. Lipka 1971: esp. 234 f.) that the major word classes have 
central and peripheral members, partly overlap, are characterized by certain 
formal elements (labelled "designators" by Crystal in 1967), and may be 
subclassified according to (weighted) phonological, graphemic, morphological, 
2 It is true that good dictionaries differentiate metaphorical, metonymic, and other 
related lexical units by means of numbers and/or letters (and the respective 
usage labels, e.g. A m E a p p r e c si for f o x 4) and may even give cross-references 
to semantically related items (s.v. f o x , b a c h e l o r - with reference to s p i n s t e r -, 
c h a i r in LDCE 2 and OALD 4). They also often include collocations, idioms, 
and sometimes explicit mention, under one lexeme, of items related through 
word-formation processes (OALD 4). However, alphabetical order may disrupt 
such structuring, e.g. when c h a r g e r ^ 4a soldier's horse* is separated from 
charge^ (verb) ... 3 'to rush (as if) in an attack', inter alia by c h a r g e 2 (noun), 
c h a r g e a c c o u n t , c h a r g e d'affaires, and c h a r g e n u r s e in LDCE 2. 
3 See 2.3.1. and Jackson (1988: 15, 17) for die distinction between 'lexical 
words' and 'grammatical words'. 
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syntactic, semantic, and notional criteria (cf. Jackson 1988:17). 
Recently, the parallelism between the fuzzy boundaries of grammatical 
classes (and thus of items of the metalanguage like n o u n and v e r b ) , and of 
words generally has been noted. Consequendy, the notion of 'prototype' was 
applied also to word classes. Leech et al. (1982:26) compare the prototypes 
of c h a i r and b i r d to the prototypical n o u n and v e r b and explicitly state that 
just as some chairs are less 'chairy* than others, and just as some birds are less 
'birdy' than others, so some nouns are less 'nouny* than others, and some verbs 
less 'verby* than others. 
The fuzziness of word classes is an obstacle for any attempt to structure the 
lexicon neatly, on the basis of such distinctions. Furthermore, the division of 
the entire vocabulary into the three categories (a), (b), (c) in diagram (1) -
with special focus on the open classes and their finer subcategorization - would 
only result in a very global structuring. Finally, such a categorization would 
capture neither the morphological relations, nor the very essential semantic 
relations within the lexicon. 
Semantic classes are a second alternative to dictionaries and thesauruses. 
Coseriu's "lexical classes" are "classematic structures" since they group together 
sets of words on the basis of their common classeme (i.e. very general features), 
e.g. 'living being', 'non-living being', 'person', 'transitive', 'intransitive' (cf. 
Coseriu/Geckeler 1981:59). Hansen et al. (21985:18f., 221 ff.) also point out 
that words may be grouped together - on the basis of specific semantic 
components - into semantic classes like abstracts, persons, states, animals, but 
also according to other principles. They further distinguish two types of 
"paradigms" ("Wortbildungsparadigmen" and "semantische Paradigmen"), which 
are said to structure the lexicon in a systematic way since semantic classes 
alone are (indeed!) not easy to grasp ("unuberschaubar") and a grouping 
according to subject matter ("Sachgruppen") is boundless. We have dealt with 
word-formation in 3.2. and the second type of "paradigm" will be discussed 
here under the heading of l e x i c a l f i e l d s (see 4.2.4.). 
4.2. Paradigmatic Relations 
At the beginning of this book (see 1.1.) we reviewed the fundamental distinction 
between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations on various levels of language. 
In diagrams (3) and (4) of chapter I, we distinguished - on the level of the 
lexicon - between paradigmatic and syntagmatic l e x i c a l r e l a t i o n s . These were 
defined as relations between lexical items which are not necessarily s e m a n t i c 
r e l a t i o n s . Not all possible semantic relations between elements of the lexicon, 
however, are also s e n s e - r e l a t i o n s (in the sense introduced by Lyons in 1968) 
(see 4.2.3.). I will try to clarify these distinctions by drawing on the concept 
of the binary sign as defined by Saussure (see 2.1.). Basically, there are four 
possibilities of paradigmatic relations between pairs of linguistic signs: 
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1. Their s i g n i f i a n t , the phonological or graphemic form, is identical, the 
s i g n i f y , the meaning, is different and unrelated. In this case, the two 
signs, or lexical items, are traditionally called homonyms and the relation 
between them is labelled homonymy. If the meaning is partly identical, 
one also speaks of polysemy, or m u l t i p l e m e a n i n g . The distinction 
between these two relations will be discussed in detail in 4.2.1. 
2. The reverse is given when the signifiant is different, but the signifies 
are almost identical. Such a relation has for a long time been called 
synonymy. Modem linguists believe that there is no perfect or total 
synonymy. 
A further theoretical possibility for paradigmatic relations between signs is that 
both the s i g n i f i a n t and the s i g n i f y are different. Depending on the various 
relations between the contents of such signs, further distinctions are usually 
made. If the relation is one of oppositeness, one traditionally speaks of 
a n t o n y m y . An inclusion relation between the meanings, which corresponds to 
a hierarchic relation between the signs, is today normally labelled hyponymy. 
This term was coined in 1963 by Lyons and introduced into modem linguistics. 
3. A n t o n y m y , in the wider sense (for a more restricted use see 4.2.3.3.), 
is a paradigmatic relation between signs whose content is different but 
undoubtedly related. The meanings of such signs are opposed in various 
ways (cf. Mettinger 1988). 
4. In the case of hyponymy the relationship between the contents is of a 
different kind, not one of oppositeness. In this case, the signs are related 
in a hierarchic order. The subordinate lexical item is called h y p o n y m , 
the other one h y p e r o n y m , or (less confusingly) super o r d i n a t e ( t e r m ) , or 
a r c h i l e x e m e . Such hierarchic relations lead to the postulation of one type 
of l e x i c a l f i e l d . 
Only the last three types of paradigmatic relations, synonymy, antonymy and 
hyponymy, are semantic relations between full signs (or more precisely between 
lexical units). Lyons (1968,1977) has treated these under the label s e n s e - r e l a t i o n s . 
The first type of paradigmatic relation, homonymy, is not a meaning-relation 
or semantic relation between signs, lexical items, or lexical units. In the case 
of homonymy there is no relation whatsoever between the contents. On the 
other hand, polysemy too is not a paradigmatic sense-relation between lexical 
items, because we have a single lexeme and we can have no relations between 
one and the same lexeme. However, we may well discuss the relationship 
between different l e x i c a l u n i t s within a lexeme. The more serious question, on 
the other hand, which has troubled linguists for a long time, is how we can 
distinguish between homonymy and polysemy. We will now turn to this subject. 
4.2.1. Homonymy versus Polysemy 
The topic has already been touched on in 3.1. Criteria for the distinction which 
have been used by various linguists are thoroughly examined in Lipka (1986b). 
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Some linguists have also changed their mind over the years. Thus, Lyons 
(1968:406) claimed that 
the distinction between homonymy and multiple meaning is, in the last resort, 
indeterminate and arbitrary. 
In Lyons (1977:554) he argues that it is preferable 
to maximize polysemy. This will have the effect of producing a lexicon with far 
fewer entries than are to be found in our standard dictionaries. 
One of his reasons for this change of position is the greater frequency of 
polysemy, compared to homonymy. More importandy, he argues (1977:567) 
that polysemy is the result of metaphorical creativity of natural languages, and 
that this creativity is essential for the functioning of languages as efficient 
semiotic systems. 
In order to distinguish one word with several meanings (i.e. polysemy or 
multiple meaning) from two different words with unrelated meanings (i.e. 
homonymy) basically three types of criteria have been used in research: 1. 
etymology, 2. formal identity or distinctness, and 3. close semantic relatedness. 
Also, various tests have been proposed, but it is not always clear what is 
actually being tested. In view of the importance of the problem and the 
consequences for distinguishing between words, lexemes, and lexical units, we 
will discuss the various criteria in some detail. This is also relevant for the 
understanding of zero-derivation, metaphor, and metonymy (see 4.2.2.) and our 
treatment of sense-relations (see 4.2.3.). 
We will take up the criterion of etymology first. For ease of reference, it 
is useful to adopt a convention normally followed by dictionaries, which often 
distinguish words which are spelled identically, but belong to a different word 
class, by raised numbers. In order not to confuse these with the numbers of 
footnotes, it is better, however, to write them below the word as subscripts. 
E a r x 'organ of hearing' and ear2 'head of com' are distinguished as homonyms, 
because they were formally distinct in Old English and thus have a different 
etymology. Consequently, they are treated as two separate words or lexemes 
in present-day English dictionaries. Following this argument, we would have 
to treat f l o w e r 'part of plant' and flour 'powder made by crushing grain' as 
a single, polysemous word with two meanings. The reason for this is that they 
are etymologically identical, since both go back to the same Middle English 
word f l o u r . In spite of the different spelling, both are also identically pro-
nounced. Lyons (1977:550f.) points out that also p o r t { 'harbour' and p o r t 2 
'fortified wine' - which are certainly considered as two words by most speakers 
- would have to be treated as polysemous, since ultimately they both derive 
from Latin p o r t u s . We can add a number of pairs of words with the same 
origin, which can demonstrate that etymology cannot be a decisive criterion. 
Thus, g l a m o u r and g r a m m a r , p e r s o n and p a r s o n , s h i r t and s k i r t have a common 
source. Further well-known pairs in the history of English are: c a t c h and chase, 
m i n t and money, and i n c h and o u n c e . It is furthermore true that the speaker 
of a language does not normally possess any etymological knowledge. In any 
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case, this is irrelevant for a purely synchronic semantic analysis of English. 
From all this we conclude that etymology cannot be a useful criterion for 
distinguishing between homonymy and polysemy. 
The second possible criterion is formal identity or distinctness of a linguistic 
sign. This must be further differentiated, although this is often not done. We 
must distinguish between the spoken and the written medium and also consider 
morphological and syntactic aspects. Hansen et al. (21985:201) speak of 
complete homonymy ("vollständige Homonymie") only in the case of spoken, 
written, and grammatical identity of two signs. Traditionally, a further dis-
tinction is made between h o m o p h o n y and h o m o g r a p h y , as illustrated in the 
following diagram: 
(2) homonymy vs. polysemy 
(= multiple meaning) 
homophony homography 
flower : flour r e a d : r e a d 
l e d : l e a d [i:] [e] 
[e] [e] 
F l o w e r and flour are homophonous signs, as well as l e d (past participle) and 
l e a d (noun), or r e d 'colour' and r e a d (past participle). On the other hand, the 
infinitive r e a d and the past tense and past participle of the same verb are only 
spelt the same way but pronounced differently. For this reason they are 
examples of homography. It must be mentioned, however, that the distinction 
illustrated in (2) is often not made and that the terms homonym and 
homonymous are frequendy used in their wider sense, not only for complete 
homonymy. 
The following is meant as an illustration of a clear case of complete 
homonymy. The identical form b a t clearly has two different meanings and can 
therefore be assigned to two separate lexemes as in the following diagram: 
(3) 71. 'a specially shaped stick 
for hitting the ball in cricket etc' = BAT, 
b a t 
2 'a flying mouselike animal' = BAT. 
Obviously, there does not exist any semantic relationship between the two 
meanings or s i g n i f i e s . The fact that in both cases we have countable nouns 
with a very general feature [+CONCRETE] or [-ABSTRACT] is irrelevant. Agree-
ment in such an extremely common element of meaning is not an essential 
condition for assuming a single polysemous lexeme. We will return to the 
question of the necessary requirements for the close semantic relatedness of 
senses of a polysemous lexeme. 
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At this point, in connection with the sameness of the s i g n i f i a n t , an aspect 
of the formal identity must be mentioned which is neglected in all treatments 
of polysemy I know of. This is the formal distinctiveness of the s i g n i f i a n t , als 
already briefly touched on in 3.1., when b a c h e l o r and c u p were compared. 
Monosyllabic words like c u p and c u b are not as formally distinct as complex 
lexemes like topless (cf. Cruse 1986:49f.), or a m p h i t h e a t r e , verb-particle 
combinations like f a l l o u t , eat up (which also have very specific syntactic 
properties), or hard words of Latin and Greek origin, like v o m i t o r y , p e d e s t r i a n , 
or h e t e r o - p a r o n y m y (coined by Cruse). Establishing the formal unity of word 
like s u p e r c a l i f r a g i l i s t i c - e x p i a l i d o c i o u s (used in the musical Mary P o p p i n s ) is 
on a very different level from that of b a n k or o p e n . 
But even with monosyllabic words (as opposed to polysyllabic ones), 
different morphological and syntactic properties will lead to the postulation of 
separate lexemes. We can clearly distinguish between c a n x , c a n 2 , and c a n 3 
because we have a modal auxiliary in one case, a noun in the second, and 
a transitive verb with the meaning 'put into a can' in the third case. Can^ can 
be interpreted as a zero-derivation from the noun c a n 2 (see 4.2.2,). Thus, 
different word class and meaning must lead to the distinction of homonymous 
lexemes.4 
To return to polysemy, let us look at the third criterion, close semantic 
relatedness. How much semantic overlap is required to decide on a single 
lexeme with different senses, i.e. on a family of l e x i c a l u n i t s ? Hansen et al. 
(21985:202) speak of a "relativ engen Zusammenhang zwischen den Sememen" 
and opt for polysemy in two cases: 1. Semantic inclusion or hyponymy, and 
2. semantic transfer, i.e. metaphor and metonymy. I wil l here adopt this 
delimitation of polysemy and wi l l use the notation introduced above, 
distinguishing lexical units and lexemes by means of subscripts. Thus, the 
lexeme MANJ can be said to contain the lexical units, m a n 1 'human being' (Ger 
M e n s c h ) , m a n 2 'adult male human being' (Ger M a n n ) , but not M A N 2 'to furnish 
with men' (Ger b e m a n n e n ) . Within the lexeme FOX we can distinguish f o x l 
'wild animal', f o x 2 'person as crafty as a fox', and f o x 3 'fur of fox'. In the 
discussion of the distinction between polysemy and homonymy, psychological 
criteria have also been used, i.e. subjective association, for determining semantic 
relatedness. However, this is a different kind of relatedness. If a single speaker 
decides whether we have one word with two meanings or two different words, 
4 As in Lipka (1986b: 134), I here argue that the noun c a n 2 with the word-forms 
c a n , singular, and c a n s , plural) and the verb t o can^ (with the inflectional 
forms h e c a n s , c a n n e d ) constitute two homonymous lexemes in spite of the 
common meaning 'closed metal container'. Zero-derivation is an instance of 
'lexeme-formation', and thus differs from the creation of new 'lexical units' by 
metaphor and metonymy. Basically, homonymy and polysemy are not absolute 
opposites, and total homonymy must be seen as die end-point of a continuum 
of degrees of formal and semantic relatedness and difference (cf. Lipka 1986b: 
137, but also Lipka 1990 for parallels between word-formation and semantic 
transfer, namely metaphor and metonymy). 
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this is certainly not an objective procedure. Of course one could also use 
statistically relevant tests with a large number of informants to reduce the 
dangers of subjective intuition. 
Tests of another kind for semantic relatedness are discussed in Kastovsky 
(1982a: 123). He claims that we must decide in favour of homonymy in three 
cases: 
1. If two meanings of the same form belong to different lexical fields, they 
have to be treated as homonyms. An example is Fr v o l e r : ' f ly ' , which 
belongs to the field of movement verbs, and v o l e r 2 'steal', which does 
not. 
2. Membership in different word-formation families ("Wortbildungsfami-
lien") is a second objective criterion. Thus, m a n x (Ger M e n s c h ) is related 
to the compound m a n k i n d . On the other hand m a n 2 (Ger M a n n ) is 
related to m a n l y , m a n h o o d , t o m a n 0 , and t o u n m a n 0 . 
3. The third criterion is the coordination test. Thus, from the unacceptability 
of *He saw many f a i r g i r l s a n d games we must conclude that there are 
two homonymous adjectives f a i r . 
We have seen in the discussion above that it is often not easy to distinguish 
clearly between homonymy and polysemy. I hope it has become clear that they 
are not absolute opposites, and that there are various degrees of formal and 
semantic unity. Thus they must be regarded as the two end-points of a scale 
with a continuum in between. There is certainly not a single criterion for 
drawing the line, but we must combine various criteria and tests in order to 
determine the degree of relatedness and difference in form and meaning. 
To my knowledge, this was expressed explicitly for the first time in Cowie 
(1982:51), where we read: 
Polysemous words can differ considerably according to die degree of relatedness 
and difference which their meanings display ... homonymy (total distinctness of the 
meaning of identical forms) is properly seen as the end-point of the continuum. 
From the point of view of the productivity of language and the psychological 
reality of human categorization (see 3.4.2.) we must support Lyons's decision 
to maximize polysemy. This solution is also most sensible from a historical 
point of view as Toumier (1985:199) clearly demonstrates. Furthermore, he 
rightly stresses the fact that polysemy is an eminently economical phenomenon, 
and that speech communities which did not use metaphor and metonymy would 
lack imagination, the ability to perceive analogies and to establish rational 
associations. He concludes that polysemy belongs to the properties which 
distinguish human language from animal communication. 
4.2.2. Zero-Derivation and Word Metaphors 
In 3.2.2. we have discussed zero-derivatives in connection with morphological 
structure and suffixal derivatives. Here we shall consider them briefly in 
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comparison with word metaphors (see 3.4.2.). From our conclusions in 4.2.1. 
we can see that the latter must be interpreted as different lexical units belonging 
to the same lexeme. Zero-derivation, however, produces new lexemes with a 
different (though related) meaning and superficially identical, but grammatically 
distinct form, belonging to another word class. This can be illustrated with the 
following examples: 
(4) (a) t i c k x 'parasitic insect' —> t i c k 2 = lexical units 
'annoying person'5 
(b) t i c k 3 'sound of a clock —> t i c k 4 / 0, verb = homonyms 
or watch' 'make ticking sounds' 
(c) t i c k 5 'a mark in a list' —> t i c k 6 / 0, verb = homonyms 
'mark with a tick' 
The literal and figurative nouns tick in (4a) are two lexical units within the 
same polysemous lexeme. The verbs in (4b) and (4c) are derived by zero-
derivation from the respective nouns and therefore homonyms. The three nouns 
in (4) are also homonymous lexemes, since they are semantically unrelated. 
From the point of view of productivity, the two processes of derivation are 
very similar, and as we have seen in 3.4.2., word-formation and semantic 
transfer are often combined. We could therefore regard word metaphors and 
metonyms as the result of a special type of derivation, which might be labelled 
"semantic" or "inner derivation" (cf. Lipka 1986b: 134f.). A further parallelism 
between word-formation and metaphorical and metonymic derivation is that the 
results of all three processes may be equally affected by lexicalization (cf. Lipka 
1990). Having recognized that there is no sharp borderline between homonymy 
and polysemy, it is nevertheless advisable to include zero-derivation with 
homonymy, since there are clear grammatical differences (word class) and there 
is also the close parallelism with overt suffixal derivatives as illustrated in 
diagram (7) in 3.2.2. 
4.2.3. Lexical Relations, Sense-Relations, and Lexical Semantics 
We have already mentioned that lexical relations are not necessarily semantic 
relations and that lexical semantics is not exclusively relational. This caveat 
is not true for all approaches to semantics (see 2.2.2.), however. In particular, 
it must be stressed here that especially the semantic theory developed by Lyons 
since 1963, and also the type of lexical semantics propounded in Cruse (1986) 
- a book firmly based on Lyons's theory, but cast in rather idiosyncratic 
terminology - are fundamentally and also exclusively relational. To be fair, 
Cruse also draws on semantic features (which he calls "semantic traits"), and 
even mentions prototypes, but the bulk of his book (chapters 4-12) deals with 
T i c k 2 is listed in LDCE 1 as B r E infml 'an annoying or worthless fellow' and 
in OALD 4 als B r i t s i 'unpleasant or contemptible person'. 
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lexical relations such as hyponymy, hierarchies, part-whole relations (termed 
"meronomies"), opposites, and synonymy. 
Incidentally Lyons has become increasingly sceptical, over the years, about 
componential analysis and critical of all metalinguistic meaning elements. In 
00156's book especially, the three types of opposites originally introduced into 
linguistics in Lyons (1968) - and then further subclassified and elaborated in 
Lyons (1977) - are re-classified and analysed in great detail. 
In order to understand the situation, and also because lexical relations are 
so important within lexical semantics, we must have a closer look at the 
development of what Lyons termed s e n s e - r e l a t i o n s . It must be kept in mind, 
however, that these are only a special kind of both semantic relations and 
lexical relations, and that they do not at all cover the whole field of lexical 
semantics. Also, I would like to emphasize here that it is not true that sense-
relations do hold only between the meanings of linguistic signs (as in Coseriu's 
theory; cf. Coseriu/Geckeler 1981:54, Kastovsky 1982a:25), or between lexemes 
as complete signs (as claimed by Lyons), but exclusively between l e x i c a l u n i t s 
(as the combination of a form with a single sense). 
For Lyons neither homonymy nor polysemy are sense-relations. In his 
introduction to linguistics (1968:428) he defines the "sense of a lexical item" 
as 
the whole set of s e n s e - r e l a t i o n s which it contracts with other items 
and explicitly recognizes that the items may be paradigmatically or 
syntagmatically related. In the following, he only deals with paradigmatic 
relations, which I will sketch presently. These are established - on the basis 
of logical relationships - between "lexical items" that are substituted for each 
other in the same syntactic slot of sentences. The main relations set up in 1968 
are summarized in the following diagram: 
(5) sense-relations: 
1. synonymy : r i c h 
2. hyponymy : flower 
wealthy 
t u l i p 
3. oppositeness 
(= 'antonymy' 
in wider sense) 
a) complementarity: 
b) antonymy: 
c) converseness: 
m a l e / f e m a l e 
good/bad 
buy/sell 
At this point I would only like to make a few explanatory remarks. I will return 
to the five relations in detail presently. 'Synonymy', although defined on a 
logical basis, corresponds to the traditional usage of this term. The relation 
holds between two words with more or less the same meaning. The term 
hyponymy was coined by Lyons himself in 1963, on the analogy of synonymy 
and a n t o n y m y . It is closely related to i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y , and both are for Lyons 
the most fundamental paradigmatic relations of sense in terms of which the 
vocabulary is structured. Hyponymy relates a superordinate term to a sub-
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ordinate h y p o n y m . Lyons replaces the traditional term a n t o n y m y (in the wider 
sense) by oppositeness (of meaning) with a further subclassification into a) 
c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y , b) a n t o n y m y (in the narrower, restricted sense) and c) 
converseness. Additionally, these three finer distinctions fall together under the 
term a n t o n y m y in the wider sense. As already mentioned, neither homonymy 
nor polysemy belong to the 'sense-relations', but in Lyons (1977:559f.) the 
possibility is discussed, whether "absolute, or complete, homonymy" should be 
defined as "a relation between lexemes". 
I would now like to describe paradigmatic semantic relations in detail, with 
special focus on Lyons (1968) and (1977). Lexical fields, another important 
area of paradigmatic lexical semantics, closely related to hyponymy, will be 
treated in 4.2.4. Fields may be either hierarchic or non-hierarchic structures. 
Syntagmatic lexical relationships like those between b l o n d and h a i r , kiss and 
l i p s , b a r k and d o g , k i c k and f o o t , including purely lexical collocations which 
cannot be explained and described semantically, will be treated much later (see 
4.3.). 
As a last point, before beginning the detailed discussion of paradigmatic 
sense-relations, I would like to emphasize two methodological aspects of the 
theory underlying Lyons (1968) und (1977). Both publications are characterized 
by: 1. The lack of any meaning elements or semantic components, and 2. the 
logical basis of the relationships. As opposed to Leech and many other linguists, 
Lyons does not make use of a semantic metalanguage in his structural semantic 
theory. The sense-relations are established between lexical items, i.e. full 
linguistic signs, which are substituted for each other in the same syntactic 
position of sentences. This procedure is supposed to guarantee the objectivity 
of the methodology.6 
4.2.3.1. Synonymy 
I will start with the first sense-relation in diagram (5) and will not restrict 
myself to the opinions expressed by Lyons. In his I n t r o d u c t i o n t o T h e o r e t i c a l 
L i n g u i s t i c s (1968:428) he first defines synonymy provisionally in the following 
way: 
Two (or more) items are synonymous if die sentences which result from die 
substitution of one for the other have the same meaning. 
He points out that neither "total synonymy" nor "complete synonymy" exist 
and then concentrates on "cognitive synonymy". This is defined precisely 
6 In Lyons (1981:91-97) the logical notions 'entailment* and 'meaning postula-
tes' are used to define the "substitutional** (paradigmatic) sense-relations: hypo-
nymy, "descriptive synonymy", and incompatibility (with the sub-classes: 
complementarity, "polar antonymy*', and converseness). Lyons (1981:84) conce-
des that componential analysis is useful not for representing die meaning of 
lexemes, "but as a way of formalizing that part of their proto-typical, or focal, 
meaning which they share with other lexemes.'* 
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(1968:450) in terms of "bilateral implication" or "equivalence" which may be 
illustrated with the following example: 
x 
(6) (SI) The Arabian sheikh was w e a l t h y , and 
(S2) The Arabian sheikh was r i c h 
y 
Slz> S2 and S2D SI, therefore SI = S2 = equivalence 
This can be explained as follows. Two sentences SI and S2 must mutually 
imply each other (z> is the logical symbol for "imply, implication"). If this is 
the case, then SI and S2 are equivalent (s stands for "is equivalent to"). In 
addition, the two sentences must have an identical syntactic structure. If, 
furthermore, one differs from the other only in that where one has a lexical 
item x , the other has y (in the same position), then x and y are synonymous. 
On closer inspection we realize that synonymy does not hold between 
"lexical items" (as claimed by Lyons) but between lexical units. If, for example, 
we distinguish between r i c h { 'wealthy' and r i c h 2 'fertile', then, obviously, the 
latter is not synonymous with w e a l t h y . Let us look at some additional examples. 
We may distinguish e.g. the lexical units p i g l 'animal', p i g 2 'greedy person', 
and p i g 3 'policeman' (the German equivalenTIs B u l l e , which can either denote 
an animal or a policeman). The lexical unit p i g 3 is never synonymous with 
the lexeme s w i n e , which may be split up into the lexical units s w i n e x 'animal' 
(with an additional connotative label a r c h a i c , see 1.3., 2.2.5.) and s w i n e 2 
'extremely unpleasant person' (with an additional label o l d - f a s h i o n e d s l a n g ) . 
Synonymy might only be claimed to exist between the lexical units p i g x and 
s w i n e x as well as between p i g 2 and perhaps s w i n e 2 . H o g (in the animal sense) 
is either connotatively marked as American English, or has a specific sense 
denoting a male, castrated animal. In the person sense, h o g cannot replace p i g 
in the collocation m a l e c h a u v i n i s t p i g . 
The examples demonstrate not only that synonymy is a matter of lexical 
units, but that cognitively more or less identical words usually differ in their 
connotations. It is perhaps worth pointing out that Lyons proposes to extend 
the notion of synonymy beyond equivalent lexical items to groups of lexemes. 
One could then call d r a k e and its paraphrase m a l e d u c k synonyms. This 
proposal results from the recognition of an important principle of the inter-
relation between paradigmatic lexical stmcturing and syntagmatic modification 
(cf. Lipka 1981a). Several other linguists even use the terms synonym and 
synonymy for relationships between sentences. I believe, however, that they 
should be reserved for purely lexical relations and that the term p a r a p h r a s e 
should be used in other cases. 
According to Lyons (1968:452 f.) synonymy is not "a structural relation-
ship", especially if compared to hyponymy. In other words, it is fairly irrelevant 
for the structure of the lexicon of a language. If all instances of synonymy 
were eliminated from the vocabulary, this would not effect the structural 
relationship between the remaining lexical items. The so-called "impoverished" 
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lexicon would no longer provide stylistic variety and choice, but everything 
could be said with the smaller "synonymy-free vocabulary". 
4.2.3.2. Hyponymy and Incompatibility 
Lyons characterizes hyponymy and incompatibility as the most fundamental 
paradigmatic relations of sense. Both are largely interdependent and extremely 
important for the structure of the lexicon. As opposed to synonymy, they cannot 
simply be eliminated without serious consequences. 
Let us look at hyponymy first, which is the relation of lexical subordination 
or superordination. Lyons (1968:455) gives a definition in terms of "unilateral 
implication", i.e. logical implication of lexemes in identical syntactic position. 
The subordinate term (or h y p o n y m ) necessarily implies the superordinate one, 
but not vice versa. The latter (which may sometimes be missing in a natural 
language, because there is a lexical gap in the system) is called h y p e r o n y m 
by some linguists. I shall avoid this term in the following, because of the 
danger of confusion with h y p o n y m . 
Following Coseriu's, Kastovsky's, and my own usage I shall prefer the un-
ambiguous term a r c h i l e x e m e . This has been coined on the analogy of the 
phonological term a r c h i p h o n e m e ("Archiphonem") used by the Prague School 
of linguists. Thus the neutralization of the opposition between the phonemes 
/d/ and /t/ (in final position in High German e.g. in R a d and R a t ) is symbolized 
by the archiphoneme H I . Scholars of German often speak of Auslautverhärtung 
in this case. 
This is another instance of the parallelism of phonology and semantics. In 
lexical semantics as well, the opposition between subordinate units is neutralized 
in the superordinate term. Hyponyms which are on the same level of the 
hierarchy are labelled co-hyponyms. The following simple diagram is meant to 
illustrate both the nature of the sense-relation and the terminology used by a 
number of linguists. 
(7) flower superordinate (term) 
Lyons (1968:455) defines the unilateral (or asymmetrical) implication between 
e.g. t u l i p and f l o w e r as "proper hyponymy". He also points out that the 
principle of hyponymy "enables us to be more general or more specific 
according to circumstances". On the same page, he points out that synonymy 
may be interpreted as a special case of hyponymy, namely as "symmetrical 
hyponymy". If x is a hyponym of y and if y is also a hyponym of JC, then 
x and y are synonyms. Thus, logical implication can be made the underlying 
basis for both lexical sense-relations. 
Again, it must be pointed out that hyponymy is a relation between lexical 
units, not lexemes. This becomes immediately clear if we look at the figurative 
(= archilexeme) 
J HYPONYMY 
(co-) hyponyms («->) t u l i p «-> v i o l e t r o s e 
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senses of animal names, which are often used as terms of abuse in many 
languages. Thus, t i c k 2 (see 4.2.2.), p i g , ass, b i t c h I Ger S c h w e i n , Esel, Gans 
I Fr v a c h e , c o c h o n , c h i e n do not at all logically or linguistically imply a n i m a l , 
as do their literal counterparts (cf. Tournier 1985:239 ff.). 
Incompatibility is defined by Lyons (1968:458) on the basis of the logical 
c o n t r a d i c t o r i n e s s between two sentences. If Sj explicitly or implicitly denies 
another sentence S 2 and the two sentences only differ in that one has the lexical 
item x and the other has y (in the same syntactic position) then x and y are 
incompatible. This is illustrated by: Mary was w e a r i n g a r e d h a t and Mary 
was w e a r i n g a g r e e n ( b l u e , w h i t e . . . ) h a t . Colour-terms are obviously incom-
patible lexical items. Within the same hierarchic lexical field, all those co-
hyponyms are incompatible which belong to the same d i m e n s i o n . Such 
'dimensions' (which group together a number of specific semantic features) are, 
for example, COLOUR, SEX, AGE, SHAPE, PURPOSE etc. (cf. Lipka 1980:100, 109f., 
Kastovsky 1982a: 81 ff., Schneider 1988:52f., 147ff.). Incompatible lexemes 
must therefore have important semantic features in common. Simple difference 
of meaning is not the same as incompatibility. 
Again, we must stress that this sense-relation is a matter of lexical units. 
Senses which belong to different dimensions are not affected by incompatibility. 
Examples are b l u e and its senses 'depressed' or 'indecent' and b l a c k and its 
senses 'illegal' or 'sinister'. 
To conclude this section on two closely connected sense-relations, it seems 
appropriate to draw attention to their functional aspects. Lyons (1968:455) points 
out that the principle of hyponymy "enables us to be more general or more 
specific according to circumstances". Cruse (1986:112ff., 136ff.), who 
distinguishes various "hierarchies" and "taxonomies" and relates these to the 
problem of categorization (143 ff.), discusses the pragmatic question of lexical 
over- and under-specification in particular situations, in connection with the 
notions "folk taxonomies" and "natural kinds". These will be discussed here 
under the heading of "lexical fields" (see 4.2.4.), which Cruse labels "lexical 
configurations". 
4.2.3.3. Complementarity, Antony my, and Converseness 
As already pointed out (see diagram (5)), Lyons calls the traditional lexical 
relation of antonymy "oppositeness of meaning" and distinguishes three different 
types of oppositeness. He restricts the term a n t o n y m y to just one of those three 
types. We will review them in turn. In doing this, we should keep in mind 
that these sense-relations too are defined on the basis of logical relationships. 
The most recent (corpus-based) study of binary opposition in English is 
Mettinger (1988). 
C o m p l e m e n t a r i t y can be illustrated by pairs of words like m a l e and f e m a l e , 
or s i n g l e and m a r r i e d (cf. Kastovsky 1982a:96f, 234 f.). It is characteristic 
of complementaries that the denial of the one implies the assertion of the other 
and vice versa. The definition of this sense-relation is therefore based on logical 
implication combined with negation. 
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Thus, e.g. J o h n i s n o t m a r r i e d implies J o h n i s s i n g l e , and also J o h n i s 
m a r r i e d implies J o h n i s n o t s i n g l e . There is no third possibility, which is also 
captured by the traditional Latin expression t e r t i u m n o n d a t u r . This corresponds 
to the logical "contradictory statements", which are exclusive and exhaustive. 
This type of oppositeness is based on a yes/no-decision. Complementarity may 
be regarded as a special case of i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y , which only concerns pairs of 
lexical units. 
Lyons (1968:461) emphasizes that the logical relation only holds for the 
"normal usage" of such pairs and that "dichotomization" is a very important 
principle in the semantic structure of language. Thus there may well be other 
possibilities besides the complementaries e.g. m a l e and f e m a l e , namely 
h e r m a p h r o d i t e . In our terminology we could say that the two complementaries 
do not cover the entire dimension of SEX . This is even more true today, 20 
years after the publication of Lyons's book, of the pair s i n g l e and m a r r i e d . 
He points out himself though, that under special circumstances an utterance like 
m o r e m a r r i e d may well receive a sensible interpretation. 
In this connection he also states that (besides logical criteria for the 
definition of complementarity) gradability is a linguistic characteristic. In normal 
usage such terms are neither qualifiable, nor gradable. In an article published 
in 1980, however, Cruse sets up a further subclass, namely "gradable comple-
mentaries" (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 98, 135; Cruse 1986:203). Examples are the 
following pairs: c l e a n : d i r t y , t r u e ' . f a l s e , p u r e : i m p u r e . In Cruse (1986) "oppo-
sites" are then discussed in very great detail in the three chapters 9-11. 
A n t o n y m y (in the narrow, restricted sense of Lyons) is the second subclass 
of oppositeness. It is distinguished from c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y by being based on 
different logical relationships (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 131 ff., Cruse 1986:204ff.). 
For pairs of antonyms like g o o d / b a d , b i g / s m a l l , h i g h / l o w only the second one 
of the above-mentioned relations of implication (or entailment) holds. The 
assertion containing one member does imply the negation of the other, but not 
vice versa. Thus, J o h n i s g o o d implies J o h n i s n o t bad. But J o h n i s n o t g o o d 
does not necessarily imply J o h n i s bad. The negation of one term does not 
necessarily imply the assertion of the other. Using a further example, The w a t e r 
i s n o t h o t does not necessarily imply The w a t e r i s c o l d . However, from The 
w a t e r i s c o l d the negation The w a t e r i s n o t h o t does follow. Furthermore, The 
w a t e r i s h o t logically implies the negation The w a t e r i s n o t c o l d . 
Here, the principle t e r t i u m d a t u r does hold, i.e. a third possibility exists. 
This corresponds to "polar opposition" in the terminology of Leech (21981:101 f.) 
and to the "contrary" in traditional logic (cf. Lyons 1977:272). Antonymous 
adjectives (in the narrower sense) behave like comparatives and are therefore 
often tied to specific norms as a point of reference (cf. Kastovsky 1982a: 132). 
Cruse (1986:206ff.) distinguishes a number of finer subclasses of antonyms. 
An important linguistic difference from complementaries (like s i n g l e / m a r r i e d ) 
is that antonyms (in the narrow sense) are always fully gradable. This is true, 
of course, for g o o d / b a d , h o t / c o l d and many adjectives. Additional criteria for 
the determination and subclassification of antonymy have been used in various 
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publications by Cruse, Ljung, and Geckeler. 
Converseness is the third subclass of oppositeness of meaning distinguished 
by Lyons (cf. Kastovsky 1981b; 1982a: 136, Cruse 1986:231 ff.). This term 
introduced by Lyons derives from symbolic logic, where converse denotes an 
equivalent mirror-image relation, or function, in which the order of the 
arguments is reversed. We have already come across such cases when 
discussing 'relational features' (see 3.3.2.) and even earlier, when discussing 
the notion of t h e m a t i c m e a n i n g introduced by Leech (see 2.2.4.). Examples are: 
husband/wife, d o c t o r / p a t i e n t , teacher/pupil, but also precede/follow, a b o v e / b e l o w , 
i n f r o n t of/be h i n d , before/after, i.e. not only nouns. 
The criterion for the sense-relation of converseness is the possibility of 
permuting noun phrases, functioning as arguments, in sentences which remain 
otherwise equivalent. In other words, the sentences imply each other and thus 
have the same meaning. Thus, e.g. J o h n b o u g h t t h e c a r f r o m B i l l implies B i l l 
s o l d t h e c a r t o J o h n and vice versa. This example with the three-place pre-
dicates buy and s e l l is, of course, more complex than sentences with two-place 
predicates (cf. Lyons 1968:467; 1977:280). I would like to represent it 
schematically in the following way: 
(8) ( N P J b o u g h t N P 3 from ( N P J c 
( N P j s o l d . N P 3 to ( N P J 
Mirror-image sentences are in several ways similar to the relation between ac-
tive and passive sentences. There is also a parallel to antonyms in the compara-
tive form, and thus X i s b i g g e r t h a n Y is equivalent to Y i s s m a l l e r t h a n X . 
Converseness is thus characterized by the fact that pairs of sentences with 
lexemes like buy and s e l l , or h u s b a n d and wife imply each other mutually. 
Thus, J o h n i s M a r y ' s h u s b a n d implies the sentence Mary i s John's wife and 
vice versa. The substitution of lexical converses - with constant meaning - thus 
causes a permutation of the noun phrases functioning as arguments. This pro-
vides the possibility of assigning a different theme/rheme-structure with different 
'thematic meaning\ for purposes of information presentation in texts (cf. 
Kastovsky 1981b). 
Cruse (1986:232 f.), who characterizes converses as "relational opposites", 
draws attention to the "dual semantic nature" of many nouns that belong to 
pairs of lexical converses. Adapting one of his examples to our purposes, I 
would like to demonstrate that converseness - as well as the other types of 
opposites - is a matter of lexical units too, not of lexemes. The lexeme CHILD 
contains two lexical units c h i l d x and c h i l d 2 , of which only the latter is relational. 
It does not contain a feature [-ADULT] and only this lexical unit is an instance 
of converseness (together with p a r e n t ) . This is illustrated by (9a) vs. (9b): 
(9a) She was a c h i l d x when her parents died 
(9b) All their children are now grown up. 
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We have seen that the three kinds of sense-relations between lexical items (or 
more precisely, lexical units) that are traditionally summed up under the term 
a n t o n y m y differ clearly in many ways. Complementaries, antonyms and 
converses always occur in pairs, which are treated and interpreted as two-
member lexical fields by some linguists. For all three types of oppositeness 
Lyons (1968), in his classical treatment, bases his definitions on the relation 
of logical implication, or entailment. In more recent research (Lyons 
1977:28 Iff ; Cruse 1986:223 ff.) this logical basis loses its importance, the 
subclassification becomes much more detailed and refined, and a fourth type 
of oppositeness is introduced, which is called d i r e c t i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n . We shall 
now look more closely into these developments. 
4.2.3.4. Contrast and Opposition: Recent Work 
As already mentioned, Lyons (1977) modifies, enlarges, and refines his earlier 
work on sense-relations. The most important change is the introduction of a 
fourth type of oppositeness, labelled d i r e c t i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n . This has also been 
adopted by Cruse and further subclassified and modified. The position in Lyons 
(1977) can be schematically represented as in the following diagram (10). This 
has been adopted (with minor modifications) from Geckeler (1980:46). As in 
many other cases, Lyons only gives a verbal explanation, and does not 
summarize his many distinctions in diagrammatic form. 
(b) non-binary^contrasts 
antonymy complemen 
tarity 
directional o. 
(i) consequence 
(ii) orthogonal o. 
(iii) antipodal o. 
serially 
ordered 
sets 
cyclically 
ordered 
sets 
scales ranks 
We will discuss this schema in detail and look at (a) o p p o s i t i o n and (b) 
n o n - b i n a r y c o n t r a s t s separately. The major changes as compared to 1968 are: 
the addition of "directional opposition" under (a) (with additional subclasses), 
the finer subcategorization under (b), and the diminishing importance of 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y , which is now regarded mainly as a property of "non-binary 
contrasts". The binary types, unfortunately termed o p p o s i t i o n by Lyons (cf. 
Geckeler 1980:46) may be represented and illustrated as follows: 
(10a) 
antonymy 
hot/cold 
complemen-
tarity 
male/female 
opposition 
converse-
ness 
buy/sell 
directional o : 
(i) consequence : 
(ii) orthogonal o.: 
(iii) antipodal o. : 
up I down 
l e a r n I know 
north I east 
north I south 
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We have already discussed the first three types of opposition. D i r e c t i o n a l 
o p p o s i t i o n (with its subclasses) is based on the notion of contrary motion (i.e. 
in opposite directions). This is seen most cleary in the pair u p / d o w n . According 
to Lyons (1977:281) the pairs come/go and a r r i v e / d e p a r t also involve motion 
in two opposed directions, with respect to a reference point P . In u p / d o w n , 
however, the opposition is drawn within motion away from P . Come/go is 
different again, in that it involves deixis, as does the opposition e.g. between 
h e r e / t h e r e . Here, the reference point is normally the speaker. We have already 
discussed this phenomenon in connection with deictic features (see 3.3.2.). 
Direction and motion can also be understood in a more abstract, figurative 
sense. This is often referred to as "the localist hypothesis" or "the thesis of 
localism". Motion from a place as well as abstract motion produces certain 
results. Lyons therefore distinguishes two possible types of "consequence": po-
sitive and negative consequence. The first one may be illustrated by l e a r n / k n o w , 
get/have; the second one by f o r g e t / n o t know and d i e / n o t be a l i v e . 
Antipodal (or diametrical) opposites are illustrated by n o r t h / s o u t h and east/ 
west. Lyons distinguishes this type from orthogonal (or perpendicular) 
opposition, as in e.g. n o r t h , opposed both to east and west, or east, opposed 
both to south and n o r t h . Although the distinction between antipodal and 
orthogonal opposition may seem far too specific, since it applies only to a very 
restricted number of lexemes, it is helpful in explaining why certain lexical 
items do not have a single opposite (cf. Lyons 1977:285). Thus, g i r l is opposed 
orthogonally to both boy and w o m a n . 
Cruse (1986), however, has given up this distinction and only recognizes 
a n t i p o d a l s as one of a number of subclasses of directional opposition. Among 
the others, converses and "reversives" (in most cases realized by complex 
lexemes) are perhaps the most important ones. 
The category of "non-binary contrast" is newly introduced in Lyons 
(1977:287 ff.), with further possible subcategorization as represented in diagram 
(10b). Lyons also speaks of "many-member lexical sets", which he discusses 
in connection with incompatibility. 
(10b) 
serially 
ordered 
1. cycles 
sets 
Sunday 
Monday 2. scales 
hot 
3. ranks 
excellent I field m a r s h a l 
good I general w a r m 
poor I private 
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I will make some brief explanatory remarks concerning the three subcategories. 
1. 'cycles' (or cyclical sets): like s p r i n g , summer, a u t u m n , w i n t e r or J a n u a r y 
to December, Sunday to S a t u r d a y , are mainly to be found among words 
denoting units or periods of time. There are no "outermost members", or 
extremes, although there is a conventional beginning and end. Serially ordered 
sets or groups of words are subdivided by Lyons into: 2. 'scales' (which are 
gradable) e.g. h o t , w a r m , c o o l , c o l d on the one hand and 3. 'ranks' (which 
are not) on the other. The latter are exemplified by examination marks like 
e x c e l l e n t , g o o d , a v e r a g e , f a i r , p o o r and terms for military ranks.7 
It might seem that this subclassification is too delicate, but as Lyons 
(1977:290) points out, it may contribute to a better understanding of the basic 
colour words in English, which combine a scale ( b l a c k , g r e y , w h i t e ) with a 
cycle (red, y e l l o w , g r e e n , b l u e , p u r p l e ) . Lyons also argues that the scale of 
temperature words in English is unusual in that it contains an outer and an 
inner pair of antonyms (hot/cold and w a r m l c o o t ) . 1 
Finally, it has to be emphasized once more that "many-member lexical sets" 
do not really consist of lexemes, but of lexical units. As mentioned above, b l a c k 
and b l u e are polysemous words. This is also true for examples such as h o t , 
w a r m , f a i r , p o o r etc. 
Non-binary groups of words which belong to the same word class and cover 
a certain semantic area may clearly be understood also as non-hierarchic 
semantic or lexical fields. In fact, Lyons explicitly mentions both of these in 
1968 and 1977 in connection with colour terms and examination marks. We 
will return to this subject presently. 
Before doing this, a few critical remarks on Lyons (1977) and Cruse (1986) 
will not be entirely inappropriate. They concern both their terminology and the 
delicacy of the fine subcategorization. The terminological distinctions introduced 
by Lyons are not all of them entirely fortunate. In particular, his definition of 
o p p o s i t i o n as 'binary contrast' may be and has been cruized. A detailed critique 
can be found in Geckeler (1980), whose own terminological proposals, however, 
have not found favour with other linguists. The terminology used by Cruse, 
with its extremely fine ramifications, is unorthodox and idiosyncratic, especially 
the many new terms coined on a Latin and Greek basis, which, however, at 
least testify to the productivity of what Marchand called "word-formation on 
a foreign basis." 
With respect to content, one can always criticize missing points or examples. 
Nevertheless, it is surprising that Lyons (when discussing the transfer to abstract 
relations on the basis of the localist hypothesis) does not mention temporal 
7 Lyons (1977:289) stresses that in the grouping of examination candidates in 
terms of e x c e l l e n t , g o o d , ... p o o r "these lexemes will be construed as a serially 
ordered set of incompatible and ungradable terms.". In our terminology, the 
ungradable g o o d , p o o r etc. are different 'lexical units'. 
8 However, similar double pairs exist in other European languages, e.g. Ger 
heiß/kalt + warmikiih!, Fr chaud/froid + tiide/frais, It caldolfreddo + iepidol 
fresco. 
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opposites like n o w / t h e n and first/last (cf. also before/after). This also holds for 
Cruse and his account of directional opposition. In many languages such lexical 
units are derived from locative lexemes. 
It is important, however, that both Lyons and Cruse clearly demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the traditional, global notion of antonymy. This comprehensive 
concept obviously covers and confuses many important differences which exist 
between the various types of binary and non-binary lexical "contrasts". The two 
linguists must certainly be credited with demonstrating the variety of distinctions 
which exist in the area of lexical opposites. 
On the other hand, one can also go too far in refining an analysis and 
setting up an ever finer subclassification. It must be emphasized here that the 
more distinctions are introduced, the fewer general statements, rules, or so-called 
generalizations remain. This problem, which has also been discussed in 
linguistics under the term d e l i c a c y , does not have an absolute solution. In 
principle, one can make ever finer or more delicate discrimination and 
subclassification in many areas of language. It depends on the subject matter 
as well as on the purpose of a description, where the boundary line is drawn 
between a detailed analysis and an insightful generalization. For didactic 
purposes, a certain simplification is always more advisable than a too detailed 
description. There is always the danger of no longer seeing the wood for the 
trees. 
Lyons (1968:152 f, 164) himself has expressed this very clearly, by drawing 
on the concept of the "principle of diminishing returns". He illustrates this with 
the example of the ever finer subclassification of word classes. In his own 
words (1968:153): 
The linguist will be faced with a situation in which he is establishing more and 
more rules, each covering very few sentences; and he will be setting up so many 
overlapping word-classes (sic!) that all semblance of generality is lost. This is what 
is meant by the principle of 'diminishing returns'. 
And he continues: 
There comes a point (and where this point is might be legitimate matter for dispute) 
at which the increase in the complexity of the rules is too 'cosdy* in proportion 
to its 'yield'. 
One might well argue that both Lyons and Cruse have gone beyond this point 
and have overstepped the boundaries of a sensible balance. 
4.2.4. Lexical Fields and Hierarchies 
In the following, we shall first look at linear lexical fields and quasi-hyponymy 
and will then deal with the ambiguous concept of inclusion again, in connection 
with the notions of intension and extension. Finally, this will be related to a 
discussion of hierarchies. 
Field-theory has a long tradition in European linguistics and all sorts of 
typologies have been proposed for it. Recent theoretical and practical work on 
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the subject has been done mainly by Coseriu, Geckeler, Lehrer, and myself. 
The terminology is extremely confusing (cf. Lipka 1980:94-97, Kastovsky 
1982a: 125 f.). Cruse (1986:112 ff.) speaks of l e x i c a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s , while for 
Lehrer (1974) the terms s e m a n t i c field and l e x i c a l field are synonyms. Coseriu, 
who uses Wortfeld (translated as l e x i c a l f i e l d in the English version) dis-
tinguishes these (cf. Coseriu/Geckeler 1981:58 f.) from: a) scientific taxonomies, 
b) categories of subject matter ("Sachbereiche"), c) associative fields, and d) con-
ceptual fields. For him, all lexical fields are necessarily conceptual fields but 
not vice versa. 
My own ideas on the subject are derived from Coseriu's, especially in 
considering fields as necessarily paradigmatic and opposed to syntagmatic 
structures. But I have introduced a finer distinction between the more compre-
hensive l e x i c a l field (consisting of simple or complex lexemes) and the w o r d -
f i e l d (exclusively containing morphologically simple items), in Lipka (1980). 
One of the reasons for doing this is the concept of 'lexical gap', which can 
only be proved to exist in structures of simple words. If complex lexemes are 
admitted in such a field, the productive word-formation processes may close 
such a gap at any time. In the article just mentioned, I have also adopted 
Coseriu's distinction between a " m i c r o - f i e l d " and a " m a c r o - f i e l d " . Another, 
more important, subcategorization in our context is the differentiation between 
linear and hierarchic fields. 
In Lipka (1980:98) the following conditions for membership in a field were 
set up (partly following Coseriu): 
1. items must be in direct opposition in the same syntactic slot, i.e. belong to the 
same word class, 2. they must have at least one specific semantic component in 
common, 3. field-membership must be established by objective procedures. 
With non-hierarchic, i.e. linear fields, criterion 2 for the definition of fields 
is equivalent to the statement that the field covers a whole 'dimension' such 
as SEX, AGE, COLOUR, TEMPERATURE etc. Hierarchic fields are based on the 
sense-relation of hyponymy (or inclusion) and can normally be replaced by an 
archilexeme. Note that this does not hold for the "hierarchic oppositions" in 
Leech (1981:106ff.) such as inch/foot/yard etc., J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y etc., o n e / t w o / 
t h r e e etc. 
Hierarchies normally consist of several levels, usually not more than five 
(cf. Cruse 1986:112ff, 145). If a hyponym is missing on any level we may 
speak of a "specification-gap". Conversely, the lack of an archilexeme may be 
termed "generalization-gap" (cf. Lipka 1980:107). The latter case is called 
"quasi-hyponymy" by Lyons. In the case of a two-level hierarchy with a miss-
ing archilexeme, quasi-hyponymy results in linear fields, which we will now 
sketch briefly. 
As we have seen in diagram (10b) Lyons (1977) distinguishes three kinds 
of "non-binary contrast": 1. cycles, 2. scales (gradable) and 3. ranks (non-grad-
able). Cruse (1986:192 ff.) (within his treatment of "non-branching hierarchies" 
in chapter 8 of his book) uses two different criteria for distinguishing between 
"ranks, grades and degrees", namely 1. continuous or discontinuous variation 
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on an underlying scale, and 2. gradability. Thus for him r a n k s "vary in discrete 
jumps", while g r a d e s (gradable) and degrees (non-gradable) vary on a con-
tinuous scale. The terminological confusion is complete and returns of the 
subclassification do not only diminish, but may seem to approach zero. I 
therefore prefer to treat all these subcategories as instances of linear lexical 
fields. Let us look at a concrete example: 
(11) 
hot warm tepid cool cold - TEMPERATURE = SCale 
Here we have gradual oppositions, i.e. degrees on a scale (both in their literal 
sense!). An archilexeme is missing (or even, perhaps, inconceivable) which 
covers the whole lexical field, or more precisely word-field. But all members 
of the field have the semantic component [TEMPERATURE] in common, because 
they all belong to this dimension. 
Both Lehrer and Lyons use the term s c a l e for this type of opposition, 
because the members of the field are gradable (e.g. w a r m e r , c o o l e r etc.), except 
for the zero-point t e p i d . This (Lehrer* s centerpoint) is in the middle of the 
field, which is exceptional, and the increase is directed to both ends of the 
scale. 
This particular linear field is also exceptional in other respects (cf. Lehrer 
1974:110-112; Lyons 1977:289), because it contains an outer and an inner 
pair of antonyms. A third, not so exceptional property, is the possibility of 
adding and inserting further lexemes, such as s c o r c h i n g , b u r n i n g , l u k e w a r m , 
f r e e z i n g , i c y . Since these are morphologically complex, they do not (in my 
terminology) belong within the w o r d - f i e l d . However, together with the simple 
lexemes, they would constitute a complex l e x i c a l field. Collectively, all these 
adjectives of temperature constitute a linear field, a s c a l e . Other scales (which 
we cannot deal with here) are treated in Lehrer (1974:28 f.). 
My second example of a linear field is taken from the simple words for 
colours in English. Basic colour-terms have been investigated in many languages 
(cf. Leech 21981:24ff.) from various points of view, including universality, 
psychological reality, and prototypicality. As already mentioned, colour is 
denoted in English both by a 'scale', namely b l a c k , g r e y , w h i t e and a cyclical 
opposition, which may be represented as a linear field in the following way: 
(12) red yellow green blue purple COLOUR cycle 
This linear field is a c y c l e in Lyons's classification. No single element in the 
chain of oppositions is above any other, nor does it show a greater degree of 
some quality. The items all have the same status. This type of opposition was 
called equipollent by Trubetzkoy in his theory of phonology (cf. Lyons 
1977:279). An archilexeme is missing, although Kastovsky (1982a: 90) proposes 
153 
the complex lexeme c o l o u r e d for this function. However, this usually has the 
meaning 'non-white'. 
A third type of linear fields is formed by what Leech (21981:100) calls 
"multiple taxonomy", e.g. g o l d , c o p p e r , i r o n , m e r c u r y , kinds of animal like b i r d , 
fish, insect, m a m m a l , species of animal like c a t , d o g , h o r s e , cow, wolf, and 
breeds like a l s a t i a n , t e r r i e r , s p a n i e l , c o l l i e etc. These examples show that linear 
fields are not restricted to adjectives. Leech posits the common semantic 
components: METAL, KIND, SPECIES, BREED. The subclasses ( g o l d , c o p p e r etc., 
b i r d , f i s h , etc., c a t , d o g etc., a l s a t i a n , t e r r i e r etc.) are distinguished in his 
notation by arbitrary, typographical symbols. 
The reason for this procedure is explained better in Cruse (1986:140), who 
claims that e.g. h o r s e cannot be paraphrased as 'equine animal' and be opposed 
to cow in the same way as s t a l l i o n may be paraphrased as 'male horse' and 
be opposed to m a r e . He argues convincingly that in this case modification of 
a n i m a l is impossible, because h o r s e , cow etc. are "natural kind terms", which 
resemble proper names in that both are "rigid designators". His argument is 
further strengthened by the observation that metalinguistic elements like EQUINE, 
BOVINE, CANINE, FELINE etc., and the paraphrases they are derived from, have 
doubtful status as evidence. 
According to Cruse natural kind terms and their relations with their 
superordinates "can only be described encyclopaedically". Consequently, only 
those linear fields which do not denote natural kinds can be described with 
the help of dimensions such as TEMPERATURE, COLOUR, SHAPE, LENGTH, TASTE, 
SEX, AGE and (for verbs) MANNER, INSTRUMENT, PURPOSE (cf. Lipka 1980:109). 
If we now turn from linear to hierarchic fields, both the concepts of 
inclusion and hyponymy must be reconsidered. In 2.2.1. we found (see esp. 
diagram (8) (p. 51), when looking at the relationship between language and 
reality, that the ambiguity of the term i n c l u s i o n can be resolved, if we make 
a clear distinction between "sense inclusion" and "referential", or better "deno-
tational inclusion". There is an inverse relationship between the two and they 
are complementary. The sense, or meaning component ANIMAL is necessarily 
included in the sense HORSE, but the class of horses is a subclass, and thus 
included in, the class of the denotata of a n i m a l . The sense FLOWER is included 
in the sense TULIP, but the class of t u l i p s is included in that of f l o w e r s . 
Because of the ambiguity of the term i n c l u s i o n , Leech (21981:93) thinks 
it is safer to avoid using the term altogether and to prefer hyponymy instead 
(see 4.2.3.2.). Unfortunately, h i e r a r c h y and h i e r a r c h i c are also ambiguous. As 
already mentioned, Leech uses the terms for oppositions like inch/foot/yard etc., 
J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y etc. and opposes it to "multiple taxonomy" (e.g. g o l d , c o p p e r , 
etc.). Clearly, this is not what is meant when Lyons (1977:295ff.) deals with 
"hierarchical structure in the vocabulary". For Cruse (1986:112ff., 145) 
"hierarchies" must also have several (usually up to five) distinct levels, of which 
the "generic level" (exemplified by r o s e ) is the most important one in natural 
(or folk) taxonomies. I here reproduce his example of p l a n t in modified form, 
with additional branching and terminology indicated. 
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(13) plant unique beginner (= archilexeme) 
- life-form (= "kind") 
generic (= genus) 
specific (= species) 
varietal (= variety) 
Just below the most important g e n e r i c l e v e l , complex lexemes like t e a - r o s e , 
moss r o s e , and d o g - r o s e set in. This is the point where we change from a 
hierarchic word-field (with simple lexemes) to a l e x i c a l field. In my opinion, 
Cruse's h y b r i d t e a is a technical term and denotes a subclass of t e a - r o s e . Other 
problems with the diagram are where flower comes in, and whether t r e e , f l o w e r , 
and v e g e t a b l e are to be treated as co-hyponyms of p l a n t , because they can all 
be defined as 'a kind of plant'. 
In principle, the differences between co-hyponyms are always neutralized 
in the archilexeme, and there are archilexemes on all levels, except for the 
lowest one. This is so because hyponymy is a relative concept. In order to 
illustrate this further, let us look at a possible, simplified, hierarchic field for 
a n i m a l (see diagram (8b) in 2.2.1. and the theme A "Life and Living Things" 
in the L o n g m a n L e x i c o n of C o n t e m p o r a r y E n g l i s h (LLCE)). 
(14) a n i m a l 
mosquito elephant h o r s e 
mare stallion f o a l 
filly colt 
Here, as in diagram (13) and (15), only the items functioning as archilexemes 
are italicized. There are problems for this hierarchy too.9 Lyons (1977:296, 298) 
points out that in ordinary everyday English a n i m a l is not superordinate to fish, 
b i r d , and insect. Rather, c r e a t u r e is the archilexeme to all four, including also 
p e r s o n (cf. Cruse 1986:136, 146).10 This can be represented as follows: 
9 It is certainly not homogeneous as is evident from a comparison of 'A h o r s e 
is a kind of a n i m a l ' but (??) 'A m a r e is a kind of horse\ Cf. also pony 
(kind/type of horse), A r a b , mustang, bay, chestnut, piebald, pacer, jumper, 
( f o x ) h u n t e r . 
1 0 It is important to make a distinction between 'folk (or natural) taxonomies' 
and 'scientific (or technical) taxonomies' as pointed out in Cruse (1986:145). 
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creature 
(15) person a n i m a l 
dog elephant robin e a g l e cod trout ant dragonfly 
Since complex lexemes are normally hyponyms of their determinatum (cf. 
Kastovsky 1982a: 185), all the italicized lexemes can also function as 
archilexemes, but in a lexical field, not a word-field. Further hyponyms are 
indicated in diagram (15) by empty branches. Note that we here leave out of 
consideration polysemy and the figurative use of such words, and thus do not 
go beyond the level of lexeme to that of lexical unit. 
For testing hyponymy (and thus the position in a hierarchic lexical field) 
Lyons (1977:292) has proposed the formula: 'x is a kind of y ' (where x is 
the hyponym, cf. Cruse 1986:137). With the slight modification suggested by 
Cruse, the following test-frame may be used: 
(16) A(n) X is a kind/type of Y 
A p o o d l e is a kind of dog. 
If the formula is further modified (cf. Lipka 1980: lOOf.) it can also be used, 
not only as a test for proper hyponymy in English, but even as a procedure 
for discovering and justifying specific, inherent semantic components in both 
English and German. We will return to the subject of contrastive linguistics 
and the relationship between strict testing procedures and the notion of field 
presently. 
Before doing this, a remark is not out of place concerning hierarchies of 
verbs, since only nouns have been discussed so far. Of course, lexical fields 
consisting of verbs can also be hierarchically structured. A detailed analysis 
of an English word-field with the archilexeme s t r i k e is given in Lipka (1980). 
It contains dimensions like INSTRUMENT, MANNER , and PURPOSE. A treatment 
of further hierarchic word-fields can be found in Lehrer (1974). The notion 
'Natural taxonomies' have been extensively studied by anthropologic linguists, 
especially Brent Berlin and his associates, as mentioned by Cruse and Lakoff 
(1987:32 f.), who both draw heavily on their work. The results are particularly 
relevant for the problem of die psychologically 'basic level' in categorization 
(what Berlin called die "folk-generic level"), illustrated by the genus ( o a k , 
maple) - as opposed to die "unique beginner" (plant, a n i m a l ) , the "life form" 
(tree), the "intermediate" (leaf-bearing tree) above, and the "species" (sugar maple) 
and "variety" (cutleaf s t a g h o r n s u m a c ) below. See 5.2.1. and diagram (13) p. 
155. 
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of lexical field can also be fruitfully applied to verb-particle constructions with 
o u t and u p , as demonstrated in Lipka (1972:216-221). The results show that 
constructions with o u t can be described with the help of archilexemes like 
d i s c o v e r , d i s t r i b u t e , o b l i t e r a t e , r e m o v e , u t t e r , while those with u p are 
hyponymous to b e g i n , consume, f i l l , i m p r o v e , i n c r e a s e , r e m o v e , and s p o i l . 
In my opinion, field theory is particularly helpful in the area of contrastive 
linguistics. The following example may serve as rather sketchy evidence for 
this claim. 
(17a) horse (17b) Pferd 
(Non-Adult) (Nicht-Erwachsen) 
(Female) (Male) (Weiblich) (Männlich) 
filly colt 0 0 
[S/uffohlen] [Hengstfohlen] 
(17a) and (17b) only represent sections from the two word-fields h o r s e and 
Pferd. In (17b) F o h l e n and F u l l e n in present-day German are synonymous and 
there is no specification with regard to the dimension SEX. We thus have two 
specification-gaps (symbolized by 0) which in the technical language of horse-
breeders are filled by complex lexemes. This demonstrates why lexical gaps 
can only be posited with assurance for word-fields, not lexical fields. 
4.2.5. Association and Lexical Sets 
Before we bring to a close our section on paradigmatic lexical relationships, 
we must have a look at some problematic cases. Obviously, we need a concept 
for lexical relations which are not sense-relations and which cannot be captured 
and described by strictly linguistic principles and procedures. 
Thus, for example, tests for proper hyponymy or the criteria set up for syno-
nymy cannot be applied to all the words grouped together in ROGETs THESAU-
RUS or the L o n g m a n L e x i c o n of C o n t e m p o r a r y E n g l i s h . Purely linguistic methods 
are not applicable either to the conceptual fields and the categories of subject 
matter ("Sachgruppen") which Coseriu excludes from his "lexical fields". 
Words may also be related through their denotata, for example in a part-
whole relationship (e.g. f i n g e r - h a n d ) , a type dubbed "meronomies" by Cruse 
(1986:157ff.), and treated in a separate chapter of his book. Cruse (1986:194) 
also mentions "awkward and marginal" cases like egg, c a t e r p i l l a r , c h r y s a l i s , 
butterfly. 
157 
Finally, words are also psychologically related in our mental lexicon, a fact 
that can be tested with "word association responses", and then butterfly may 
be linked with: moss, insect, w i n g ( s ) , b i r d , fly, y e l l o w , net, p r e t t y , flower(s), 
b u g (cf. Aitchison 1987:74). 
We will therefore introduce here, as a notational term, l e x i c a l set, which 
is intended as a cover term for all paradigmatically related groups of words 
which cannot be described by purely linguistic methods. On the syntagmatic 
level, this is paralleled by the term c o l l o c a t i o n , in the sense originally used 
in the British linguistic tradition (cf. also COBUILD 1987:xvii). L e x i c a l sets 
are either based on association and intuition, or on objectively verifiable 
extralinguistic relationships captured by encyclopedic knowledge. They are often 
highly culture-specific and closely connected with the notions of prototype and 
categorization (see 3.3.3.). There is no necessary logical relation (e.g. impli-
cation) between words in a l e x i c a l set, but normally a rather fuzzy one of 
expectation. 
Kastovsky (1982a: 39), who speaks of associative fields ("assoziative Felder"), 
mentions Pottier's "virtueme" and the German example Möwe and weiß (not 
s c h w a r z l ) , but also the notorious case of Fr boeuf, related to l a b o u r , c h a r r u e , 
j o u g , t r a v a i l etc. from Bally. The traditional German notion of "Sachgruppen" 
can be illustrated with groups of words for religious buildings, such as: c h u r c h , 
c a t h e d r a l , m i n s t e r , c h a p e l , v i c a r a g e , r e c t o r y , s e m i n a r y , m o n a s t e r y , t e m p l e , 
mosque, synagogue etc. and for human dwellings like: f a r m , h a m l e t , v i l l a g e , 
b o r o u g h , t o w n , c i t y , c a p i t a l , p o r t , settlement, c o l o n y , s l u m , g h e t t o etc. Further 
examples of lexical sets can be easily collected from the L o n g m a n L e x i c o n of 
C o n t e m p o r a r y E n g l i s h , e.g. oyster, c o c k l e , mussel, w h e l k , w i n k l e , which may 
be subsumed under the (more or less technical) archilexeme m o l l u s c , but 
also "other sea creatures" like j e l l y f i s h , s t a r f i s h (both not f i s h e s l ) , u r c h i n , 
sponge, c o r a l , which may not be. To return to butterfly (not a fly\), the L L C E 
subsumes the relation between it and egg, c a t e r p i l l a r , l a r v a ( g r u b ) , 
c h r y s a l i s (pupa) as well as housefly under "stages in the lives of insects". 
The latter, together with dragonfly (also not a f l y ! ) , m o s q u i t o , b e e t l e , bee, 
wasp etc. are categorized as "common insects", another illustration of a "Sach-
gruppe". 
The author of the L L C E , Tom McArthur, does not tell us in the preface 
or elsewhere in the Lexicon how he arrived at his "list of sets" for organizing 
the words in the book. This information is to be found only in McArthur 
(1986:148 f.), where it is explained that the "word sets" given, and their micro-
and macrostructure, are the result of a combination of two approaches. The 
first one is "the kind of thematization" which has a long tradition in European 
culture, from Pliny onwards, in the work of compilers of knowledge, ending 
in ROGET's T H E S A U R U S . This is blended with "the kind of semantic structuring 
proposed by linguists like John Lyons". 
One last remark on lexical sets and the possible relation between its 
members. They also may denote the same extralinguistic entity from different 
points of view. Thus, the surface of the world when compared to the sea is 
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called l a n d , when compared to the sky e a r t h etc., and thus l a n d , e a r t h , s o i l , 
g r o u n d , f l o o r form a lexical set (cf. L D C E 2 s.v. l a n d ) . 
4.3. Syntagmatic Relations 
We now turn to syntagmatic structures in the lexicon and, in connection with 
this, to syntagmatic relations between lexemes and lexical units in the sentence. 
We have already dealt with one specific kind of syntagmatic relation between 
lexemes, or rather lexical morphemes, while analysing and describing complex 
lexemes (see 3.2.). We have seen that word-formation must be regarded as a 
syntagmatic process for the formation of new lexemes. In the following, those 
problems will be left aside. 
Research on syntagmatic lexical relations has been carried out within 
different theoretical frameworks. Basically, we can distinguish between 
generative and non-generative (mostly structuralist) approaches. Within the latter, 
we can further separate those using a metalanguage from descriptions without 
semantic elements of any kind. Amongst research without metalinguistic 
elements, the notion of c o l l o c a t i o n , as developed within British linguistics, has 
to be particularly emphasized. The reason for this is that a number of linguists 
using this concept do not refer to semantic relations at all. They merely state 
that particular lexemes co-occur frequently. I therefore consider this asemantic 
approach to collocation as a parallel to the concept of lexical set as introduced 
in 4.2.5. For syntagmatic incompatibility of lexemes in the British tradition the 
terms c o l l o c a t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s and c o - o c c u r e n c e r e s t r i c t i o n s are often used (cf. 
Lipka 1972:47ff., 72ff.). 
4.3.1. Various Approaches 
I will now briefly sketch the various approaches, developments, and concepts. 
First the suggestions made within the framework of generative grammar in the 
wider sense. Here, the notion of s e l e c t i o n ( a l ) r e s t r i c t i o n s has played a crucial 
role. For determining and describing these, syntactic and semantic features have 
been used and generally descriptions were based on a highly formalized 
metalanguage. The features were intended to restrict and prevent the co-
occurrence of certain lexemes. As late as 1965, the features used by Chomsky 
for this purpose were understood as exclusively syntactic. 
The semantic nature of the phenomena was only recognized rather late. A 
survey of the whole development can be found in Lipka (1972:30ff.). In 1968 
McCawley still argued that selection restrictions are semantic in nature and do 
not concern single nouns, but complete noun phrases. Five years earlier, Uriel 
Weinreich had proposed (as already mentioned) in his critique of Katz/Fodor 
(1963) to replace selection restrictions by the more active concept of "transfer 
features". In the later development McCawley (also in 1968), following Charles 
159 
Fillmore, had stated that selection restrictions are "presuppositions about the 
intended referents", not language-immanent phenomena. 
In this connection it must be stressed that the term p r e s u p p o s i t i o n and the 
different notions related to it in linguistics and philosophy are used very 
differently by various authors. In any case, what is at issue here is "lexical 
presupposition", not "existential presupposition" (which is more relevant in 
philosophy). Obviously, when the concept is understood as presuppositions made 
by speakers or hearers about an intended extralinguistic referent, we have left 
the domain of linguistic semantics proper and entered the realm of pragmatics. 
Within structuralist proposals for capturing syntagmatic semantic relations, 
there are also rather different positions. At first, before the impact of Katz/ 
Fodor (1963), lexical semantics was almost exclusively paradigmatic. Under the 
overwhelming influence of Trier's field theory, attention and effort was 
concentrated on paradigmatic relations (cf. Lyons 1977:250ff.). It is true, how-
ever, that as early as 1934 Walter Porzig focused on syntagmatically connected 
lexemes, labelling such relations "wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen" (cf. Leisi 
21985:200). But on the whole, there is a long tradition of neglecting these, 
from Leisi's, Coseriu's and Lyons's early work on semantics right through to 
Cruse (1986). 
In Coseriu (1967) Porzig's proposals are explicitiy taken as a starting point 
for developing a syntagmatic, structuralist approach using semantic features. 
Coseriu relabels the phenomenon l e x i c a l s o l i d a r i t i e s ("lexikalische Solidaritä-
ten"). In Kastovsky (1980) lexical solidarities and selection restrictions are 
compared. He arrives at the conclusion that the two concepts are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather complementary from an analytic and synthetic point of 
view, respectively. Solidarities are positive semantic implications, while selection 
restrictions are constraints in a synthetic linguistic theory. In Kastovsky 
(1982a: 145, 262) the terms c o n t e x t u a l f e a t u r e s ("kontextuelle Merkmale") and 
i n d i r e c t semic i n f o r m a t i o n ("indirekte semische Information") are also used for 
solidarities. In his opinion, these correspond to Weinreich's transfer features, 
4.3.2. Selection Restrictions and Projection Rules 
The term s e l e c t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s was first introduced in Katz/Fodor (1963) in 
connection with their suggestions for a semantic theory. As already mentioned, 
Chomsky still believed in 1965 that the combination of lexemes is a purely 
syntactic problem. In his proposals for the subcategorization of verbs, he distin-
guishes between "strict subcategorization rules" and "selectional rules". The for-
mer refer to the categorial context, and thus determine e.g. whether a verb can 
be followed by an NP or not. On the other hand, "selectional rules" refer to 
the possible syntactic features in the subject or object of a verb. Thus, according 
to Chomsky, the restrictions on the verbs f r i g h t e n and a d m i r e can be formalized 
as follows (in simplified form): 
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(18) f r i g h t e n [+ V t ... [+Animate]] 
a d m i r e [+ V, [+ Human] ]. 
In (18) the long underline indicates the position of the verb with respect to 
the following and preceding elements in the sentence, i.e. the inherent features 
of a noun functioning as subject or object. The formalization thus means that 
f r i g h t e n requires an animate noun as object, while a d m i r e has a selectional 
feature [+ H U M A N ] in the subject noun. If these conditions are not met, the 
verb cannot be inserted in the nominal frame. Thus, the generation of * J o h n 
f r i g h t e n s s i n c e r i t y and ^ S i n c e r i t y may a d m i r e t h e boy is blocked by selectional 
rules. 
The s e l e c t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s proposed in Katz/Fodor (1963) are semantic in 
nature (cf. Fodor 1977: 64-69). Their complex and highly formalized proposals 
for a semantic theory were extremely influential but not always convincing. 
They cannot be discussed here in detail. The following brief sketch, however, 
seems useful in our context. The model consists of two components: 1. the 
dictionary and 2. the so-called "projection rules". The "dictionary entry" 
contains various meanings of a single homonymous or polysemous lexeme, e.g. 
b a c h e l o r (see diagram (2) in 3.1.). The theory is supposed to select the 
appropriate meaning, in a specific context, and thereby to resolve the ambiguity 
of a lexeme. Thus, the disambiguation of e.g. b i l l , b a l l , colorful is achieved. 
A certain so-called "path" (i.e. a chain of general and specific semantic features) 
or "reading" is selected, as illustrated for b a c h e l o r in (19). Here, round brackets 
symbolize "markers", and square brackets so-called "distinguishers". 
(19) b a c h e l o r —> Noun -> (Animal) -> (Male) —> (Young) 
-> [fur seal when without mate during breeding time] 
As opposed to nouns, adjectives and verbs have selection restrictions in their 
lexical entries, symbolized by angular brackets. These control the combination 
with nouns. The following abbreviated example may illustrate this: 
(20) hit: V , V T R (Action) ... <SUDJECT: (Human) v (Higher Animal), 
OBJECT: (Physical Object) ...> 
Katz/Fodor's standard example The man h i t s t h e colorful b a l l has been 
discussed in many linguistic publications. It contains two or more homonymous 
lexemes b a l l with readings such as: 1. globular object' and 2. 'social activity'. 
The second reading is excluded in the sentence by means of the selection 
restrictions, because it cannot be combined with h i t . Thus the disambiguation 
is achieved. 
The combination of the various possible readings of words in a sentence 
is performed by the projection rules, the second component of the theory. These 
are said to "amalgamate" readings, i.e. meanings, on the basis of the syntactic 
structure of the sentence. The amalgamation starts at the basis of a tree diagram, 
representing the syntactic structure of the sentence. The projection rules always 
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combine the paths, i.e. the sets of features, of two immediate constituents of 
the sentence, unless this is prevented by selection restrictions. Thus, working 
upwards through the hierarchy of the sentence, they are intended to combine 
the meanings of more and more constituents, until we arrive at the meaning 
of the whole sentence. 
4.3.3. Transfer Features and Metaphor 
As already mentioned (see 3.3.2.), Katz/Fodor's theory was harshly criticized 
by Uriel Weinreich, a critique which resulted in the postulation of transfer 
features to replace selection restrictions. Besides my own use of this concept 
in various publications, it can also be found in recent work in Tournier 
(1985:229) as "seme de transfert" (claimed to be the basis of metaphor), and 
in Cruse (1986:105) who says that semantic "traits are ... transferred to the 
head", e.g. in my p r e g n a n t n e i g h b o u r I cousin!friend. Weinreich's arguments for 
preferring transfer features to selection restrictions are all very convincing for 
any semantic theory and practice that makes use of semantic features, be it 
more or less formalized. 
His main objection against the Katz/Fodor theory, however, is that projection 
rules do not really build on syntactic structure, but rather destroy the semantic 
structure. Their application reduces the words of a sentence to a heap of 
features, and in fact the meaning of any complex expression becomes "an 
unstructured heap of features - just like the meaning of a single word" 
(Weinreich 1972:34). The amalgamation of the paths for the sentences C a t s 
chase m i c e and M i c e chase cats "would yield the same unordered set of fea-
tures". As we have seen, transfer features are more active and less restrictive 
than selection restrictions, and they can explain the interpretation of vague, 
unusual, and even conflicting combinations of lexemes, or rather lexical units, 
including metaphors. Thus, e.g. T h e a n i m a l m i a o w e d H e s a i l e d (flew) t h e croft, 
H e was d r i n k i n g c a r r o t s and H i s f e a r a t e h i m up can all be assigned a sensible 
interpretation (see diagram (26) p. 112). 
Besides verbs like s a i l , fly, eat, d r i n k (but also Ger esserufressen, cf. Lipka 
1972:48-51), adjectives like b u x o m and p r e g n a n t (cf. Ger schwangerIträchtig) 
are often found in the debate on syntagmatic semantic relations. In English, 
we do not have (within eat and drink) the further distinction between Ger 
t r i n k e n ! s a u f e n and essen/fressen, which can also be explained on the basis of 
transfer features. If the subject of the verb saufen or fressen contains an inherent 
feature [+HUMAN], this is overridden and dominated by a feature <+ ANIMAL> 
transferred from the verb. This then leads to the interpretation 'drink like an 
animal' and 'eat like an animal'. 
The same factual linguistic state of affairs might also be explained differ-
ently by drawing on the notion of presupposition. Thus, in the manner of 
McCawley and Fillmore, we could say that the items fressen and saufen 
presuppose that the subject of these verbs is non-human or an animal, or more 
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precisely still 'like an animal'. In such a pragmatic explanation, however, we 
are no longer concerned with syntagmatic relations between lexemes as elements 
of the linguistic system. We would then, rather, make assumptions about 
extralinguistic referents or denotata. At the same time, this means giving up 
the possibility and the advantages of formalization. 
Within the structuralist, language-immanent framework of Lyons's theory, 
the same facts are accounted for by the concept of e n c a p s u l a t i o n . Lyons 
(1977:262) explicitly starts from Porzig's "essential meaning-relation" between 
k i c k and f o o t , p u n c h and f i s t , and coins the term e n c a p s u l a t i o n for "the 
lexicalization of this syntagmatic modifying component". Kastovsky (1982a: 68) 
implicitly identifies this term with Coseriu's l e x i c a l s o l i d a r i t i e s (to which we 
will come presently) and draws attention to the parallel with word-formation 
syntagmas. In the latter, one word is semantically and formally contained or 
implied in the other, as e.g. Telefon in t e l e f o n l i e r e n and knife (noun) in the 
zero-derived verb t o knifeo. In the case of encapsulation and lexical solidarities, 
according to Kastovsky, one item is only semantically implied or contained in 
the other, namely Z a h n in beißen, l i p s in kiss, f o o t in k i c k . Other relevant 
examples in English would be teeth and g n a s h , lips and p u r s e , lips and p o u t , 
s h o u l d e r s and s h r u g . For Lyons (1977:262) this is not a matter of lexical 
relations, but of sense-relations, because 
the sense of with the foot is encapsulated in the sense of kick, as the sense of with 
the teeth is encapsulated in the sense of bite. 
Encapsulation and lexical solidarities are both positive implications between the 
content of two given lexical items. Selection restrictions and transfer features 
attempt to capture such semantic relations with the help of features, either in 
a negative, restrictive way or a positive, dynamic one. A l l four concepts or 
theoretical approaches to the same problem and facts are within the bounds 
of a purely language-immanent view. 
This perspective is transcended as soon as we move to a pragmatic level 
and include lexical presuppositions, as beliefs of speakers and hearers. If we 
further shift the focus along this line to a psychological, cognitive point of view 
- which in my opinion is complementary, not mutually exclusive - metaphor 
is understood as dual, or secondary, categorization, and metonymy (which is 
banned from most structuralist models) is easily explained (see 3.4.2.). 
To the mind, the connection between two lexical units related through 
metaphor is simply similarity; in the case of metonymy it is simply contiguity. 
This semantic shift between the lexical units, both synchronically and dia-
chronically, is extremely economical, since the form of the lexeme remains the 
same (as opposed to most word-formation processes). The mental effort is 
limited in both shifts, although it is not always easy, in the case of metaphor, 
to see the likeness in two things ( b i t i n g c o l d , 2L f o x ) . Poets are often specially 
gifted at doing precisely this. Nevertheless, the two cognitive processes, 
metaphor and metonymy, are basic and fundamental and both involve 
categorization (see 3.4.2.). 
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4.3.4. Lexical Solidarities 
The following presentation of the notion of "lexical solidarities", as a very 
prominent approach to syntagmatic lexical structures from a language-immanent 
perspective, will be based mainly on the classic article Coseriu (1967), and also 
on Kastovsky (1980) and (1982a: 144-156). Coseriu explicitly starts out from 
Porzig's concept of "essential meaning relation" ("wesenhafte Bedeutungsbezie-
hung") and his examples: b e l l e n - H u n d , w i e h e r n - Pferd, beißen - Zähne, 
b l o n d - H a a r . Coseriu proposes to reformulate Porzig's insights and make them 
more precise by drawing on certain concepts of structural semantics, such as 
lexeme, archilexeme, and classeme. The latter is a kind of very general semantic 
feature, such as [±ANIMATE], [ ± H U M A N ] , [ ± M A L E ] . 
Coseriu (1967:296) defines "lexikalische Solidarität" as "inhaltliche Bestim-
mung eines Wortes durch eine Klasse, ein Archilexem oder ein Lexem", i.e. 
the determination of the content of one word by a class of other words (repre-
sented by a "classeme"), by an archilexeme, or by a specific other lexeme. 
Kastovsky (1980:70; 1982a: 249) contrasts lexical solidarities with selection 
restrictions, characterizing the former as positive implications between lexemes. 
Solidarities are directed, oriented, unilateral implications. Thus, e.g. the 
determined lexeme kiss contains the meaning of the determining lexeme l i p s , 
but not vice versa. The classeme [+HUMAN] is contained in the following verbs 
and their grammatical subject: m a r r y , a p o l o g i z e , a d m i r e , c r i t i c i z e , m u r d e r , 
assassinate. 
Generally speaking, Kastovsky argues that the two concepts, lexical 
solidarities and selection restrictions, are not contradictory, but supplement each 
other and that lexical solidarities describe the same phenomenon from an 
analytic perspective, while selection restrictions do this from the point of view 
of synthesis. Coseriu distinguishes three types of lexical solidarities (which he 
calls "Affinität, Selektion, Implikation"), depending on whether a classeme, an 
archilexeme, or a specific lexeme function as a distinctive feature in a word, 
namely 1. 'affinity', 2. 'selection', and 3. 'implication'. These may be illustrated 
with the following example from Kastovsky (1980:87): 
(21) (a) The boy apologized: classeme [+HUMAN] = 1. affinity 
I T 
(b) A w e e k elapsed : archilexeme TIME = 2. selection 
Kastovsky argues convincingly that (21a) and (21b) should be taken together 
and thus the distinction between 1. 'affinity' and 2. 'selection' should be given 
up.1 1 His reasons are that classemes often function as archilexemes and that 
in both 'affinity' as well as 'selection' semantic features are involved as 
The point of his argument, basically, is that he rejects die distinction between 
s e m e and c l a s s e m e ' , die rest follows from this automatically. 
lexeme s h o u l d e r s = 3. implication 
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opposed to 3. 'implication', which only concerns specific lexemes. In connection 
with linear lexical fields, we have seen in diagrams (11) and (12) (p. 153) that 
semantic dimensions (sometimes called "archisememes") like TEMPERATURE and 
COLOUR are equivalent to the (missing) archilexemes. Modifying Coseriu's 
typology of lexical solidarities thus seems justified. 
In fact, Coseriu's system is a cross-classification, because in addition to the 
three types he makes a further distinction between unilateral and multilateral 
("einseitige/mehrseitige") solidarities. Examples of both types are the following: 
(22) (a) bite - teeth, lick - tongue, kiss - lips etc. = unilateral 
(b) bark - dog, neigh - horse, bray - donkey etc. = multilateral 
The unilateral solidarities are idiosyncratic, while the multilateral ones form 
paradigmatic sets. With the former, the absence of the determining lexeme is 
the rule. Therefore, utterances like *He kissed her w i t h h i s lips and *The dog 
c h e w e d t h e bone w i t h i t s teeth are hardly acceptable. Kastovsky (1982a: 147) 
draws attention to the fact that the explicit realization is perfectly normal, as 
soon as the determining lexeme is further modified. Thus, we may have Romeo 
kissed J u l i e t w i t h c h o c o l a t e - s m e a r e d lips and the dog may well chew w i t h i t s 
s h a r p t e e t h . With multilateral solidarities, the determining lexeme may either 
appear in the context or not. Thus we have both: t h e donkey b r a y e d and t h e 
a n i m a l b r a y e d . 
At the end of his famous article on lexical solidarities, Coseriu points out 
that non-solidarity also exists. According to him, if we have a contradiction 
between inherent features and those deriving from syntagmatic relations, a 
metaphor may arise. Obviously, the conflict does not lead to excluding or dis-
carding such a non-solidary utterance. There are thus no restrictions in Coseriu's 
approach. He gives the example of the verb beißen, which is said always to 
contain the syntagmatic feature "mit den Zähnen" and thus in the utterance D i e 
Kälte beißt, according to Coseriu (1967:302), "wird dadurch die Kälte als ein 
Wesen mit Zähnen dargestellt", i.e. coldness is represented as a toothed being. 
Incidentally, beißende Kälte and b i t i n g c o l d are habitual collocations in German 
and English (see 4.3.5.) but could also be interpreted as dead or "half-dead" 
metaphors. 
Coseriu's method of dealing with non-solidarity clearly corresponds to 
Weinreich's use of transfer features. Kastovsky (1982a: 148) explicitly refers 
to these when dealing with metaphor, which for him is the result of 'contextual 
features' being superimposed on inherent features. In conclusion I would like 
to quote some of his examples of such reinterpretation: 
(23) (a) His irony was biting 
(b) Jim is married to his car 
(c) The policeman barked at the suspect. 
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4.3.5. Collocation as a Neutral Syntagma 
The concept of collocation, which plays an important role in British linguistics, 
where it originated (cf. Lipka 1971:214 f.; 1972:72-75), is neutral in several 
respects. The term designates the co-occurrence or syntagmatic combination of 
lexical items (or lexemes), independently of word class and syntactic structure. 
According to J. R. Firth, we "know a word by the company it keeps" and 
this "keeping company" he called 'collocation' and considered it part of its 
"meaning" (in the widest sense; cf. Lipka 1971:214f., 1972: 72ff., Palmer 
1976:94 ff., Carter 1987:36 ff., 48 ff.). Thus, for example open and w i n d o w 
form a collocation, irrespective of whether open is a verb or an adjective. As 
opposed to selection restrictions, the syntactic relation between subject and 
predicate, or verb and object, does not matter. The term collocation is also 
neutral with respect to which element is primary or dominant in the relation 
(cf. Lipka 1972:74). Finally, in the traditional British approach, a semantic 
analysis is also not carried out and thus lexical units (in our sense) do not 
play a role (cf. Carter 1987:48 f.). 
Precisely because of this vagueness and neutrality, the concept of collocation 
has, in my opinion, certain advantages for capturing syntagmatic relations 
between lexical elements. This holds for syntagmas both on the syntactic level 
and on the level of word-formation, i.e. compounds and nominalizations. 
Collocations can therefore be called neutral syntagmas. This neutrality is 
particularly relevant for applied linguistics and the teaching and learning of 
vocabulary (cf. Carter 1987:155 ff.). Collocations are thus syntagmatic lexical 
relations, but not necessarily semantic relations. They are therefore parallel to 
the 'lexical sets' on the paradigmatic axis (see 4.2.5.) which are not necessarily 
sense-relations. A further parallel between the two is caused by the 
psychological notion of association. Just as lexical sets are paradigmatically 
linked by association (cf. Saussure's terminology mentioned in 1.2.) collocations 
are syntagmatically associated, learned and memorized. 
The lexical items which form a collocation need not necessarily be con-
tiguous, as demonstrated by the following example: 
(24) (a) They collect stamps V + NP 
(b) They c o l l e c t many things, but chiefly s t a m p s . 
Word class and syntactic structure are also irrelevant for collocations, as 
illustrated by the following classic example (cf. Lipka 1971:214): 
(25) (a) His argument was strong N + Adj 
(b) He argued strongly V + Adv. 
In both cases we have the same collocation between a r g u e and s t r o n g that 
appears in s t r o n g a r g u m e n t , t h e s t r e n g t h of h i s a r g u m e n t , and h i s a r g u m e n t 
was strengthened. The same holds for the German items r a u c h e n and s t a r k in 
E r r a u c h t s t a r k and E r i s t e i n s t a r k e r Raucher. A l l these examples demonstrate 
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that collocation affects both the levels of syntax and word-formation.12 Further 
proof of this point, as well as of the independence from word class and 
syntactic structure, is the sentence A b u l l f i g h t e r f i g h t s b u l l s a t a bullfight. It 
contains three instances of the collocation of f i g h t and b u l l . 
For the learner, it is often difficult to establish and use the correct, 
significant, habitual, or fixed collocations in a foreign language, especially if 
the items concerned are semantically very close (e.g. l a r g e , b i g , g r e a t I m a l e , 
m a s c u l i n e I f a t , p l u m p , stout, obese cf. Carter 1987:53) or formally similar 
(e.g. e l e c t r i c , e l e c t r i c a l I o p t i c n e r v e , o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n ) . But even in other cases, 
languages often differ in unpredictable ways. Although Ger Wasser kochen 
corresponds to E b o i l w a t e r , the similar collocations Kaffee k o c h e n , Tee kochen 
have to be rendered by make/brew coffee ( t e a ) , and * b o i l (coffee/tea) is un-
acceptable. 
Specialized dictionaries are not of great help, in particular with items from 
the general vocabulary (see 1.4.). This is true of Friederich/Canavan (1979), 
the DEWC, and Benson/Benson/Ilson (1986), the BBI dictionary of English, 
where one searches in vain for the collocations of m a l e and m a s c u l i n e (but 
see s.v. o u t s t a n d i n g in the sense 'not yet paid'). Ordinary modem dictionaries 
like the L D C E 2 (21987), the O A L D 4 (41989), or the C O B U I L D E n g l i s h 
L a n g u a g e D i c t i o n a r y (1987) are much better sources of information. In the 
latter, based on a computerized corpus of about 20 million words (cf. Carter 
1987:140 ff), we find the following collocates (i.e. items collocating) of m a l e : 
n u r s e , h o r m o n e s , a t t i t u d e s , u n e m p l o y m e n t , r o l e s , sex, p l a n t , p a r t of a d e v i c e 
and, as separate entries, the fixed collocations m a l e c h a u v i n i s m , m a l e c h a u v i n i s t , 
m a l e c h a u v i n i s t p i g . 
In an empirical study carried out by one of my students, with the help of 
a restricted number of native speaker informants (two English, two Scottish, 
two American), m a l e was found to collocate most frequently with c h o i r , c h i l d , 
n u r s e , a n i m a l and m a s c u l i n e with s t y l e , w o m a n , p r o n o u n . The judgement and 
elicitation tests also yielded the collocations: e l e c t r i c l i g h t (shock, c h a i r ) , but 
e l e c t r i c a l e n g i n e e r ( e n g i n e e r i n g , a p p l i a n c e , i n d u s t r y ) . Such collocations must 
be learnt as complete expressions, which are automatically triggered and repro-
duced. Syntactic or semantic rules cannot be formulated for them.13 
G. Pascoe (personal communication) claims that there is a rule about e l e c t r i c 
('powered/driven/caused by electricity') and e l e c t r i c a l ('concerned/connected 
with electricity'). Similar rules for this pair in grammars and dictionaries are 
reviewed in Marsden (1985:27, 29) who believes that e l e c t r i c a l is the older 
form and that Ac is preferred in recent collocations - witness also e l e c t r o n i c . 
1 2 Syntactic restrictions connected with a collocation may serve as an indicator 
for possible idiomatization. 
1 3 Cf. Marsden (1985) for a very thorough and comprehensive empirical study of 
current usage concerning adjective pairs in Ac and -ical. From his evidence he 
concludes that there is "undivided usage", namely 100% consensus among 
speakers on the collocations, only with two pairs: economic/-al and electricl-al. 
At the bottom end of die scale, with almost exacdy divided usage (50%), is 
poetic/-al. 
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The O A L D 4 distinguishes five different lexical units e l e c t r i c (of which one 
is metaphorical - 'causing sudden excitement'): 'producing (electricity'), 
'produced by', 'used in conveying', 'using electrical power'. It illustrates these 
with the collocations e l e c t r i c a t m o s p h e r e ( g e n e r a t o r , c u r r e n t , p l u g , c o o k e r ) and 
further defines the familiar collocations e l e c t r i c b l a n k e t ( c h a i r , f i e l d , r a z o r , 
shock, s t o r m ) . No collocations are given for e l e c t r i c a l with the single relational 
meaning 'concerned with electricity'. 
There may be, however, a certain amount of individual variation. Thus, for 
example, McArthur (1986:111, 124ff.) and Carter (1987:28ff.) consistently use 
a l p h a b e t i c in collocation with o r d e r , o r d e r i n g , mode, sequence, l e x i c o g r a p h y 
(cf. also OED HI, s.v. a l p h a b e t i z a t i o n ) . Carter also uses p r o b l e m a t i c ( c a t e g o r y , 
set, f e a t u r e ) and u n p r o b l e m a t i c ( e q u i v a l e n c e ) while Lyons and Cruse prefer 
p r o b l e m a t i c a l . 
The conclusion about the impossibility of general rules is further supported 
by research reported in Leitzke (1989a: 18ff.), based on the work of many 
linguists and in addition on the LOB Corpus.14 The author discusses pairs of 
what she calls "(de)nominal adjectives", such as i n d u s t r i a l / o u s and e c o n o m i c / 
- a l , derived from an identical base with different suffixes. 
She arrives at the conclusion that for the single pair h i s t o r i c vs. h i s t o r i c a l 
we can draw a systematic distinction and assign specific meanings to suffixes, 
as in h i s t o r i c spot (event, speech) 'famous in history' vs. h i s t o r i c a l events 
( p e o p l e , s t u d i e s ) 'belonging to history'. In all other cases, collocations are un-
systematic and the same meaning (e.g. a positive value judgement in e c o n o m i c a l 
and h i s t o r i c ) may be expressed by different suffixes. 
Examples with the same base, either from a formal, etymological, or 
semantic perspective, collected from the L D C E 2 (21987) may further illustrate 
the unsystematicity of collocations. We find k i n g l y manner/feast, r e g a l m a n n e r s / 
o l d l a d y / ~ a l l y e n t e r t a i n e d , r o y a l f a m i l y / a s s e n t v s . r i g h t r o y a l welcome, r o y a l 
blue/flush, p r e r o g a t i v e , and R o y a l H i g h n e s s . Furthermore, there is queenly d i g n i t y , 
queen c o n s o r t / m o t h e r , Queen's b e n c h / C o u n c i l / E n g l i s h and queen's evidence. 
Obviously, a number of these examples are more or less idiomatic. There is 
no hard-and-fast dividing line between fixed collocations and idiomatic turns 
of phrase, but basically only a difference of degree.15 
For many idioms (cf. Lipka 1972:75ff.) like r e d h e r r i n g , or k i c k t h e bucket 
(and Ger i n s G r a s beißen), synchronic explanations cannot be given. They can 
often only be explained from a diachronic point of view. Consequently, in 
learning a foreign language, such extreme cases of fixed collocations can only 
be taught and learnt as units. 
1 4 The Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen Corpus of British English; see Chapter I, footnote 1. 
1 5 For a comprehensive, descriptive study of English "coiour collocations'5, includ-
ing metaphorical and idiomatic ones, cf. Bennett (1988). This book contains a 
long alphabetical list (197-301) of collocations and expressions with colour 
terms (in nominal or adjectival form and as parts of compounds), together 
with definitions, collected from a great number of reference works and other 
sources. 
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Idioms as well as fixed collocations are the expression of irregularity which 
remains in the lexicon, besides the many possible generalizations and the inter-
nal and external structuring. There is no rule-governed explanation for the fact 
that we have c o u n t r y house besides r u r a l r e s i d e n c e , or that in French c h e m i n 
de f e r exists side by side with v o i e ferrée. As we have seen in 3.2.5., such 
irregularity can be described on the level of the 'norm' of a language (in 
Coseriu's sense), which exists between the l a n g u e , the language system, on the 
one hand and its concrete realization, the p a r o l e , on the other. Different varieties 
of the same language system may have different norms, such as British and 
American English, or Swiss, Austrian, and so-called High German (see 1.4.). 
The following quotation from Quirk (1972:26) is my last example of how 
erratic collocations (on the level of syntax and word-formation) can be in the 
norm of British and American English: 
M a i l and p o s t are interesting examples of the complexity that is possible. While 
Americans handle their mail (or post) - which may include p o s t c a r d s - through the 
p o s t office and the p o s t a l services with p o s t a g e stamps, die British deal with the 
post (or mail) with the help of m a i l h a g s in m a i l vans, m a i l trains, R o y a l M a i l 
steamers, and there is the air m a i l service. Yet although Americans sometimes speak 
of die p o s t m a n delivering their letters, there is no corresponding British use of 
m a i l m a n . 
We may add that the British usually post a l e t t e r I p a r c e l etc., i.e. 'send by 
post', while the Americans m a i l it. 
Textlinguistic aspects are also relevant for collocation. O u t s t a n d i n g in the 
sense of 'not yet paid' (see p. 167) is rare in many texts and there are only 
5 instances of it in the LOB Corpus. If, however, we focus on a particular 
text type, namely reminders for payments due, it occurs quite often in the 
company of words like a c c o u n t , debts, i n v o i c e , payment etc. Thus a specific 
text type favours certain otherwise rare collocations. In journalese, certain 
collocations frequently occur as clichés or euphemisms, as in the following 
examples taken from Gil l (1987): shy s p i n s t e r , d e v o t e d m o t h e r , n u t t y p r o f e s s o r , 
d o c t o r s b a t t l e t o save l i v e s , t h e p o u n d p l u n g e s , f i r e m e n s t r u g g l e , c o n f i r m e d 
b a c h e l o r , c o n s t a n t c o m p a n i o n , f u n - l o v i n g , p a r t y - g o i n g . 
A more fundamental textlinguistic aspect of collocations is the way in which 
they contribute to what Halliday/Hasan (1976) have called "lexical cohesion". 
In general, the term c o h e s i o n was used in early textlinguistic studies for 
denoting the inherent means by which texts are linguistically connected. Clearly, 
lexical means are an extremely important subclass of such cohesive devices, 
which link parts of text across sentence boundaries and thus constitute texts. 
Halliday/Hasan (1976:274) define l e x i c a l c o h e s i o n as "the cohesive effects 
achieved by the selection of vocabulary" (cf. Carter 1987:72ff). The most 
important kind for them is what they call "reiteration". This form of lexical 
cohesion involves the repetition of a lexical item at one end of the scale and 
the use of a so-called "general word" at the other one. In between, there are 
a number of other lexical relations, which I shall summarize and illustrate in 
the following diagram: 
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1. Reiteration 
(a) same word (repetition): 
(b) synonym (or near-synonym): 
(c) superordinate: 
(d) general word: 
mushroom - mushroom 
boy - l a d 
car - Jaguar 
flower - t u l i p 
m a n , people, creature, 
thing, stuff, business, matter, 
move, question, idea 
The second important form of lexical cohesion, besides the various types of 
reiteration, is "collocation". Although Halliday/Hasan (1976:284) define c o l l o c -
a t i o n as "the association of lexical items that regularly co-occur", the term is 
obviously not used in exacdy the same way as I have used it so far. It in-
cludes various types of oppositeness of meaning and other kinds of sense-
relation, as can be seen from the following diagram, in which I illustrate and 
summarize the views they express verbally in the book: 
(27) 2. Collocation 
(a) complementarity: 
(b) antonyms: 
(c) converses: 
(d) co-hyponyms: 
boy - g i r l 
l i k e - hate, wet - dry 
order - obey 
chair - table I f u r n i t u r e 
(h) proximity: l a u g h - joke, i l l - doctor. 
Besides lexical cohesion (in Halliday/Hasan's sense) other lexical phenomena 
contribute to cohesion and coherence in texts, especially the productive 
processes of word-formation. It must be pointed out here that in more recent 
research on textlinguistics the terms c o h e s i o n and c o h e r e n c e are used differendy 
from the way they are in Halliday/Hasan's book. Today, c o h e s i o n normally 
denotes the means of grammatical linking in the surface structure of texts. On 
the other hand, c o h e r e n c e is used for deeper, underlying semantic and 
conceptual relationships. Since the productive processes of word-formation (see 
3.2.4.) create both formal and semantic linking in the co-text, morphologically 
complex lexemes establish both cohesion and coherence at the same time. With 
these remarks we have already entered a wider, fundamentally different field, 
namely the contextual relations of words in general. We will discuss these under 
a separate heading here. 
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Chapter V 
T H E F U N C T I O N O F W O R D S . Co-Text, Context, and the Mental 
Lexicon 
So far we have disregarded the function of words in texts, the distinction 
introduced in 1.3. (p. 24) between co-text (linguistic context) and context (extra-
linguistic context, including the context of situation), and the function of words 
in the mind (not only for categorization), namely especially their storage and 
processing (cf. also Kastovsky 1982b). 
This will lead to the question of whether lexical units can be at all sensibly 
discussed without linguistic and extralinguistic context (5.1.). We will finally 
(5.2.) consider briefly problems of the mental lexicon, i.e. how words can be 
stored, found and processed in the mind, and how far the linguistic organization 
and structuring of words corresponds to their organization in the brain. 
5.1. Words in Context 
As is customary today, we wil l make a terminological distinction in the 
following between co-text, denoting the verbal or linguistic environment, and 
context (in the wider sense), including situational and cultural surroundings. 
Textual environment thus refers to co-text, and we will first have a closer look 
at complex lexemes and their various possible functions in texts. We then turn 
to the problem of monosemization in co-text, i.e. the problem of how specific 
meanings of homonymous or polysemous items (see 4.2.1.) are selected and 
determined by the co-text. Finally, the appropriateness of certain words in 
different varieties of English (see 1.3.) and different cultural contexts will be 
discussed. This topic clearly goes beyond merely co-textual considerations. 
5.1.1. The Functions of Word-Formation in Texts 
Besides the general function of complex lexemes just mentioned, of creating 
cohesion and coherence simultaneously, several specific functions of word-
formation can be distinguished (cf. Lipka 1987b). Perhaps the most specific / 
function, which immediately comes to mind, is die high degree of information 
condensation achieved by various kinds of nominalization. In the following 
example from Kastovsky (1982 a: 217) there is no preceding co-text, but the 
extreme formal and semantic condensation becomes obvious: 
(1) I know a n alleged discoverer o f t i m e - t r a v e l . 
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The compound p e n f r i e n d , another isolated example, defined in the L D C E as 
a person, esp. in a foreign country, whom one has come to know by the friendly 
exchange of letters, but whom one has usu. never met 
is a further striking case in point. 
The second function of complex lexemes in texts (related to information 
condensation) is quite well known and is repeatedly referred to in research by 
the term "pronorninalization" (in the wider sense) (cf. Kastovsky 1982a:217, 
1982b :182 f.). I would like to illustrate this with an instance of the very regular 
and productive process of agent-nominalization, taken from T I M E magazine (8/ 
8/83:31): 
(2) Not since ... 1941 when Rudolf Hess flew off from Berlin to Scotland ... had 
a private trip abroad by a German leader so p u z z l e d his country-men. This time 
the^uzz/erwas none other than Franz Josef Strauss. 
A much more complex type of nominalization is illustrated by the following 
example (3) collected from an introductory book on text linguistics (cf. Lipka 
1987b: 60): 
(3) Der letzte Bus ... [war] längst abgefahren, als der ... Zug ... gegen M i t t e r n a c h t 
in Nienhagen ankam. Der einzige Fahrgast, der dem Zug entstieg, war e i n H e r r . 
... schließlich ging er entschlossenen Schrittes in die angezeigte Richtung davon 
... Aber noch ehe d e r nächtliche Wanderer diesen Gedanken verfolgen konnte 
In this example, the complex nominal takes up and incorporates semantic ma-
terial from the co-text of the antecedent, namely nächtlich from M i t t e r n a c h t 
etc. and W a n d e r e r from g i n g entschlossenen S c h r i t t e s etc. On the morphological 
level, nächtlich is only partially and indirectly related to M i t t e r n a c h t and the 
agent noun W a n d e r e r is not at all derived from an absent verb w a n d e r n in 
the text, but semantically related to g i n g . We thus have no direct word-
formation processes in the text, but a morphologically complex nominal. I 
therefore proposed (in Lipka 1987b: 61) to use the terms "semantic nomi-
nalization" or "semantic pronorninalization" for cases like this, in which pre-
ceding semantic and lexical material is taken up in the form of a complex 
nominal. Such a process is not recognized within Halliday/Hasan's concept of 
lexical cohesion. I_propose to treat cases like der nächtliche W a n d e r e r as a 
Öyrd; type of word-formational function in texts, since it is clearly distinct from 
the preceding one. 
A fourth kind of function has also been noticed by various linguists (who 
often speak of "Benennungsfunktion"), namely the naming function of complex 
lexemes. In my opinion, this is a mixture of more specific subfunctions, related 
to classifying (cf. Lipka 1983:928) and categorization (see 3.4.2.) on the one 
hand and to the positive and negative aspects of the.cpnce^ 
?f .^ords on the other hand. The negative aspect of the latter has been referred 
to (see l . | 0 by the term hypostatization. 
In addition to the four types of function distinguished here, we can also 
mention another group of purely textual functions, such as creating coherence 
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and cohesion, stylistic effects, etc. (cf. Lipka 1987b: 59-63). In this connection, 
metatextual discourse markers ("Textgliederungssignale") must be mentioned, 
in particular those performed by headlines containing non-lexicalized complex 
lexemes. These function as attention-getting devices in titles of journalistic texts, 
because the resulting cataphoric relations of such nonce-formations create 
suspense. 
5.1.2. Monosemization as the Resolution of Polysemy 
The age-old question of the ambiguity and polysemy of lexical items is nor-
mally only a problem if words are considered in isolation. As soon as the co-
text and context are taken into account, ambiguity and polysemy are resolved, 
unless they are intended not to be, as e.g. in humorous (puns), literary, tactful, 
or political language. This is particularly true of longer and clearly situated 
texts. In such a case, a single meaning or "reading" of a lexical item is selected 
by the context, i.e. a lexical unit (in our terminology). I propose to introduce 
the term m o n o s e m i z a t i o n for this phenomenon, a translation of the term 
"Monosemierung", which is quite current in German linguistics. The text, or 
more precisely its interpreter (in pragmatical terms), selects a single, actual, « 
or textual sense from the greater number of potential, or multiple meanings. 
Hansen et al. (21985:198ff.) stress the point that monosemization ("Monosemie-
rung") may be produced either by the situational or linguistic (grammatical, 
lexical) context and claim that a polysemous word is monosemized by a 
contextual partner ("wird durch einen Kontextpartner monosemiert",2l985:200). 
Clearly, "contextual partner" is a near-synonym of c o l l o c a t i o n (see 4.3.5.). 
Hansen et al. also speak of the mutual monosemization, e.g. in the case of 
the verb p l a n t and the noun phrase a b u l b , as opposed to the ambiguous and 
vague noun-phrase a s m a l l b u l b . 
We will take up their example and represent the polysemous item in the 
following way: 
(4) 1. * underground stem of plant* 
Clearly, there is a metaphorical relationship between the two lexical units based 
on the shape of the concrete objects. Syntagmatic relationships (like those 
between verb and object above) will normally disambiguate the item. This also 
holds for coordinated noun phrases like t h e b u l b s of t h e l i l i e s a n d t h e t u l i p s 
and for complex lexemes like t u l i p b u l b . Hansen et al. further illustrate this 
with The bombers w e r e t r a i n e d ! m a n u f a c t u r e d and the following example, which 
I represent as diagram (5), where a metonymic relationship exists (see 3.4.2. 
and cf. Lipka 1988b): 
bulb 
2. * glass container of electric lamp* 
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(5) r e b u i l t the whole house [^ ARTEFACT] 
They< 
^informed the whole house [+HUMAN] 
Obviously, the question of monosemization (either seen from a language-
immanent or a pragmatic point of view) is a variant of the problem of 
disambiguation, hotly discussed in TG (see 4.3.2.) in connection with examples 
like H e was w e a r i n g a l i g h t s u i t and The man h i t t h e colourful b a l l . Weinreich 
(1972:17 f.) in connection with his critique of the theory proposed by Katz/ 
Fodor, speaks of the "determination of the number of readings of a sentence" 
and "the idea of contextual resolution of ambiguities", which was "a common-
place with neogrammarian and descriptivist semanticists". 
5.1.3. Words at Work 
In concluding the topic of words in context, I would like to draw on some 
examples used in Quirk (1986:104f., 114f.), which establish a connection with 
the appropriateness of lexical items in a larger, cultural context. This collection 
of papers bears the subtitle "Lectures on Textual Structure". The examples given 
there are closely related to the topic of varieties of English, discussed in 1.3. 
Quirk (1986:108 f.) points out that some lexical items and only a few 
performative verbs are used "for a few common occasions" and in very specific 
text types, as e.g. / do hereby a d m i t y o u as a member of t h e R o y a l C o l l e g e 
and / do confer u p o n y o u . Thus, ceremonies and charters provide the only 
suitable contexts for some verbs and adverbs ( h e r e b y , h e n c e f o r t h ) , which are 
otherwise very rare. Subject matter (e.g. tennis or cooking), and the correspond-
ing text types (sports reporting and recipes), are responsible for the selection 
of items like s t r a i g h t sets, top-seed, or k w a l i , s t i r - f r y , c h i l l i e s . Quirk 
(1986:113 ff.) speaks of "content-dependence" as opposed to "style-dependence" 
and stresses the fact that: 
Important as are grammar and sentence-structure ... there is no area of language 
comparable with vocabulary in the extent of its influence in conferring a sense of 
appropriacy. 
The use of vocatives (Mrs. W o n g , M a r y , Tony, V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r , Y o u r Ex-
c e l l e n c y ) clearly depends upon situational as well as cultural context (e.g. British 
vs. American speakers). A particularly striking example of the combination of 
both factors, situation and culture, is the "choric declaration" of new graduates, 
on admission to the profession of veterinary surgeons in the U.K. [my italics, 
L L ] . 
(6) I n a s m u c h as the privilege of Membership of die R o y a l C o l l e g e of V e t e r i n a r y 
S u r g e o n s is about to be conferred on me, / p r o m i s e and s o l e m n l y d e c l a r e that 
1 will a b i d e in all due loyalty to the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons 
174 
and will do all in my power to maintain and promote its interests. I further 
... my constant endeavour will be to ensure the welfare of animals committed 
to my care 
and the response of the President, quoted by Quirk (1986:107 f.): 
(7) In the name of the Council of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons ... 
I do h e r e b y admit you as members of the Royal College and by the same power 
d o confer upon y o u the right to be styled Veterinary Surgeons and to be known 
and d e e m e d and recognised henceforth as duly qualified members of the 
veterinary profession. 
Finally, he emphasizes the importance of sustaining a metaphor and avoiding 
mixed metaphors, as features of "all good discourse" and the need for "internal 
lexical harmony" in texts (1986:115). This is a fitting conclusion for our 
discussion of words in context. 
5.2. Words in the Mind 
The psychological aspects of the lexicon have long been neglected in linguistics, 
but were recently rediscovered in connection with Prototype Semantics and 
Cognitive Linguistics. Interdisciplinary approaches in text linguistics have also 
stimulated an interest in the relationship between linguistic and mental 
structuring and processing, as well as in the problems of understanding and 
of storing, retrieving, and processing information. The psychological notion of 
s e m a n t i c memory is sometimes equated with the subjective or mental lexicon 
of the individual and, indeed, also with world or encyclopedic knowledge 
generally (cf. Hormann 1986:145 f.). The question how knowledge is stored 
and represented in the brain is closely related to models of linguistic and mental 
representation and organization, and to the process of categorization, also from 
a developmental point of view. Insights in this area are obviously of the utmost 
importance for language learning and teaching (cf. Carter 1987). 
The following part of my book will be based mainly on HSrmann (1986), 
an excellent introduction to the psychology of language written by a 
psychologist, and on Aitchison (1987), a very competent and palatable 
introduction to the mental lexicon proper by a linguist. The sketch of a possible 
organization of the lexicon of English draws heavily on McArthur (1986) and 
his thematic, non-alphabetically organized "wordbook", the L L C E . 
5.2.1. Categorization and Psychology 
Hormann (1986:135 ff.), in a clear and revealing chapter on the psychology 
of word meaning, starts out from the observation that the lexicon, as the 
storehouse of our knowledge, cannot be ordered alphabetically, but must be 
structured otherwise. For HSrmann, who applies many of Karl Biihler's insights 
into language, meaning is the "activation" of a relationship between linguistic 
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and non-linguistic factual situations. Understanding is related to building groups, 
or categories, of things and words and to processes of differentiating. The 
similarities and connections, but also the differences, may be captured by using 
semantic features and also in other ways. 
Hormann (1986:147 ff.) describes three types of psychological models which 
have been used for representing how we conceptualize the inner structure of 
the lexicon or "semantic memory": 1. network models, 2. feature models, and 
3. prototypes and family resemblances (following the research of Labov and 
Rosch). The psychological experiments for lending plausibility or falsifying the 
various hypotheses are all based on one specific working assumption: what is 
closely connected in semantic memory and the brain can be reached quickly 
and therefore needs very little processing time. 
Let me concentrate on Hormann's (1986:148 f.) summary and critique of 
a theory developed around 1970 by Collins and Quillian (later revised by 
incorporating "spreading activation"). This model tries to describe and explain 
how information is stored economically in the brain in the form of a network. 
In the hierarchic representation short distance equals semantic relatedness and 
two types of relation are incorporated: l.an TS a'-relation between concepts, ex-
pressed by dominance in the hierarchy and 2. a ' H A V E a'-relation, which lo-
calizes attributes of concepts around the nodes of the network. Diagram (8) is a 
partial and modified version of the schematic representation given by Hormann. 
dachshund St. Bernard 
Hormann rightly points out that many more relations are possible and necessary, 
besides 'is a' and ' H A V E a \ such as e.g. c o n t a i n s , o w n s , nates, i s offspring 
of etc. He further notes that feature models, like networks, describe a certain 
categorization of extralinguistic reality and require yes/no decisions on the 
membership in a category (but see 3.3.3.). This naturally brings him to 
prototypes and the notion of f a m i l y resemblances, originally developed by 
Wittgenstein for the problems of the category of games (cf. Hormann 1986 :155, 
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Aitchison 1987:47f.). As long ago as 1958, the philosopher Wittgenstein had 
noted that there is no characteristic attribute, or semantic feature, common to 
all sorts of games, such as b o a r d - g a m e s , c a r d - g a m e s , b a l l - g a m e s , and O l y m p i c 
games. However, there is a complicated network of overlapping similarities, 
for which he therefore coined the term f a m i l y resemblances. Hormann stresses 
the fact that Rosch sees the prototype as a gestalt, in the sense of gestalt 
psychology, but that all three models for semantic memory fundamentally 
consider the things stored (words, lexemes, semantic features, concepts) as 
having a verbal character. 
If, however, concepts which we express with words are represented in 
memory by an "image", many problems of the three models of representation 
do not occur. In fact, Hormann (1986:159 f.) argues for such an "imaginal 
representation" of meaning, in which the word c a r is represented "as a v i s u a l 
i m a g e of a car". Strangely enough, he does not mention the concept (and word) 
G e s t a l t in this context, although it would be most appropriate, since its original 
meaning in German is 'shape'.1 But shapes of concrete objects can only 
insufficiently be described in a verbal manner, and must be present before the 
inner eye in visual form (cf. Lipka 1987a for c u p , mug, b o w l , t u m b l e r , b o t t l e , 
and various types of d e c a n t e r ) . 
Hormann's (1986:160) solution is the so-called "dual-coding hypothesis", 
originally introduced by Paivio. According to this proposal: 
Concrete words and sentences are stored as images and as words, whereas abstract 
words and sentences are stored only in verbal form. 
This theory, which has two codes for concrete material, but only one for abstract 
words, can explain many research findings in psychology. Hormann (1986:161) 
concludes: 
It seems to be rather well established that in many cases the meaning of a word 
is either completely or partially represented by an image. 
This ties in neatly with Leisi's admission, referred to in 2.2.2., that a referential 
approach to semantics cannot be applied to abstract words. Thus, not only are 
Feature Semantics and Prototype Semantics complementary and not alternatives 
(cf. Lipka 1987a) - as analytic vs. holistic processes - but both have to be 
supplemented by language-immanent paraphrasing techniques. 
Aitchison (1987:51-85) discusses the three models of word meaning in the 
chapters 5-7 of her book, and semantic memory, i.e. the organization of the 
mental lexicon, in her chapter 17. Her starting-point is the observation that the 
lexicon must be structured in some non-alphabetic way for two reasons: The 
To avoid misunderstanding: I do not claim mat die German word G e s t a l t is to 
be identified with the technical term of psychology gestalt* (as a loan-word 
with a specific sense), nor with 'visual image' or 'shape*. Shape, with its 
inherently visual nature, is only one aspect of a holistic view of things as 
postulated by gestalt psychology. My point is to draw attention to the etymo-
logical and semantic connections. 
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enormous number of words and the extremely short time for retrieving thei 
In her presentation of semantic networks she argues convincingly (1987:74 j 
85) that there are four important types of link between words in the hum; 
mind: 1. co-ordination, 2. collocation, 3. superordination, and 4. synonymy, 
which especially co-ordinates and collocational links seem to be particular 
strong.2 For the problem of finding words in the mental lexicon, Aitchisc 
(1987:165-176) discusses several models of the retrieval process, concludii 
that "spreading activation" is the most plausible one. The overall organizatk 
of the mental lexicon, with two major components - a semantic-syntactic ai 
a phonological one - is then outlined in chapter 17. A very important insig 
into the workings of the mind is the conclusion (Aitchison 1986:199) that bo 
in the search for a word and in processing links between them, many mo 
words are activated than are eventually required and selected. 
5.2.2. The Structuring of the Universe 
In our minds, the organization of our cognitive views of the outside world c 
basically be described as derived from its categorization. Words serve 
concept-forming tools, as crystallization points for semantic material, and 
containers for the result of this process. Categories depend upon specif 
languages and it may be extremely difficult in some cases, if not altogeth 
impossible (cf. Aitchison: 1987:50, 195) to separate word meaning fro 
encyclopedic knowledge.3 
The distinction between the words and categories c a m e l and d r o m e d a r y (ai 
the parallel German K a m e l and D r o m e d a r ) may serve as an example. Mar 
people remember that the property or attribute of having either one or tv 
humps is relevant here, but are often at a loss to decide which is whic 
Obviously, we are not experts in this area, although most of us have actual 
seen the animals in question in the circus or the zoo. Turning to dictionari 
for help, we find the following definition in the COD: 
(9) d r o m e d a r y = 'Light fast-moving (esp. Arabian or one-humped) camel 
bred for riding' ... [ . . . f . Gk d r o m a s , - a d o s , runner ...] 
From this dictionary entry we can conclude either that the d r o m e d a r y is a type 
or kind of the category camel, or that these are two closely connected 
The 'co-ordinates' of psychology correspond to the linguistic concept of 'co-
hyponyms'. Thus psychological experiments appear to prove die dominance of 
horizontal, non-hierarchic relations (co-hyponyms, collocations) over the vertical, 
hierarchic, paradigmatic ones (hyponymy, homonymy, polysemy, sense-
relations). 
Like Leech (21981:39) I believe that "language both determines and reflects 
the understanding of the world we live in" and that "the conceptual system of 
a language predisposes its users towards certain distinctions rather than others" 
and also that "die extent to which man is 'enslaved' by his language ... is 
mitigated by various forces of creativity in the system itself." 
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agones, like the s l u g and s n a i l , or the sheep and g o a t , which fall together 
a single class in Ger Schnecke or in Chinese y a n g (see 2.2.1.). Obviously, 
s difficult in this case to distinguish relevant linguistic from encyclopedic 
wledge. The COD (marking this by the label "esp.") treats both 'Arabian' 
i 'one-humped' as non-criterial meaning elements, i.e. as inferential features 
my terminology). In the COLLINS, d r o m e d a r y is treated as polysemous, 
as the two lexical units: 1. 'a type of Arabian camel bred for racing and 
mg, having a single hump and long slender legs' and 2. 'another name for 
r a b i a n camel9. The L D C E 2 also considers one meaning of d r o m e d a r y as 
onymous with camel, but treats both as different animals in the following 
breviated) entry: 
(10) c a m e l = "n either of two large long-necked animals used for riding ... 
a also d r o m e d a r y - the Arabian camel with one large HUMP ... 
b the B a c t r i a n c a m e l from Asia with two large HUMPS 
s clear that even well-known higher animals may be classified or categorized 
different ways and that the resulting structures of the animal kingdom will 
fer (see 4.2.4.). In this context, an experimental psychological study of the 
rman field of mammals (Hejj/Strube 1988: esp. 77, 80 ff.) is revealing, also 
TI a general theoretical point of view. The authors emphasize (cf. the subtitle 
their article) that development and age are relevant factors here and that 
structuring of this field crucially depends on instruction (e.g. W a l - F i s c h is 
a F i s c h but a mammal), age, and the acquisition of specialized knowledge 
expertise. It seems that these factors are more or less relevant in the cog-
ve and linguistic structuring of many aspects of our universe. This is the 
son why many larger dictionaries draw on a staff of special consultants for 
ariety of subjects. 
In concluding this topic, let us return to the most recent attempt at a non-
habetical organization of the English lexicon: the L L C E (see 1.4.). It may 
regarded as one possible proposal for structuring the universe (on a 
nprehensive but basic scale, containing "a core of some 15,000 words"), as 
resented and categorized through the English language (cf. McArthur 1981, 
S6:148f.). We will only look at the first one of the 14 "semantic fields" 
im A 'Life and living things' to N 'General and abstract terms') and its 
microstructure ( A l - A150), the "sets" in McArthur's terminology. The latter 
correspond to my own "lexical sets" (see 4.2.5.). The whole universe and the 
"theme", or "superset" A (on which I focus here, cf. McArthur 1986:148f.) 
are divided up in the following way: 
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(11) 
A Life and living things 
B The body: its functions 
and welfare 
C People and the family 
N General and abstract 
terms 
A l Life and death 
A30 Living creatures 
A50 Animals/mammals 
A70 Birds 
A90 Reptiles and amphibians 
A100 Fish and other 
water creatures 
A110 Insects and similar 
creatures 
A120 Parts of animals 
A130 Kinds and parts of 
plants 
A150 Plants in general 
As already pointed out in 1.4., this framework is a combination of thematization 
and linguistic semantic structuring. In the preface to the L L C E , McArthur places 
himself in the tradition of the work of the Bohemian educator Comenius 
published in 1631 and of R O G E T s Thesaurus (first published in 1852). But 
whereas Roget starts out with Class 1 'Abstract Relations' and deals with or-
ganic, inorganic, and matter in general, in Class 3 'Matter', McArthur finishes 
with abstract terms and mainly focusses on the concrete extralinguistic reality.4 
The L L C E is not a thesaurus, however, but really a new kind of reference 
book (based on the LDCE) which contains information of various kinds and 
many illustrations. The use of the latter can be seen as conforming to the 
insights of gestalt psychology and Prototype Theory. This becomes particulary 
obvious if we look at the illustration given for d r o m e d a r y (Africa, W Asia) 
and B a c t r i a n c a m e l (Asia) given in A 59. The illustrations provide the visual 
images for the categories and reveal the importance of the "slender legs" (in 
the COLLINS definition) and the runner qualities of the d r o m e d a r y clearly. 
In the "set" A 50 (animals/mammals) useful feature matrices (from linguistic 
theory) are given for many animals and also for some birds - in addition to 
visual images - like the following one: 
(12) Names for the horse according to age and sex 
male 
stallion 
colt 
female 
mare 
filly 
foal 
But s.v. Head 256 Sharpness for n a i l , p i n , needle, dagger, spire, steeple and 
Head 258 Smoothness for silk, satin, velvet, marble, glass, ice in Kirkpatrick 
(1987). The LLCE makes extensive use of die relations: 'relating to', 'kind 
of, and 'part of for structuring die lexicon and die universe. The last one 
provides empirical evidence for the importance of the 'part of (not 'piece 
of!) relation Cruse called m e r o n y m y , a term apparently coined by Ruqaiya 
Hasan in 1984 (cf. Carter 1987:21). 
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Matrices with meaning components, functioning as distinctive features, are also 
used in other areas of the lexicon, when appropriate, such as e.g. with ranks 
and titles, or in the following example from C 80: 
(13) general and smaller 
larger 
small 
very small 
This schematic information, however, is supplemented in the lexicon by 
definitions (from the LDCE) for distinct lexical units, such as t o w n : and t o w n 2 
(the latter with the label affec) and with illustrative quotations. A l l this 
information represents features (in the non-technical sense) not to be found in 
a thesaurus. That lexical sets, like A 100 and 110, group together similar 
creatures, while others, like A 120 and A 130, incorporate parts of animals 
or plants, is in my view a legitimate procedure for structuring the universe and 
forming lexical sets. These sets contain items which linguistically and 
psychologically belong together, although they cannot be justified by the strictly 
structuralist procedures discussed in 4.2., in particular in 4.2.4. Thus, the limits 
of for example the intricate testing procedures developed in Cruse (1986) are 
transcended in the structuring of the L L C E . Admittedly, the gain in descriptive 
adequacy and psychological reality is bought at the loss of rigorous linguistic 
methodology. 
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Chapter VI 
S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
6.1. Summary 
The theme of this book was the nature of words and the development of our 
understanding of them. My aim has been to give a comprehensive and up-to-
date survey of research on the vocabulary of English, of the most important 
dictionaries, of the foundations of general lexicology and lexical semantics, of 
the structure of words and of the lexicon, including some limited account of 
the function of words in context and in the mind. The book is intended both 
as an introduction to the field for the interested student and as a concise survey 
for the specialist. The open-ended nature of the lexicon and the basically un-
limited productivity of various morphological and semantic processes have been 
stressed throughout. Although the focus was mainly on semiotic and structural 
phenomena from a synchronic point of view, pragmatic, sociolinguistic, textual, 
and cognitive aspects have not been neglected and the fundamental outlook is 
indeed interdisciplinary. 
Chapter I discusses general problems, starting out from the words l e x i c o l o g y 
and l e x i c o n , and others. A traditional, synchronic survey of the structure of the 
English vocabulary is then given and l e x i c a l s t r u c t u r e is found to be ambiguous, 
meaning either 'the structure of lexical items' (Chapter III) or 'the structure 
of the lexicon' (Chapter IV). The former, the internal structure, may be further 
subdivided, according to whether the items are simple or mophologically 
complex, while the latter, the external structure, may be described from the 
point of view of paradigmatic or syntagmatic relations. Varieties of English are 
then considered in great detail, in particular on the basis of the schema of six 
variety classes proposed in the UGE and its possible application to lexicography 
in the form of "labels" attached to the entries in the LDCE. A l l variety classes 
can be correlated with specific labels. The chapter closes with an up-to-date 
sketch of the most important and relevant English dictionaries, where the OED, 
naturally, figures prominently together with various reference books derived 
from it. Special attention is given also to a characterization of medium-sized 
modem dictionaries and thematic "wordbooks". Diagram (10) summarizes the 
survey of British and American dictionaries most relevant for the present 
purposes and their interrelation. Lexicography is found to be "a never-ending 
story" and the future for dictionaries is surely electronic. 
In Chapter II we turn to various aspects of the linguistic sign and the 
semiotic and semantic foundations of lexicology. Three models of the sign 
(Saussure's, Ogden and Richards's, Biihler's) are presented and its meaning and 
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different kinds of 'meaning' are thoroughly investigated. Purely language-
immanent approaches to semantics may be distinguished from those which take 
extralinguistic reality into account. If the abstract language system is separated 
from its concrete realization and application (Saussure's l a n g u e vs. p a r o l e ) we 
must distinguish, following John Lyons, between d e n o t a t i o n and r e f e r e n c e . The 
latter is basically a speech a c t , in the sense of Searle and linguistic pragmatics 
generally. D e n o t a t i o n must also be distinguished from various types of 
c o n n o t a t i o n , for which a specific taxonomy is proposed. Finally, the basic 
structuralist notions m o r p h e m e and lexeme, necessary because of the ambiguity 
of the term w o r d , are introduced. A schema for the classification of morphemes 
generally is suggested in this context, in which l e x i c a l vs. g r a m m a t i c a l 
morphemes, related to word-formation and inflection (morphology in the narrow 
sense), are the most important subclasses. 
The internal structure of words is then treated in Chapter in. Morpho-
logically simple lexemes may clearly have multiple meaning, namely different 
'senses' or sememes, i.e. they are polysemous. The l e x i c a l e n t r y of such a 
lexeme consists of different l e x i c a l u n i t s . The preliminary discussion and 
illustration of polysemy, at the beginning of the chapter, provides a starting 
point for a survey of morphological structure, seen from a dynamic point of 
view, with the focus on the most productive processes of word-formation 
(compounding, derivation, nominalization). Word-formation produces new 
'lexemes', while metaphor and metonymy (or 'semantic transfer') lead to new 
'lexical units'. The results of both productive processes are then found to be 
equally affected by lexicalization and institutionalization. The semantic structure 
of words and its analysis and description by means of componential analysis 
and semantic features form another central part of this chapter. In this con-
nection an original typology of features is proposed and Feature Semantics is 
found to be complementary to the newer, holistic approach of Prototype Theory, 
It is also pointed out that the problem of the internal relation of semantic 
components within lexemes and lexical units has still not been adequately 
solved, in spite of Weinreich's distinction between 'clusters' and 'configurations'. 
In the final part of the chapter Leech's proposal of a lexical rule common to 
word-formation and semantic transfer is taken up and dealt with in connection 
with metaphor, metonymy, and categorization. 
Chapter IV covers the relations between words and thus the structure of 
the lexicon as a whole. It starts out with the introduction proper of the new 
concept of l e x i c a l u n i t , adopted from Cruse, which combines a single sense 
of a lexeme with the form of a lexical entry. The lexeme is defined as a family 
of 'lexical units'. Before continuing with the 'sense-relations' originally 
introduced by Lyons, which are now seen as holding between 'lexical units', 
not 'lexemes', other units of the lexicon are discussed which concern its 
organization and possible generalizations. These are the 'word classes' (parts 
of speech) and the 'semantic classes' postulated by Coseriu. Lexicology is 
mainly concerned with the 'open classes': noun, adjective, verb, adverb. These 
grammatical classes are found to have fuzzy boundaries, just like words, and 
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the concept of p r o t o t y p e can therefore be applied to them as well. Paradigmatic 
and syntagmatic lexical relations generally, between lexemes and lexical units, 
are the main topic of this chapter. Besides the distinction between homonymy 
and polysemy, and the various kinds of paradigmatic sense-relations, linear and 
hierarchic l e x i c a l f i e l d s are considered. The notion of l e x i c a l set is then 
introduced to account for paradigmatic lexical relations which cannot be cap-
tured and described by strict linguistic procedures. Various prominent approaches 
to syntagmatic lexical relations (selection restrictions, transfer features, lexical 
solidarities) are then discussed and the concept of c o l l o c a t i o n , as a neutral 
syntagma, is seen to be parallel to the l e x i c a l set on the syntagmatic axis. 
A book on lexicology would not be complete without at least a brief sketch 
of the function of words in context and in the mind. This is the topic of the 
last chapter (V). A distinction between c o - t e x t (linguistic context) and c o n t e x t 
(extralinguistic environment, situation) is made and the function of complex 
lexemes in texts is illustrated. Both co-text and context contribute to the re-
solution of polysemy, here called m o n o s e m i z a t i o n . Different text types also play 
a role especially for the function of particular words as speech acts. In the mind, 
words not only serve for the categorization of extralinguistic reality, but they 
are stored, processed, and retrieved. These problems have been tackled by 
psychology and a brief review of the relevant research is finally combined with 
remarks on the relationship between the linguistic organization of the lexicon 
and its function as a means of structuring the extralinguistic world. 
6.2. Conclusions 
6.2.1. Specific Results 
A number of important insights emerge from this survey of the "state of the 
art" in English and general lexicology and from the discussion of individual 
examples. These are mostly compatible with previous work and are couched 
in generally accepted terminology, unless fundamentally new concepts require 
a new term. It must be recognized, however, that all technical terms are 
fundamentally n o t a t i o n a l t e r m s , a concept introduced into linguistics by Nils 
Erik Enkvist, i.e. they have no "correct" sense, but may be defined differentiy 
by individual scholars in different theoretical frameworks. 
This is particularly true of the crucial distinctions made here between: 
d e n o t a t i o n and reference', l e x e m e and l e x i c a l u n i t ; p o l y s e m y and h o m o n y m y ; 
l e x i c a l field and l e x i c a l set; s e l e c t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n , l e x i c a l s o l i d a r i t y , and 
c o l l o c a t i o n ; c o - t e x t and c o n t e x t ; and for the fundamental notions: m o r p h e m e , 
sememe, l e x i c a l i z a t i o n , c a t e g o r i z a t i o n , s e n s e - r e l a t i o n s , s y n t a g m a , p r o t o t y p e , 
v i s u a l i m a g e , s e m a n t i c n e t w o r k s , and m o n o s e m i z a t i o n . 
The terms of linguistics themselves, which belong to the metalanguage, 
exhibit the Janus-faced nature of words, which have often been compared to 
coins: their concept-forming power on the one hand and the dangers of hypos-
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tatization, as the reverse of the medal. This dual property may seem to support 
the binary model of the linguistic sign, but I hope it has become evident, 
throughout the book, that such a view is too narrow. Language-immanent 
approaches have to be transcended, in order to account not only for the 
prototypical kernel of linguistic categories, but for their fuzzy boundaries as 
well, and for our ability to structure and categorize the extralinguistic universe 
in specific natural languages and their words. Also, different functions of lan-
guage, various kinds of meaning, and a variety of connotations must be 
distinguished for a full understanding of the social, pragmatic, textual, cognitive, 
and psychological aspects of words. 
Various specific results are represented in diagrammatic form in Chapter 
II. The ambiguity of i n c l u s i o n and the necessity to distinguish between m e a n i n g / 
sense i n c l u s i o n , or intension, and r e f e r e n t i a l ! d e n o t a t i o n a l i n c l u s i o n , or extension, 
is illustrated in (8). The connotations of words (inherent properties of words), 
distinct from their denotation (the relation to classes of referents in the 
extralinguistic world), may be subcategorized, and possible schemas for doing 
this are given as (17), (17a), and (17b). The subclasses may be identified with 
different aspects of what Leech calls a s s o c i a t i v e m e a n i n g . In contrast to neutral 
lexemes, or more precisely lexical units, which only have denotation (namely 
cognitive or conceptual meaning), those which contain additional connotations 
may be characterized as instances of 'marking' or 'markedness'. Diagram (20) 
presents a specific proposal for a cross-classification of morphemes. Besides 
zero-morphemes, better labelled z e r o - a l l o m o r p h s , pseudo-morphemes called 
f o r m a t i v e s are recognized. The lexeme may be defined syntagmatically as a 
combination of morphemes or formatives, and paradigmatically as a set of 
word-forms. 
In Chapter III the concept of sememe is introduced for the specific sense 
of a lexeme, following Barbara and Klaus Hansen and their colleagues' work 
on English lexicology. In spite of the basically analytic approach to the internal 
structure of words in word-formation and componential analysis, the dynamic, 
productive aspect is stressed in connection with the notions l e x i c a l r u l e (34) 
and s e m a n t i c processes (40), (41). The productivity and regularity of word-
formation and semantic transfer is Umited, or rather modified and superimposed 
upon, by the basically diachronic processes of lexicalization and 
institutionalization, which may result in idioms as the end-point of a scale of 
idiomatization. The combination of morphemes yields word-formation syntagmas 
(consisting of a determinant and a determinatum), while that of formatives results 
in idioms or p h r a s a l lexemes, the domain of phraseology, not lexicology proper, 
as represented in (4). The distinction between base and affix leads to a general 
formula for affixation (6), originally postulated by Tournier. An improved 
version of Marchand's theory of types of reference (11) can explain differences 
between superficially parallel complex lexemes and nominalizations as well as 
the underlying identity of types in morphologically distinct words. 
Semantic decomposition must be justified by objective procedures; evidence 
for specific analyses may be gained from morphological surface structure, from 
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acceptable paraphrases, and from logical and semantic tests. An illustration of 
this procedure is given in (21) and (22) for verb-particle constructions with 
o u t and u p . A typology of semantic features is presented in (24), in which 
denotative, connotative, relational, transfer, deictic, and inferential features are 
distinguished, all of which function as d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s , with the exception 
of inferential features. The postulation of this last class, which enables Feature 
Semantics to capture synchronic and diachronic variation and the phenomenon 
of semantic change, saves Feature Semantics from the charge of being unable 
to handle fuzziness of meaning and prototypicality. Nevertheless, Prototype 
Theory is needed to complement Feature Semantics, but the attributes of the 
former are found to be equivalent to semantic features. However, higher-level 
semantic d i m e n s i o n s (like SEX, A G E , SHAPE, FUNCTION) are also needed, which 
clearly function in both semantic theories. Metaphor and metonymy are con-
sidered as extremely productive semantic processes in the lexicon, and metaphor 
is explained as secondary or multiple categorization. Various illustrations are 
given of the fact that complete, prototypical scenes may be involved in this 
type of semantic transfer based on similarity, not only single features or 
attributes of the referent as 'tertium comparationis\ 
Chapter IV reviews the most important research on possible generalizations 
within the lexicon, namely the structure of lexical relations and the overall 
organization of the vocabulary. Criteria for distinguishing between homonymy 
and polysemy are evaluated and the distinction is found to be based on a 
continuum on both the formal and the semantic side. Etymology is excluded 
as a proper basis for the distinction. Zero-derivation is found to produce new 
lexemes belonging to a different word class, and is therefore not to be identified 
with semantic transfer resulting in metaphors. Although both are extremely 
productive processes in English as illustrated in (4), metaphors are new lexical 
units. The ever finer subclassification of semantic opposites in the work of 
Lyons - as summarized and visually represented in (10), (10a), (10b) - and 
further developed by Cruse, is found to be an instance of the 'principle of 
diminishing returns\ Hierarchic lexical fields like (13), (14), (15) are not always 
based on the linguistic sense-relation of hyponymy, which can be tested by the 
general formula (16). Word-fields, consisting of morphologically simple words, 
must be separated from l e x i c a l f i e l d s , containing complex lexemes as well, if 
the problem of 'lexical gaps' (with a further subclassification into 'generalization 
gap' and 'specification gap') is to be adequately solved in connection with the 
productivity of word-formation. As originally claimed by Kastovsky, the 
s e l e c t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s of TG and the l e x i c a l s o l i d a r i t i e s introduced in Coseriu's 
structural semantic theory may be regarded as complementary theoretical con-
structs in a synthetic and an analytic framework. Weinreich's transfer f e a t u r e s 
further contribute to a better understanding and formalization of syntagmatic 
semantic relations, although all three language-immanent semantic theories are 
limited, as especially shown by recent work in Cognitive Linguistics. Never-
theless, the notion of c o l l o c a t i o n , as a purely formal relation on the level of 
lexis, also has its merits particularly for pedagogical purposes. It is furthermore 
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extremely relevant from a textlinguistic point of view, since it creates c o h e s i o n 
as shown in the theory developed by M . A . K . Halliday and Ruquaya Hasan, 
illustrated in (26) and (27). 
The necessity of a contextual, functional, and interdisciplinary approach to 
lexicology is demonstrated in Chapter V. Complex lexemes are found to create 
both c o h e s i o n (in Halliday's and Beaugrande's sense) and cognitive c o h e r e n c e , 
understood as in the theory proposed by Beaugrande and Dressier. Apart from 
this fundamental property, four kinds of function in texts are distinguished: 
information condensation, pronominalization (in the wider sense), s e m a n t i c 
n o m i n a l i z a t i o n , and the referential naming function which may be further 
subclassified. M o n o s e m i z a t i o n is a function of both co-text and context, which 
normally leads to the resolution of the polysemy of lexemes. Quotations from 
specific text types discussed in original work by Randolph Quirk, as given in 
(6) and (7), show that certain words, used for performing particular speech acts, 
are only appropriate in very specific contexts and cultural settings. 
Research by psychologists, particularly as surveyed by Aitchison and Hor-
mann, shows that the mental lexicon and its organization is only imperfectly 
understood so far. Nevertheless, n e t w o r k models, as illustrated by (8), have 
considerable plausibility. This also holds for the importance of v i s u a l images, 
related to the notion of p r o t o t y p e , in the so-called "dual-coding hypothesis" ori-
ginally proposed by Paivio. Of the four types of link between words in the 
mind, namely co-ordination, collocation, superordination, and synonymy, 
psychologists have found that the first two are strongest. The 'coordination' 
of psychologists corresponds to the sense-relation of co-hyponymy set up by 
linguists, which means that horizontal, (non-hierarchic) relations between words 
are apparently dominant. Finally, linguistic categorization seen from the point 
of view of the psychologist, the linguist, and the lexicographer, is a matter of 
both linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge, and the categorization of the 
universe in specific languages must be seen as a socially, culturally, and lin-
guistically determined structuring of reality. 
6.2.2. General Conclusions and Consequences 
The lexicon as a linguistic level, and lexicology as the discipline concerned 
with it, are today no longer the poor relations of linguistics, or the Cinderella 
of linguistic theory, as in the heyday of generative grammar, when the lexicon 
was regarded as "the full set of irregularities" of a language. Similarly, pheno-
mena like metaphor and metonymy, which had been excluded from hard-core 
linguistics due to their connection with extralinguistic reality and their in-
accessibility to formalization have been rediscovered with the advent of 
Cognitive Linguistics. Especially metaphor, with its close relationship to 
linguistic categorization, is now seen to have been an ugly duckling that has 
risen to prominence and respectability as an object of linguistic study. Research 
into the fuzziness of lexical meaning, triggered by experiments in denotational 
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structure as carried out by William Labov and others, has come into contact 
with Prototype Theory, first hailed as an alternative to "checklist theories of 
meaning". This still-developing approach is itself the outcome of interdis-
ciplinary contacts between linguists and psychologists, which have proved 
exceedingly fruitful in other areas as well. 
Here are some of the consequences of recent lexical research for lexico-
graphy, language learning, and language teaching. Extralinguistic reality as well 
as social and cultural phenomena must no longer be strictly separated from 
linguistic science. Applied linguistics in all its forms must make use of insights 
from other fields, especially from psychology. This means that dictionaries, 
which have always made distinctions between the various senses of a word, 
should make more systematic use of the distinction between lexemes and l e x i c a l 
u n i t s and of the findings of research on polysemy and linguistic variation. 
Semantic transfer should be treated in a more systematic way. The importance 
of visual images is in fact already recognized by an increasing use of clear, 
prototypical illustrations. Pragmatic information is also already incorporated in 
some works in the form of "usage notes" and "language notes". The importance 
of collocations is fully acknowledged in many recent reference books. The 
productive patterns of word-formation also find special attention in the latest 
editions of some works. These are "steps in the right direction". What goes 
for lexicography also holds to a large extent for language learning and language 
teaching. 
It is the duty of the lexicographer and the teacher alike to draw on the 
insights of linguistics into the internal and external lexical structure, without 
neglecting at the same time the limits of the discovered generalizations and 
the influence of extralinguistic factors. Above all, the function of words in 
context and the creative forces of lexical rules and semantic processes must 
be seen as the fundamental tools which help man to come to grips with the 
universe around him. 
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Abbrev ia t ions 
A argument 
Adj adjective 
A H D American Heritage Dictionary 
AmE American English 
apprec appreciative 
BBI Benson/Benson/Ilson Dictionary 
BrE British English 
CED Chronological English Dictionary 
CN(s) complex nominal(s) 
COBUILD COllins Birmingham University International Language Database 
COD Concise Oxford Dictionary 
D A E Dictionary of American English 
D A R E Dictionary of American Regional English 
derog derogatory 
DEWC Dictionary of English Words in Context 
DF(s) distinctive feature(s) 
dial dialectal 
dm determinatum 
DNE Dictionary of New English 
dt determinant 
E English 
EPD English Pronouncing Dictionary 
esp especially 
ET English Today 
fig figurative 
fml formal 
Fr French 
FSP Functional Sentence Perspective 
Ger German 
GSL General Service List of English Words 
humor humorous 
IA Item and Arrangement 
IC(s) Immediate Constituent(s) 
IF(s) inferential feature(s) 
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infml informal 
IP Item and Process 
IPA International Phonetic Alphabet 
It Italian 
L D C E Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English 
lit literary 
L L C E Longman Lexicon of Contemporary English 
LOB Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen Corpus of British English 
med medical 
N noun 
NEngE North of England English 
NP(s) Noun Phrase(s) 
O Object 
O A L D Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 
ODEE Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 
OED Oxford English Dictionary 
OEDS Oxford English Dictionary Supplements (1972-1986) 
old-fash old-fashioned 
P Predicate 
poet poetical 
pomp pompous 
RDP(s) Recoverably Deletable Predicate(s) 
S Subject 
si slang 
SOED Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
tdmk trademark 
tech technical term 
TG transformational-generative grammar 
UGE University Grammar of English 
W 3 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
WP Word and Paradigm 
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